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This thesis analyses the sociological and historical genesis of enterprise skill formation in 
South Africa and its effective coordination.  South Africa’s late nineteenth century 
development as an emerging economy contributed to the state often taking the lead and being 
at the forefront of efforts to ensure coordination in enterprise skill formation.  But gradually, 
concerns shaped by issues related to labour supply motivated leaders in firms and enterprises 
to forge their own imprint on the coordination of enterprise skill formation.  The thesis also 
shows how these concerns with the coordination of enterprise skill formation involved 
intellectuals and professionals who attempted to intervene on these matters. 
 
The thesis proceeds to elaborate the unique institutional architecture which was constructed at 
various junctures in the history of South Africa’s human resource and skill formation journey.  
Furthermore the thesis gives an insight into the coordination of enterprise skill formation 
which occurred in the period of apartheid induced reforms.  The evidence however shows 
that even when regimes change and new political orders are established, it does not end the 
necessity for continuity in the coordination of enterprise skill formation.  As is to be 
expected, the institutional, regulatory and instrumental content of the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation is more complex in the contemporary period (circa. 2017) than it 
was in the 1920s and 1930s.  However, the goal striven toward then was for a more 
streamlined process which could contribute to a change and improvement in the existing 
practice of enterprise skill formation.  Evidence shows that this has been ongoing for over a 
century. 
 
The thesis gives an intricate and detailed insight into the process of building a new 
coordinated skills development system that was intended to ensure the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation under a democratic post-apartheid political dispensation.  In this 
period a levy-grant system underwritten by a national skills levy has been a central 
instrument of direct coordination into enterprise skill formation.  The analysis that is provided 
traces the iterative steps that were treaded by policy makers and policy thinkers from at least 
the early 1920s as they confronted what may have appeared as an elusive enterprise skill 
xiv 
 






Chapter 1  Introduction to the Coordination of 
Enterprise Skill Formation in South Africa 
1.1 Setting the Scene 
Insights which we are able to glean from recent research literature on the character of the 
South African skill formation system, particularly, as it relates to the generation and supply of 
skills at the firm or enterprise level to which the entire system owes its content and substance 
allows for a set of uncontentious propositions about what this system is (see in particular 
McGrath, 2004 & Kraak, 2004a).  A wide spectrum of comparative international literature is 
typically invoked to contextualise the South African system in relation to comparative skill 
formation systems.  It is meant to simplify the characterisation of the South African skill 
formation system and its supporting institutions.  It is meant to make the choice about how 
one actually defines the South African skill formation system easier to arrive at. 
 
The legacy of the differentiated skill formation and training system that has evolved in South 
Africa often complicates analysis because it sets the precondition for having to explain the 
different phases in the application of racial policies underwritten by the state which was 
applied to the overall system.  Furthermore, in depicting the South African skill formation 
system, even at a general level, it has been necessary in the literature to account for the 
differential access and participation which different groups of the South African population 
experienced.  In relation to the acquisition of skills and training at the level of firms and 
enterprises in the country, this depiction is obligatory.  It also typically requires 
contextualising the historical process to this condition.  Thus, while the exclusionary racial 
policies that were transmitted from the segregationist period (prior to 1948) of the country’s 
history, complicates matters even further, the overall system for the provision of workplace 
skills and especially the generation of the supply of skill through the coordinating activity of 
the enterprise has typically been characterised as a low-skilled regime (Kraak, 2004a; 
including the remaining papers in McGrath, Badoodien, Kraak & Unwin (Eds.) (2004). 
 
A number of features are associated with the low-skilled regime which characterised the 
period under apartheid.  It typically lacked national coordination.  Its vocational qualification 
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structure was fragmented.  It was served by a multiplicity of educational and training 
departments.  Its certification and qualifications systems appeared chaotic.  As the reform 
process evolved under apartheid, market triumphalism in the training dispensation had started 
becoming entrenched (Kraak, 2004a).  The overall system entrenched the production of low 
skills.  Employers tended to be short-sighted and voluntarist in their training and skill 
enhancing interventions at the enterprise level (these points are all drawn from Kraak, 2004a) 
 
Implicit in the argument – when it is combined with evidence from the structure of skill 
formation systems in the advanced economies (e.g. Thelen, 2004) – is an imputed distinction 
between liberal market economies (United States and Britain) and coordinated market 
economies (Germany and Japan) which is seen to influence how the South African skill 
formation system is defined.  Despite the divisive racial labour market policies that prevailed 
in South Africa, the comparison which is usually invoked between liberal and coordinated 
market economies is so compelling that the South African skill production system in the late 
apartheid period can quite accurately be classified as exhibiting a liberal market training and 
skill formation dispensation.  But while the characterisation of South Africa having a low-
skilled training dispensation is advanced, there is a lot of reticence in this literature about 
making the further logically consistent argument that the South African training dispensation 
is a liberal market training dispensation. 
 
Supposing, one was to advance such an argument about the apartheid training dispensation 
being a liberal market dispensation, it will be logical also to extend the characterisation of the 
system as being liberal to an even earlier period and before apartheid.  The distinction in 
terms of the skill formation and training dispensation at the enterprise level between the 
apartheid and segregationist training dispensation would not be that significant.  Both phases 
exhibit the South African form of a liberal training and skill formation dispensation.  As for 
the apartheid phase which is documented in the monograph on Shifting Understandings of 
Skills, indicates, enterprise skill formation interventions during the segregationist period can 
also be characterised as exhibiting a high level of voluntarism.  In fact, attempts by the state 
to intervene and introduce a semblance of training coordination can be seen to have been 
tried from quite an early period.  This was done through statutory interventions to organise 




Although this was applied to a relatively narrow band of artisan and semi-skilled occupations, 
there was an effort from the state to introduce mechanisms to coordinate training and the 
formation of skill in South Africa especially at the enterprise level.  This process ensued from 
at least the early 1920s.  The state in South Africa but mainly through the Department of 
Labour attempted to devise and create institutional mechanisms which would enable and 
coordinate the process in which a regular flow of skilled personnel were trained to occupy 
mainly artisanal and semi-skilled occupations. 
 
In examining the evidence of this phenomenon historically, one is struck by the level of 
consistency at which the state intervened to ensure that training of new incumbents within 
these designated occupational trade groupings was indeed successful.  Enterprises certainly 
did engage and participate in these coordinating structures and bodies which were established 
to support the recruitment, training and expansion of new personnel into these craft and semi-
skilled occupations.  In addition to these options that the state made possible through its 
interventions, enterprises also resorted to making use of their own internally controlled 
methods to train and enhance the productivity of the labour force.  Through the process a 
requisite supply of skilled labour was created. 
 
As much as enterprises were open to making use of the state to mitigate challenges that were 
faced in generating a consistent supply of skilled labour, enterprises as a whole were also 
open to the idea of drawing on outside expertise through which to improve specific 
components of the overall system.  Seldom however was it possible for these firms and 
enterprises – which typically operated under the constraints of small enterprise size in the 
South Africa market – to incorporate such expertise into the routine functioning of the 
business as a distinct occupational layer.  The state had a greater concentration of resources at 
its disposal for this to occur.  Subsequently, industrial management expertise was 
accommodated into state research bodies and this ensured that such expertise was available 
for use within and by firms in the private and public sectors.  This was undertaken as an 
initiative designed to support high level technical needs and provide specific skill 




1.2 Similarities and Differences 
Although, the literature which concentrates on the rebuilding of new institutions which form 
part of the overall skill formation system in South Africa under the democratic political 
dispensation, gives less attention to similar initiatives which occurred in the past, there are 
indeed strong similarities between past and present.  The attempt by the state in both the 
segregationist and apartheid periods to improve the coordination of interventions either 
through policy or through the introduction of new institutional vehicles and instruments to 
enhance and strengthen the production of enterprise skill did not end with apartheid.  It 
continued beyond this point and was promoted by intellectuals and policy makers who were 
intent on reversing the characteristics of a low skilled training dispensation which was in 
place with the ending of apartheid and the onset of democracy in 1994. 
 
The new democratic state in South Africa also constructed a new but different skill formation 
agenda for a system which began to be constructed with legislation and subsequently the 
inauguration and formation of new institutions.  Context setting legislation culminated in the 
South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Act of 1995 which had the aim of creating a 
unified system of education and training qualifications in the country.  It was supported by 
the creation of new institutions designed to buttress the emerging system (DoL, 2001a).  The 
crux of this outer core was a framework for new qualifications and its accreditation.  These 
context setting measures were extremely important and significant in constituting an outer 
core.  The inner core of the skills formation system in South Africa started being assembled 
in 1998 with the passage of the Skills Development Act of 1998.  It was followed 
immediately thereafter by the Skills Development Levies Act of 1999.  These legislative 
instruments set into motion the process of the design, construction and financing of new 
institutions responsible for spearheading the acceleration in the formation of workplace skills 
in a democratic South Africa. 
 
The inner core of institutions to skill formation in South Africa which the Skills Development 
Act and the Skills Levies Act set into motion is a generalised form of workplace training in 
South Africa.  It is financed through training levies borne by enterprises and managed by 
multi-stakeholder institutions known as Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) 
(Macun, 2001).  The entire inner core to the skill formation system in South Africa is 
underpinned by the understanding that the purpose of the exercise is to develop a single 
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integrated education and training system.  The state through the government department 
responsible for ensuring that skill formation is indeed underway (i.e. the Department of 
Higher Education and Training) as well as through ancillary institutions which collect 
revenue (e.g. the South African Revenue Services), directs resources (SETAs and the 
National Skills Fund) is supported by accompanying institutions that ensure that the learning, 
testing and accreditation process to skills formation operates effectively.  These accreditation 
institutions include SAQA and the quality councils.  In the realm of enterprise skill formation 
the principal quality council is the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO).  
Since artisans are an important segment of the skill formation chain, the testing and quality 
assurance of artisans is undertaken by the National Artisan Moderation Body (NAMB).  The 
recently introduced Quality Assurance Partners (QAPs) which have replaced the SETA 
ETQAs are additional institutional mechanisms that are in place to support the coordination 
of skill formation in South Africa.  All these institutions, separately but ultimately 
collectively intervene particularly on enterprise skill formation which is the object of enquiry 
to this thesis (Also see Hammond (2006) for the most recent provisions of institutional 
configuration which the legislation allows). 
 
The earlier period in South Africa was of course set in a context of more racially exclusive 
policies.  Shortly after the Union of South Africa was constituted in 1910, state administrators 
and policy makers were already discussing the importance of creating a more coherent and 
coordinated vocational training system.  As the evidence in commissions of enquiry show, 
these state representatives and advisors wanted to see a semblance of order and coherence 
become established within a vocational training system which was still quite rudimentary.  In 
terms of its systemic constitution, it was therefore still at an infant level.  It is the 
embodiment of the ideas, thinking and proposals which emanated from these state officials 
and advisors to improve and enhance the system to the formation of enterprise skills that will 
be scrutinised more carefully in this thesis. 
 
Despite it appearing that their attention and focus was mainly on the apprenticeship system as 
the principal form through which enterprise training was undertaken, the institutional 
architecture which these state officials and advisors proposed and put into place was 
important and significant.  It was important because it imposed obligations and constraints on 
enterprises and the industries in which they were located to adjust and respond – however 
small – to the training of artisans and other categories of workers.  It is historically 
6 
 
significant, because it was an initiative driven by the state through specific government 
departments (but principally the Department of Labour) and other bodies of authority.  
Although driven by state policy, this authority also made provision through the Industrial 
Conciliation Act for the representatives of employers and white trade unions to bilaterally 
exercise this authority on an industry specific basis.  This was the state of affairs in terms of 
enterprise regulation to skill formation throughout the segregationist years of the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s in South Africa. 
 
Of course this begs the question about the corresponding response of other stakeholders 
inside and outside the enterprise.  Inside the enterprise were of course the contending forces 
and interests of employer and workers and the associations which each respectively belonged.  
Outside the enterprise was a wide spectrum of new scientific knowledge and expertise, which 
scientific management had awakened.  This new scientific expertise was mobilised to guide 
and give support to component elements of the wider skill formation challenge.  It potentially 
represented a source of assistance to the wider coordination of skills formation in general.  
This wider knowledge ranged from cost accounting, industrial social work and personnel 
management.  This knowledge which covered the human dimension of enterprise and 
industrial management found its most strident embodiment in industrial psychology.  In the 
period from the 1920s to at least the early 1960s industrial psychology held intellectual 
hegemony over the interventions that were applied at the enterprise to improve and shape the 
orientation of skill formation. 
 
So, just as it is possible to pose the question today, we can also pose it historically and ask: 
what were these attempts at the coordination of enterprise skill formation in the pre-
democratic period (in both its segregationist and its apartheid forms); how did it function 
institutionally and organisationally?  Did it achieve what was intended, if not, why not?  
Since I pose this question historically, I apply it as well to the contemporary period. 
 
1.3 The Research Problem and Question 
This thesis revolves around three fundamental issues that are related to the coordination of 
the supply of enterprise skill formation.  The first overarching issue relates to the definition, 
application and usage of the concept of coordination to characterise contemporary and 
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historical changes to the formation of enterprise skill in South Africa.  The time span 
assigned to explore this dimension covers the period from the mining revolution in South 
Africa (i.e. 1870s) to the more contemporary period (circa. 2013). 
 
The second overarching issue concerns the role and function of the enterprise in skill 
formation.  Because of its ability to generate resources, the enterprise also has the capacity to 
attract outside interests who hold a different set of specialised insights about the best route to 
follow, in order to enable the enterprise to function as a source for skill formation.  Thus, the 
thesis tries to prise open the operations of the enterprise by giving closer scrutiny to its 
calculative and coordinative practices.  Traditionally, these calculative and coordinative 
practices have been treated merely as a black box through which the operations of the 
enterprise have remained hidden. 
 
The enterprise as a site to the coordination of skill formation leads inevitably to the third 
fundamental issue and this concerns the training or skills levy as an instrument of 
coordination to the supply to enterprise skill formation.  As will be shown in the literature 
review below, the skills levy in South Africa lends itself to sociological interrogation in 
respect to calculative and coordinative practices within the enterprise which has an effect on 
how the levy is used by firms and enterprise as well as the alternative measures which 
enterprises can deploy as they use the levy to advance their training and skill formation 
requirements.   
 
Having outlined the themes which this thesis addresses, I apply to the subject matter the 
question which permeates the entire thesis.  It is essentially to understand the process of the 
coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa.  Thus the question which the thesis 
poses is the following: 
What were the institutional mechanisms for the coordination of enterprise level 
training in South Africa?  How has this changed?  Is the coordination of enterprise 




1.4  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as a narrative of the process of interventions made by the state, 
enterprises and other groupings inside and outside the enterprise, to shape the substance and 
content of enterprise skill formation in South Africa.  The analysis concentrates on three 
different historical periods.  The first period extends from the late 19
th
 century to the period 
just before the Nationalist Party came into power.  An analysis is provided of the institutional 
mechanisms to the coordination of enterprise skill formation and how it changed over the 
period. 
 
A similar historical overview is undertaken of the process to enhance the coordination and 
supply of skills to enterprises and firms in the period that the Nationalist Party was in power.  
Because there is such a thoroughly rich record of insight and intervention that was made to 
improve the coordination of enterprise skill formation in the period of apartheid reform, quite 
a detailed and extensive analysis is provided of evidence and insights which the Riekert and 
Wiehahn Commissions left in their wake.  These very significant apartheid reform 
commissions were also at the heart of the process which witnessed attempts to construct 
sectoral based levy grant mechanisms for enterprise training. 
 
But it was the period after the ending of apartheid which witnessed a more systematic attempt 
to improve and systematise the coordination of enterprise skill formation.  Chapter 7 in 
particular provides a very detailed analysis of the institutional architecture and the tools, 
instruments and mechanisms that were put into application to enhance enterprise skill 
formation.  This culminated in the design of a national levy-grant system which is financed 
by payroll levies imposed on firms and enterprises.  The analysis however also addresses the 
intermittent policy shifts and institutional shifts which the state as the principal agent to the 





Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The research is framed to comprehend the influence and impact on the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation in South Africa over a relatively extended historical trajectory.  
This period spans the turn of the 19
th
 century, spilling over into the initial phases of the 
second decade of the 21
st
 century (circa. 2013-2015).  The research evidence which buttresses 
this thesis is simultaneously historical and contemporary. 
 
This thesis was initially conceived as a study of the relationship between work, education and 
training and the status of disciplinary knowledge.  It was meant to explore the impact of these 
dimensions on the National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS).  At the time it was 
conceived, the first phase of the NSDS had come to an end.  The second phase had at the time 
just commenced. 
 
My intention was to understand the current strategies that shaped the NSDS and compare it 
with experiences recorded in putting the first proto-institutional architecture of a skills 
development system into place which was starting to germinate in the 1930s and 1940s 
during the segregationist period of South Africa’s history (i.e. before the Nationalist Party 
came to power in 1948).  Unfortunately, investigating the historical records for this period, 
some of which are in archives in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Grahamstown, was not 
practically feasible at the time.  Consequently, the proposed study had to be amended.  It was 
therefore revised to understand the conceptual purpose which was embedded and infused in 
attempts to create a coherent skills development system in South Africa. 
 
I noticed that apart from the challenge of creating a more coherent and integrated skills 
development system after the onset of democracy in 1994, there was also a strong thread 
which pointed to coordination as an important goal in building a skills 
development/formation system.  Traces of attempts at coordination were also evident during 
the early phases of the vocational and training system in South Africa’s history.  There is 
evidence that this started taking place already during the segregationist period (1910 to 1948).  
Thus, access to government commissions of enquiry provided an inroad into studying the 
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historical dimension to the coordination of an emerging skill formation system in South 
Africa. 
 
My practical employment obligations since 2001 gave me the opportunity to be involved with 
labour market research and this has mainly covered different facets which were related to the 
skills development process.  It provided an opportunity for a more detailed overview and 
perspective of the general performance of the new skills and training dispensation which was 
being assembled in South Africa.  Some of this research was undertaken for the Department 
of Labour and its Skills Development Planning Unit (Bhorat & Lundall, 2002; Lundall, 
2003a).  Other research explored dimensions of skill through an interrogation of firm-level 
experiences (Lundall, Majeke & Poswell, 2004; Lundall, 2005; 2006a; 2006b).  Further 
research was more critical of the pattern in which the new skill formation system was 
evolving (Lundall, 2003b).  These research outputs were generated on the basis of qualitative 
interviews, typically supported by an interview schedule (Lundall, 2005; Lundall, Maree & 
Godfrey, 2008; Maree, Lundall & Godfrey, 2009).  In some cases a firm-level survey was 
used (Lundall, 2006b). 
 
This research referred to above was motivated by a desire to use data from panel-firm 
surveys.  It was influenced by the Africa Desk of the World Bank who roughly at the same 
time had been conducting firm surveys of enterprise performance in three South African 
metropolitan areas: Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town.  I was fortunate to work on a 
project in which data for the World Bank survey for the Greater Metropolitan District of 
Johannesburg was analysed.  Our study incorporated evidence from the National Enterprise 
Survey which had been completed at roughly the same time (See Bhorat & Lundall, 2002).  
Researchers at the time realised that firm survey data provided extremely rich perspectives of 
the dynamics within enterprises and for me there was the interest in empirically measuring 
the skill acquisition and skill formation of employees within firms and industries that were 
surveyed in this manner. 
 
Over a relatively short period between 2003 and 2007, I had conducted a large number of 
interviews with key informants as well as informants representing firms (some of whom were 
the owners and CEOs of these) and was adamant that I did not have the energy to endure such 
intensity in the course of writing a thesis.  In any event, I was also reaching a point of 
frustration, because many of the informants to whom I spoke were not able to answer specific 
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and complex questions about the new skills development system.  One example, of my 
naivety was that I could not understand (and still find it perplexing) why mandatory grant 
funds could not be sequentially used to finance a trainee on a learnership or apprenticeship 
programme engaged at a firm so that it is completed over a three or four year period.  This 
only became clear to me when I studied the NTB/NEDLAC Reports and the 1997 Green 
Paper on Skills Development 
 
2.2 Research Design 
The extraction of empirical evidence to uphold the thesis, dictated the design of the study.  In 
order to sharpen the conceptual formulation of the study, it was necessary to undertake a 
detailed review of the literature that defines ‘skill’.  This was necessary in order to ground the 
consultation of primary and secondary literature.  The same process had to be undertaken to 
give meaning and to elaborate the concept of coordination.  Since the concept of coordination 
was being framed through a sociological understanding, it was obligatory to undertake a 
rather detailed review of pertinent sociological analysis where this concept is used.  It was 
therefore necessary to discuss the work of key authors who deploy the concept of 
coordination sociologically.  Furthermore, a similar process was necessary to further my 
insight into enterprise coordination.  Since the work of Thelen (2004) which this thesis draws 
upon can be located in the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach to comparative analysis, 
where a distinction is made between coordinated market economies and non-coordinated 
market economies (often typified as liberal market economies), a brief review is given of 
research work which makes use of this approach.  A more overarching perspective to the 
depth and breadth of the concept ‘coordination’, however finds the most congruence in the 
work of Ernest Alexander (1995).  The conceptual approach to skill and coordination was 
thus used to select and direct my reading of evidence to the coordination of the supply 
process to skill formation in South Africa. 
 
2.3 Research Methods and Techniques to Extract 
Evidence 
Four essential sources of empirical evidence was examined and digested to complete this 
thesis.  The first source and bulk of the evidence was obtained mainly from official 
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documentary sources.  These also included published material that made reference to aspects 
of coordination or its challenges which the official sources highlighted. 
 
Arguably, the most comprehensive record of the challenge which coordination presented – 
especially to administrators and theorists of the state and its institutional apparatuses, 
including its knowledge advisory bodies (e.g. the National Council for Social Research, the 
Prime Minister’s Advisory Council and the Human Sciences Research Council) – was 
captured in Commissions of Inquiry.  Typically these were in Commissions of Inquiry 
produced after the four South African provinces (i.e. the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and 
Transvaal) were merged into a national union and British dominion in 1910.  As is shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6, Commissions of Inquiry were read for traces of conceptions to coordination 
as it applied to the domain of skill formation.  Following Althusser and Balibar (1970), a 
symptomatic reading was directed to these Commissions of Inquiry with the purpose of 
making the concept of coordination visible as well as locating its axiomatic character in the 
process of state formation initially under a union government and subsequently under racially 
exclusive and after 1994 democratic republican governments.  It is the drift and flow of the 
Althusserian breeze as well as Koyre’s (1943, 1953 & 1968) insights into the formation of 
new concepts in the history of the astronomical and physical revolution which guided my 
thoughts into a symptomatic reading of the presence, status and effect of coordination in the 
discourse of the skill formation process in South Africa. 
 
The reports of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry (1979-1982) demonstrated perhaps the 
depth and richness of maintaining such a symptomatic reading.  Notwithstanding its location 
in the political economy of apartheid’s reform, a symptomatic reading conceives the tasks 
and objectives which resulted from the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions particularly those 
that apparently remained invisible.  The coordinative dimension of these last bold apartheid-
reform commissions of inquiry were the more startling and interesting but were typically not 
recognised as such in the literature that traces the formation of skills from the mid-1980s.  
Although the post-democratic investigations into the skills formation process which started 
with the National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI) had a stronger focus on institutional 
coordination framed in the language of technical rationality and efficiency, the rich vein of 
public documents and reports emphasised the importance of giving continuity to the 




The second source of empirical evidence drawn upon to substantiate or confirm arguments in 
the analysis of the coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa was embedded in 
a large body of secondary source material.  Ultimately it was only the most relevant of these 
which were cited as source evidence in the thesis.  Babbie & Mouton (2001: 374-383) refer to 
the use of primary and secondary documentary evidence as a form of unobtrusive research in 
which evidence is assembled or extracted without interposing the presence of the researcher 
on the shape or content of the evidence. 
 
In contrast, my presence in the research field as a participant observer over a long duration 
may suggest my intrusion as a possible influence on the subject matter for this third source to 
the empirical evidence which I have used.  However, this possibility is so remote, such an 
influence of my presence on informants generally minimises any intrusion to nothing more 
than background noise.  Indeed I have served as a participant observer to two different types 
of institutions active in the current skills development dispensation in South Africa.  This was 
to the advisory and ostensibly policy making body currently known as the National Skills 
Authority (NSA), but the period of my participation on this body (2005-2007) ended almost a 
decade ago.  I served on the NSA as a member of the Community Constituency to NEDLAC.  
Subsequently (2010-2011), I served for an interim period as a board member to the Clothing, 
Textile, Footwear and Leather (CTFL) SETA and the Wholesale and Retail (W&R) SETA 
representing the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU).  In both 
instances, apart from practical measures to support specific groups (e.g. the community 
constituency and the labour constituency) the theoretical objectives of my participation on 
these bodies was to understand how they functioned especially in relation to the levy-grant 
system which was taking shape in South Africa.  Thus the conclusions that I subsequently 
reached as a result of these insights has been on the basis of soul-searching and self-
interrogation.  Nonetheless the insights that I gained from participation on these bodies has 
been invaluable.  The conclusions that I drew were however not magically discovered 
through participant observation.  The conclusions that I arrived at over the course of an 
arduous journey have been mainly on the basis of theoretical labour and this has generally 
been quite independent of these constituents to whom I was previously engaged. 
 
The fourth and probably final clutch of empirical evidence which was required to complete 
this thesis was through the assembly and extraction of evidence of the incidence of self-
financed training expenditure which firms incurred and which remained outside the reporting 
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obligations of the national levy-grant system that is in place in Sout Africa.  I have referred to 
this phenomenon as an incidence of the out-of-pocket expenditure on training which firms 
undertake.  I initially sought to establish this evidence through the administration of a pilot 
questionnaire involving roughly 43 firms in Cape Town.  I have subsequently come across 
more credible evidence of out-of-pocket training expenditure among firms in South Africa 
which is consolidated in a report of a national skills survey (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 
2008).  This evidence is a more robust demonstration of the pervasiveness of out-of-pocket 
expenditure on training among firms in South Africa. 
 
While the process of empirically demonstrating the existence of the practice of out-of-pocket-
expenses among firms that paid a skills development levy to the South African Revenue 
Services which is subsequently transferred to the skills levy disbursing agencies (e.g. SETAs 
and the NSF), may appear peripheral to the coordination of enterprise skill formation, it is in 
fact quite central to it.  Out-of-pocket-expenses are a reflection of the dynamics of enterprise 
coordination of skill formation.  But these dynamics only become apparent through a process 
in which firms make technically rational decisions and calculations about skills training 
trajectories which is best suited to their needs.  These are often couched as a detour from state 
programmes which are interpreted by such firms as bureaucratic and less responsive to the 
immediate and direct training requirements of such firms.  But reliance on out-of-pocket 
expenditures as an exclusive trajectory that firms pursue is not a universal phenomenon.  
Even where firms choose to play an active role in state sponsored levy-grant mechanisms to 
advance workplace training, a high number of such firms will also engage in the practice of 
out-of-pocket expenditures for skills development and training.  It probably gives such firms 
a level of control and a guarantee that things will get done quicker and more effectively if 
they do it themselves.  Essentially, I argue that out-of-pocket expenditures are pursued as a 
route or tactic to enhance the coordination of skill formation within the enterprise itself. 
 
However, this incidence alludes to a trend whereby firms are choosing to some degree to opt 
out of participating fully in the current levy-grant system for skills development in South 
Africa.  This trend raises the possibility that current attempts by the state to coordinate the 
supply of enterprise skill formation, is not comprehensive.  Indeed, the growth in the 
incidence of the phenomenon of out-of-pocket training expenditure among firms and 
enterprises indicates that voluntarist mechanisms to the coordination of the supply in the 
formation of enterprise skills in South Africa may have reached a turning point.  It may be on 
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the rise once more, just as was the case at the beginning of the twentieth century when policy 
makers realised that the vocational training dispensation in South Africa which experienced a 
minimum level of state coordination presented an opportunity to in fact initiate the initial 
steps of its coordination by the state.  This process has continued ever since and into the 
present period.  Evidence of a contrary phenomenon may in fact suggest a turning point 
where the skill formation system is once more being drawn, even if only symbolically to its 
initial starting point at the beginning of the twentieth century.  This thesis attempts to explore 
the evidence whether such a trend is likely in South Africa. 
 
2.4 Research Ethics 
While my experience and insight from previous research investigation has been used to 
enrich the insights and understanding of the skill formation process in South Africa, the 
research which I have conducted for this study has not been undertaken elsewhere.  It is 
unique to the present study.  I have also not reproduced in this thesis material that has 
appeared elsewhere and in other publications. 
 
This research was guided by the principles and values of ethics which the University of Cape 
Town tries to instil in its students.  These ethical principles and values were also instilled 
over the many years that I spent in research units at the universities of Cape Town and 
Western Cape respectively.  Many years later, Babbie and Mouton’s (2001) handbook on the 
practice of social research, helped to reinforce these dimensions in the practice of social 
research. 
 
In following the research design and research methods which were customised for this thesis, 
it was not necessary to conduct primary interviews.  Nonetheless, in the initial phase of the 
research, it was necessary to conduct a small pilot survey among firms in the metal and 
engineering and ICT industries to collect evidence to verify the proposition that firms resort 
to some level of ‘out-of-pocket’ expenditure to advance employee training that is not 
adequately financed by payroll levies regulated by the state.  Through an electronic 
questionnaire, respondents representing firms were informed that the ‘study explores the levy 
as an incentive and stimulant to further training within firms and enterprises’.  In the letter 
accompanying the pilot questionnaire, an undertaking was given that: ‘All the answers that 
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you provide will be treated confidentially.  Results will therefore be reported without details 
of the names and location of firms’.  Even though qualitative interviews were not used in this 
study, the same principle guided the use of sensitive insights and information that was 
volunteered by SETA officials with whom I spoke.  The same principle dictated abstinence in 
the use of confidential and sensitive information which was at my disposal through 
participation as a board member on the NSA and subsequently as a trade union representative 
on the boards of the CTFL and W&R SETAs respectively. 
 
Writing this thesis would not have been possible without ongoing curiosity as a close 
observer and occasionally as a willing participant in the emergence of a new skill formation 
dispensation in South Africa over many years.  But in following Althusser’s adage that 
history is a process without a subject, my participant observation insights are treated in 
exactly the same manner as I would in reading, interpreting and interrogating conceptions to 
the skill formation process and its coordination as these have been elaborated in public 
documents such as Commissions of Inquiry.  It is merely a method of gathering evidence to 





Chapter 3: Defining Skill: A Review of the 
Literature 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the inter-related components that constitute ‘skill’ is examined.  First, a 
number of permutations in the definition of skill are provided.  Because ‘skill’ in the 
contemporary period has become significantly more important as an object of policy 
discussion and intervention, its frequent usage has compelled writers to advance a common 
understanding of the concept.  But as Francis Green (2011) has shown, these definitions have 
generated more disagreement than consensus.  Different intellectual disciplines have also 
tried to impose their specific stamp onto these definitions, which has in turn aggravated the 
levels of resistance, disagreement and critique.  Second, an important distinction is drawn 
between the skill attributes of individuals versus the skill attributes of jobs.  Neither of these 
attributes is immutable.  However, when the balance between the skill attributes of 
individuals and the skill attributes of jobs is disrupted, disequilibrium and upheaval ensues.  It 
is spearheaded mostly by the opportunities and rewards versus the misfortunes and losses 
which the new conditions bring about. 
 
Finally, I have attempted to formulate a consistent working definition of skill which is 
functional and flexible and can be used to give some anchorage to the comprehension of skill 
as it is used in the entire thesis.  Since most things have a source, rather than getting 
completely muddled with trying to formulate a definition of skill which is only partially 
accepted, it is better to pose the problem differently and thereby sharpen the formulation. 
This is done through an analysis which distils skill through the processes which contribute to 
it as a source.  In this way, one is able to pose a double question about what skill is and where 
it comes from. 
 
3.2 What is Skill? 
Much of the literature that addresses the question of skills give more attention to the 
availability and circulation of skills and the existence of gaps and shortages among those who 
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hold skills.  There still remains a dearth of texts systematically informing us what skills in the 
world of work really are.  In recent years there has been an explosion of considerations given 
to different types of skill such as soft skills versus hard or technical skills.  Examples of soft 
skills include communication skills, assertiveness and attitude and dedication.  Hard or 
technical skills typically consist of skills which have a foundation in mathematics or 
numerical computation.  Skills in the engineering and applied sciences are examples of hard 
or technical skills.  South African policy discussion has taken some of these considerations to 
heart, but it has also put quite a lot of emphasis on scarce and critical skills (see the chapters 
in Erasmus & Breier, 2009). 
3.2.1 The Social Construction of Skill 
Almost without exception, the literature is virtually in unison in positing skills as being 
socially constructed (Rigby & Sanches, 2006).  Conceptions of the social construction of skill 
highlight the tension that different parties or interests hold with respect to knowledge, skills 
or experience.  Perspectives which advance a strong view about the social construction of 
skills usually also accept that the elements that contribute to skills such as knowledge, skills 
or experience are often highly contested.  The context through which the social construction 
of skill is presented is considered important.  Emphasis is also placed on the system of 
industrial relations prevailing at any given time as an additional factor which shapes the 
context through which skills are constructed.  Rigby and Sanchis (2006) capture the tension 
in this dynamic as follows: 
‘Workers selling their labour are likely to define their skills differently from 
employers buying them.  For workers, their skills are a combination of knowledge, 
skills and experience they have acquired both before entering employment and during 
their careers.  Their definition of their skills is likely to include elements they use in 
their present jobs, in previous jobs and even elements they have never used but could 
if required.  This concept can be called effective skill.  Employers on the other hand, 
tend to define skill more narrowly, from the point of view of the requirements of the 
job after due analysis.  This narrower definition can be termed nominal skill, which is 
normally the only skill employers are prepared to recognize (and reward)’ (Rigby and 
Sanchis, 2006: 23). 
 
But it is within the interstices of social relations where the process of social construction is 
deeply embedded.  Nowhere is the social construction of skills more prominent than what is 
recognised for jobs women do in contrast to men.  Similarly, such social construction is 
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evident in the wage and salary rates that differentiate male jobs from female jobs.  Often as 
Rigby and Sanchis (2006) indicate, the criteria used to order the substance of skill can be 
quite ambiguous.  Drawing from evidence of collective agreements from the textile industry 
in Spain, Rigby and Sanchis (2006) noticed that sewing jobs which were performed mostly 
by women were classified as skilled while cutting-out work which was dominated by men 
was classified as unskilled. 
 
Skill also has distinct geographical and contextual characteristics.  Due to differences in 
factor intensities of production (including distinct capital and labour intensities), the skills of 
metal workers from Gary, Indiana are not the same as the skills of metal workers from 
Vanderbijlpark, Gauteng
1
.  But in both of these distinct geographical contexts, skills are also 
conceptually transient: these can be eroded as well as upgraded.  This is especially true with 
changes in the organisation of production.  This transience contributes to differences in the 
social meaning of skill. 
3.2.2 Situating Skills through Intellectual Disciplines 
Noon and Blyton (2007) suggest that intellectual disciplines play a significant role in 
structuring inquiry into skill.  Different disciplines situate skills differently.  This means that 
disciplines which situate skills using quantitative measurement criteria will develop a 
different approach to situating skills compared to disciplines which make greater use of 
strong qualitative criteria. 
 
Thus, Noon and Blyton (2007) examine skills through its location or situation
2
.  Here, three 
distinctions are made.  These are: first, skills within the person; second, skills within the job 
and third, skills within its setting.  Specific intellectual disciplines usually set the pace in 
advancing such enquiries. 
 
The situating of skill within the person builds on the premise that skill is an attribute of 
individual qualities and talents.  The approach to measure the quantity and quality of skills 
within the person is favoured by occupational and industrial psychologists and economists.  
Typically, occupational and industrial psychologists uncover skill within the person through 
                                                 
1
 Gauteng is a province in South Africa.  While geographically the smallest province in the country, it is the 
dominant economic and manufacturing hub in South Africa. 
2
 Noon and Blyton (2007) refer to the location of skills.  I have amended the idea of ‘location’ and replaced it 
with the notion of ‘situating’, which I think is less instrumental and more sensitive to context. 
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test batteries such as aptitude tests.  These tests link skills to competence.  Similarly, 
economists (particularly the human capital theorists) measure skill within the person through 
the amount of formal education and on-the-job training obtained by individuals as well as the 
amount of experience that they have accumulated in their jobs or occupations (Noon and 
Blyton, 2007: 117). 
 
Analysing the situation of skill within the job focuses on the tasks that are necessary to 
perform a job competently.  An orientation to the analysis of skill within the job tends to be 
deployed more often by management theorists as well as industrial and employment relations 
theorists.  Noon and Blyton (2007: 123-124) suggest that a number of approaches can be 
followed in analysing the content of skill in a job.  They discuss two and there may be some 
merit to digress and discuss what these are before we address the third and final approach to 
the situating of skills. 
 
The first is to analyse skill in a job by assessing its difficulty.  Progress can be made by 
observing the content and steps required to do a job effectively and efficiently.  This becomes 
a tricky exercise when applied to jobs that require its holders to exercise greater tacit skills.  
Undervaluing the level of tacit skills necessary for the jobs can cause it to be incorrectly 
classified in terms of skill content.  As an example Noon and Blyton mention how jobs that 
require a good technical knowledge in for instance a sales environment can be performed 
better by incumbents who have a combination of good technical knowledge and high social 
skills.  A techno-geek without any social skills would be abysmal in holding such a job. 
 
The second approach which can be adopted to analyse the content of skill in a job is through 
assessing the amount of discretion which the job allows its holder to exercise.  Borrowing 
from the work of Elliot Jaques (1967), this implies distinguishing between prescribed (rule 
dominated) and discretionary (choice dominated) work.  Although Noon and Blyton have 
cautioned using this approach with sensitivity to the context in which it is located, the idea 
behind it is that work which has a higher discretionary orientation correspondingly embodies 
a higher skill content compared to work which is more prescriptive in orientation. 
 
The third and final approach to the situating of skills does so in its setting.  This is the 
approach social constructionists prefer.  Social historians, gender theorists and sociologists 
and social anthropologists are more inclined to explore skill through its social setting.  
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Essentially it translates into understanding how people make the best use of their capacities to 
succeed against the adversities which they confront and which threatens failure.  Although 
there are large divergences to the investigation of skill within its social setting, the 
ethnographic study by Douglas Harper (1987) provides eloquent testimony to the insights that 
can be gleaned by analysing the situation of skill in its social setting.  Through his interviews 
with Willie, the subject and sole informant to the analysis of working knowledge, Harper 
suggests that the situating of the content to the skills which Willie possesses resembles an 
instinct of workmanship.  The ingredients of previous training, experience, informal learning 
and the application to an art of workmanship would in contemporary discussion be referred to 
as ‘skill’ within a specific context.  It has been described by Harper in the following terms: 
‘Willie’s method can be summed up as an inductive approach fuelled by attention, 
patience and creativity.  I’ve talked about the role of the setting: the idea that a certain 
kind of environment requires its own form of survival, which for some becomes a 
working method.  I’ve shown how Willie’s attitude and method are similar to those of 
people who make and repair things centuries ago.  I’ve suggested that Willie’s 
working knowledge is due in part to the way he learned – informally from his own 
kin, throughout the years of his motivation.  The working knowledge depends on a 
deep and thorough knowledge of materials.  The working method depends on a 
certain attitude toward time stated most modestly as patience, most dramatically as a 
kind of contemplative attitude that sees all steps to an end as equal.  The working 
method is a combination of small steps of hypothesis forming and testing through 
which many inductive strings lead to deductive generalities that launch more 
inductive experiments.  It depends on a kind of kinaesthetic knowledge that is difficult 
to describe, close as it is to the actual flow of experience.  In these ways I’ve 
‘disassembled’ Willie’s method, but I feel I’ve also dismembered it’ (Harper, 1992: 
148). 
Workmanship tends to be reinforced by isolation from the mores of society.  It is also the 
process which gives a mechanic like Willie a sense of identity which puts work ahead of time 
and money.  The entire combination of training, talent, experience and an instinct of 
workmanship, compels one to conclude that these attributes can only be conveyed between 
people through comparisons where skill is the sole denominator between people holding and 
yearning to possess similar attributes
3
.  A wider canvass to the exposition of the situating of 
skills can be showcased by exploring how skill is seen through policy analysis of national 
training discourse. 
                                                 
3
 Also see Gamble (2004) who makes a similar point in relation to craft pedagogy. 
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3.2.3 Skill seen through Policy Analysis of National Training 
Discourse 
The policy analysis of national training discourse can also have an impact on the way skills 
are conceived.  Jonathan Payne (2000) addresses this issue in relation to UK education and 
training policy discourse.  Payne’s (2000) article shows how the absence of a framework to 
consider the problem of skill has tended to confine skill to qualifications and credentials
4
.  
More importantly however, Payne traces some of the dominant forces which have contributed 
to skill acquiring greater prominence in UK policy discourse. 
 
Payne (2000) attributes four catalytic processes to the prominence of skill in UK policy 
discourse.  Because the borrowing of policy is prominent in late-starter countries such as 
South Africa, especially from policies formed in the UK, there is merit in enumerating these 
processes.  First the shift from ‘traditional manufacturing industry towards services, coupled 
with the growth of employment in professional, technical and administrative occupations’ 
(Payne, 2000: 354), has had an important influence on ideas about skills intervention in UK 
policy discourse.  Payne argues that the shift towards service industries and occupations 
required greater interaction between employees and their clients and customers.  It implied 
that employees required higher exposure and training in soft and relational skills.  Examples 
of these include face-to-face and voice-to-voice interaction.   
 
Second, the growth of services in the national economy necessitated the industrial 
restructuring of traditional industries particularly in manufacturing.  Theories of post-
Fordism, flexible specialization and the learning organization – which emerged out of this – 
put a higher premium on integrated systems.  A labour force within the higher echelons of the 
occupational ladder bears greater responsibility at ensuring that such integrated systems 
function.  Thus, more of this burden falls on those within the professional, technical and 
managerial strata.  The premium placed on new skills for those in this grouping would 
therefore be higher than before.  In Payne’s words, the ‘high-tech forms of integrated 
manufacturing place a premium on a range of advanced analytical and interaction skills such 
as communication, problem solving, team working and creativity as the key drivers of 
comparative advantage in high quality, high-value added product markets’ (Payne, 2000: 
354). 
                                                 
4
 Although critical of the tendency which conflates skill with qualification, a closer reading shows that Payne 




The third process involves the intensification in the use of information and communication 
technologies.  Entry into the ranks of the new knowledge workers demands ‘people who can 
manipulate “symbolic languages”, think holistically in “systems” terms, as well as creatively 
handle and apply ever increasing quantities of knowledge and information across diverse 
contexts’ (Payne, 2000: 354).   
 
Finally, as an example of the fourth process, the high unemployment levels that were 
experienced in the mid-1970s especially among new entrants among the youth, compelled 
policy makers to adopt a more instrumentalist interpretation of skills delivery.  Pressure for 
employment absorption led to a closer connection being made in policy discourse with 
employability.  New entrants were trained to undertake jobs that would lead immediately to 
employment.  These jobs were often associated with high levels of turn-over.  Thus, the 
immediate beneficiaries of the training programmes end up shortly afterward being 
unemployed again.  Instrumentalist measures are usually ameliorative only in the short-term 
but fail over the long-term.  The initial beneficiaries often end up where they started: either 
unemployed or alienated in dead-end jobs.  Due to the difficulty in sustaining an 
instrumentalist outcome between skill acquisition and employment absorption, the emphasis 
on adaptability for employability resulted in much of the skill transfer taking place through 
soft skills.  This was done to mitigate the effects of instrumentalism in training policy.  But it 
also dovetailed with the application of soft skills in the ICT-driven knowledge economy. 
 
Payne advances a conception of skill that is made up of the requisite attributes individuals 
require to perform a job on the labour market.  These attributes can be met through skills.  
Skill transfer takes the form of an education transfer, training transfer or knowledge transfer.  
The proof of the transfer is usually shown as the award for acquiring some qualification or 
certification.  Payne represents the school of thought which assumes that skill and 
qualification bear a close relationship. 
3.2.4 Anglo Saxon versus European Conceptions to Perceive Skills 
Clarke and Winch (2006) have noted that different conceptual perspectives which they refer 
to as frameworks give different meanings to skill.  Within the European context, two 
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frameworks or conceptual perspectives are said to exist: an Anglo-Saxon and a European 
skills framework. 
 
Under the Anglo-Saxon skills framework, according to Clarke and Winch (2006), writers 
such as Ashton and Green (1996, cited in Clarke and Winch), refer to skills as: social 
attributes, general education, training, qualifications and technical skills.  Other writers such 
as Grugulis, Warhurst and Keep (2004, cited in Clarke and Winch) make a clearer 
demarcation between the components that constitute skill.  They differentiate between skill as 
human capital (which they derive from Gary Becker), skill as jobs (drawn from Braverman) 
and skills as socially constructed through negotiation.  Clarke and Winch note further that the 
definition of skill used by Ashton and Green (1996) ‘includes practical propositional 
knowledge, virtues and character attributes, social abilities and formal educational outcomes’ 
(Ashton and Green cited in Clarke and Winch, 2006: 256). 
 
Clarke and Winch (2006) complain that among the dangers in the various conceptual uses to 
skill by Anglo-Saxon theorists, in general (but exemplified in the writing cited above), is 
incoherence and conceptual inflation.  Conceptual inflation occurs when a relatively narrow 
range of applications are given wider interpretations.  It creates ambiguity and 
incomprehension.  Moreover, when the experience and understanding of skill in Europe and 
particularly Germany is viewed through the Anglo-Saxon lense, they argue, there is a search 
‘in vain for its German equivalents’ (Clarke and Winch, 2006: 256). 
 
Under the Anglo-Saxon conception of skill (as used in the UK, USA and Australia including 
commonwealth countries where similar perspectives prevail), skills bear a close resemblance 
to specific tasks that are applicable to industries, occupations and jobs.  Here, qualifications 
per se do not indicate whether a particular level of skill has been achieved.  Vocational 
qualifications can certify some contextual linkage with industry, but general education 
remains non-specific to industry, occupation, job or task (Clarke and Winch, 2006: 257).  
Two implications follow.  First, measuring qualifications in an Anglo-Saxon context is 
insufficient to comprehend the overall level of skill.  Second, as Clarke and Winch remind us, 
the possessor of skill may be certified to do specific jobs or tasks but yet not be in possession 
of an occupational or industrial qualification.  As Clarke and Winch argue, the Anglo-Saxon 
notion of skill is synonymous with ‘know-how’ and ‘technique’.  Possession of ‘know-how’ 
for the job or task is distinct from possessing the qualification.  Clarke and Winch point out 
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that this notion of possession as applied to skill can be equated to property.  It corresponds to 
a nineteenth century sense of property in skill.  The notion of skill as possession can be traced 
from Adam Smith through Marx to Braverman (Clarke and Winch, 2006: 257).  At least from 
the period when Adam Smith was writing, the notion of skill as property was associated with 
traditional apprenticeships. 
 
Having shown the Anglo-Saxon notion of skill to be an individual attribute which bears no 
direct association with an industry or occupation, Clarke and Winch (2006) further segregate 
skills from knowledge.  Using the work of Gilbert Jessup to substantiate the argument, skill is 
revealed through the demonstration of an application whereas knowledge is elicited through 
the abstraction of conversation, questioning or working.  Four elements summarising the 
main characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon conception of skill are advanced by Clarke and 
Winch (2006: 261):  
 Skill is an individual attribute or property; 
 Skill is associated with tasks and jobs rather than with industrially based occupations; 
 Skill is associated with physical or manual mastery or ability; 
 Skill bears no particular association to a knowledge base. 
 
Germany is cited by Clarke and Winch as an example of a country where a European 
conceptual perspective frames the understanding of skill.  It is in sharp contrast to the 
dominant perspective of skill in Britain.  ‘Skill’ in Germany is signified conceptually by 
qualification.  This gives rise to the presumption in Germany that a formal industrial 
qualification endows its possessor with the capacity to perform a range of work activities.  In 
countries such as Germany, academic and vocational education and training institutions are 
the bedrock on which a valid high quality qualifications recognition, exchange and reward 
system is constructed. 
 
The importance placed on applied theoretical knowledge which is specific to an occupation in 
Germany reinforces what the English would refer to as ‘knowing that and knowing how’ 
(paraphrased from Clarke and Winch, 2006: 263).  Since the nature and content of this 
knowledge in Germany tends to be negotiated by the social partners, namely trade unions and 
employers, it has wide social legitimacy and acceptance.  This social arrangement extends to 
the vocational education curriculum, its assessment and certification which the labour force is 
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induced to undergo.  Thus the German industrial qualifications process differs from the task 
or job skills that is a hallmark of the UK and in its stead provides for knowledge which has a 
legally controlled status (cf. Clarke and Winch, 2006: 264). 
 
Knowledge deemed appropriate for an occupation in Germany is designed to fit into the 
overall occupational structure within the specific industry for which it is assigned.  In terms 
of technical requirements, the possessor of occupational knowledge is required to act 
independently and in cooperation with others (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung cited in 
Clarke and Winch, 2006: 264).  Emphasizing the content of the theoretical knowledge 
incorporated into the vocational qualification in more detail under the conditions in Germany 
Clarke and Winch write: 
‘It will typically encompass: knowledge of the industry as a socio-economic entity, 
including the structure and organisation of firms; relevant theoretical knowledge, such 
as mathematics and physics, and understanding of how it is applied; technical and 
practical knowledge needed to practise a particular Beruf in its current, likely future 
and even past state of development; knowledge of its relation to the rest of the 
industry and to other Berufe; legal aspects such as liability, employment and labour 
law; economic aspects such as cost; as well as general knowledge, civic awareness, 
health and safety, and environmental protection’ (Clarke and Winch, 2006: 264). 
 
Thus, vocational qualification in Germany is designed for wider socialisation and 
incorporation of individuals into the occupational milieus in which they will serve.  Even 
where the qualifications are eventually matched, Clarke and Winch (2006) maintain that a 
qualified worker in Germany has a broader knowledge and responsibility compared to a 
skilled worker in the UK context.  If the equivalent to the English notion of skill is sought in 
Germany, Clarke and Winch maintain it will only cover ‘a small part of a much more wide-
ranging and complex capacity which is linked to an established occupation within an 
industrial structure and enjoys social and legal recognition’ (Clarke and Winch, 2006: 265).  
This interpretation finds endorsement in the work of Greinert (cited in Clarke and Winch, 
2006: 265) and to some extent it is also an approach which the educational philosopher 
Kerscheinsteiner argued for earlier. 
 
Since pressure for the recognition of workplace qualifications in Britain is usually made from 
an individual trade level instead of an industrial level, many abilities outside the trade level 
but within the industrial level remain unrecognised as skills (cf. Winch and Clarke, 2006: 
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266).  The work which gets done using such abilities is labelled ‘unskilled’.  The decline of 
tripartism in which skills were recognised instead encouraged employers in Britain to 
continue this trend.  In the UK Construction Industry, as documented by Clarke and Winch 
(2006) an employer demand-led system for accredited workplace qualifications was 
spearheaded by individual employer associations.  But it was directed towards workplace 
qualifications within their specific areas of operation.  Areas falling outside these spheres 
such as groundwork and civil engineering remained unrecognised and without training taking 
place within it.  But even when these skills are recognised, they are not necessarily 
remunerated as skilled occupations in collective agreements, nor is there a guarantee that 
such recognition leads to formal training (Clarke & Winch, 2006: 266).  In the aggregate, 
national vocational qualifications in the UK context have only limited social recognition and 
it does not command the same standing as vocational qualifications do in Germany. 
 
Unlike a European skills framework, there is less correlation between skills in individuals and 
the skills of jobs under an Anglo-Saxon framework. 
 
3.3 The Skills Attributes of Individuals versus that of Jobs 
In the analysis of work related skills, economists have sought to draw insights from analyses 
which have focused on both the skills attributes of individuals in employment as well as skills 
required to perform specific jobs or clusters of jobs within the labour market.  With the first 
approach, wage data has been pivotal in understanding changes to skills attributes.  This has 
usually been done on the basis of covariates signifying specific educational dispositions or 
occupational classifications.  As documented by O’Connor and Lunati (1999) studies 
deploying this approach have generally focussed on shifts in wage shares on selected 
covariates.  Almost as a corollary, when combined with data on other factor inputs (especially 
capital and technology), the studies using wage data have widened the channels to relational 
themes on complementarities and substitutability.  Examples that stand out are skill-capital 
and skill-technology complementarities and the substitutability of higher skilled workers for 
lower skilled workers given specific capital and technology investments at the enterprise 
level.  Wage inequalities are thus explained by changes in the job mixes and skill upgrading 
of specific occupational groups.  These have been reinforced by studies supported by 
evidence of a direct relationship between earnings and cognitive skills [Murname et al (1995) 
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and Wolff (1996) cited in O’Connor and Lunati, (1999)], most of which is attributed to the 
phenomenon of skill-biased technical change (SBTC). 
 
The second approach that focuses on the requirements for jobs within the labour market, has 
generated insights which O’Connor and Lunati (1999:11) characterise as being ‘merely 
description, offering few insights on their own into the economic forces driving 
compositional shifts’.  This approach has been strengthened with quantitative skill indices for 
specific occupations that have been listed in the United States government’s Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT).  O’Connor and Lunati (1999) refer to a study that was conducted 
by Wolff (1996) which correlates General Educational Development (GED) levels – using a 
scale of qualification levels acquired – with an occupational rank (e.g. managerial, 
professional, middle-level).  The correlated result can also be given a corresponding 
description of its skill level (e.g. high-skilled, middle-skilled and low-skilled).  In Wolff’s 
(1996) case, deeper insight was presented through three other DOT skill categories.  These 
three categories were: motor skills, interactive skills and cognitive skills (or substantive 
complexity) (O’Connor and Lunati, 1999: 13). 
 
Wolff (cited in O’Connor and Lunati, 1999) showed that for the period from 1950 to 1990, 
the demand for motor skills, interactive skills and cognitive skills exhibited distinct rates of 
growth.  These also showed changes in growth at different historical junctures.  Cognitive 
skills grew most rapidly over the forty year period although this growth tempo had already 
peaked by the 1960s, slowing down thereafter.  The demand for interactive skills experienced 
rapid growth after 1960 and this trend has accelerated even further during the 1980s.  As a 
reminder that the demand patterns for the three different categories of skill is specifically for 
the United States, Wolff’s evidence indicates that from ‘the 1970s onward, motor skills 
experienced declining demand at an accelerating rate’ (O’Connor and Lunati, 1999: 14).  
Further decomposition of the skills mix, leads to Wolff (1996) distinguishing between intra-
industry occupational shifts which he attributes to technological change and the inter-industry 
distribution of jobs which he attributes to shifts in employment demand. 
 
Both approaches, that is, wage inequality studies which focus on the attributes of individuals 
and studies that focus on the attributes of jobs are generally framed by the necessities of 
labour demand.  Machin and Manning (1997) challenge the purely demand-driven orientation 
of these approaches with an argument in which firms create jobs when the requisite skills to 
29 
 
perform those jobs are readily available.  If firms create jobs for which the skills are not 
available, it imposes a heavy transaction investment to source those skills.  As a result firms 
prefer creating jobs where the skills exist.  This fundamentally penalises the niche supply of 
workers who have the skills but who are not collectively and individually matched with 
employers prior to the decision not to invest in the creation of jobs more suited to their skills.  
Instead, firms create the jobs for which the largest groups of workers generally hold the 
requisite skills.  In a sense, as Machin and Manning (1997: 509) claim, ‘supply creates its 
own demand’. 
 
It is quite obvious that while a broad spectrum of disciplinary inputs beyond pedagogy and 
industrial sociology prevail in defining skill as was shown in the previous section, the field 
has a more monolithic disciplinary orientation with respect to the demand for skills.  
Discussion and inputs about the demand for skill is almost wholly conducted by economists.  
Measurement giving rise to data, the content of this data and its subsequent manipulation in 
econometric models is the rule rather than the exception.  The theoretical orientation of these 
studies by economists appear mostly framed under the rubric of the returns to education 
approach as demonstrated in the work of Gary Becker particularly his influential text Human 
Capital.  Subsequently the approach has generated a momentum of its own with a diversity of 
applications. 
 
3.4 The Compromise of an Inter-disciplinary Synthesis 
Considering the absolute difficulty of reaching a common understanding about what skill is 
in the theoretical and academic literature, there is certainly need for introspection and 
revision in order to devise a more precise definition.  Lamenting the current confusion which 
pervades the subject, Francis Green at the Institute of Education, University of London 
suggests that a broader definition of skill is now timely: 
‘We are dealing, in the case of skill, with a slippery concept.  Its meanings range 
among writers from different disciplines, and among common usages.  The concept 
has also evolved with the changing economy.  Half a century ago skill was reserved in 
policy discourse for technical qualities, usually in craft and related occupations, and 
had a distinctly manual overtone.  In the “knowledge economy” its meaning is a great 
deal broader’ (Green, 2011: 21). 
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Green (2011) proposes a new and broader definition of skill which permeates disciplinary 
boundaries.  For the definition to be a success it is necessary for it to accommodate different 
disciplinary perspectives particularly those ensconced in economics, psychology and 
sociology.  The definition which Green (2011) proposes is not at dissonance with definitions 
of skill which have been used at least since the early 1990s.  To overcome narrowness which 
has fuelled controversy, Green (2011) proposes a broader definition which exhibits 
functionality and is within the tradition of political economy.  According to Green, skill is a 
personal quality which has three features: first it is productive (P) of value, second it is 
expandable (E) and can be enhanced by training and development and third, skill is social (S) 
and is therefore socially determined (Green, 2011: 5).  Green combines the acronyms of the 
three features of skill.  As a combination, these three features can be expressed as the PES 
concept of skill.  An advantage of the concept Green argues is that it is action-centred and 
premised on how individuals and social agents can change these qualities (Green, 2011: 6). 
 
Green’s timely heterodox formulation of skill provides a platform for others to use it as a 
framework to configure definitions of skill that are designed to address specific problems 
encountered in research such as that of the current thesis.  The challenge of the thesis is to 
generate a working definition of skill which is productive, expandable and social but which 
also can be traced to a definitive source and can be measured empirically.  Essentially, 
Green’s definition of skill accommodates the working definition of skill that has been 
customised for the particularity of skills in a milieu of inter-organisational coordination 
which the thesis explores. 
 
3.5 The Four Sources and Components to the Formation 
of Skills 
There are two approaches which can be discerned from the literature to illustrate the sources 
of skill formation for individuals participating within the labour market.  These approaches 
can be described respectively as a diachronic and a synchronic orientation to skills formation. 
 
The diachronic approach to skill essentially means that it is conceived across time, mainly by 
following the trajectory through which individuals or groups of individuals acquire skills.  
The diachronic approach is best exemplified by Heckman and Lochner (1999).  Despite the 
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heavy emphasis that they assign to appropriate policy intervention to facilitate the formation 
of skills, their approach importantly recognizes a human life cycle as being critical to the 
formation of both cognitive and social skills among individuals.  With this approach, non-
formal sources of skill formation such as families, neighbourhoods and firms are accorded 
equal prominence to fostering skills formation as formal educational institutions.  For 
instance, higher income families present children with better access to education consumption 
and this also translates into accessing a better quality of such educational consumption 
compared to children from lower income families.  The assumption is that endowments in 
skill formation opportunities at every stage of the life cycle, contributes to a higher 
proficiency and a wider repertoire of accumulated skills for individuals who enter the labour 
market. 
 
The synchronic approach shows all the sources which contribute to the supply of skills within 
a given economic and temporal context.  Synchronicity is concerned with sources and flows 
to education and training which is used to sustain skills acquisition.  It is more concerned 
with medium and short-term flows that go into the formation of skills.  Therefore, it places 
more emphasis on initiatives into skills formation that occur almost simultaneously in the 
present.  A significant part of the literature assumes a stylised representation to such sources 
of skill formation.  For instance cognitive skills are closely linked to formal educational 
attainment, whereas motor skills and interactive skills are a product of formal vocational 
training, on-the-job training and work experience (O’Connor and Lunati, 1999: 14).  Sadoi 
(1998) gives a practical rendition to this stylised representation. 
 
My approach is to structurally present the distinct elements attributable as a source to skills 
formation using the synchronic approach.  Only what can structurally be discerned as a 
source to skill and can be measured is listed as such.  To succinctly reiterate the basic 
elements to the sources of skill formation, one can designate these to be: 
 Formal education and the qualifications which it provides.  Formal education would 
constitute the appropriate knowledge which individuals holding these credentials possess.  




 Formal skills training: this typically occurs through formal structured training conducted 
on-the-job in an enterprise or firm or through formally structured off-the-job training 
conducted in a training centre, technical facility or technical college workshop. 
 Skills acquired through the accumulation of work experience by workers in both their 
current and preceding jobs.  This includes elements of job and occupational promotion 
and job mobility which can be attributed to accumulated work experience. 
 
A further addition to the above three basic elements to the sources of skill formation, which 
will be justified below, includes: 
 The capacity for learning by doing in organisations of the workplace5. 
 
Using the literature at my disposal, I will assemble evidence that strengthens the quest to 
comprehend the inputs and sources that constitute ‘skill’.  This is undertaken to show how 
groundwork on policies for the advancement of skills can indeed be taken up. 
 
O’Connor and Lunati (1999: 14) casually mention the above three elements as constituting 
sources to the formation of skills.  Unsurprisingly, the vast social science literature on the 
subject generally acknowledges this fact, but confines itself to only discussing particular 
elements of sources for skill such as qualifications (e.g. Williams, 1999).  In South Africa, 
research which the Human Sciences Research Council (see Kraak & Perold (Eds.) 2003 & 
Kraak & Press (Eds.) 2008) has undertaken is an illustration of this trend. 
 
Business management theorists and economists however have not shied away from the 
challenge of specifying clearly the synchronic sources to skill formation.  Being more 
representative of the business management approach, Sadoi (1998) empirically documents 
the institutional access points that new entrants to the labour market use to access 
                                                 
5
 The notion of learning by doing is quite different from the concept of a learning organization.  Both concepts 
put a premium on experience as a mechanism which advances learning but this is where the similarity ends.  
Learning by doing has no evaluative preconditions on the type of organizational controls in which learning takes 
place.  Thus learning by doing inevitably takes place where a solution has to be found to problems confronted.  
The concept of the learning organization on the other hand necessitates values and organisational behaviours 
which support learning (See Ian Smith (2004) for a succinct discussion of continuing professional development 
within the context of a learning organisational framework).  Learning in a learning organization usually brings 
about managerial styles which have less controls, encourage reflection and puts high premiums on team working 
within organizations.  It thus has a strong evaluative component about the values that cement learning.  Learning 
by doing on the other hand takes place irrespective of everything else.  The learning organization has severe 
normative preconditions, whereas learning by doing is categorically factual. 
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employment in firms within the Malaysian Auto Parts Industry.  A gradation of educational 
institutions train potential workers for jobs at different occupational levels.  These are made 
up of the formal schooling system (primary and lower secondary), an upper secondary 
schooling structure which has a binary differentiation between academic and vocational 
education as well as a post-secondary system.  The post-secondary system has a more 
functional differentiation spread between academic, polytechnic and vocational education.  
This functional differentiation assigns graduates undergoing education and training (i.e. 
sources to skill formation) to equivalent occupational places in the labour market (e.g. 
universities train engineers, polytechnics train technicians while vocational institutions place 
skilled and unskilled workers).  The process of providing sources to skills is continued at the 
enterprise level and beyond the sphere of institutional training.  Here Sadoi (1998: 325-332) 
distinguishes between off-the-job training, on-the-job training and overseas training.  
Overseas training usually occurs at a foreign subsidiary of a parent company (e.g. in Taiwan 
or Thailand) or at the home-base of the foreign parent company (commonly at a plant in 
Japan). 
 
A significantly more elegant rendition to the sources and components which constitute 
synchronic skill formation is contained in regression analyses.  Such analyses highlight the 
returns to education shown as accumulated skills to individual workers.  A notation of the 
elements in the regression model indicates what the key elements are that econometricians 
have identified as probably the most critical sources to skill formation.  Here, I do no more 
than to repeat what these elements typically are.  Roomkin and Somers (1974) adopt this 
approach.  Their article is especially relevant because it builds on the premise that formal 
education, training and prior experience ‘influence the point at which workers enter the 
internal job hierarchy of the firm but then lose their importance as sources of wage 
differentials’ (Roomkin & Somers, 1974: 228).  Notice here that the premiums on wages are 
used by the econometricians to infer which sources of skill justify the highest reward.  Since 
wage growth has a direct bearing on the nature of firm specific jobs, ‘internal promotion, on-
the-job training and longevity pay increases’ [seniority pay P.L], (Roomkin & Somers, 1974: 
228) are more direct determinants to wage growth. 
 
Among the plethora of vocational training or related employment experience which workers 
obtain, Roomkin and Somers distinguish between formal and informal skills training.  
According to them, formal skills training, involves some classroom instruction whereas 
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informal skills training takes place exclusively on the job under the tutelage of fellow 
workers or supervisors (Roomkin and Somers, 1974: 231).  Measures of coefficients derived 
from regression analysis showed that neither formal education endowment nor length of work 
experience or seniority was the source of significant earning differentials (Roomkin & 
Somers, 1974: 239).  Instead, the results – applicable especially to skilled and semi-skilled 
workers – showed that ‘significant increases in earnings are associated with formal training 
on the highest paying jobs, upward mobility and the combination of formal training and 
upward mobility’ (Roomkin & Somers, 1974: 241).  This means that the elements that give 
rise to mobility give a clue to the sources of skill.  Using a synchronic approach, these can 
either be: better education, more on the job training or longer working experience or 
whichever elements are shown up as a justifiable reward for what makes up skill.  The 
evidence also pointed to a positive relationship in terms of earnings from first jobs for 
workers particularly those in craftsmen jobs who had undergone a combination of on-the-job 
and classroom training (Roomkin & Somers, 1974: 241).   
3.5.1 The Capacity for Learning-by-Doing 
Because the notion of learning-by-doing within organisations and firms is intricately tied to 
illustrations of qualitative measurements and evaluations, regression analyses of econometric 
data tends to steer away from this topic.  Mathematical economists stimulated by a seminar 
paper written by Kenneth Arrow (1962) were however among the first to develop theoretical 
models to address the problem of learning-by-doing in firms.  But it has generally been 
management and organisational theorists and economic historians who have led the way by 
expanding our knowledge of the problem. 
 
Von Hippel and Tyre (1996) have shown how learning-by-doing was vital to addressing 
failures experienced during machine use in a processing plant dedicated to mounting circuits 
onto circuit-boards (von Hippel & Tyre, 1996: 315).  The relatively de-contextualised 
application of new technology from its design and development environment in the 
laboratory to its use or point of application, introduces conditions which exposed implicit but 
rectifiable failures in the technology.  These failures or ‘bugs’ usually become noticeable 
outside the design environment of the laboratory, when the technology is put to use in the 
factory.   A vision system was designed to locate specific metallised patterns on circuit 
boards being manufactured on the production line.  During tests conducted by the machine 
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development group in the lab, the vision system functioned properly when tested on a sample 
of circuit boards from the user plant.  However, in the factory, users found the vision system 
sometimes failed and drew the attention of the machine developers.  Development engineers 
found that failure in the vision system occurred when boards that were light yellow in colour 
were being processed.  Von Hippel and Tyre continue to describe the episode: 
‘The fact that boards being processed were sometimes light yellow was a surprise to 
the machine developers.  While factory personnel knew that the boards they processed 
varied in color, they had not volunteered the information because they did not know 
that the developers would be interested.  Early in the machine development process, 
factory personnel had simply provided samples of boards used in the factory to the 
machine development group.  As it happened, these samples were green.  On the basis 
of the samples, developers had then (implicitly) assumed that all boards processed in 
the field were green.  It had not occurred to them to ask users, “How much variation 
in board color do you generally experience?” Thus, they had designed the vision 
system to work successfully with boards that were green. (von Hippel & Tyre, 1996: 
317) 
The description by von Hippel and Tyres (1996) reveals that the engineers within the 
particular firm chose to pursue a design strategy in which they used a vision system in the 
component placing machine.  Unfortunately, the vision system could not distinguish between 
the metallised patterns on the board and the light yellow circuit boards that formed the 
background and this led to machine failure.  Thus the engineering decision choice was 
between a design strategy with the appropriate contextual knowledge or a design strategy that 
was oblivious to context.  But the vision reading machine required contextual knowledge of 
the different colour circuit boards it would potentially have to read. 
 
There are of course sceptics of the notion of learning-by-doing.  Andrew Weiss (1994) 
described the difficulties in trying to measure the effects of learning-by-doing using a sample 
of workers at three factories in the United States over the period 1977 to 1979.  One of the 
difficulties encountered was the large outflow (quit rates) and inflow (new hiring) which had 
to be accounted for.  The context of work organisation at a factory level also suggests a 
spectrum of issues which could only be accounted for partially.  Weiss drew the conclusion: 
‘… that rapid productivity growth occurs during the first month that production 
workers are employed, even without formal job training programs.  However, 
productivity growth falls rapidly and effectively stops by the sixth month on the job.  
The fall may be due to peer pressure not to “break the rates”’ (Weiss, 1994: 158). 
Despite advancing evidence of peer pressure to ‘break the rates’, Weiss asserts rather boldly: 
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‘The data we have presented also casts some light on the extent to which aggregate 
productivity growth is due to learning-by-doing.  It appears that learning-by-doing by 
production workers has only a small effect on productivity growth’ (Weiss, 1994: 
159). 
There is valid justification in establishing a relationship between the concept of learning by 
doing and the discussion that was had earlier about situating skills through intellectual 
disciplines.  Here the distinction drawn in the work of Elliot Jaques (1967) between 
prescribed or rule dominated work on the one side versus discretionary or choice dominated 
work is extremely apt.  I do not think that it is entirely accurate to impute discretionary or 
choice dominated work only to those performing higher-level occupations (following the 
broad parameters of the standard industrial classification system) and correspondingly to 
impute prescribed or rule dominated work to those in lower level occupations.  While this 
may be the general rule in practice, exceptions would contradict the rule.  Exceptions that 
occur more frequently are more than exceptions.  Thus we have people in low level 
occupations that exhibit the highest degrees of professionalism and lateral thinking 
imaginable.  One also finds a lack of vision and discretion from those occupying the highest 
occupational levels often being responsible for making the worst decisions imaginable: 
decisions which are inscribed with error and the absence of learning by doing.  We all know 
that the planning for success or failure is typically shaped at high or senior occupational 
levels.  Where this occurs, failure is more likely. 
 
Charles Bettelheim (1974) reports that even during the Cultural Revolution in China, the 
urgency to secure economic production, by relying on internal strengths played an important 
role in factory organisation.  This occurred despite having to rely and make use of old and 
out-dated machinery.  This is what the workers’ management team told Bettelheim: 
“Certain changes enable us also to improve quality and make labor less burdensome.  
In the dyeing and printing shop, for instance, everything used to be done by hand.  
This shop is being upgraded, but we still lack a number of machines.  Those you saw 
this morning, which can dye and print an entire roll of jersey, were made with the help 
of old machines we received from another factory.  The experts and specialists had 
always claimed that this type of machine could not possibly dye and print jersey in 
two colors.  The workers said: ‘Why can’t it be done? Let’s try it!’ After the Cultural 
Revolution, they proposed the attempt be made, and after a few trials it turned out to 
be quite practical to print in two colors.  Nevertheless, we still have problems. 
“The sewing shop has machines that make it possible to cut out sleeves and sew them 
onto jackets in a single operation.  Each machine requires but one operator, and this 
new technique represents progress.  But the work is very hard – the worker must 
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simultaneously hold the cloth with her hands and operate the foot pedals, and give her 
full attention to this job eight hours a day.  Some women workers said that this 
improved technique is not really an improvement because the women who operate 
these machines get no rest at all.  A few of these machines were set aside, and we 
studied the problem with the operators.  We succeeded in modifying the machines by 
eliminating the pedals. 
“There were other problems.  It was necessary, for instance, to cut the threads 
between the pieces to separate them.  Here too we solved the problem through 
innovation – the pieces are now made and overlapped automatically, and the worker 
has only to position the cloth and hold it in place by hand.  If this machine were in 
general use, the length of apprenticeship – six months in the case of the old foot-
operated machines – and labor intensity could be considerably reduced”(Bettelheim, 
1974: 26-27). 
The problem of learning-by-doing is not unfamiliar to South African investigations although 
the context is significantly different from that which was presented to von Hippel and Tyres.  
Research by Lundall (2005) pointed to the role which early entrepreneurs in the Western 
Cape textile industry performed by adapting foreign technology to local conditions.  
Interviews suggested that a number of immigrant engineers, especially those trained in 
Germany as metal and engineering artisans and engineers began to branch out and establish 
their own firms.  A number of textile factories in Cape Town emerged from such humble 
beginnings.  These entrepreneurs were adept at redesigning foreign machines and 
technologies for use by lower skilled workers without dramatic losses in productivity 
(Lundall, 2005: 34).  It is quite possible that these German textile engineers were not 
previously required to undertake such technological adaptation.  They learnt how to do it 
because it was theoretically possible.  Learning-by-doing may in fact be an unrecognised 
attribute which employees at different tiers constantly undertake at workplaces throughout 
South Africa.  These are further illustrations of the importance in which learning-by-doing is 
a source to the application of skills within enterprises. 
 
Thus, as a conclusion to this section I have attempted to substantiate the claim that there are a 
number of sources to the flow of skills but that these sources can basically be reduced to four 
distinct components.  These are: 
 formal education,  
 formal skills training,  




The flow in which skills are acquired can include either of these four components or a 
combination of two or more specific elements to them. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The substantive literature that has been written on the different facets which constitute skill, 
qualitative insights and qualifications into the subject matter, does not fundamentally 
challenge or refute the four components to the sources of skill that has been formulated in the 
preceding section of this chapter.  Since it is denuded of unnecessary trappings, and presented 
in its simplest and most elegant form, these four components and sources to the formation of 
skill will permeate the conception to skills formation which the thesis upholds.  This thesis 
devotes significant attention and analysis to skill formation and its coordination at the 
workplace.  It is signified institutionally through skills formation in enterprises and firms.  
The four sources to the composition skill that this thesis therefore upholds are the following: 
 Skill acquired through formal education and the qualifications that are awarded to its 
incumbents. 
 Skills acquired through formal skills training both on- and off-the-job.  Formally, skills 
training typically leads to the award of certification and some level of accreditation to its 
incumbents. 
 Skill acquired through the accumulation of work experience by workers in both their 
current and preceding jobs.  Such experience is often more sensitive to the tacit 
dimension of quality within skill. 
 Skill acquired through learning-by-doing.  Trouble-shooting and the diagnostics of 
problems not encountered before elevates the learning curve that the engineers, 
technicians and artisans and perhaps even other categories of workers who hold skill 
undergo.  Learning-by-doing enables one to discover the solution to a problem or error.  
The skill acquired through learning-by-doing is invaluable and advances the aggregate 
skill composition and skill accumulation in an enterprise or firm.  These can potentially 
be diffused with spin-offs at the meso-level of the industry or sector where learning-by-




Chapter 4: The Sociological Understanding of 
Coordination 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of coordination occupies a prominent place in this thesis.  It is the basis of an 
historical and contemporary analysis of enterprise skills development in South Africa, 
especially of the new skills dispensation which was formally instituted after 1998.  While this 
chapter will show that there are multiple perspectives to the concept of coordination, it may 
be helpful to establish a general understanding about the meaning of coordination.  Frances, 
Levačić, Mitchell and Thompson (1991) deploy a definition that captures the gist of its 
meaning.  They write: 
‘Coordination implies the bringing into a relationship otherwise disparate activities or 
events.  Tasks and efforts can be made compatible by coordinating them.  Bottlenecks 
and disjunctures can be eliminated, so coordination is usually discussed under a sign 
of efficiency.  By coordinating a set of items something can be achieved which 
otherwise would not be.  It is the positive performance consequences of coordination 
that makes it such an attractive social practice and objective.  Various agents and 
agencies can be ‘ordered’, ‘balanced’, ‘brought into equilibrium’, and the like, by the 
act of coordination.  Without coordination these agents and agencies might all have 
different and potentially conflicting objectives resulting in chaos and inefficiency’ 
Frances, Levačić, Mitchell and Thompson (1991: 3) 
This chapter explores the multiple meanings of coordination.  The unfolding of these 
meanings occurred largely outside the disciplinary field of sociology.  This chapter provides 
broad brush strokes to make sense and perhaps incorporate useful perspectives on 
coordination, into sociological theory. 
 
The concept of coordination is pervasive.  It is spread across multiple organisational and 
disciplinary fields.  These include: physics, economics, computer and information science, 
linguistics, public administration, organisational studies and comparative politics.  While 
pervasive, the concept is seldom theoretically defined in its fields of application.  Instead a 





Correspondingly, the study of coordination has almost no theoretical body of coherent 
concepts in the disciplinary field of sociology.  As studies and conceptions related to 
coordination began to permeate disciplines and fields in which it gradually became 
established (particularly economics, computer and information science, policy studies etc.), 
the problem of social integration (exhibited through the work of Talcott Parsons) and later 
systems integration (advanced by David Lockwood) occupied a more central place within 
sociological theory (Parsons, 1951 & 1960; Lockwood, 1964).  Parsons with Smelser also 
undertook a study postulating a closer integration between economic and social theory 
(Parsons & Smelser, 1957).  With the exception of sporadic and mainly empirically directed 
work (e.g. Winthrop, 1963; Warren, 1973 and Aiken et. al., 1975), which sociologists tackled 
within the sphere of service delivery, these efforts did not translate into further substantial 
theoretical work within sociology.  Instead, there was a catalyst for explorations of 
coordination within disciplines bordering sociology.  These studies gave prominent attention 
to inter-organizational and inter-institutional relations (and inter-organisational and inter-
institutional coordination).  The disciplinary source to these efforts was policy studies in 
social work and health as well as organizational studies (where enterprises were examined) 
and comparative politics.  In comparative politics the systemic classification of different 
types or varieties of capitalism was also postulated. 
 
The coalescence of these emergent investigations eventually found its locus mainly, but not 
exclusively in organisational and management studies.  Sociology merely became one of 
several competing branches (e.g. sociology, organisational and management studies).  It 
explored aspects of coordination tied to inter-organisational relations.  At the inception, even 
though these competing disciplines possessed modest credentials to rigorously advance 
studies into coordination, compared to sociology, its concerns with coordination was taken 
forward, whereas in sociology there was general neglect and this contributed to gradual 
retardation. 
 
As has been argued, research investigations exploring either empirical or theoretical 
dimensions to coordination have generally proceeded outside the disciplinary arena of 
sociology.  This literature is important because it mimics the coordination of dependencies 
and interdependencies in society at large, overtly but more often through non-visible 
coordination (Al-Ani et. al. 2008; Amrit et.al. n.d., Findler & Malyankar, 2000; Gomez-Sanz-
Pavon, 2006; Reimers, 2000; Raposo et.al., 2001; Raposo & Fuks, 200?; Kim, 1994).  A 
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closer symbiotic relationship between coordination in the sphere of computer science, 
information technology as well as artificial intelligence and manufacturing and organisational 
process design is advanced by researchers who classify their work as coordination theory 
(Malone, 2004; Malone & Crowston, 1991; Malone & Crowston, 1994; Crowston, 1997 & 
Van Fenema et.al., 2004).  While these theorists highlight the interdisciplinary character of 
coordination theory, the approach has a strong production and output-driven orientation, 
which circumscribes it being applied mainly to situations involving intricate dynamics 
between individuals and groups. 
 
In the discipline of Economics, Austrian-School aligned theorists in particular have studied 
coordination in relation to price, markets and the allocation and adjustment of resources 
(Hayek, 1948; O’Driscoll, 1977; Hutt, 1978).  Leijonhufvud (1981), a heterodox and left-
leaning economist has also explored the relationship between information and coordination in 
macroeconomic theory.  While extremely insightful the concept of coordination which the 
above theorists advance has been somewhat narrow and specialised.  This limits its direct 
application for the coordination of skill formation. 
 
A more explicitly organisation or institutional based theory of coordination is more 
appropriate for the purpose of understanding the coordination of enterprise skill formation.  
Here, a choice literally exists between two different perspectives: a neo-institutionalist 
perspective versus a perspective that places greater emphasis on inter-organisational 
relationships and collaboration.  The prominence of strong representation for each 
perspective in the literature encouraged my gravitation towards working with a perspective 
that favours greater inter-organisational coordination.  It appeared to me that neo-
institutionalism is more entrenched in research within political science and to a lesser degree 
in sociology.  This was particularly evident in perusing the prominent neo-institutionalist 
research programme at the Public Management Institute at the Catholic University of Leuven 
in Belgium (Beuselink, 2008; Dan, 2013). 
 
But the sheer bulk of these investigations have become so pervasive, it is almost impossible 
for sociologists that pass by to make any sense of this landscape and terrain without resorting 
to sense-making conventions that are specific to the sociological enterprise.  Here Robert 
Merton’s (1967) notion of ‘middle range theory’ seems quite apt and is a start to formulate a 
stratagem to sociologically frame discussion of coordination.  In addition to Merton three 
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inter-organisational coordination texts in particular (Chisholm, 1989; Rogers, Whetten & 
Associates, 1982 & Alexander, 1995), informed my theoretical framing of coordination.  
Because Chisholm’s (1989) was deeply grounded in participant observation research, and 
while thoroughly informative about the dynamics of informal structures to inter-
organisational coordination, it was not possible to imitate and apply this approach to my own 
research.  The contribution by Rogers, Whetten and Associates (1982) provide exploratory 
insights into different aspects of coordination which have points of intersection but do not 
necessarily share a common framework.  Ernest Alexander (1995) provides the most 
comprehensive analysis of inter-organisational coordination and it is extremely useful in 
providing almost the full ingredients to the formulation of a framework through which the 
coordination of the supply of enterprise skills in South Africa can be examined. 
 
4.2 Sociological Understanding of Coordination: Possible 
Suggestions from Middle Range Theory 
The understanding of coordination and its empirical application to the social world appears 
chaotic.  To make sociological sense of this process, a sociological theory of the middle range 
is helpful.  As Merton avers, a theory of the middle range lies between minor working 
hypotheses necessary for day to day research and an inclusive systematic effort to develop a 
unified theory (Merton, 1967: 39).  There are a host of working hypotheses on coordination 
(as will be illustrated further in this chapter) but there is certainly no consensus on a unified 
theory.  Merton suggested that within sociological theory a middle range theory which 
incorporated elements of social structure is more logical than concrete historical descriptions 
of particular social systems (Merton, 1967: 44).  Merton coincidently identified the 
‘interdependence of social institutions’ (Merton, 1967: 51) as a space tailor-made for study 
using the concept of coordination.  It was Merton’s contention that an approach which 
evolved a theory by deriving hypotheses which could be empirically demonstrated 
represented a more fertile approach within the discipline.  It extended from micro to macro 
theory (Merton, 1967: 64).  These however remained no more than suggestions which future 
sociologists could deploy.  The merit of Merton’s work is in being able to imagine that it is 
indeed possible to apply middle range theory across the micro-, meso- and macro- levels in 
order to enhance our understanding of new theoretical challenges such as ‘coordination’.  
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Success in carrying this quest through would indeed make it possible to expand our 
understanding of coordination viewed through a sociological lense. 
 
The discussion of the idea of coordination in physics, social work and economics that 
occurred roughly in the early and mid-twentieth century, serves as a mirror to contemporary 
discussions of coordination in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.  Physics, 
social work and economics – although still addressing the idea of coordination – also 
competed against a host of new disciplines which have appropriated these spaces and 
established stronger linkages with social structures and system functionalities.  While the 
subjects are different, the pattern is almost the same.  Instead of it being only physics, social 
work and economics, the new disciplinary voices explicating and advancing ideas and 
influence through coordination are now computer science and information systems, 
management science and organisational theory as well as public administration and 
comparative politics.  Sociology unfortunately got left behind. 
 
Before attempting to explicate a more sociologically informed conception of coordination, 
one can derive significant insight from reviewing attempts that have been made historically to 
understand coordination either conceptually or practically.  It signals possible leads one can 
explore to enhance its ideas further as an explanatory tool, especially when these have 
relevance to enriching conceptual understanding and practical application of the concept.  
Moreover when these potential conceptual and explanatory instruments are shown, it 
provides a credible stock-take about potential sociological insights which may be gleaned 
from such an exercise.  
 
4.3 Early Twentieth Century Attempts at Theorising 
Coordination: Precursors to Contemporary Thinking 
The notion of coordination has a unique 20
th
 century lineage but this is not always apparent in 
contemporary accounts.  Part of the lineage to coordination, has influenced the way in which 
the coordination of enterprise skill has been posed
6
.  In the work of Hayek for instance, the 
price mechanism generates a spontaneous coordinating function because it provides 
                                                 
6
 Ideas from the socialist calculation debate as well as debates on the construction of the welfare state which was 




individuals with subjective knowledge which they in turn use as a guide to navigate 
competitive processes (Hayek, 1949; O’Driscoll, 1997).  There were also elements stimulated 
by the social dimension to the debate (e.g. G.D.H. Cole) that appeared to hold little continuity 
and were discarded and forgotten with time but still holds abiding relevance to conceptions of 
coordination
7
.  By partially retracing these forgotten steps, extremely valid sociological 
insights into the problem of coordination will be presented.  This will become apparent when 
I contrast and review perspectives relevant to the coordination of enterprise skills formation. 
4.3.1 Associational Coordination and the Organisational State: A 
Precursor to Macro Coordination 
Discussion of coordination in economic and social theory usually has its starting point in 
either macro or micro problems.  Seldom are both the macro and the micro problems 
confronted simultaneously.  In the adumbration of macro problems, the state as an organ of 
coordination is given a lot of attention.  Similarly, micro coordination is important at an 
enterprise level.  The following discussion traces these earlier roots of coordination in 
political economy but we can already observe through the work of Myrdal, gravitation 
towards thematic macro discussions of coordination.  Subsequently, its standard bearers 
become economic history (through the work of Douglas North) and comparative politics 
(Peter Hall and J. Rogers Hollingsworth being leading theorists). 
 
In his book, Social Theory, published in 1920, the prominent English intellectual and Fabian 
socialist G.D.H. Cole argued that the state bore an increasingly important coordination 
function through legislative interventions around social protection, the regulation of sectional 
interests in the economic sphere as well as through the provision of public services (e.g. 
through the Post Office and railway services).  This expansion in coordination was made 
necessary through the complex and at times competing self-interest and functional 
associations which constituted society.  As Cole notes: 
‘…the State of today possesses increasingly important activities of coordination.  It is 
largely concerned in adjusting the relations between association and association, or 
between other associations or institutions and itself.  It enacts laws regulating the form 
and scope of associative activity, friendly society law, law affecting banks, 
companies, partnerships, Trade Unions, clubs, associations of any and every sort.  In 
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 Paul Hirst is one of the few recent theorists to have signified the pertinence and resurrected the writings of 
G.D.H. Cole.  See: Paul Hirst (Ed.) (1989) The Pluralist Theory of the State: selected writings of G.D.H. Cole, 
J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski (London: Routledge). 
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some degree, it regulates all religious associations, and, in some countries, the 
existence of an Established Church increases the extent of its religious intervention’ 
(Cole, 1920: 88). 
 
Cole’s characterisation differentiated between coordination that involved the state itself as 
well as coordination that encompasses the state and society.  The state was conceived as the 
principal coordinating mechanism to both.  Common sense showed that this role as principal 
mechanism was indispensable to coordination involving the state and its institutions.  
Although the same postulate was held in respect of coordination involving the state and the 
associational institutions of society, this postulate was radically revised in the cauldron of 
practice since Cole’s pronouncements. 
 
The homage which posterity accords to the founders of innovative conceptions and ideas that 
have had an indelible influence on society’s understanding of its social world is to associate 
the names of such founders with the popular impression which the idea assumes in everyday 
language.  Thus, the invisible hand reminds us of Adam Smith, the class struggle which 
finally inaugurates the dictatorship of the proletariat resurrects the image of Marx, while the 
notion of embeddedness of social institutions in the economy is an imagery which belongs to 
Karl Polanyi.  Surprisingly, we do not yet associate the concept of coordination with a major 
historical thinker.  But if there is anyone whose conception accords strongly with the form in 
which coordination as a concept is starting to be used in the theoretical literature, the honour 
ought to be accorded to Gunnar Myrdal
8
, the famous Swedish political economist. 
 
Myrdal’s starting point was that the economies of developed countries had become 
increasingly regulated, organized, coordinated and planned (Myrdal, 1960: 11).  He 
suggested that this did not occur overtly but gradually in a piece-meal fashion.  Pragmatic, 
non-comprehensive national planning had thus acquired great importance.  In Myrdal’s view 
planning arises out of the need for the state and other collective bodies to coordinate public 
policies more rationally so that desirable ends that are determined by the evolving political 
process can be attained (Myrdal, 1960: 23).  Referring to the historical evolution and the 
                                                 
8
 Although Lars Magnusson (2004) makes a convincing case into similar Wicksellian roots that are an influence 
on both Myrdal and Hayek, their theoretical positions and political orientations are virulently in opposition.  
Ironically, although intellectually poles apart, they shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1973, the 
significance which did not go unnoticed to Magnusson.  But Magnusson ignores the seminal and original 
formulation to social coordination which Myrdal develops particularly in his book Beyond the Welfare State. 
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institutional and political conditions that shaped planning in the Western democracies, 
Myrdal nonetheless warned that since planning tends to be pragmatic and piecemeal, it never 
is comprehensive and complete (Myrdal, 1960: 23).  Myrdal further implied that pressure 
from vested interests reinforces policy intervention which is pragmatic and piecemeal 
(Myrdal, 1960: 24). 
 
Myrdal contends that with the breakdown of competitive markets, a liberal non-
interventionist stance would lead to the disorganisation of society.  Faced with this problem, 
the state introduces regulatory measures which Myrdal refers to as a state-controlled 
infrastructure of collective organizations.  This allowed Myrdal to formulate an argument for 
what he calls the organizational state.  Exploring the evolution of the organizational state, 
Myrdal sees the pressures towards the dispersion of equity in society as a compulsion on the 
state to intervene by strengthening the bargaining power of weaker groups (Myrdal, 1960: 
44).  Thus state intervention distributes the concentration and misallocation of power.  
Intervention in markets is seen as an ameliorative to the disorganisation of society.  On a 
national scale, power and organizational capacity allows buyers and sellers in a market 
‘through elected officers and through appointed and salaried officials’, to ‘make binding 
agreements for all their members’ (Myrdal, 1960: 45).  These binding agreements relate to 
wages, prices, entrance to professions or even the location, number and proprietorship of new 
businesses.  Although the state initiates the process in the realignment of the balance of 
power, Myrdal is not beholden to the state.  He sees the battle between equal but contending 
powers of competing organizations as a form of public policy (Myrdal, 1960: 46).  The 
arrangement removes the direct participation of the state from the process.  The state only 
guarantee that the organizations which are hence constitutionally drawn into public policy, 
adhere to open and democratic principles and are subject to the same fiduciary and public 
scrutiny which befalls other public organs (Myrdal, 1960: 46).  In the organizational state, a 
large spectrum of approved policy is put into effect by organs other than those of the state 
administration (Myrdal, 1960: 46).  Consequently, heightened importance rests on ensuring 
that national coordination between these organs occurs and it is therefore crucial that 
organizational differences are settled peacefully and efficiently.  For this to succeed, the 
organizations have to be seen to promote the public will (Myrdal, 1960: 46). 
 
Apart from the constitutional ambit of public policy, Myrdal argued that ‘private power 
groups organised to promote interests and common causes’ (Myrdal, 1960: 47), contribute to 
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public policy.  This stems from the common causes that emerge out of group interests.  The 
fact that they wield power of some sort, made it imperative to Myrdal, that they had to be 
incorporated into the institutional infrastructure of modern organised society.  Even allowing 
that the idea of incorporation was characteristic more of the West European democracies, it 
was still a novel formulation.  It was novel because it recognised that if given a platform, 
private power groups would have an impact on public policy purely on the basis of directing 
the power they wielded to serve a broader public interest (Myrdal, 1960: 47).  Traditionally, 
state regulation of private power groups aimed to trim their power, with the intention of 
ensuring that the state became the final arbiter.  Conceiving the expansion of intervening 
powers within markets in this manner, provides a justification for the state to expand its 
coordination of public policies in the national community (Myrdal, 1960: 48).  As well as 
expanding the state’s coordination function through its direct acts of interference in social 
and economic life, an expanded coordination function would apply equally to ‘new and 
mushrooming growth of all those private organizations for collective action’ (Myrdal, 1960: 
48) that fall outside the domain of the state and outside its formal constitutional 
arrangements. 
 
While putting a strenuous argument forward about its importance in regulating the market 
and social environment, Myrdal did not see this function as inexorable and fixed for 
perpetuity.  In fact, a diminution of state regulation was possible and necessary (Myrdal, 
1960: 91).  A decrease in state intervention was perceived by Myrdal as a precondition to the 
strengthening of provincial and municipal self-government, as well as expanding the 
infrastructure of effective interest organizations.  It furthermore presumed an intensification 
of citizens’ participation and control (Myrdal, 1960: 93).  It required ‘a better educated 
public’ making use of ‘strong and efficient consumers’ organizations’, especially those 
representing the interests of buyers and consumers (Myrdal, 1960: 91).  Thus Myrdal wrote: 
‘It is my conviction, however, that it should be possible to leave much more detailed 
regulations to be settled by the people themselves, in their local communities and through 
bargaining between organizations.  This will promote the coming into being of a more 
cooperative national community, with more identification, solidarity, and participation on 
the part of the individual citizen, who will come to feel freer – and he actually will be 




Although written almost forty years apart, there are strong thematic overlaps in the work of 
G.D.H. Cole and Gunnar Myrdal.  Both recognised the importance of the state as 
instrumental in establishing a wider coordinating authority.  But both recognise equally the 
importance of other representative bodies making a contribution to social coordination.  
However, Myrdal moves beyond Cole.  Myrdal argues that after the state has put into motion 
regulations which coordinate the activities of society, there needs to be a limit on the 
dominant position of the state.  It has to retract and limit its role so that decentralized bodies 
and institutions have the space to work out the finer details. 
 
Neither, the positions of Cole or Myrdal seems to have had influence and continuity with 
practical concerns conceived and applied within local contexts in South Africa.  Andre Kraak 
(2009) for instance invokes conceptions of coordination formulated by historical institutional 
theorists who distinguish between different varieties or types of capitalism.  Kraak first used 
the concept of coordination in insightful doctoral work.  But Kraak used a relatively loose 
concept of coordination borrowed from a 1988 article by Finegold and Soskice published in 
the Oxford Review of Economic Policy. There Finegold and Soskice advanced the argument 
that the UK labour market was trapped in a low skilled equilibrium, had enterprises with 
poorly trained managers and a labour force which largely produced low quality goods and 
services (Finegold and Soskice, 1988: 22).  They argued further that a self-reinforcing 
network of societal and state institutions in the UK worked to perpetuate conditions of low 
skill equilibrium.  The term ‘uncoordinated’ was extensively applied to characterise the 
education and training regime in the UK.  Elements contributing to ‘un-coordination’ were 
identified as weak state implementation, the concentration of manufacturing firms in low skill 
continuous manufacturing instead of more skilled batch or unit production processes, the 
overbearing prominence of accounting as a managerial control tool instead of production 
management as a system of organization.  Finally, Finegold and Soskice critiqued a UK 
industrial relations milieu which largely undermined attempts to improve the skills of the 
workforce and overlooked joint cooperation between employers, unions and government to 
coordinate national training policy (Finegold & Soskice, 1988: 29). 
 
In 1999, Finegold and Culpepper edited a book containing articles on the German Skills 
Machine
9
.  At about the same period, a new literature began to evolve among those in the 
                                                 
9
 The book contains an institutional analysis of the German skills system. 
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circle of Finegold and Culpepper.  This literature was on the notion of different varieties of 
capitalism and the principal fissure was shown between liberal market economies and non-
liberal or coordinated market economies.  A more mature consolidation of the status of the 
varieties of capitalism was later assembled by Peter Hall and David Soskice (Hall & Soskice, 
2001). 
 
These conceptions of coordination that flow through the earlier work of Kraak as well as his 
most recent work (Kraak, 2009) emphasised the relevance of coordination to policy making.  
From a much earlier period, starting in the 1940s, there was however an interesting line of 
practical research conducted in South Africa on coordination.  Like the work of Myrdal in 
Sweden it represented a trend which was to continue but mainly in the United States and in 
the field of coordination around planning and service delivery (Winthrop, 1963; Warren, 
1973 and Aiken et.al. 1975). 
 
Here, the uniquely institutional and geographically specific work of Edward Batson (1940), 
the first professor and head of the department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town, 
deserves greater prominence and recognition.  Even by modern day criteria, Batson’s 
arguments were ingenious and were directed to the condition, organisation and coordination 
of social work then prevailing in South Africa.  Social work was conceived by Batson as an 
instrument to coordinate activities of different charitable and rehabilitating organisations so 
that these could be aligned for the betterment of society (Batson, 1940: 119-120).  Batson 
first proceeded by citing a range of examples of welfare and relief measures which a plethora 
of organizations performed.  These were performed by organisations independent from the 
state, partially associated with the state or directly borne out of legal provisions that enabled 
them to serve as organs through which social work was practically realised in the country.  
He then proceeded to make a distinction between national and provincial administration 
versus local administration in the coordination which he referred to as ‘the community-chest 
local-council social-service-exchange type’ (Batson, 1940: 123-124).  During roughly the 
same period, in the United States, the need to coordinate the work of private and public 
agencies in the public welfare sector gained prominence.  In the context of these agencies 
becoming involved with direct payments, grants and other subsidies, discussion about the 




Starting with a generally broad and elementary definition of coordination as being ‘to bring 
into proper relation’ (Batson, 1940: 119), Batson’s definition was immersed in colloquialism.  
Nonetheless, Batson recognised the importance which coordination had for the emerging 
organisational and institutional formation then beginning to take shape within the field of 
social work in South Africa as well as internationally.  Because these preliminary 
organisational and institutional formations required some level of intervention around social 
welfare administration – nationally and internationally – Batson suggested that the 
organisational unit capable of advancing these interventions could be coordinated in two 
ways: geographically and functionally (Batson, 1940: 124).  Geographical coordination was 
designed for social welfare units that were dispersed locally, nationally or internationally.  
Functional coordination referred to social welfare units whose operations were bound by 
exclusive and specialised objectives and goals (e.g. child welfare).  Batson was then able to 
apply these two ‘ways’ of coordination across a typology of six administrative types which he 
proposed.  These six administrative types were cast from national and international initiatives 
in the sphere of administrative organisation then taking shape in the emerging social welfare 
field in the late 1930s.  Batson’s typology showing the six types of administrative 
organisation is presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Batson’s Six Types of Administrative Organisation 
 
 
From his analysis of administrative organisational types within the emerging field of social 
welfare administration in which the intellectual discipline of social work had become 
national, specialised
Source: Batson, 1940: p.125
752 of the 782 bodies listed by the Department of Social 
Welfare are local; the majority of these are unspecialised 
but may be affiliated to specialised national bodies
30 national bodies listed among the 782; 19 of the 30 more 
or less specialised functionally
international, 
specialised
Despite the fact that much has been said ….of the need for 
local co-ordination, only in a limited number of centres 
has such machinery come into being' [U.G. 15-1940]
A local, specialised
Nationally, there is no single private body representing 
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prominent Batson (1940: 129) suggested three principle methods of coordination which could 
be applied to any specific group of activities.  He referred to these as: legal compulsion, 
administrative suasion and voluntary agreement.  A provincial ordinance was an example of 
legal compulsion.  The provision of grants, subsidies, recognition granted to participants in 
coordinating schemes by the state or coordinating bodies was an illustration of administrative 
suasion.  Similarly affiliation to national bodies and membership of local boards, councils 
and registers allowed for voluntary agreement.  Finally, as a conclusion to his argument, 
Batson issued the following advice concerning coordination: 
‘Co-ordination by voluntary agreement may be the most difficult method to employ 
and the least stable in operation; I think its advantages in terms of goodwill and 
active, as distinct from passive, participation will nearly always outweigh these 
disadvantages.  It also seems to offer the best guarantee against the special risks 
which co-ordinative machinery introduces into the social welfare system – the risks of 
monopoly and exclusiveness, of undue complexity of organization, of stagnation, of 
repressiveness, of bureaucracy.  The question of guarding against the perversions, 
while securing the benefits, of co-ordination appears to me to be a more urgent 
question than that of supporting or opposing co-ordination per se’ (Batson, 1940: 130) 
 
The merit in Batson’s conception of coordination was its practical orientation and the 
elevation which it accorded to organisational and institutional structures and units within a 
process of coordination.  Although his analysis was tailored to advance the programme and 
process of social work and social welfare administration, it represented an original blending 
of structural organisational and institutional components into coordination which would have 
been attractive to those using a Mertonian framework that could be applied at a local, national 
and international level.  However such a coalescence between theories of the middle range 
and the sociological engagement of Edward Batson did not lead to a framework to 
sociological engage with challenges which coordination as a process posed for sociologists. 
 
4.4 Enterprise Coordination: An Exemplar of Micro 
Coordination 
The discussion of micro-economic coordination will be concerned with the coordination of 
specific functional activities in the enterprise.  The enterprise or the firm is probably also the 
most important institution of economic reproduction within society.  The literature that is 
reviewed gives a slant mainly to the difficulties and problems which managers and 
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entrepreneurs confront with respect to coordinating commodity production at the enterprise 
level. 
 
There is generally a dearth of contemporary sociological and even economic writing for that 
matter, which directly addresses problems of economic coordination within enterprises.  In a 
text which was written to debunk the notion that the tendentious economic laws as elaborated 
in the three volumes of Capital by Karl Marx, the authors of a two volume discussion 
entitled: Marx’s Capital and Capitalism Today (MCCT) argued that the calculation which the 
owners and managers of enterprises undertook in contemporary capitalist firms shared little 
in common with the predicted tendencies of the capitalist system in the work of Karl Marx.  
Although reviewers were infuriated by the themes and conclusions
10
 which Antony Cutler, 
Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst and Athar Hussain reached, beyond a small coterie of supporters 
[e.g. Jim Tomlinson (1984) and the work of Peter Miller (2006; 2008) and Grahame 
Thompson (1982)], the themes which the authors attempted to address were largely ignored.  
The discourses that were in place to engage with the problems which Cutler, Hindess, Hirst 
and Hussain raised were outside the domain of sociological writing: in accounting, industrial 
management and the economics of valuation and taxation. 
 
Written as a critique of what they refer to as the essentialist elements in the work of Marx, it 
addresses the conditions underpinning calculation, through which managers and owners of 
firms have to secure the viability and reproduction of enterprises.  Shorn of the ideologically 
heated debates of the late 1970s, these concerns and difficulties encompass coordination of 
the production, management, financing and profitability of enterprises.  These themes were 
also captured by Dorothy Wedderburn in the late 1960s.  Although the examples are dated, 
they convey many of the problems of coordination which confront enterprises that are 
required to adapt to changing economic and social milieus, including milieus in which the 
coordination of the supply of enterprise skill formation is a more central concern. 
 
Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain argue that mechanisation – either through equipment 
reconditioning and renewal or through the installation of new (and more advanced) 
equipment can aggravate ‘problems of unevenness in the production process’ (Cutler, et al. 
                                                 
10
 See Michael Bleaney’s review in Marxism Today (September 1978) and that by Laurence Harris in Economy 
and Society (August 1978, vol7, no.3).  As a reflection of the virulent left-academic climate then prevalent in the 
United Kingdom at the time, Socialist Register and New Left Review devoted special critiques against Barry 
Hindess and Paul Hirst respectively. 
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1978: 169).  This is because different sections of the production process can have different 
production period outputs (i.e. the time the product takes to be completed in a particular 
phase of the new machinery cycle).  Mechanisation of specific sections of the production 
process can therefore disrupt balances in production flow which can cause bottlenecks, 
particularly ones that result when the higher output volumes of the new machines outstrip the 
processing capacity of the remaining equipment (Cutler, et al. 1978: 170).  Alternatively, 
newly mechanised sections that are not sufficiently integrated can operate at below optimal 
production capacity.  Where either occurs, neither a saving in production time nor a saving in 
unit costs is possible.  As they expressed it: 
‘An integrated process may in fact only be integrated within a given range of output 
and certain pieces of equipment may be capable of more variation in output than 
others.  Equally, running equipment at beyond optimal speeds leads to a risk of 
breakdowns or defective products whose cost impact is, … magnified under 
conditions of high-volume output’ (Cutler, et al. 1978: 176) 
Insufficient plant integration involving a situation where machines are misaligned can 
damage raw-materials or semi-processed goods, increase wear and tear on equipment and 
contribute to a situation which may appear to have got even worse after adjustments of new 
capital equipment investments.  It would require ongoing calculations to reverse the situation 
with enterprise coordinating activities which gradually enable the managers and personnel at 





In engaging in calculative practice, managers of the enterprise usually perceive 
mechanisation as an important lever through which to ‘increase the integration of a 
production process’ (Cutler, et al. 1978: 164).  While not stating it explicitly, coordination is 
seen by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain as the accompanying but also post-calculative 
intervention by which integration of mechanisation is secured.  Coordination means putting 
the differences between the old and the new machinery into alignment and it necessarily 
implies disruptions being either minimised or eliminated.  As Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and 
Hussain expressed the challenge: ‘it is possible to arrange a series of operations in such a way 
                                                 
11
 See the fascinating account by Freeze (2007) in which the British textile firm, Courtaulds experimented and 
adapted Czechoslovak machine technology in one of its UK textile plants.  The collaboration and learning 




that they can be coordinated with each other so that the minimum time period is spent on 
each’ (Cutler, et al. 1978: 164). 
 
The significance of the work of Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain is in the prominence 
which they accord to enterprise calculation as a continuous intervention to secure the viability 
and continuity of the enterprise as an organisational form.  But calculation is only possible 
through specific discourses which recognises and addresses the problems which are at hand: 
from accounting and the determination of cost to the integration of the production process 
through mechanisation coupled with diagnoses and trouble-shooting to maintain an alignment 
of elements which make up the whole.  Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain inadvertently 
stumbled across coordination as an accompanying intervention to calculation.  The 
significance of this ‘discovery’ was not made explicit and has been left to the Austrian-school 
aligned economist Peter Boettke (2001), who has popularised calculation and coordination as 
processes that coexist and operate virtually in unison.  Referring to the use of the concepts in 
his own work on the transition to socialism and on the process of its reversion to capitalism in 
Eastern Europe he writes: 
‘…advanced complex coordination requires that economic actors are able to utilize 
the tools of economic calculation provided by private property, market prices and 
profit and loss accounting’ (Boettke, 2001: 4). 
For Boettke, coordination and calculation take place in tandem.  The arguments which Cutler, 
Hindess, Hirst and Hussain advanced forty years ago were and are still innovative and 
original.  But the deeply charged theoretical debates in which they were involved, risked 
missing the pertinence of these arguments.  A more practical rendition of case studies in 
enterprise coordination which confirms the positive contribution which the authors of MCCT 
made was provided earlier by Dorothy Wedderburn.  In the concluding part to this section, 
this work by Dorothy Wedderburn will be considered in more detail. 
 
For Wedderburn (1968: 10), enterprise planning is an important feature of an active 
manpower policy
12
.  The long-term goal of an active manpower policy is integration between 
public policy and policies and programmes within the enterprise so that it culminates into a 
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 In the period in which Wedderburn wrote, the term ‘active manpower policy’ was unusual and a progressive 
advance in the literature.  Today, the term ‘manpower’ has been supplemented by ‘labour’, hence our 





.  The logic of this integration is to ‘assure the optimum productive 
utilisation of a nation’s manpower resources’ (Wedderburn, 1968: 10).  This assumes that the 
process will be coordinated but the enterprise is the foundation to the efforts at coordination.  
Coordination balances the effectiveness of the adjustment to change at the enterprise, 
particularly where it results in shifts and alternative employment with the expansion of new 
jobs which the adjustments bring about.  ‘The public agencies and policies usually 
supplement and complement these enterprise programmes and take on the responsibilities 
which enterprises are unable to do or do not perform adequately’ (Wedderburn: 1968: 10).  
Although the importance of flexibility is acknowledged as an important criterion, 
coordination is less about improvisation and more about bringing about an organisational 
impact over the long-term.  For instance, when confronted with having to make adjustments 
to technical change in the enterprise, Wedderburn (1968: 10) recognises the critical 
importance of assembling up to date information.  Furthermore, adjustment to technical 
change in the enterprise is not possible without consultation and participation of employees.  
Wedderburn (1968) identifies three major factors which have a bearing on the technical 
changes that take place at the enterprise level.  These are: 
 Change in the nature of the product or the scale of output; 
 Change in the inputs of capital or labour; 
 Change in the administration of the inputs (i.e. inputs of capital or labour). 
As a caveat to these three factors, Wedderburn warns that the actual changes do not occur as 
neatly as the factors suggest (Wedderburn, 1968: 28-29). 
 
Production reorganization, as well as product characteristics, influence the maintenance 
requirements of the labour force which is clearly shown in the example that Wedderburn 
draws from the rail industry: 
‘The replacement of steam by diesel locomotives and of wooden wagons by steel 
wagons, both of which require less maintenance, has coincided with a falling off in 
the demand for new engines and wagons because of reduced rail traffic.  Moreover 
diesel locomotives require less manpower to operate them’ (Wedderburn, 1968: 29) 
                                                 
13
 The manner of Wedderburn’s formulation certainly enables us to establish an association between her work 
and that of Gunnar Myrdal, although I am not sure if she or Myrdal was aware of this. 
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Wedderburn (1968, chapter 6) shows that the condition where labour force reductions occur 
generates coordination pressures within enterprises.  Labour force reductions become 
pronounced when the existing labour force is greater than manning requirements of the 
enterprise.  It can be caused by falling demand for labour or increases in productivity that 
contributes to redundant labour.  Many enterprises coordinate their labour force reductions 
through attrition (e.g. resignations, retirements and death).  Enterprises with a seniority policy 
can achieve reduction in the form of retirements and it is achieved at a massive cost 
advantage because younger workers who are eventually employed to take up jobs vacated by 
older workers would earn lower wages for the same jobs as that vacated by the retirees.  But 
even where the principle of seniority is upheld, coordination challenges could become 
manifest.  A United States Oil company which adhered to a policy in which seniority was 
favoured discovered that it was left with ‘disproportionate number of maintenance workers 
because senior employees traditionally sought such jobs, in order to avoid the shift work 
involved in process operations’ (Wedderburn, 1968: 73). 
 
In the 1960s, while it was still uncommon for excess labour requirements to be coordinated 
through the reduction of normal working hours, the same principle was subverted with 
respect to the reduction of overtime.  Thus, enterprises commonly reduced the working of 
overtime in order to mitigate surplus labour requirements.  Transfers across firms which were 
in close proximity was in some instances carried out (e.g. Wedderburn cites this occurring at 
a Swedish shipyard, an Austrian rolling mill and among Norwegian chemical firms) 
(Wedderburn, 1968: 66).  The task of embarking on measures of coordination could even 
impact on dismissal policies.  These included a number of measures (e.g. early warning of 
impending retrenchments, upholding seniority by letting go of younger workers, providing 
search assistance in finding jobs elsewhere on the labour market, or even upholding and 
protecting breadwinner jobs etc.).  A policy protecting breadwinner jobs could imply that the 
wives of married couples at the enterprise could be dismissed (or made redundant) in order to 
protect more male and breadwinner jobs (Wedderburn, 1968: 69). 
 
Enterprise coordination is not however solely confined to addressing the problem of technical 
change and labour reduction.  It is equally applicable to new plants, where incentives are 
necessary to ensure a ‘par’ level of output is attained.  As Wedderburn notes, this works when 
workers reach the maximum output as quickly as possible and without ‘over-valuing the new 
jobs in relation to existing ones’ (Wedderburn, 1968: 82).  Workers are an important element 
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to enterprise coordination.  In this instance, finding an acceptable piece-rate system – to both 
workers and management – may be construed as an essentially industrial relations problem.  
Even where the specific piece rates have been shaped by job-evaluation mechanisms, the fine 
line between the wage costs which the company is able to support versus both overt (e.g. 
strikes) and covert opposition from workers (e.g. absenteeism, turnover) demonstrates the 
importance of coordinating problems.  Without resolution these have the potential of scuttling 
the viability of an enterprise. 
 
Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain on the one side and Dorothy Wedderburn on the other 
share a strong common trait: both give detailed glimpses of the enterprise and the 
organizational problems it encounters in order to survive.  In Wedderburn’s case enterprise 
planning becomes incorporated into the organizational architecture of firms.  As important as 
it is, enterprise planning becomes subsumed under coordination.  Wedderburn is thus a strong 
advocate of coordination as the process which facilitates both technical, productivity and 
labour force change within the enterprise.  In the work of Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain, 
coordination holds a weaker influence.  In their work, calculation is given elevated 
importance.  Calculation is conceived as a practice which invokes all cunning and reason.  
Where calculation invokes reason, the most appropriate discourses in terms of the context and 
the problems it ruptures are deployed to navigate solutions.  But enterprise calculation is 
concerned with integrating the elements that make up the whole.  Coordination is the process 
which secures the success of integration.  While Wedderburn gives coordination a strong 
influence, even subsuming enterprise planning under the ambit of coordination, Cutler, 
Hindess, Hirst and Hussain give it a weak influence where coordination is the result of a 
success.  This distinction has significance and will be explored in more depth in the chapters 
discussing skills levy policy which has a bearing on the present skill formation processes as 
these have been conceived in this thesis. 
 
4.5 Conceiving Skills Regimes through Macro 
Coordination 
Aside from the debates on planning involving Austrian economists and socialists in the 1920s 
and 1930s or debates about the role of the state in market economies which pitted Austrian 
economists against Swedish economists soon after, the modern usage of the concept 
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coordination has closer affinity to a paradigm of systems integration (Omicini & 
Papadopoulos, 2001: 103). 
 
In this section to our discussion of coordination, consideration is given to the problem of 
exercising coordination of the vocational education and training system – in short the skills 
formation system – in the traditionally advanced social democratic countries.  First, since the 
structure of the labour market within these countries exhibit noticeable differences and 
second, since these labour market structures have experienced institutional pressures to 
accommodate ongoing change, the literature in general has designated the different types of 
social democratic market systems as coordinated market economies.  This appellation has 
been contrasted with that of either business or market centred (e.g. the United States and 
Britain) labour market configurations, which have in general been referred to as liberal 
market economies.  In contrast, examples of coordinated market economies are: Sweden, 
Germany, Japan and Norway. 
 
Quite a significant proportion of the contemporary literature which discusses coordinated 
market economies tends to be written from the perspective of an academic orientation that is 
referred to as the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach.  The writers who adopt the VOC 
perspective (see the papers in Hall & Soskice, 2001) distinguish themselves from previous 
analyses which viewed the outcomes in coordination as either the result of institutional inertia 
or the product of compacts between employers and trade unions carried out in the name of 
corporatism.  But even when corporatism was identified, the power of trade unions and 
struggles by workers from below was invoked as a key factor in forcing compromise from 
employers.  The presumption was that if employers had the freedom they would revert to 
uncoordinated systems.  But there is a strong tendency within the VOC perspective of putting 
the onus of coordination onto employers.  VOC recognises different axes of employers.  
These axes can be multiple and differentiates large from small employers, they can be 
industry or sector specific (e.g. metal and engineering sector and industries) or they can 
contain broader sectoral dimensions (e.g. export oriented versus non-export oriented sectors). 
 
The central question which concerns us is how coordination is conceived in the literature on 
the varieties of capitalism.  Considered purely on the presentation of theoretical arguments, 





.  To a degree VOC mirrors cameralism
15
.  It is able to map the 
detailed interests which constitute institutional life and its trajectory.  It actually shuns 
formalization for detailed historical and empirical analysis. 
 
VOC proposes going beyond corporatism as the collusion of two powerful interests that 
ensure stabilisation of the system.  Instead VOC assigns credit to groups for coordinating 
among themselves to achieve joint gains (Thelen & Kume, 2006: 12).  These differences are 
expressed in different clusters of institutions.  By doing this, VOC actually posits the notion 
of comparative institutional advantage and subtly avoids imputing institutional change 
exclusively to neo-liberalism.  Consequently, VOC attempts to understand the advantage 
which employers in coordinated market economies derive from regulated and coordinated 
institutional configurations.  For example, Thelen and Kume (2006: 13) believe that the 
emphasis which VOC theories give to the continuing interests of employers as a reason for 
the preservation of existing institutional arrangements is significantly better than explanations 
which impute either institutional inertia or union defence as reasons for continuity.  It leads 
them to adopt a more dynamic conception of coordination which they see as constantly being 
assembled and adapted: 
‘Rather than thinking of coordination as a “thing” or “state of affairs” that whole 
countries either have or do not have, we think it is much more useful to conceive of 
coordination as a political process and something that is not at all self-sustaining but 
in fact has to be constantly nurtured and ‘patched up’, and sometime renegotiated 
entirely’ (Thelen & Kume, 2006: 14) 
This is an important point which the detailed institutional overviews and studies (e.g. 
Bowman, 2005 and Thelen & Kume 2006) of coordination in coordinated or non-liberal 
market economies have tried to demonstrate.  Borrowing the notion of ‘beneficial constraints’ 
from Wolfgang Streek, Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012: 7) suggest that ‘the dense network 
                                                 
14
 Höpner (2007) argues that in addition to the concept of coordination, there is great value for VOC to borrow 
the concept of organization from Andrew Shonfield the author of Modern Capitalism: the changing balance of 
public and private power (1965&1969) and using it in tandem with coordination. 
15
 Cameralism was a system of public economic management that prevailed in the 18
th
 century and was strong 
in Prussia and among the German principalities.  Referring to the historical and institutional roots of German 
and American political theory, Van Meerhaeghe notes that ‘German political theory is primarily collectivist; 
American political theory is essentially individualistic’ (Van Meerhaeghe, 2011: 146).  He quotes the pioneer 
American sociologist Albion Small on the cameralists who wrote: ‘To understand modern Germany … it is 
necessary to take account not only of present activities in Germany, but those formative purposes and tentative 
institutions which the cameralists represented’ (Small cited in Van Meerhaeghe, 2011: 146).  Similarly Van 
Meerhaeghe cites Werner Sombart who wrote in the aftermath of the German hyperinflation that ‘a 
contemporary cameralism is necessary’ (Werner Sombart quoted in Van Meerhaeghe, 2011: 135). 
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of institutional constraints’ in Germany ‘imposes beneficial constraints on firms, encouraging 
them to invest in skills’ (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012: 7). 
 
A significant contribution to an institutional analysis framed around the problem of 
coordination was taken up in a book written by Thelen on how institutions evolved to create 
specific national comparative skill formation systems under different varieties of capitalism 
(Thelen, 2004).  The analysis contrasted the historical and institutional formation of skill 
development systems in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan.  The object of her 
analysis was to trace the differences between plant-based training that emerged between 
coordinated market economies such as Germany and Japan and liberal market economies 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom.  Plant-based training in Germany –the 
foundations of which were laid at the end of the 19
th
 century – gave rise to an apprenticeship 
system which is imputed as an important factor in advancing Germany’s industrial growth 
and development
16
.  Deploying an overt comparative historical institutional analysis she 
sought to trace the contemporary differences between these coordinated and liberal market 
economies back to the nineteenth century (Thelen, 2004: 4-5).  Thelen’s analysis which is 
embedded in a strong historical institutionalist research programme, poses a serious question 
between the visible continuities in industrial training or skill formation systems which her 
comparative analysis supports versus the massive discontinuities which the South African 
evidence apparently posits.  This is especially evident in respect of the changes to national 
skill development strategies which occurred after 1994. 
Thelen’s insights will be used to help draw lessons of the South African experience to skill 
formation, especially in respect of institutional reforms that have occurred in the coordinated 
market economies.  Perhaps the most important insight is that coordination problems in these 
economies tend to be resolved through non-market mechanisms, a point which Myrdal for 
instance made five decades earlier. 
 
                                                 
16
 While the dual apprenticeship system which is represented through the fusion of workplace training and 
school-based theoretical instruction epitomises the strengths of the German skill formation system, Bowman 
cautions that the parallel continuing education system in Germany (especially for adults wishing to retrain and 
renew their skills) is institutionally chaotic, ‘more jungle than a system and characterised by the low quality of 
training offers, the lack of transparency in the training market, and uneven access to further training’ (Bowman, 
2005: 572-573.  Also see Hummelsheim & Timmerman ( 2000: 47). 
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4.6 Coordination and the Importance of 
Interdependencies 
Malone and Crowston (1991; 1994) have attempted to formulate a theory of coordination 
which draws from organizational theory.  Malone and Crowston (1991: 3) define 
coordination in terms of how actors work together
17
.  But they warn that coordination theory 
does not attempt to analyse everything in complex systems.  Coordination theory ‘focuses 
only on the goal-directed processes of coordination’ (Malone & Crowston, 1991: 4).  While 
they allow a broad definition of coordination as encompassing the act of working together, 
Malone and Crowston advance a narrower but more systematic definition of coordination as 
the act of managing interdependencies between activities (Malone & Crowston, 1991: 12).  
These interdependencies can be pooled, sequential or reciprocal.  The coordination process 
involves goal selection and goal decomposition.  In a world where multiple activities exert 
pressure on limited resources, attracting and allocating resources feature prominently in 
coordination theory.  Giving content to the practical problem of engaging in activities at the 
right time and with the right resources gives rise to problems of sequencing and 
synchronization. 
 
The research which Malone and Crowston (1991; 1994 & Crowston, 1997) undertook has 
been extended by a host of other theorists.  A recent paper by Van Fenema, Pentland and 
Kumar (2004) presented a number of useful insights into where coordination theory is 
headed.  One paradigm which they refer to is the contingency paradigm.  In the contingency 
paradigm, organizations are shown to apply substitutable mechanisms to deal with task 
dependencies.  The selection process matches information processing needs with appropriate 
capacities (Van Fenema, Pentland & Kumar, 2004: 4).  Confirming an association between 
cybernetics (Wiener, 1954) and systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1968), contingency theory 
attempts to account for vulnerability and uncertainty.  Uncertainty increases the need for 
information processing.  Coordination is heightened in complex environments which are 
confronted by task variability.  Task variability dictates the amount of information processing 
that is needed.  Furthermore, the information at hand is often elusive to obtain and when 
obtained contains ambiguities.  Often it cannot be verified under the constraints requiring 
decisions to be made.  This raises the problem of task analysability.  Task analysability tends 
                                                 
17
 Within organizational theory, actors are conceived in the couplet: principal-agent.  Agents are the actors that 
manage the possession and assets of their principals. 
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to paralyse the most effective response.  A typology of dependencies was sharpened through 
models of physical workflows: sequential and reciprocal.  This was later extended to team 
interdependent workflows.  Each of these situations contain fundamental shifts in complexity 
resulting in greater difficulty of attaining delivery goals coupled with a rise in the costs of 
coordination. 
 
The analogy between coordination and transaction cost appears to feature prominently in the 
theory which Malone and Crowston advance.  Changes to the staffing of information 
technology institutions for instance have been attributed to pressures to reduce the 
coordination costs towards more intensive structures.  In such organizations, the traditional 
overseeing role which managers traditionally occupied is reassigned to lower ranking senior 
clerical staff.  Where this occurs, managers not able to assume more knowledge intensive but 
information technology roles in the organization would certainly face redundancy.  It has 
been suggested that the reduction in coordination costs –  particularly in information 
technology intensive firms – leads to smaller less vertically integrated firms (e.g. travel 
agencies operating as separate firms doing online reservations have largely reduced this 
function within airlines).  In this example, the process of the reduction in agency costs was 
shown to contribute to more decentralization.  However, where pressure is exerted for a 
reduction in the costs of information crucial to shape decisions in organizations, the trend 
would be in the opposite direction.  Thus, the shift would be for greater coordination in the 
flows of such information ensuring that it flows before expiry to the deadline into a 
centralised pool where it is consolidated for wider use within the organization or its systems 
(e.g. as occurs with the economic indicator data that is released periodically by Statistics 
South Africa). 
 
The analysis which draws heavily on the disciplinary concerns of organizational theory 





4.7 A Sociological Stock-Take and Framework for 
Coordination 
Considering the rather extensive but seemingly incomprehensible manner in which the idea 
of coordination is haphazardly applied to empirical situations, there is a lot of merit to build 
on Merton’s earlier postulates.  Merton favoured a structural application of these.  Free from 
preconceptions of grandeur, a structural application of the middle range which addresses the 
chaotic empirical applications of coordination can make a distinction between the micro and 
the macro.  Thus micro-level coordination can be differentiated from macro-level 
coordination.  We can also insert a level to coordination which is not purely at the micro-
level neither is it purely at the macro level.  For want of a better word this can be referred to 
as meso-level coordination. 
 
In general terms macro-level coordination corresponds to the coordination of multi-
organisations and institutions.  It may also have affinity to a wider system of coordination.  
Micro-level coordination certainly has a closer semblance to the coordination of single 
entities: these can include both people and organisations.  Meso level coordination invokes 
affinity with more complex organisational and institutional forms, but which are nonetheless 
still less complex than the organisational and institutional forms which would exist at a 
macro-level.  One can impute coordination involving strong inter-organisational relationships 
as a form of meso-coordination.  All levels of coordination, macro-, meso and micro- are 





In addition as Steven Brint (1994) suggests, the different levels at which coordination is 
exercised ought also to be imposed on different sectors which encompass the profit sector of 
firms and enterprises, the state sector as well as the non-profit sector.  All of these sectors 
embody different levels through which specific policies, programmes and events are 
coordinated.  These can often overlap.  The consequence is that different interests attached to 
these different sectors can come into conflict.  Although referring to the American context, it 
is applicable to different country contexts including South Africa and there is some worth in 
quoting Brint (1994) in more detail: 
                                                 
18
 Johann Maree periodically reminded me about this point in our numerous conversations. 
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‘In all the advanced societies, the market is the economic tool and the private sector is 
the employer of first resort.  ….  In general, professions involved in the spheres of 
business services and applied technology are organised as private sector activities. 
 
‘In theory, the state takes over only those activities where the market cannot be 
trusted to generate meaningful prices or adequate levels of provision.  These include 
activities that cannot be parcelled out in discrete units to individual consumers (e.g. 
defence and public health regulation), that are necessary to control economic 
externalities (e.g. environmental regulation), and in other instances where the interest 
of the entire society are involved (e.g. historically, the provision of free public 
education through adolescence).  Consequently, professions primarily involved in the 
provision of large-scale collective goods, such as legal administration, civic planning, 
mass transportation, utilities, education, social welfare, and national security are 
organized primarily as public sector activities. 
 
‘The American economy also includes a relatively large third sector (representing 
over 5 percent of the national income and more than 9 percent of total paid and 
volunteer employment).  This non-profit sector is enormously heterogeneous.  ….  
The organizations in the non-profit economy cannot distribute profits to members or 
shareholders and are eligible for a variety of tax advantages and public subsidies, 
ranging from exclusion from income tax obligations, reduced postage rates, free 
public service advertising on radio and television, and in many places, exemption 
from local property and sales taxes. 
 
‘In theory, non-profits are expected to respond to “the diversity of demands for public 
goods”.  Government provides collective goods for the majority, and non-profits for 
“the under-satisfied”.  They provide collective commodities – education, charitable 
aid and comfort, research, culture, valued training, or membership benefits – either for 
a minority of the population, or above the minimum provided by government.  Non-
profit status turns on making a persuasive argument that market provision is 
dangerous or unsatisfactory to the society’.(Brint, 1994: 60-61) 
Building on Brint’s apt description of the diversity of sectors to the American economy, 
which he classifies respectively as a profit sector, a state sector and a non-profit sector, there 
is convenience in applying this three-fold typology, by making the necessary amendments 
required, to the South African context.  I will use the same designation that Brint (1994) uses 
to distinguish between the profit-sector and the state-sector.  Brint however refers to the non-
profit sector as an economy (see third paragraph to the above quotation from Brint) which 
does not distribute profits to its members.  A similar qualification is appropriate to the 
existence of the non-profit sector in South Africa.  This occurred during the period of United 
Party rule (before 1948) when Afrikaner nationalists established a strong presence in this 
sector.  It was also a strategy to mobilise the Afrikaner population on specific issues such as 
language of instruction in schools (see Malherbe, 1981) as well as to mobilise the poor White 
population.  In the period of NP rule, the anti-apartheid opposition cultivated a strong 
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presence in this non-profit sector.  The presence of a radical socialist opposition in this sector 
was often blurred by the strong presence of liberal anti-apartheid organisations which existed 
alongside.  To emphasise the strong institutional building orientation of this sector to a non-
racial democratic South Africa – in addition to acknowledging it as a non-profit sector – 
following Brint (1994) I occasionally also use term: social development economy as a 
reference to this sector. 
 
Quite a large literature depicting the various permutations in the growth of the non-profit 
sector in the recent period has evolved (Woch, 1990; Anheier & Seibel, 1990) and various 
nomenclatures have been applied to it.  While the terms that have been applied to characterise 
it include the voluntary sector, the nonprofit sector and the third sector, the blanket terms that 
I have used to designate the sector are either the technically correct designation of ‘non-profit 
sector’ or ‘non-profit organisations’ or my own preference of ‘the social development 
economy’ which incorporates NGOs, NPOs, and social entrepreneurship ventures etc. 
 
The arena of public school-level education has also been distinctly marked first by the 
pioneering interventions of philanthropic and religious involvement in education through the 
non-profit sector.  This involvement in education was led to greater state involvement albeit 
at first gradual.  The state did not however abrogate the involvement of the non-profit sector 
in school-level education.  Nor did it circumscribe private school level education or education 
provision that was neither undertaken by philanthropic or religious involvement nor 
education that was spearheaded by gradually increasing state involvement. 
 
The insights of Ernest Alexander (1995) arguably provide the most compelling lense through 
which the micro-, meso- and macro- spheres of coordination can be systematically framed.  It 
saves us the arduous task of trying to construct a framework from the disparate and multiple 
ways that coordination is conceived in the literature.  The advantage of Alexander’s analysis 
is that it also provides a structural classification of coordination which is grounded in 
literature and case studies from the field. 
 
A precondition for coordination in Alexander’s analysis is alignment towards implementation 
of organisations that potentially can contribute to coordination.  Singularly or collectively, 
these organisations are required to act in unison for coordination to take place successfully.  
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Alexander refers to this process of organisations acting together to achieve designated results 
or outcomes as inter-organizational coordination.  As he put it: 
‘.. concerted action among organizations does not happen by chance.  It is the result of 
inter-organizational coordination (IOC)’ (Alexander, 1995: xv). 
Even in the sphere of government, interconnectedness between agencies means that there is 
less scope for only one organization to shape things without it having an impact on others.  
This means that implementation usually requires the deployment of many actors and actions 
across multiple organizations.  Alexander (1995) formulates a structural dimension to 
coordination and although his work is multi-layered, three pivotal elements in his work which 
are crucial to inter-organizational coordination merit attention.  First, is his emphasis on 
control mechanisms which he argues are a precondition for coordination structures.  Second, 
is his identification of different types of interdependence which he says contributes to a 
determinate or predictable organisational structure or form.  Third, he succinctly identifies a 
basket or set of coordination tools (sometimes also referred to as coordination mechanisms) 
which are pivotal to any coordination process. 
4.7.1 Control Mechanisms 
Alexander (1995) imputes adjustment structures which permeate society as the structural 
mechanism that controls the shape of inter-organizational coordination.  Markets are one 
example of such structural mechanisms.  Within markets coordination takes place through 
mutual adjustment between rational and self-interested actors (Alexander, 1995: 4).  Markets 
can also take a variety of forms.  Such variation can even encompass a political market in 
which transactions are expressed through legislatures, committees, regulatory and executive 
agencies and also informally between organisations (Alexander, 1995: 4). Provision is also 
made in this viewpoint for quasi-markets to be subsumed under the structural coordination of 
markets.  Alexander thus argues that ‘market-like relationships also provide the arenas for 
coordinated interaction between individuals and organizations in a variety of settings’ 
(Alexander, 1995: 5).  What characterises the variety of these market forms according to 
Alexander is a common framework of rules and mutual obligations that enable participants to 
engage in market-like interactions.  These interactions contribute to mutually beneficial 
coordinated actions (Alexander, 1995: 5).  Alexander says that within market exchange, 
organizations interact solely through mutual adjustment (Alexander, 1995: 30).  The plurality 
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of organisations demarcated into an organisational field that is coordinated through mutual 
adjustment, are known as markets. 
 
Apart from markets, organisations can be grouped into solidarity fields and hierarchical 
fields.  Solidarity fields are characterised by organisations that are linked mainly through 
communalistic reciprocal transactions (Alexander, 1995: 30).  Rights and environmental 
groups and organisations are examples of organisations that typically conform to a solidarity 
field.  Hierarchy characterises organisational fields that are linked by hierarchical forms of 
inter-organisational coordination (Alexander, 1995: 30).  These differing organisational 
contexts and fields to inter-organisational linkages are sometimes also referred to as the 
division of the inter-organisational universe between: community, hierarchy and market 
(Alexander, 1995: 30).  The three specific control mechanisms associated with each of 
market, hierarchy and community are according to Alexander respectively the mechanism of: 
price, authority and trust (Alexander, 1995: 54).  Furthermore, just as the community field is 
posited to fit between markets and hierarchies, the mutual organisation too is assigned an 
intermediate range between hierarchy and market.  The same applies to associational 
networks such as a trade union federation. 
4.7.2 Interdependencies 
Alexander suggests that the type of interdependence which organisations command in 
relation to one another is an important precondition for inter-organisational coordination.  
Interdependence based on input/output relationships between organisations are of three types.  
Alexander identifies the most basic form of interdependence which stem from input/output 
relationships as serial interdependence.  Here one unit’s product or output is the input for 
another (Alexander, 1995: 31).  Serial interdependence between separate organisations is 
referred to as sequential interdependence (Alexander, 1995: 31).  Sequential interdependence 
that involves high human capital transaction investment will increasingly lead to more formal 
coordination and control.  It can result in fully hierarchical coordination where the 
organisational forms culminate into a single organisation characterised by either vertical or 
horizontal integration (Alexander, 1995: 32). 
 
A second type of interdependence known as reciprocal interdependence is more complex than 
serial or sequential interdependence.  Reciprocal interdependence occurs where one unit’s 
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output is an input for another unit’s activities and simultaneously, the other unit’s product is 
an input to the initial unit.  This too can lead to mergers of different units. 
 
The third type of interdependence is pooled interdependence.  Pooled interdependence occurs 
through mutual commonality.  It can either involve competitive or symbolic (or commensal) 
interdependence.  Different types of pooled interdependence experience variations in 
resource dependency.  These have generated several types of coordination structures such as 
the joint venture and the trade association (Alexander, 1995: 34).  Research evidence 
summarised by Alexander suggests that pooled interdependence has usually resulted in low 
levels of inter-organisational coordination and was associated with poorly integrated 
coordination structures (Alexander, 1995: 35).  More satisfactory inter-organisational 
integration resulted from sequential interdependence but many of these initiatives 
experienced delayed implementation with uneven quality (Alexander, 1995: 35).  The lessons 
from these studies emphasised the importance of resource availability to inter-organisational 
implementation. 
4.7.3 Coordination Tools 
Finally, the third element which is pivotal to inter-organisational coordination involves 
coordination tools which some authors also refer to as coordination mechanisms.  Some 
authors also use the terms ‘tools’ and ‘strategies’ interchangeably.  According to Alexander 
(1995: 40) coordination tools are the basic elements for inter-organisational coordination to 
take place.  Examples of coordination tools include: joint planning, overlapping board 
memberships and contracts (Alexander, 1995: 40).  Thus tools can be nested in the 
framework of strategies but the reverse does not apply.  Describing in more detail what 
coordination tools potentially encompass, Alexander notes: 
‘Thus bidding and contracts would be coordination tools used in the context of a 
competitive strategy, or overlapping board memberships could be part of a co-
optation strategy.  Joint planning and budget signoff might be employed as tools in a 
cooperative strategy, or be built into organizations’ or organizational units’ prescribed 
relationships in a structural strategy of reorganization. 
 
Coordination tools comprise formal and informal processes and linkages.  “Informal 
coordinative mechanisms” include interpersonal contacts and informal channels of 
communication (Chisholm, 1989: 64-85), which may be effected through ad-hoc 
meetings, telephone contacts, or correspondence (e.g. distribution of informational 
material to a wider mailing list than the people formally linked to the source)’ 




According to Alexander (1995: 42), different sets of formal coordination tools can be 
invoked.  One set are structural coordination devices which cover the formalisation and 
standardisation of tasks.  Typically, this is achieved through standard operating procedures 
and routines, schedules and blueprints (Alexander, 1995: 42). 
 
Another set of formal coordination tools are linkage devices.  These include: inter-
organisational agreements and contracts and are responsible for assigning responsibilities but 
can also regulate resource exchanges.  In areas where coordination can potentially take root, 
linkages can be achieved through joint planning and joint budgeting.  Linkage devices can 
also be instituted through programmatic interconnections such as: ‘staff exchanges, 
collocation, joint or combined services delivery, out-stationing of personnel and mutual 
consultation (Alexander, 1995: 42).  Tools that are designed to improve programme 
management interventions can also be used to direct mandatory funding such as training 
levies towards certain implementation goals.  These can also be mobilised to strengthen the 
formal coordination of designated goals and strategies.  Alexander says that these can 
‘include grant allocation formulas, categorical grants, loan guarantees, insurance subsidies 
and tax incentives or deferments’ (Alexander, 1995: 42).  The skills development levy which 
is a core component to the funding of work-based training in South Africa would be an 
example of a coordination tool which is designed to produce coordinated action as a result of 
resource exchange (Alexander, 1995: 42).  Other programme management devices which are 
used to harness the coordination of service delivery or project execution include: 
‘…program control tools such as plan review and approval, licensing, contract terms, 
interpretation of regulations and discretionary waivers, audits, monitoring and 
evaluation.  Program control also involves the threat or invocation of sanctions such 
as stopping funding, withholding future funding, or closing programs or facilities.  
Specification or participation to influence the selection of key personnel is another 
way of exercising program control’ (Alexander, 1995: 42-43). 
A number of different characterisations can be used to group organisations which share a 
common environment and purpose.  Drawing on contemporary literature, Alexander (1995) 
indicates that different terms have been used to capture specific dimensions of these 
organisational relationships.  These include terms such as ‘action set’, ‘policy issue network’ 
or ‘policy system’.  In the context where policy is still under development and therefore still 
taking shape, the term ‘advocacy coalition’ has been applied to organisations involved with 
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the process.  Similarly, organisations involved in a common programme or project, have been 
referred to as an ‘implementation set’ (Alexander, 1995: 26-27). 
 
The process of coordination can only be brought about through control mechanisms which 
harness different types of interdependencies.  Similarly, control mechanisms and the different 
types of interdependencies at play will shape the tools that are available to affect coordination 
and bring about change. 
4.7.4 Coordination Structures 
The intelligence and decision-making process to put coordination with its potentially 
different organisational linkages and dimensions into motion is referred to as a coordination 
structure.  Alexander refers to a coordinating structure as ‘the form of the coordinating 
mechanism linking the decision centers in an organization or of the relevant organizations in 
an interorganizational system’ (Alexander, 1995: 49).  A coordinating structure can take 
multiple forms.  It can exist within a single organisation.  Examples include liaison devices or 
even through management controls in ‘divisionalised’ organisations as well as through 
similar controls exercised through the holding corporation.  It can also span several 
organisations.  Where coordination takes place between multiple organisations or 
organisational sets, coordination structures can be identified at several levels. 
 
An additional reason according to Alexander (1995: 51) for the significance of coordination 
structures to inter-organisational coordination is that it provides a format or menu to 
institutional design.  Coordination typically necessitates structural change in existing 
organisational configurations.  Such structural change cannot occur without making provision 
for some level of institutional design or re-design. 
 
Alexander (1995) formulates an organisational matrix which helps to situate coordination 
structures.  Coincidentally, it corresponds along one of its axes – for simplicity I call it the 
vertical axis – to elements of Merton’s middle range theory elaborated in Section 4.2 of this 
chapter.  But unlike Merton’s theory, it is more explicit about the hierarchical range that it 
covers.  However, instead of this hierarchical range spanning micro-, meso- and macro-levels 
as Merton’s theory suggested, Alexander’s hierarchy ranges from micro-, meso- to meta-
levels.  Each level is differentiated by increases in organisational complexity and scale.  
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Thus, meta-structures exist at the highest level and ‘embraces the interorganizational field as 
a whole (Alexander, 1995: 52).  Below the meta-level is the meso-level which covers ‘a 
particular interorganizational system, “action set: or “implementation set” of organizations’ 
(Alexander, 1995: 52).  Meso-structures thus link inter-organisational systems for inter-
organisational coordination (Alexander, 1995: 53).  Meso-structures therefore: 
‘… cover a wide range from the informal network in the market context, through 
various types of “action sets” and mutual associations such as joint ventures and 
federations, to more formally linked “implementation sets” of organizations in 
mandated frameworks, and single organizations of various forms, from the loosely 
linked conglomerate to the unitary organization’ (Alexander, 1995: 53). 
Micro-structures constitute the lowest level and: 
‘… are devices for linking intra- or interorganizational decision centres.  These exist 
within and in conjunction with the higher level coordination structures.  They include 
informal links, the interorganizational group, the bilateral liaison or boundary 
spanning role, the multiunit coordinator and the coordinating unit’ (Alexander, 1995: 
53). 
Although there is huge merit in devoting time to comprehend Alexander’s rich conception of 
inter-organizational coordination, one still has to exercise patience with his often discursive 
elaboration of the components which constitute inter-organizational coordination.  Most 
important is to understand how he assigns a framework to each of the three distinct 
coordination structures of: market, community and hierarchy.  In principle, because the 
market as a coordinating structure is dependent on price as a regulator to ensure coordination 
adjustment, the framework which markets typically exhibit is one of mutual adjustment 
(Alexander, 1995: 56).  Resources which are necessary to ensure that coordination under 
markets take place, are deployed through mutual adjustment.  If there is no consent on the 
coordination imperatives under markets, resources are not released.  Conceptually, market 
coordination is pervaded by a framework of mutual adjustment. 
 
Institutions and organisations that are grouped under ‘community’ exhibit and project a more 
solidaristic outlook to social organisation.  Examples of such institutions within a South 
African context are cooperatives, community organisations, non-profit institutions.  In and 
among institutions that make up the community sector, trust is a regulator to coordination and 
coordination adjustment.  Trust is fuelled by ingredients such as reciprocity and sacrifice.  
Although not absent in other coordination structures, these elements play a significant role to 
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coordinate, shape and generate social change.  Alexander refers to the framework which this 
segment of society generates as the solidarity framework: 
‘In the solidarity framework, coordination is the result of a sense of mutual obligation 
among its participating units.  This may be the product of any or all of several factors: 
shared beliefs or values, common affiliation, and long-term reciprocal interaction.  
The family, clan and tribe are the traditional forms of societal organization which are 
examples of solidarity-based coordination, but the family is still universal, and clans 
and tribes remain common in some societies today’ (Alexander, 1995: 58). 
Importantly, Alexander notes that professionals who often galvanise around shared values 
and ideas develop relationships with each other and with organisations where their activities 
and actions are regulated through a framework of solidarity.  Similarly, ‘solidarity based 
coordination can also take the form of a “collegium”: a peer-group sharing disciplinary or 
professional values’ (Alexander, 1995: 58).  Therefore, conceptually, community 
coordination is pervaded by a framework of solidarity. 
 
The final peg to comprehending frameworks that broadly correspond to coordination 
structures is reserved for mandated frameworks.  Typically coordination that is mediated 
through authority structures puts greater emphasis on mediated frameworks to ensure that 
coordination and specifically inter-organisation coordination indeed takes place.  It is more 
likely that hierarchical systems, action sets or implementation sets will impose or use 
authority to sanction or mandate a framework through which coordination is attained.  As 
Alexander avers: 
‘... mandated frameworks produce coordinated action primarily by providing a 
legitimised set of rules or norms to govern specific types of resource exchange.  
Resource allocation is the incentive for coordinated action in another type of 
mandated framework: the categorical grant programme, which is a type of non-
administrative program’ (Alexander, 1995: 60). 
To reiterate, hierarchical coordination structures (e.g. centralised state or ‘divisionalised’ 
corporation – with General Motors being its exemplar in the literature for the 1990s and 
earlier) has the authority that allows one to conceptually perceive that hierarchies are 
pervaded by a framework which mandates.  This is known as a mandated framework. 
 
The NSDS in South Africa which is financed through a levy-grant system is also an example 
of a mandated framework.  In this instance, through its authority and persuasion, the South 
African government sets the parameters of the framework.  It is mandated through legislation 
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and regulation governing its tools or mechanisms, such as the payroll levies which form the 
bastion to the levy-grant system as it operates in South Africa. 
 
However, Alexander’s text did not systematically formulate the matrix of coordination 
structures so that the appropriate balance could be comprehended between hierarchical levels 
on the one axis with control mechanisms on the other.  This is because his text conflates 
control mechanisms with hierarchical levels.  While his characterisation of control 
mechanisms is not incorrect, it does create some confusion.  One can rectify this by stating 
quite simply that there are typically three coordination structures consisting of markets, 
hierarchies and solidarity (or community) that permeate across all three hierarchical or 
societal organizational levels (e.g. micro-, meso- and meta-levels).  As structural mechanisms 
or coordination structures, markets, hierarchies and solidarity (or community) are in general 
each respectively regulated and controlled through the mechanism of price, authority and 
trust.  When these mechanisms are disrupted, the structural mechanism or coordination 
structure of markets, hierarchies and solidarity (or community) will in turn also be disrupted.  
The same applies should the mechanism collapse; it would lead to the collapse of the 
structural mechanism or coordination structure.  With this said, the matrix is complete and in 
fact is clearly represented in the Table 4.2 below which I have extracted from Alexander 





Table 4.2: Inter-organisational Coordination Structures 
 
 
This brings to a close the theoretical observations which the thesis advances.  In chapters 5 to 
7 a more empirical dimension to the coordination of enterprise skill formation as it unfolded 
in South Africa will be examined.  However, the theoretical observations formulated in 





solidarity frameworks Interorganizational networks mandated frameworks






advocacy coalition Interorganizational networks federation
alliance/coalition mutual organizations assocation
tribe alliance/coalition lead organisation
clan Joint venture single organisation
collective federation
commune
family informal links interorganizational group
clan liaison boundary spanner coordinator





Solidarity (Community) Hierarchy (Organization)Market
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Chapter 5: Coordination and Formation of 
Enterprise Skills in South Africa during the 
Segregationist Period: late 1870s to the 1950s 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a discussion is presented of the process to the coordination of the supply of 
enterprise skill formation as it has evolved historically.  This discussion covers the period that 
roughly extends from the discovery of precious minerals in the South African hinterland (late 
1860s), the process which started its exploitation (1870s and 1880s) as well as the extensive 
mining-led industrialisation (1870s to 1950s) which characterised the period until well after 
the Second World War.  The need for a stable and consistent labour supply, to feed this 
process, is a key factor, to understanding the economic history of modern South Africa.  
There is a voluminous literature which covers this subject but a more up to date introduction 
is given in Feinstein (2005).  In this chapter, attention is directed to the emergence of 
strategies, institutional designs as well as the active intellectual knowledge and support which 
gradually coalesced to realise the challenge of the coordination process to the supply of 
enterprise skill formation.  This occurred incrementally in the decades which followed the 
mining revolution in South Africa.  The analysis extends from the late 1870s to the late 
1950s. 
 
When one addresses the coordination of skills development among firms, it is important to 
distinguish between the coordination needs of individual firms on the one side versus larger 
collective groupings of firms on the other.  Comparative institutional theorists have been at 
the forefront in making a strong argument using this distinction.  Kathleen Thelen (2004) 
applies this approach to an analysis of the historical emergence of skill formation regimes 
across four countries in the early decades of the twentieth century: Germany, Britain, the 
United States and Japan.  Individual firms themselves will favour collective coordination 
processes which guarantee provision of skills to their own specific ‘firm' because this signals 
consistency in policies towards skill formation especially in government policy.  Moreover, it 
provides firms with a degree of stability and certainty in the manner each individually relates 




The argument put forward in this chapter is that the process to the coordination and 
regulation of enterprise level skills in South Africa suggests profound continuities between 
the attempts made at the turn of the twentieth century from what was eventually 
institutionalised in a more complex fashion towards the closing years of the fifties.  This 
trajectory continued until the end of the apartheid period at the beginning of the 1990s.  But if 
the period of democratic rule contradicts this trend, it will have shown discontinuities, 
notwithstanding the legacy of racial inequality in the formation of skill in South Africa.  
Arguments for continuity appear to be consistent with the arguments of Thelen (2004) about 
how vocational training systems in both liberal and coordinated market economies are 
replicated, notwithstanding policies which are intermittently invoked to introduce and adopt 
successful features of the one onto the other. 
 
South Africa is quite unique in adopting a vocational training system in the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 centuries which was modelled on Britain.  However, its policy makers were not immune 
to experimenting with adjustments to the country’s vocational training system.  In South 
Africa’s vocational training history the successes of the German model became particularly 
attractive especially from the mid-1930s.  Nonetheless, South Africa was never successful in 
discarding a vocational training model which exhibited perennially enduring features of a 
liberal vocational training system (Lundall, 1998).  This was despite the importance that the 
apprenticeship system played in constituting the core content and reference to vocational 
training.   
 
5.2 Apprenticeship Training as the Bedrock for 
Coordination and Regulation of Enterprise Skills 
Formation 
It is a truism, but also necessary to state that in societies where workplace training through 
apprenticeship precedes the development of a ‘massified’ state supported and funded school 
education system, the apprenticeship training system remained an important bastion to the 
formation of skills.  This was especially evident for the emerging economies of early 
industrialising countries as was the case in South Africa.  So despite many inherent 
limitations, the apprenticeship system acquired an association with the skill formation 
systems which gradually evolved in such societies (e.g. Britain and Germany).  While 
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apprenticeship training systems bear common historical roots and traces of a lineage  which 
extends to the craft guilds, these systems showed significant divergences.  These divergences 
were already visible by the beginning of the early twentieth century when, as our analysis 
shows, the South African skills development system begins to establish rudimentary anchors.  
In a sense therefore, the apprenticeship training system – as was the case for many early 
industrialising countries – and for South Africa too, can be generalised as a skills formation 
institution that was the bedrock to the coordination and regulation of enterprise skills 
development and supply. 
 
Though this is a premise which permeates this thesis, it is quite important to note that since 
apprenticeship training systems rest on complicated social relations, dynamics and 
associations which are unique and specific to almost every single country, the notion that 
such apprenticeship training systems can be imitated and replicated in toto from one society 
to the next is extremely difficult.  While perhaps bearing some continuities such borrowed 
systems rapidly developed menus, contingent applications and implementation short-cuts 
which soon differentiated it from the system in the colonial or mother country (Root & 
Wachira, 2009).  In the contemporary era, where skills development systems have acquired a 
more complex configuration, similar borrowings too will necessitate qualifications about 
imitation and replication.  Qualifications about the infeasibility of exporting vocational 
training systems in their entirety are also prudently demonstrated by Euler (2013). 
 
But despite making this qualification at the start of this chapter, it should not detract from the 
fact that state-functionaries, policy-makers, institutional-designers and advocates – under the 
guise of adopting best-practice – will continuously and consistently hold and refer to such 
imitation and replication as representing a real undiluted exchange and transfer.  
Consequently, even when acknowledged that the apprenticeship system which initially 
emerged in South Africa was based on the British model, the actual apprenticeship system 
which emerged in South Africa was not the British apprenticeship system.  It was merely 
modelled on the British apprenticeship system.  As such, while having many parallels to the 
British system, it gradually acquired its own specific national characteristics.  The same 
qualification applies to subsequent policy borrowings and institutional imitations that have 
characterised later emendations of the South African skills formation system particularly after 
the abrogation of apartheid and the birth of a democratic dispensation in 1994 (see 




5.3 Comparative Apprenticeship Systems and its 
Coordination 
A central concern in this thesis is to gain clarity and postulate the process of coordination in 
skill formation systems particularly the coordination in the formation of a skilled labour 
supply.  How does such coordination work and what are its source and anchor point?  This 
chapter will reflect on this question using evidence from South Africa.  If one used evidence 
from the period of the initial emergence of capitalism (see Farr (2000) for a more detailed 
analysis) in which craft guilds largely defined and shaped the apprenticeship training system, 
it was also the general source and root to the coordination of the supply of skills.  It resulted 
in masters either controlling the craft guilds as an oligarchic stratum.  Masters also carried out 
the transmission of knowledge and training.  This condition would have been strengthened by 
the promulgation of legislation.  The institutional arrangement simultaneously functioned to 
regulate wages, maintain employment stability for skilled labour by exercising control over 
positions of employment.  It also formalised apprenticeship training under indenture laws.  In 
England the Statute of Apprentices (or Artificers) which formed the bastion of laws designed 
for this purpose was promulgated in 1563 (Foot, 1980).  The comparative legal and social 
framework for the dissolving medieval and the emerging capitalist economies of Western 
Europe effectively established craft masters under the auspices of guilds as the drivers of 
coordination.  It occurred mainly under a limited but growing market.  Here through 
indenture agreements craft masters had authority to shape and dictate the dispensation of 
training in a skill.  Their remuneration, recruitment and transmission of craft knowledge 
through the training of apprentices and other subordinates was closely monitored by the 
respective guilds which had the authority and jurisdiction on the matter. 
 
Following the trend of the French revolution of 1789, as the struggle against absolutism in 
Western Europe intensified, guilds were gradually outlawed and guild regulation in respect of 
apprenticeship training began to be modified.  It also meant that the generalised notion of 
control being exercised over apprenticeship training was no longer the uncontested preserve 
of master artisans.  Master artisans typically operated their own craft establishments.  Where 
they did not do so, they worked for other masters as hired journeymen employees.  It was at 
this point that different routes to the control and coordination of apprenticeship training 
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became possible.  Two routes are apparent: coordination of the supply of skilled craft labour 
through master controlled guilds on the one hand or coordination of the supply of skilled craft 
labour through craft unions. 
5.3.1 Germany 
In Germany towards the late nineteenth century, unlike the situation in England which 
showed signs of the dissolution of traditional apprenticeship, apprenticeship training of 
artisans was still under the auspices of the organised handicraft sector (Thelen, 2004: 39-40 
provides a useful account).  Apprentices learnt their trade on the job under the supervision of 
a master craftsman.  Industrialisation and the growth of manufacturing industry was however 
encouraging large firms to train their apprentices in-house but in training workshops that 
were partially removed from normal operational activities.  To pre-empt a contentious 
struggle for the radicalisation, seizure and control of the traditional apprenticeship training 
system by non-traditional interests (e.g. skilled workers or large manufacturers) and thereby 
maintain an historical status quo, the late 19
th
 century imperial German state devised a 
strategy to use the agency of a conservative stabilising stratum as a means to institutionally 
preserve the traditional apprenticeship system.  Ostensibly its design served to keep radical 
forces in check.  The Prussian state therefore passed a law in 1897 that would preserve this 
conservative stabilising force.  Known as the Handicraft Protection Law (Thelen, 2004: 43), 
it allowed handicraft chambers to function alongside voluntary guilds.  These occurred under 
a Chamber of Crafts which served as an umbrella organisation.  Thus as Gessler and Howe 
(2013: 23) argue, the Chamber of Crafts was an intermediary organisation under state control.  
It formalised the protection and institutionalisation of a traditional master-led [Meisterlehre] 
training model of on-the-job training in specialised craft production firms. 
 
These handicraft chambers ‘were endowed with extensive powers to regulate the content and 
quality of craft apprenticeship’ (Thelen, 2004: 44).  As well as set the standards for artisans, 
the Handicraft Chambers (Thelen’s translation) or the Craft Chambers (Gessler & Howe’s 
translation), were responsible for regulating and controlling the guilds.  It set minimum 
standards – based on age and working experience in journeyman occupations – for craftsmen 
to be allowed to take and train new apprentices.  By setting limits on the number of 
apprentices a firm could take, as well as regulating the length of apprenticeship contracts, the 
intention was to prevent abuse and exploitation of apprentices as cheap labour.  
80 
 
Apprenticeship examinations were instituted and representatives working as a chamber 
inspectorate were appointed to monitor training quality and if necessary revoke the licence of 
firms in the handicraft sector who failed to meet the apprenticeship training standards of the 
handicraft chamber.  Gessler and Howe note that: 
‘Chambers of Crafts received a de facto examination monopoly in the area of 
apprenticeships; the master title was protected by law.  A further amendment of the 
Trade Regulation in 1908 finally re-introduced the evidence of competence: the right 
to vocational training was now once again linked to the (medieval) master title’ 
(Gessler & Howe, 2013: 24). 
As Thelen (2004: 44) presciently remarks, the 1897 legislation constituted the cornerstone of 
the German vocational training system and its subsequent evolution. 
 
This progression in German apprenticeship training has enormous relevance to vocational 
training in South Africa.  On the opposite side, ‘Germany’s large machine producers sought 
to “rationalize” training by instituting firm-based apprenticeship workshops’(Thelen, 2004: 
55)  The idea was to train apprentices in larger groups in dedicated training workshops that 
were separated from the actual production activity of the firm.  But it was in the interests of 
large firms to transfer such training schools to the state thereby lessening the cost burden on 
employers for training.  Because, the handicraft sector had a monopoly over the standard 
setting and certification of apprenticeship training in Germany, the large scale machine 
producers waged a long struggle for universal standardization which would allow them to 
expand the volume of apprentices undergoing training in factory apprenticeship workshops.  
More importantly the large machine producers sought to overcome the regulatory oversight 
of handicraft quality assurance and certification requirements.  They were insistent that the 
skill formation system should be reformed and modernised for expanded growth.  It resulted 
at the beginning of the twentieth century in a parallel system of vocational training based in 
large manufacturing enterprises operating alongside the craftsmanship system.  In the words 
of Thelen: 
‘Tensions between the two systems changed the main route of institutional 
development.  As a result, the system departed from the decentralised and rather 
unsystematic apprenticeship, which had been characteristic of the older craftsmanship 
model, and achieved a far higher degree of centralization, standardization and 
uniformity – elements, that are considered today as determining features of the 
German system’ (Thelen quoted and translated in Gessler & Howe, 2013: 25). 
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Essentially the skills training regime in Germany was set by a coalition of shifting alliances 
between different employer interests over the direction of the vocational training system.  The 
evolution of vocational training and the skill formation process in Germany serves as an 
exemplary model to coordination between employers on the substance and most suitable 
direction that had to be taken to strengthen the overall skills development system.  It is for 
this reason that the German model is commonly referred to as a coordinated training regime. 
5.3.2 Britain 
The trajectory in Britain, as was alluded to earlier was different.  The successful struggle 
against absolutism in England occurred more than a century before the French revolution.  
When the Dutch landed by sea at the tip of the African continent to what was later to be 
known as the Cape of Good Hope and a province in a future South Africa, Oliver Cromwell 
as Lord Protector had already fought a civil war, defeated and beheaded King Charles I, the 
monarch of England.  As Lord Protector from 1653, he would lead a republican government 
in England until his death in 1659 (Christopher Hill, 1970).  In line with its quest to displace 
the colonial might of Catholic Spain, England’s foreign policy was bent on expanding the 
commercial power of a unified Britain.  A war of conquest and colonisation was being waged 
against Ireland.  Through migration from the mother country, the New England colonial 
settlements in North America, was being strengthened.  England’s naval and commercial 
power was in the ascendancy.  The British overseas empire was still only in its infancy but 
would over the next one-and-a-half-centuries become the largest sea-borne, trade, 
commercial and settlement-empire the world would know.  These conditions created a much 
more favourable climate for new commercial opportunities and ventures.  It also expanded 
the organisational forms to business enterprises owing mainly to expansion in the division of 
labour beyond traditional craft enterprises (e.g. the putting-out system).  These changes to the 
British economy were well under way from the second half of the seventeenth century. 
 
Commercial growth and foreign trade accelerated the industrial revolution in England.  As it 
established firmer roots, illegal masters and larger capitalist employers at first surreptitiously, 
later overtly, started to violate the protected employment practices which the guilds had 
traditionally upheld (Kramer, 1927: 158-160).  From at least the Stuart period (i.e. beginning 
of the seventeenth century), the English government was less inclined to defend traditional 
privileges (Thelen, 2004: 94).  Independent journeymen and struggling independent master 
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artisans bandied together to maintain seven year apprenticeship indentures.  They also sought 
controls over the number admitted into apprenticeship training.  It is evident that in relation to 
a state more attuned to a liberal policy of revoking traditional privileges, guilds were bound 
to have less influence in regulating labour market conditions of skilled journeymen artisans. 
 
Neither were guilds able to stem the recruitment of young men into apprenticeships.  As 
Hewins (1892: 81-82) shows, the onset of this trend began to emerge at the time of the 
English Civil War although Sharpe (1980: 76-77) presents evidence of this already occurring 
in the 1620s.  As a result, guilds became a moribund force.  Guilds were not able to control 
the influx of new workers into the realms which it traditionally protected and regulated 
through qualifying indentures.  Neither were guilds able to protect the rights and working 
conditions of new entrants which had begun to overwhelm the dykes and arches of the guild 
system (Kramer, 1927: 186-188).  A new form of industrial organisation based on the 
association of workers therefore came into being.  What guilds had been unsuccessful at 
preventing, trade unions began to address through controls exercised by a membership made 
up mainly of journeymen and not masters.  The objectives of the working men’s associations, 
a nascent form of craft-based trade unions, were mainly to protect and uphold wage rates, 
regulate recruitment to the trades and control the education and training of new incumbents. 
 
Despite the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 banning all forms of trade unions in Britain 
(Thelen, 2004: 96), such prohibitions had a more onerous effect on unskilled workers.  
Skilled workers possessed skills which employers desperately needed to maintain production.  
Skilled workers in Britain were therefore able to subvert the Combination Laws and 
organised themselves into ‘Friendly Societies’ especially in the period from 1800 to 1820.   
Journeymen made regular contributions to their designated ‘Friendly Society’, which they 
and their families could draw upon during unemployment, sickness or death of breadwinners 
(Thelen, 2004: 96).  Small masters too retained membership of a trade club or society as 
something to fall back upon under adverse conditions.  The ‘Friendly Society’ was a small 
step from guilds to membership in a trade union which was based on craft control. 
 
Naturally the quest to control the labour market for skilled craft workers had a direct bearing 
on the apprenticeship system.  Control implied setting limits to the supply of new artisans.  It 
strengthened the bargaining position of artisans in relation to employers.  A relatively weak 
labour market policy from the British state (compared to Germany) merely intensified the 
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adoption of craft control strategies in early British trade unions.  Thus, when the Combination 
Laws prohibiting trade union organisation was repealed in 1824, skilled workers appropriated 
the organisational devices fashioned for greater protection during the earlier phase of 
collective prohibition and inserted these into their own craft unions which they started to 
formally build.  Craft control strategies were geared to exclude non-apprenticed workers from 
protected skilled occupations.  It also excluded non-artisans from enjoying membership of 
such craft unions.  Craft control measures were typically applied to maintain levels of 
remuneration, conditions of employment and the supply of recruits undergoing industrial 
training in designated skilled occupations.  A high premium was placed on guaranteed 
contractual rights for some which would ensure that the artisan was not reduced to the same 
miserable status and condition of unskilled workers.  It sought to control access points to the 
labour market for skilled occupations.  These craft control measures did not place the same 
emphasis on quality concerns as for instance was the case in the German handicraft sector. 
 
When compared to South African labour history, it bore similarities to racial job reservation 
but since it functioned in a racially homogenous country (England), it reserved skilled jobs 
along lines of occupation and craft by differentiating between the inclusion of a labour 
aristocracy and the exclusion of an industrial proletariat.  Unlike the German metal and 
engineering industries, where contestation to reform and innovate the vocational training 
system was principally between the handicraft sector and large engineering firms, in Britain, 
the axis of conflict and contestation of apprenticeship training was between employers and 
unions representing skilled workers (Thelen, 2004: 104).  The outcome of the entire process 
of conflict and contestation about apprenticeship was a precursor to establishing new 
conditions for apprenticeship coordination which would be more stable and entrenched. 
 
Coordination of the skills agenda in Britain was through a contestation over the definition and 
control of skill between craft unions and employers.  As long as the craft trade unions which 
defended the control over craft skills remained strong, this kept employers at bay.  It meant 
that the craft trade unions played a pivotal role in exercising a coordination function to the 
supply of apprentices into craft and artisan trades.  Throughout the process, the state pursued 
a voluntarist training agenda.  The specific characterisation and configuration of the 
apprenticeship system in Britain in the late nineteenth century that subsequently formed the 
bedrock to skills training which evolved in Britain over the course of the twentieth century 
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has been variously characterised as a liberal or uncoordinated training regime (see Finegold 
& Soskice, 1988; Heyes & Stuart, 1994). 
 
5.4 The South African Inheritance 
As was indicated above, the South African apprenticeship system was modelled on the 
British apprenticeship system.  The peculiar circumstances of mineral discoveries on the 
South African hinterland during the 19
th
 century which gave major impetus to the subsequent 
industrialisation of the country shaped this adoption. 
 
The Cape of Good Hope was a Dutch colony for just roughly 150 years.  It was however lost 
to the British permanently in 1806 (Feinstein, 2005: 27).  To maintain its strategic hold of its 
colonial possession but also as a result of employment and financial crises at home, Britain 
encouraged emigration among its citizens to South Africa.  These occurred in small streams: 
first the 1820 settlers who landed at Algoa Bay (in the contemporary city of Port Elizabeth) 
and settled in the Eastern Cape hinterland and then as several migratory flows to fill the gap 
left by the north easterly migration of the Voortrekkers from the Cape Colony from 1835 
onwards.  Later when the colony of Natal was annexed from the Voortrekkers in 1843, 
British settlers flowed into this colonial possession too (This description is drawn mainly 
from Feinstein, 2005)  
 
The most cataclysmic events that would finally accelerate gravitation towards construction of 
a vocational training system in South Africa was the mining revolution that followed the 
discovery of diamonds in the 1870s and the discovery of gold in the 1880s.  Because South 
Africa was a colony to the world’s most advanced industrial power, it was quite natural that 
the bulk of the skilled technical labour and managerial labour force that was required to 
develop these new diamond and gold mines would be drawn mainly but not exclusively from 
Britain.  The engineers and skilled artisans were drawn from immigrants that were 
predominantly steeped in English traditions and organisational cultures.  Naturally, too the 
conceptions of craft control that this layer of skilled workers exuded was transferred and 




As the mining sector in South Africa emerged, first in the north-eastern and north-western 
regions of the Cape Colony, after the annexation of Griqualand West from the Griquas with 
the mining of kimberlite diamonds at Kimberley and copper at Springbok, this was followed 
later with the establishment of gold mines on the Witwatersrand in the South African 
Republic (which today falls mainly in the province of Gauteng), a railway transport 
infrastructure started to be built.  The railway network linked the interior mining towns to the 
major ports of Southern Africa: Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Delgoa 
Bay (later Laurenzo Marques and today Maputo). 
 
The most immediate industry that rose in tandem with the mining industry and the railway 
sector was the engineering industry (Webster, 1985: 25).  The need for food and raw material 
supplies in the new mining towns would have deepened the food and agricultural markets 
which emerged as immigrants, both local and foreign were attracted to the mining rush which 
escalated from the 1870s.  While engineering services to the burgeoning mining industry 
would have grown through sub-contracting and jobbing, on the railways such engineering 
services would have had to be provided in-house in railway workshops.  We know almost 
nothing about the vocational training cultures within these inter-dependent industries 
(mining, rail transport and engineering supplies) in the years immediately before the 1899 
Anglo-Boer War.  Drawing from the Industrial Census of 1910, Webster (1985) remarks that 
in the engineering industry, ‘prior to 1900 the 189 establishments that existed were either 
repair shops or blacksmith shops’ (Webster, 1985: 25). 
 
The critical industrial skills that the emerging enterprises required were drawn mainly from 
an immigrant industrial European working class population interspersed with skills that were 
embedded locally.  The Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission of 1935 tried to give 
an abbreviated account of this history: 
‘The opening up of the diamond and gold mines found the Union in urgent need of 
skilled tradesmen and necessitated the importation of large numbers from oversea.  
With the growth of trade unions the training of South African youths and 
apprenticeship began to assume importance.  The number of apprentices was 
regulated largely by the influence the trade unions were able to exert; ratios of not 
more than one apprentice to four and five journeymen were, we are informed, 
common.  Outside the mining industry and the State railways, few apprentices were 
however, employed’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 691). 
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Industrial training was mainly located in the artisan trades.  The skills which these trades 
subsisted on, was often passed from father to son and through inflows of immigrant labour.  
Skilled labour in the Cape Colony was performed by a skilled artisanal force which became 
entrenched in the traditional craft industries which emerged: building, masonry, carpentry, 
blacksmithing, wagon-building etc.  Since European immigrants under the Dutch 
administration preferred to engage in farming activities, there was a perennial shortage of 
craftsmen at the Cape of Good Hope.  The Dutch East India Company filled the void by 
importing East Asian slaves to meet the craft labour needs of the emerging colony.  These 
slaves were mainly from Java, adjoining Indonesian islands and Malaysia.  In their new 
homeland, the East Asian slaves retained these craft skills and transmitted it generationally to 
their descendants.  Traces of these beginnings are very much inscribed into present day craft 
labour markets of the Western Cape.  Although, the earlier Masters and Servants legislation 
which was applied in the Cape Colony provided for the training of apprentices and indentured 
labour in domestic service, handicrafts and agriculture, the legal regulation of this process 
was shaped by successive repressive state apparatuses.  Generally, the regulations guiding 
apprenticeship training from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century 
within the Cape Colony, was more repressive than under the guilds in thirteenth century 
Europe.  In the Cape Colony, apprenticeship based on indenture was a customised system to 
the perpetuation of slavery (Worden, 1994; Scully, 1994).  Unlike the guilds where the 
masters managed apprenticeship training through an exclusive form of guild democracy, in 
South Africa, this task was performed in the absence of guilds, first through a Dutch colonial 
state which institutionalised slavery and later by an English colonial state, bent on 
Anglicising the remnants of Dutch settlers in the Cape Colony (see Dooling, 2007) 
 
The mining revolution necessitated the expansion of a railway network which linked 
hinterland mining towns to port cities.  Drawing on official reports, Alexander Wilmot (1892) 
provided an apt description of activities in the Railway Workshops of the Cape Colony 
towards the end of the 19
th
 century.  Wilmot identified three categories of workshop activity.  
These consisted of first, repairing of locomotive engines, second, building carriages and 
wagons and third repairing carriages and wagons.  Among the main trade occupations 
performed by skilled workers at Salt River, Uitenhage and East London, the three principal 
railway workshops in the Cape Colony were: engine-fitters, turners, works of machinery for 
cutting metals, Blacksmiths, spring-makers, boiler-makers, iron and brass moulders, pattern 
makers, coppersmiths, lamp-makers, grinders, carriage body builders and repairers, wagon 
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builders and repairers, workers of timber converting machinery, painters, carriage trimmers 
and tarpaulin-makers.  In addition there were also jobs that were not classified as tradesmen 
occupations such as Blacksmiths-strikers, wagon lifters, stationary engine drivers and helpers 
(Wilmot, 1892: 91). 
 
Numerically, taking into account both men and boys and excluding engine drivers, firemen, 
cleaners, shed men, coalmen and pumpers, 590 were engaged on the Western System (where 
the main railway workshop was Salt River), 492 were engaged on the Midland System 
(where Uitenhage was the main railway workshop) and 222 were engaged on the Eastern 
System (where East London was the main railway workshop).  While Wilmot did not provide 
further details on the industrial training system that was in force at the time, he did leave 
clues to the rough breakdown between skilled workers and boys and youths that had not yet 
acquired artisan status: 
‘Of the total number employed, 191 are boys and youths who have not attained the 
rank of skilled artisans, the number of applicants for the admission of boys to the 
workshop being largely in excess of the number which can be employed’(Wilmot: 
1892: 91). 
While relatively little is known about the type of industrial training which was provided in 
the railway workshops during the period that Wilmot wrote, he provided a more detailed 
description of the types of fabrication activities which were taking place within these 
workshops during the early 1890s.  In Wilmot’s own words: 
‘There has been a gradual diminution in the importation of finished parts of 
locomotive engines nearly all of which are now manufactured in the form of bars and 
plates, the only articles of regular consumption imported ready for fixing in position 
being brass boiler tubes. 
‘The advance made in the production of castings in iron and brass has been very 
marked, the quality of both being now equal to the best that could be imported and the 
manufacture of locomotive engine cylinders which have hitherto been imported has 
recently commenced. 
‘All the worn and broken parts of cast iron and brass are re-melted and new castings 
made for them, in addition to which purchase of scrap iron are made, a quantity of 
broken columns from the late exhibition building at Cape Town having been obtained 
among other articles’ (Wilmot, 1892: 91) 
Despite the limited facilities at all three railway workshops in the Cape Colony, Wilmot 
noted further that: 
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‘The building and remodelling of carriages are extensively carried on at Salt River 
and Uitenhage, and at East London, so far as the limited workshops room and 
appliances will permit’ (Wilmot: 1892: 92) 
Comparatively, the Railway Workshops at Salt River, Uitenhage and East London would at 
the time have constituted among the largest metal and engineering establishments in the Cape 
Colony.  Drawing from Webster’s earlier remarks that the engineering industry prior to 1900 
consisted mainly of repair shops and blacksmiths’ shops, the process of coordinating the 
training provision within these enterprises would have been extremely rudimentary.  With the 
exception of the railway workshops which operated with a comparatively large staff 
complement for the period, industrial training provision would have depended on master 
owners or journeymen artisans giving on-the-job instruction and guidance to apprentices and 
young men.  Most of these apprentices and young men would have had incomplete schooling.  
Thus the on-the-job training provided through this format would have been ad hoc and 
inconsistent: it would have been excellent at a few establishments but largely deficient at the 
majority of establishments. 
 
Large establishments such as the Railways would have been encouraged to establish their 
own company schools to systematise the instruction and training of apprentices in their 
employ.  But even such large enterprises would have clamoured for state assistance to get 
their internal company schools going, if this was possible.  Therefore, in the main, we can 
advance the proposition that the need for workplace industrial training would have largely 
galvanised the demands of the private business sector of the economy for greater financial 
assistance from the state.  This occurred in all the post-Anglo-Boer war colonies.  State 
assistance would also give access to the less prominent sections of the private sector to access 
these training facilities for their own corporate needs.  The evidence from Pittendrige (1988) 
suggests that the above paradigm of railway workshop technical training was not at all 
farfetched: 
‘The first technical classes for apprentices were started by the Natal Government 
Railways in the railways workshops in Durban in 1884.  The Cape Government 
Railways established classes at the Salt River Works in 1890, Uitenhage in 1895 and 
East London in 1902 and railway apprentice classes were started by the Central South 
African Railways in Pretoria in 1902 and in Bloemfontein in 1904.  Typical subjects 
being taught at the stage were machine construction, practical mathematics, carriage 
building and sketching (Pittendrige, 1988: 108, drawing from evidence in the 1912 
Union Government Financial Relations Commission Report). 
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A similar need for the internal training of its own specific staff was also evident in the mining 
industry.  Thus, in 1894 the Cape Colonial government (with Cecil John Rhodes still Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony), encouraged the establishment of a physics laboratory at the 
South African College in Cape Town to provide for the training of mining engineers.  Two 
years later in 1896, the School of Mines was established at Kimberley (Pittendrige, 1988: 
109).  In 1897, all apprentices employed at the De Beers diamond mining company were 
obliged to attend compulsory evening classes at the School of Mines.  As the need for further 
technical education expanded on the Witwatersrand, the School of Mines with all its students 
was transferred from Kimberley to Johannesburg in 1904.  It became known as the Transvaal 
University College in 1906, the School of Mines and Technology in 1910 (after the Transvaal 
University College was moved to Pretoria).  The name of the School of Mines and 
Technology was changed to the University College of Johannesburg in 1920 and finally the 
University of the Witwatersrand in 1922 (Pittendrige, 1988: 109).   
 
What the above evidence highlights are the circumstances which elevated the industrial 
training needs of the private market economy as an important item on the national agenda.  
Aspects of these industrial training needs of the existing profit driven economy was important 
for more specialised engineering educational needs as well as for the technical and industrial 
education requirements of a broader spectrum of technical and artisanal labour that would 
work under the direction and supervision of engineers and managers.  The analysis does not 
however mean that the industrial training needs for employees that worked for the state or 
broader public sector was less important
19
.  Nor was this the case for those employed within 
the non-profit or voluntary sector (e.g. industrial education provision driven through 
philanthropic initiatives or through the work of religious institutions).  It just meant that the 
industrial training requirements of this segment of the population received less prominence at 
the time than was accorded to the firms and enterprises in the profit driven sector of the 
economy. 
 
                                                 
19
 Horton (1968) for instance discusses some of the forces that were arrayed to provide for the schooling needs 
of mainly English immigrant children in Johannesburg through the Council of Education. 
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5.5 Shifts in the Control of Training and the Emergence of 
State Intervention in Training 
With the formation of Union in 1910 which incorporated the four colonies into a unified 
national state, there was a concerted effort to consolidate and build an efficient centralised 
South African state.  Government Commissions of Inquiry performed a prominent role in 
investigating and advising state administrators and the bureaucracy on how best to 
institutionally design the machinery and organise the new state formation.  In November 
1911, Francois Stephanus Malan, the minister of education in the Louis Botha cabinet, 
convened a conference on technical, industrial and commercial education in Pretoria.  The 
conference was attended by 29 individuals among whom were ‘four Provincial Directors of 
Education, representatives of various technical institutes, the Secretary of the Cape Town 
Chamber of Commerce, the Secretaries of the Departments of Justice, Agriculture and 
Mining, and a representative of the SA Railways Administration’ (Pittendrige, 1988: 111 
cites the Conference Proceedings which was published by the Government Printing and 
Stationery Office).  In his opening address, the Minister gave two reasons for holding the 
Conference.  These were: 
‘(1) to stimulate and encourage the interest taken in industrial and technical education; 
(2) to try and coordinate the activities now apparent in the different parts of the 
Union, and to evolve a uniform system so as to make it more effective and 
useful’(Union of South Africa, U.G. 21/1913, p.4 quoted in Pittendrige, 1988: 112) 
At the 1911 Conference, Professor Snape – a professor of Civil Engineering at the South 
African College in Cape Town – read a report evaluating the quality of apprenticeship 
training at industrial workshops of engineering and manufacturing establishments and firms 
in South Africa
20
.  After demonstrating mastery of specific craft or artisanal tasks, 
apprentices with talent and inclination were often assigned to carry out the machine 
production of these craft tasks, usually for long stretches of their training period.  Without 
being trained and rotated periodically, to different craft job tasks, their training stalled and the 
skills they could absorb was narrower.  Instead, Professor Snape argued that it was much 
better for the apprentice to: 
                                                 
20
 At the turn of the twentieth century the term ‘industrial workshops’ was used to designate engineering and 
machine shops.  Typically, such engineering and machine shops indentured apprentices were trained on-the-job. 
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‘receive a preliminary training from tradesmen, whose main purpose is to teach, in 
small shops where he will get thorough instruction in general work on the lathe, drill, 
shaper and planning machine.  This is the purpose of a trade school, and it is believed 
that boys who have received such groundwork when they enter the works, will know 
the elementary principles of engineering, will be able to pick up knowledge faster, 
and will do their work with less trouble to their employers’ (U.G. 2/1912, p.14). 
The Committee on Industrial Education expressed the same sentiment five years later in the 
following terms: 
‘It is a common complaint that a learner who shows skill in one process is kept 
working at that process for an undue period, this plan making him for the moment 
better worth his wages and saving the foreman from the trouble of instructing him in 
fresh work’ (U.G. 9/1917, para. 129) 
The Minority Report of the Railway Commission of Inquiry of 1914 drew evidence from a 
deputation of boilermakers in Pretoria blaming the piece-rate system, then in existence in 
South Africa, for contributing to this condition.  As J.M. Nield, author of the Minority Report 
noted from the evidence: 
‘A deputation of boilermakers at Pretoria said: 
“There are thirty boilermakers and twenty apprentices in the boiler shop.  Apprentices 
should not be put on piece-work, because they are taught to specialize and do not 
therefore learn their trade thoroughly.  ….  An apprentice would be shown anything 
on day work, but while on piece-work he is given all the rough work.  If the 
journeyman does all the smooth work, how is the apprentice to learn his trade?  ….  
The apprentices in the boiler shop look like old men before they are twenty years of 
age.  The price of piece-work is based on a mechanic’s pace, and the apprentice has to 
keep pace with him”’(U.G. 50/1914: Minority Report, p.153) 
In addition to the piece-rate system, the quality of training then prevalent in the Railway 
Workshops also came under damning criticism from the Minority Report to the Railway 
Commission of Inquiry.  Mr Seymour Hosley who at the time was attached to the Technical 
Institute at Pietermaritzburg, conveyed to the Commission of Inquiry the following 
impression which firms held about the training that apprentices received at the Railway 
Workshops in Natal: 
‘Things have gone so far that firms outside the railway will not employ men who have 
been trained in the railway.  I was asked by one young man, just out of his 
apprenticeship, if I could get him something better.  I made enquiries, and one 
gentleman told me point blank that the training on the railway was no use to him, and 




The thrust of Professor Snape’s report put forward the argument that because of operational 
imperatives, establishments with industrial workshops in South Africa that took on 
apprentices to be trained were often unable to adequately perform this task.  Such a task 
would be better undertaken in Professor Snape’s judgement by trade schools, where ‘boys 
who have received such groundwork when they enter the works, with the elementary 
principles of engineering, will be able to pick up knowledge faster, and will do their work 
with less trouble to employers’ (U.G. 2/1912, para.14).  Once they had attained a critical 
foundation that could be built upon in terms of technical knowledge and skills, they could 
continue to expand this knowledge and skill during evening hours at a technical college or 
technical institute.  Professor Snape was quite emphatic about the argument which he sought 
to advance: 
‘I strongly think that this model offers a solution of the difficulties of training 
apprentices in modern, highly organized shops.  The old-fashioned apprenticeship 
system is breaking down in Europe and America, and this system is taking its place 
with splendid results.  The youths are keener, more intelligent, better instructed, and 
obtain a better grasp of their trade.  Well-known employers in the Transvaal have 
stated that only by some such means as this can youths be properly trained.  There is 
still a certain amount of prejudice against these schools, as well as against technical 
education generally, and great good would be done if the Government were to give 
boys passing through these schools the preference in their own works.  The battle for 
technical education in Europe and America has been fought and won, but this is not so 
in South Africa, though the advance made is very great when one considers that it is 
less than ten years’ growth.  The success of a school of this kind, depends almost 
entirely upon the method of teaching, and the tact with which the objects of the school 
are asserted’ (U.G. 2/1912, p.14). 
The Majority Report of the Railway Commission of Inquiry expressed similar sentiments.  In 
fact the report submitted evidence from Mr Hosley, Principal of the Technical School at 
Pietermaritzburg, whom I have mentioned above, who proposed a scheme to advance the 
training of apprentices.  As the Commission noted in invoking Mr Hosley’s evidence: 
‘He stated that according to the highest authorities it is essential that apprentices 
should be instructed in the practical and theoretical sides of the work conjointly, and 
suggested that for the first two years the apprentice should attend school in order to be 
thoroughly instructed in his trade.  The work which he would do in the school should 
be supplied from the workshops and the material sent with it and charged to the job; 
when complete the work would be returned to the Government stores and valued in 
the ordinary way by the Government.  The workshop of the technical school would be 
regulated exactly as an ordinary industrial workshop, excepting that the objective 
would be instruction, not profit. 
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‘The advantage claimed for this system were briefly: that the workman could devote 
his attention to his work and the apprentice would receive individual instruction in all 
positions of his work, while the work turned out would be of value to the Government 
as a return for the outlay’ (U.G. 50/1914, para. 192) 
The argument which Professor Snape raised in 1911 was emphasised again in the Industrial 
Education Commission of 1916 but this time it was suggested that attendance at a Trade 
School should be a precondition for admission to apprenticeship training programmes: 
‘In engaging learners or apprentices, preference should as a rule be given to those 
who have endeavoured to prepare themselves by work at a vocational school.  If this 
had been a Trades School, the lad will already have acquired facility in the use of 
hand-tools, and some knowledge of trade processes.  This will materially shorten the 
period during which the learner is practically valueless as a wage-earner.  He will be 
familiar with the atmosphere of a workshop, and can be made useful at once.  
Recognition ought to be given to such preliminary training both in wages and in 
shortening the period of apprenticeship.  The boy coming from a Technical Day 
School will not have the same practical knowledge but will have received a wider 
general education, and at the same time have learned to use hand-tools.  One of the 
greatest needs in the young apprentice is the power to learn for himself without an 
undue amount of supervision, and this power should be developed in the boy from the 
Technical Day School or the High School.  Any previous education which has led the 
pupil to read for himself and to think and reason for himself will be of advantage to 
the employer, and should be recognised by him accordingly’ (U.G. 9/1917, para. 128). 
From the inception of Union, the state showed a keen interest in the progression of industrial 
education in South Africa.  The 1911 Conference served as a rallying point for the advance of 
technical, industrial and commercial education in South Africa.  A later Commission of 
Inquiry proposed making a distinction between industrial education and technical education, 
which it claimed was ‘difficult to define, but generally industrial education is intended for the 
mechanic and artisan, technical education for the skilled craftsman and professional man’ 
(U.G. 9/1917, para.2).  At the time, a greater part of the cost of technical instruction was 
being borne by the state (U.G. 9/1917, para.127).  There were numerous cases in which 
industrial education was either being supported or initiated through the efforts of different 
provincial education departments in the Union (U.G. 9/1917, para. 13-31).  In addition to this, 
four government Departments controlled vocational schools.  These included: The 
Department of Agriculture, the Forest Department, the Department of Mines and the Prisons 
Department (U.G. 9/1917, para. 32).  There was the understanding that state support for 
instructional costs would be balanced by employers carrying the workshop training costs of 
the apprentices and young workers in their employ.  This is how the Report of the Committee 
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on Industrial Education understood the shifts taking place with an expression of the state’s 
position on the matter in 1917: 
‘In old times the employer was responsible for the whole of his apprentice’s training, 
and this was given during working hours; it is now recognised that under modern 
conditions much of the training cannot be given in the workshop, and the State 
undertakes the greater part of the costs of lecture-room and laboratory instruction’ 
(U.G. 9/1917, para. 130). 
It is quite clear that the state played an instrumental role in strengthening technical, industrial 
and commercial education from the inception of Union in 1910.  The agenda which the 
Minister of Education postulated at the 1911 Conference was hardly subjected to extensive 
scholarly scrutiny, yet it represented a fundamental turning point in South Africa’s history of 
technical, industrial, vocational and commercial education.  The apprenticeship system was a 
vital component to this history.  The quest of putting into place a system ‘to try and 
coordinate’ as Minister Francois Malan indicated was even lost to astute commentators of the 
apprenticeship system.  Kooy (1952) for instance appeared to be side-tracked by evidence 
recorded by Commissions of Inquiry concerning employer evasions of regulatory obligations 
and alleged abuses and exploitative behaviour towards youth and apprentice labour.  This was 
merely a universal response from employers to prolong the use of cheaper wage rates that 
applied to learners and apprentices.  By avoiding paying the regulated wage rates for senior 
apprentices and journeymen, simply meant that many employers responded to basic 
economic self-interest.  This suggested reluctance to uphold the principles that rewarded 
those that incrementally moved up formally to a higher skill status.  However, such 
underhand practice from employers was not unique to South Africa.  A vast record of 
evidence can be assembled wherever apprenticeship systems existed about employers 
shirking their training responsibilities and attempting to exploit for longer than permissible 




In partially postulating reasons for the promulgation of the Apprenticeship Act in 1922, 
Frederick van Biljon (1939) suggested that it was a calculated response to contain the 
purported power which the trade unions had gained historically through the apprenticeship 
system.  Perhaps, this echoed evidence gleaned from the 1935 Industrial Legislation 
Commission which asserted that: 
                                                 
21
 See Honeyman (2007) for the experience of Parish apprentices in the English clothing and textile industries 
between 1780 and 1820.  Compared to the South African experience in the 1920s and 1930s the exploitative 
conditions of the Parish apprentices in this period in England can only be described absolutely horrendous. 
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‘The number of apprentices was regulated largely by the influence the trade unions 
were able to exert; ratios of not more than one apprentice to four and five journeymen 
we, were informed, are common’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 691). 
Understandably, while the initial Union Commissions of Inquiry preceded from the premise 
which acknowledged the importance of the state’s role in regulating but also shouldering 
responsibility for some of the operational and infrastructural costs for industrial training and 
technical education, these Commissions also emphasised the importance which both 
employers and employees (as trainees and learners) were meant to fulfil by ensuring that the 
specific objectives of each was met.  Employers were expected to train the apprentices and 
trainees indentured to their firms.  This obligation was to remain ongoing for the duration of 
their contracts.  Similarly, expectations of meeting strict learning and training objectives were 
also meted to apprentices and trainees.  This encompassed the motivation to learn while 
earning a wage.  Employers also had the discretion to select apprentices who demonstrated an 
inclination towards fulfilling their training obligations (see U.G. 9/1917, para. 128 & 130). 
 
Van Biljon therefore claimed that the Act ‘deprived the trade unions of the assumed power to 
stipulate the ratio of minors to journeymen in certain skilled trades’ (van Biljon, 1939: 231).  
Nonetheless he was also correct in recognising the importance of Apprenticeship Committees 
as bodies that ‘were brought into being to determine the appropriate conditions of 
apprenticeships and to recommend the registration of contracts to the Inspector of 
Apprenticeship’ (van Biljon, 1939: 231).  The new system established apprenticeship 
committees on the one side which would operate in tandem with the Technical College and 
Trade School system at which apprentices were required to attend technical classes on the 
other side (van Biljon, 1939: 232). 
 
The argument that is advanced in this thesis is that there was a fundamental shift in the 
orientation of the state with the passage of the Apprenticeship Act in 1922.  It made provision 
for apprentices to attend trade school as a precondition for the completion of an 
apprenticeship.  It also established the rule that firms would obtain apprentices on condition 
that they had adequate facilities to train them (Lewis, 1984: 26).  In fact this shift preceded 
the promulgation of the Apprenticeship Act.  In 1921, the Juveniles Act was passed.  This 
Act made provision for the establishment of Boards to deal with matters affecting juveniles 
that had left school but were still in limbo and were not yet absorbed into a fixed job or more 
permanent occupation.  The Juvenile Boards dealt with matters that had a bearing on the 
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employment, training, welfare and supervision of juveniles (U.G. 14/1926, para. 76).  Thus 
the introduction of ‘Boards’ was an important institutional breakthrough when the 
Apprenticeship Act was promulgated the following year. 
 
When the Apprenticeship Act was passed in 1922, the institutional body which the Act 
established to regulate the apprenticeship system within designated industries and to regulate 
apprenticeship contracts and employment conditions was known as the ‘Apprenticeship 
Committee’.  Several of these were initially established but the intent was that new 
Apprenticeship Committees would come into operation as the need arose.  The 
Apprenticeship Committees were essentially institutional bodies that were assigned the task 
of coordinating the apprenticeship system.  While similar coordinating bodies that had been 
established through the Juveniles Act were known as Juvenile Boards, under the 
Apprenticeship Act, these coordinating bodies were known as Apprenticeship Committees.   
 
5.6 Apprenticeship Committees as Coordinating 
Mechanisms 
The Apprenticeship Committees had the responsibility for setting the wage scales of 
apprentices for the successive years of the period of their indenture (U.G. 14/1926, para. 76).  
At the beginning in the 1920s this was typically five years.  From the inception, three 
Apprenticeship Committees were national committees.  These national committees dealt with 
apprentices under: the Railways and Harbours Administration, a second dealt with all other 
government departments and the third was responsible for the entire Printing and Newspaper 
industry in South Africa.  Apprentices in the remaining industries were under the jurisdiction 
of a local or provincial apprenticeship committee.  These industries included: Boot-making, 
Building, Clothing, Carriage Building, Electrical Engineering, Food (which compromised 
Baking, Butcher and Milling), Furniture, Leather working and Mechanical Engineering. 
 
Thus at the time that the Economic and Wages Commission heard evidence in 1925, five 
Apprenticeship Committees had been set up in the engineering industry ‘for the Transvaal, 
the Cape Peninsula, Kimberley, Durban and Port Elizabeth’ (U.G. 14/1926, para. 76).  The 
Building Industry had undergone a similar process with apprenticeship committees having 
been set up ‘for the Witwatersrand, Cape Peninsula, Kimberley, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East 
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London, Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg’ (U.G. 14/1926, para. 76).  An Apprenticeship 
Committee had also been established in the furniture industry for the Cape Peninsula.  
Although Apprenticeship Committees were scheduled (meaning that its eventual 
establishment was a certainty), when the Commission reported these had not yet been set up 
in the following industries: clothing, leather, food and carriage building.  The Commission 
however noted that Apprenticeship Committees were likely to be set up at an early date for 
the clothing industry and the leather industry on the Witwatersrand and at Port Elizabeth 
(U.G. 14/1926, para. 76). 
 
Two problems permeating the entire apprenticeship system which the apprenticeship 
committees had not yet been able to address was however identified.  The first was the 
comparatively high apprenticeship to journeymen pay scales.  This was seen as a threat to the 
‘creation of more opportunities for the white youth of the country in skilled employment’ 
(U.G. 14/1926, para. 79).  High apprenticeship wages were a deterrent to engaging 
apprentices.  It was also a deterrent to their effective training because there was greater 
pressure on firms to recoup high wages with productivity gains compared to low wages paid 
to incumbents in training.  In the opinion of the Postmaster-General who gave evidence 
before the Commission, the “salary or wage paid to the South African youth in the early years 
of his career is in many cases too high” (Postmaster-General cited in UG 14/1926, para. 79).  
The second was the remarkable divergences in wage rates set by the apprenticeship 
committees between regions in specific industries.  From the evidence to the Commission, 
the following pattern to apprentice regional wage variations was established: 
‘Thus, a building apprentice in his fifth year is paid 75s. a week on the Witwatersrand, 
90s. in Pretoria, 55s. in Cape Town, 65s. in Durban, and 40s. in Port Elizabeth; the 
starting rate (after six months’ probation) is 10s. in Port Elizabeth, 15s. in East 
London, 20s. on the Rand and in Durban, and 22s. in Pretoria.  A printer’s 
apprentice’s starting rate varies from 20s.9d. (at Cape Town) to 26s. (on the Rand).  
An engineer’s apprentice starts from 10s. (at Cape Town) to 18s. (at Durban) and in 
his last year reaches from 40s. to 60s.’ (U.G. 14/1926, para. 81). 
 
A representative from the Building Apprenticeship Committee who appeared before the 
Commission said in mitigation that these high regional divergences merely followed 
prevailing practice at the time the scales were drawn up.  The Commission contended 
however that it ‘had evidence that some of the rates diverged widely from previous practice’ 
(U.G. 14/1926, para. 81).  The Commission suggested in the light of the limited response that 
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Apprenticeship Committees were able to exert, the problem merited further consideration 
which it argued was a coordination problem: 
‘There would appear to be room for more co-ordination between different districts in 
the same industry, and even more important, between apprenticeship committees in 
different industries.  It would be advisable for the chairman of all the apprenticeship 
committees to meet at regular intervals and endeavour to ensure co-ordination 
between the different industries and districts’ (U.G. 14/1926, para. 81) 
It was a coordination problem because it had an impact on the supply of apprentice labour, 
even though it was almost exclusively white apprentice labour.  The Commission suggested 
that since the Wage Board was ‘likely to be the principal co-ordinating authority in wage 
matters’ that it would indeed be ‘desirable that the chairman or another permanent member’, 
participate in the conferences with the chairmen of all the apprentice committees (U.G. 
14/1926, para. 81).  
 
At the end of December 1934, thirty-five Apprenticeship Committees had been established 
and operated in the following industries as shown in Table 5.1 below: 
Table 5.1: Apprenticeship Committees active as at 31st December 1934 
 
 
The competence and energy of the individuals appointed onto apprenticeship committees was 
an important factor to the way these committees executed their responsibilities.  As bodies 
responsible for advising the Minister of Labour on apprenticeship matters, each committee 
Industry Number of Committees
Banking and confectionary 2
Building 8
Building, electrical, mechanical and motor engineering 1




Government (building and engineering) 1
Hairdressing 2
Leather-working 3
Mechanical and electrical engineering 4
Mechanical, electrical and motor engineering 2
Mechanical, electrical, motor engineering and carriage building 1
Motor 1
Printing 1
Railway and Harbours Administration (building; engineering and carriage building) 1
Transvaal Mines (building, mechanical and electrical engineering) 1
Source: Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission (U.G. 37/1935), para. 708
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had to have at least five members and an independent chairman who was not necessarily from 
the industry.  The employers’ organisation and trade union had an equal number of 
representatives.  The Minister had the right to discharge committees which could not perform 
its functions and instead vest these functions in the Inspector of Apprenticeship (U.G. 
37/1935, paras. 699 & 709).  Inappropriate individuals often got appointed onto 
apprenticeship committees.  Where this occurred, it inhibited the coordinatory functions of 
Apprenticeship Committees.  As the evidence of the Industrial Legislation Commission 
showed: 
‘In one instance, a trade union actually appointed as representatives, minors still 
serving under indenture.’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 715) 
It was also claimed that in many cases ‘contracts of apprenticeship were granted to unsuitable 
employers whose importunity eventually broke down the better judgement of committees’ 
(U.G. 37/1935, para. 715).  Independent chairmen of apprenticeship committees who could 
only exercise a vote to avert a deadlock were not able to prevent this from happening. 
 
As was indicated earlier, the National Printing Apprenticeship Committee was a national 
committee.  It was also the only private industry apprenticeship committee which held such a 
jurisdiction and function.  It was also viewed as a highly successful apprenticeship 
committee.  This success was attributed ‘largely to the fact that both employers and 
employees are highly organised and the number of establishments is not so large as to prevent 
the personnel of the committee obtaining a fairly good idea of conditions prevailing in each 
of them.’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 717) 
 
National apprenticeship committees had a higher capability than local or regional committees 
to establish common national policies which overcame local parochial interests (U.G. 
37/1935, para. 718).  A common policy could therefore evolve in respect of ‘the designation 
of trades, entrance qualifications, the period of apprenticeship, technical training and lines of 
demarcation between industries’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 718).  Local apprenticeship committees 
had the potential of pursuing contradictory policies which could lead to ‘one committee 
destroying the work of another’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 719).  Where the number of apprentices 
was small the burden of administrative costs on national apprenticeship committees could 
potentially be heavy (U.G. 37/1935, para. 720).  The Report of the Industrial Legislation 
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Committee again reiterated the importance of coordinating the work of local apprenticeship 
committees: 
‘We do not advocate national committees for all industries, but as associations of 
employers and employees develop along national lines, the advantages or otherwise of 
setting up more national committees should be explored.  In the meantime there is a 
definite need for coordinating the work of local apprenticeship committees for the 
same industry, and the advisability of creating a special committee consisting of, say, 
two representatives from each committee for the purpose should be considered.  Such 
a committee need not meet at frequent intervals once important questions of policy 
have been determined’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 721). 
Even as early as the 1930s, instances were recorded of overlaps in the jurisdiction of 
apprenticeship committees and industrial councils, even though both institutions were 
regulated through separate statutes.  In particular this involved the control of minors into 
skilled trades.  As the Industrial Legislation Commission of 1935 observed: 
‘This is done by councils, firstly, requiring employers under the agreements [P.L 
industrial council agreements], either to apply for permission to employ a minor in a 
designated trade or to fix a ratio between such minors and journeymen, and secondly, 
prescribing wages and other employment conditions for unindentured minors’ (U.G. 
37/1935, para. 738). 
Despite having established quite an elaborate formal architecture for apprenticeship training 
in South Africa in which apprenticeship committees had by 1935 been in existence for about 
a dozen years and were accorded an important coordinating function, the evidence presented 
before the Industrial Legislation Commission was not terribly flattering.  As the Commission 
reported: 
‘Many witnesses representing industrial councils and trade unions unhesitatingly 
assert that a very large proportion of apprentices in industry are not being properly 
trained.  One witness fixed the proportion as high as 75 per cent.  This state of affairs 
was attributed to a variety of causes, inter alia – 
(a) to inadequate equipment of workshops (or no workshops at all in the case of some 
employers in the building industry); 
(b) to a lack of interest on the part of employers; 
(c) to lack of qualified journeymen or supervision by journeymen, or inability of 
journeymen to communicate knowledge; 
(d) to limited scope of work available; 
(e) to minors being kept too long on particular operations, often of a minor character; 
(f) to temperament of apprentices; 
(g) to unsuitability of apprentices for the trades chosen; 
(h) to feeling of security on the part of apprentices after indentures are signed; 
(i) to lack of power of concentration and to irresponsibility on the part of apprentices 
at their work and at technical classes; 
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(j) to lack of discipline among minors.’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 761) 
 
The above conditions contributed to the establishment of the National Apprenticeship Board 
which had a wider coordination purview than individual apprenticeship committees.  While 
not displacing the apprenticeship committees, the National Apprenticeship Board would thus 
appropriate and centralise a significant portion of the coordination function of individual 
apprenticeship committees. 
 
5.7 Strengthening Coordination through a national 
Coordinating Structure: the National Apprenticeship Board 
After being amended in 1924 and again in 1930, a new Apprenticeship Act was promulgated 
in 1944 (HSRC & NTB, 1984: 15-16).  A major institutional design feature in the 1944 
Apprenticeship Act was provision for a National Apprenticeship Board.  The Board had more 
supervisory and recommendatory powers which enabled it to ‘coordinate the activities of the 
local apprenticeship committees’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 1116).  It was given the responsibility 
of advising the Minister of Labour on matters which he may take action in terms of the Act 
and ‘on such matters as the Minister may refer to it’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 1116). 
 
The Apprenticeship Board was composed of the Minister of Labour who served as chairman 
and ten other members appointed by the Minister.  The ten other members consisted of the 
following: 
a) ‘one shall be the Secretary of Labour and one the Registrar (of apprentices); 
b) two shall be nominated by the Minister of Education for their knowledge of 
matters relating to technical training; 
c) two shall represent the interests of prospective apprentices in or from rural 
areas; 
d) two shall be appointed for their special knowledge of matters relating to 
apprenticeship; and  
e) one shall be appointed from a list of persons nominated by such organisations 
as the Minister may deem qualified to represent the interests of employers, and 
one similarly selected to represent the interests of employees. 
The Minister may also in a similar manner appoint an alternate to the members of the 
Board.  The Secretary for Labour is deputy chairman.’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 1117) 
 
Since neither the Minister, nor the Secretary of Labour, could find the time to attend the 
meetings of the National Apprenticeship Board, the Apprenticeship Act (1944) was amended 
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again in 1951 to allow the Registrar of Apprentices instead to serve as the chairman of the 
Board.  The 1951 amendments also followed the recommendations of the De Villiers 
Commission and made provision for ‘day release’ technical classes and qualifying trade tests 
(HSRC & NTB, 1984, para.1.39). 
 
The National Apprenticeship Board certainly bore some resemblance to future institutions 
which would ostensibly embody its functions, namely the National Training Board of 1981 
and the National Skills Authority of 1999, even though both would be established under 
different contexts and under different legislation.  This narrative will be explored in the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
The 1948 Commission of Technical and Vocational Education (often referred to as the De 
Villiers Commission) elevated enterprise size as one of the most fundamental cleavages in 
the apprenticeship training system.  It was seen as a strong rationale for an overt role by the 
state in classroom instruction for apprentices.  From the beginning of the 20
th
 century when 
railway and mining firms were the only enterprises to have their own workshop training 
schools for practical instruction up until the twenty-first century where the bulk of firms in 
for example the metal and engineering industry continued being too small to have their own 
training schools, the cleavage was evident.  The reason for this was really quite simple.  The 
size of the industrial enterprise or establishment set limits on the internal training 
infrastructure of firms.  Quoting the most recent industrial census data at the time, the 
Commission on Technical and Vocational Education observed: 
‘According to the latest industrial census only about 125 manufacturing concerns 
have more than 500 employees.  As in-service training in the thousands of small-scale 
industrial establishments is not likely to overcome its present limitations, South Africa 
will perforce be more dependent on its educational institutions for systematic 
vocational training than is the case in such industrial countries as Great Britain and 
the U.S.A.’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 1058) 
The limited enterprise size of ‘industrial establishments’ in the country meant that most 
establishments were dependent on outside workshop school training schemes for the training 
of their skilled labour, including their apprentices.  Until this time the state was only able to 
provide theoretical class-room instruction to apprentices and other skilled labour through the 
technical colleges which were subsidized from state revenues.  The Leather Industry did 
however develop an institutional relationship which was not under state control.  This 
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relationship emerged between the Leather Industries Research Institute (LIRI) and the 
technical college at Port Elizabeth for the benefit of the Leather Industry in the region as a 
whole.  But the Leather industry had a predilection for training under learnerships instead of 
apprenticeships. 
 
Since the state already played such a pivotal role in the apprenticeship system, through the 
provision of regulations (with the Apprenticeship Act and its numerous amendments), 
through shaping coordinating institutions, albeit in a nascent and emerging form (e.g. 
Apprenticeship Committees and the National Apprenticeship Board) as well as through the 
examining body to the trade theory subjects for apprentices (via the Department of 
Education), the extended role for the state was equally prominent in the periodic legislative 
amendments that ensued.  The proposal for trade testing which the De Villiers Commission 
put forward would lead to this being assigned to the National Apprenticeship Board and after 
1951 with its implementation to the Central Organisation for Trade Testing (COTT).  It was 
therefore unlikely in the post-war period that workshop training schools in general would 
have been established without the involvement of the state.  The few in-house enterprise 
workshop training schools were likely to be found only among the largest enterprises in the 
country.  The De Villiers Commission elegantly confirmed that the state was intent on 
securing complete control over the entire education system in South Africa.  The Commission 
suggested that the principal was for it to be a centrally controlled and administratively 
decentralised system that would extend into regions or units.  But since it was not yet feasible 
to implement such a system of central control with administrative decentralisation, a more 
elegant solution was suggested: 
‘The control of all education by a single centralised authority appears, however, to be 
for the present at least, impracticable.  The Commission has, therefore, turned to a 
more feasible solution of the problem of divided control, namely the creation of a co-
ordinating authority or council for education.’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 2022) 
This quest to coordinate and eliminate duplication applied equally to the technical vocational 
education sphere. 
‘This need is, however, particularly clamant in the case of vocational education which 
is linked up with industry, commerce, agriculture and labour, all activities which are 
administered by Union Government Departments.  A uniform, elastic and flexible 
system so essential in this field would only be possible under unified control’ (U.G. 
65/1948, para. 2025) 
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This section brings to a close the historical narrative of enterprise coordination through the 
involvement of the state to improve the functioning of the apprenticeship system.  As was 
shown, this coordination function occurred through apprenticeship committees.  It was 
subsequently strengthened by according the National Apprenticeship Board greater policy 
and regulatory powers to coordinate the process of enterprise skill formation. 
 
5.8 A Brief Historical Overview of Intervention by 
Professions and Professional Organisations to confront 
the Labour Supply Problem and shape the Coordination of 
Enterprise Training in South Africa 
In this section, I shall reflect very briefly on the involvement of intellectuals and 
professionals through various measures and institutional vehicles to improve and increase the 
scope of the fields influencing enterprise coordination in South Africa, particularly the 
coordination of skill formation and its supply.  These measures made use of new forms of 
applied knowledge to give the process a more rational and calculated grounding.  It also 
anticipated and represented nascent disciplines that started making a representation of its 
power to chart new directions in the field.  Ultimately, it had the potential to enhance the 
overall coordination of enterprise skill formation. 
5.8.1 The Problem of Labour Supplies 
Prior to the Second World War, human resource development in South Africa had not yet 
evolved into a discipline with a formalised strategy.  It tended to be a discursive and often ad 
hoc process held by many threads but still preoccupied with the question of securing skilled 
labour supplies.  The structure of the existing labour force meant that there was only a limited 




Even modest demand for skilled labour was likely to constrain existing supplies.  This 
encouraged state authorities to explore other avenues to secure skilled labour.  At the time, 
the most prominent medium that the state used to expand the supply of skilled labour 
nationally was through an immigration policy (Smith and Byron, 1941).  Despite restrictive 
prohibitions from the Immigration Board on admission of ‘aliens’ into South Africa, the skills 
                                                 
22
 The tacit embodiment of skills in the general population was a great benefit to small firms and small scale 
industries and is often under-estimated. 
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demand that was beginning to be placed on industry during the 1930s led to higher levels of 
importation of white skilled labour from overseas countries such as Britain, Germany, 
Holland and Canada (Smith and Byron 1941: 255-256).  It was also recognised that the 
entrance of female workers into the labour force as well as the growth of an African labour 
force existed as possibilities that could conceivably be harnessed in the future to address this 
problem.  Similar problems had already been encountered in the United Kingdom and there 
consequently existed a record of conceptual attempts in which elements of a more responsive 
and systemic labour supply intervention was beginning to be conceived.  Hence, the 
knowledge of experiments elsewhere to address these was slowly percolating into the public 
domain.  Borrowing such ‘successful’ lessons seems to have consciously started in the 1930s 
and has continued within South African public policy ever since. 
5.8.2 Applied Psychology 
The results of experiments in industrial management at the enterprise or firm level naturally 
followed the work of Frederick Taylor.  Soon after the impact of the work that Taylor 
undertook to improve labour productivity had begun to gain broader recognition and 
prominence, especially in the United States, coupled with reaction to the influence of his 
disciples, applied psychologists began to demonstrate that the limited perspective and 
knowledge of production engineers (who were generally spell-bound by the impact of 
Taylor’s work) had limitations.  These limitations did not sufficiently address the personal 
attributes of workers.  It was seen to constrain the productivity of labour.  In contrast, the 
applied psychologists showed that the motivation, organisation and efficiency of the labour 
force could be radically enriched by the knowledge and applications of applied psychology.  
Biesheuvel (1954) provides an apt interpretation and summation of the process.   
 
In 1929, referring to the divisions which constituted applied psychology, Gardner Murphy 
(1929) noted that vocational guidance became a distinct social movement from about 1910.  
It a compulsion which educators had to take into account because a minimum standard of 
intelligence was demanded in each occupation.  According to Murphy it was therefore taken 
for granted that: 
‘an intelligence test must be administered and that the applicant should be saved both 
from the attempt to enter a career in which he would almost certainly fail, and from 
the idle acceptance of a level beneath his capacities.  Employment psychology, 
recognising the same principles, rejects applicants whose intelligence predicts failure 
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in the position sought, and in some cases discourages applicants whose intelligence is 
so high as to render it improbable that they would long remain in a given position’ 
(Murphy 1929: 373) 
Intellectuals who were the pioneers of the discipline – in an attempt to advance their 
disciplinary interests – set about organising themselves into more robust organisational 
formations.  Thus the National Institute of Industrial Psychology was founded in Britain ‘on 
an entirely voluntary basis in 1921’ (Myers, 1933: 15).  Among the principle objectives of the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP) according to Myers was that it would: 
‘… carry out investigations at the request of individual industries or firms or (as in the 
case of vocational guidance) on behalf of individual persons, to train and to promote 
the training of investigators in industrial psychology throughout the country, and not 
only to carry out research in the subject but also to spread a popular knowledge of 
such research and to indicate the value by lectures to employers, managers and 
workers, as well as by publications’(Myers, 1933: 19-20). 
In 1930, a Scottish Division of the NIIP was established with headquarters in Glasgow 
(Myers, 1933: 20). 
 
A prominent corresponding intervention in this process of social engineering in which 
elements of future human resource benefits were clearly visible emerged from Binet’s work 
in 1904 on intelligence testing.  While the intelligence testing movement was later 
strenuously taken up and propagated within industry, its first incursions within South Africa 
occurred within the educational sector.  Ernest Malherbe was a key actor to this process.  
Building on his post-graduate work at Columbia University in New York in the 1920s and 
using his experience as a commissioner on the Carnegie Commission into Poor White 
poverty, he was instrumental in the establishment of a research body within the South African 
Union Department of Education known as the National Bureau of Educational and Social 
Research (NBESR) and was appointed its first director in 1929 where he remained until 1939 
(Malherbe, 1981).  As well as undertaking research and collecting statistics from provincial 
education departments, the NBESR also carried out intelligence testing to identify social 
problems that had an impact on the educational participation and progress of white children 
(Fleish, 1993).  As a forerunner to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the 
NBESR was perhaps the first initiative to establish a programme of applied educational 
psychology in South Africa.  Statistical collection and analysis as well as psychometrics and 
intelligence testing was an important part of its programme.  Significant parallels can be 
observed in the manner that applied industrial psychologists and applied educational 
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psychologists proceeded to contribute from the vantage point of a disciplinary competence to 
the broader challenges of a future labour supply in South Africa. 
5.8.3 Sociologists and Human Resource Development Concerns 
Sociologists too were engaged in investigating the new field of human resource development, 
which the labour supply problem had generally presented, but this was couched in terms of 
developing a sociological understanding of the participation of various social groups in the 
social divisions of labour which capitalist industrialisation and historical change in South 
Africa had inaugurated.  In the period of the 1930s to the 1950s, a number of sociological 
investigations were conducted in South Africa, in the emerging sub-discipline of the 
sociology of work.  Among such studies to be undertaken were those by Hansi Pollak on 
Women in Watersrand Industries in 1932, Erika Theron’s Fabriekwerkers in Kaapstad in 
1942, Valdo Pon’s masters thesis on the Social Investigation of Female Workers and a 
related study of their Absenteeism in 1949, an investigation into The African Factory Worker 
by the Department of Economics at the University of Natal in 1950 as well as Ellen 
Hellman’s study in 1953, titled Sellgoods: a Sociological Survey of the African Commercial 
Workforce (see Webster, 1981 who documents these studies).  But just as was the case in the 
1970s when sociologists had a significant presence in the expansion of disciplinary 
interventions that stemmed from the democratisation of South Africa’s industrial and labour 
relations regime and again in the contemporary period of the 1990s where sociologists were 
central in putting a new human resource development framework in place (e.g. through 
NEPI), the disciplinary involvement of sociology was severely diluted once new institutions 
began to be constructed.  In the latter instance, professional lawyers and human resource 
practitioners began to dominate the fields of industrial relations and human resource 
development.  Consequently the sociological discipline itself viewed these processes 
generally with the preoccupation of critical investigators from a ‘distance’. 
 
From the beginning, the sociologists were simply not a match for the applied psychologists, 
that is, both the industrial and educational psychologists who were the anchors to these 
institutional arrangements and the intellectual custodians of the discourses and disciplinary 
knowledge that flowed from it
23
.  In the more recent period the labour economists and the 
                                                 
23
 In fact this gap seems to have widened even further with ‘Work and Organizational Psychology’ the new term 
by which Industrial Psychology has become known, establishing a level of utilitarian advantage in contrast to 
Sociology over a wide set of enterprise related functions and activities including training.  Compare for instance 
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econometricians too, have increased their dominance over the sociologists in the area of 
research on the dynamics of the labour market.  Sociologists with their more meta-theoretical 
interpretative approaches have not been effective at establishing institutional vehicles through 
which to advance their professional standing and simultaneously showcase the practical 
imperatives of their applied work as a social good which is supported through public funding.  
The disciplines which dominate the policy sciences are extremely effective in doing this. 
5.8.4 Personnel Management 
The emergence and growth of personnel management in South Africa can be traced to the 
1940s.  Unlike the two branches of applied psychology, that is, industrial psychology and 
educational psychology, personnel management was integrally linked to enterprise 
organisation and therefore quite directly with the coordination of enterprise skill formation.  
What it lacked in systemic oversight it gained through mico-institutional association with the 
enterprise.  Bruce Kaufman (2000) traces the roots of personnel management to the writings 
of the early labour economists in the United States (i.e. John Commons, Paul Douglas and 
Sumner Slichter).  While the influence of the economists on personnel management waned 
after the Second World War, personnel management was presented in Industrial Psychology 
as ‘applied psychology’ (Kaufman, 2000: 246). 
 
Isobel White who had first gained industrial psychology experience in the United Kingdom 
assisted the Leather Industries Research Institute (LIRI) in Grahamstown in conducting 
personnel research (Louw, 1993a).  White’s work at the LIRI and the recognition of building 
a cadre of personnel management practitioners who could work in industry resulted in 
Rhodes University offering a one year post-graduate diploma in Personnel and Welfare 
Management in 1944 (Louw, 1993a). According to Louw (1993a) this took place in either 
1943 or 1944.  The Personnel Research Section of the LIRI had responsibility for organising 
the practical training and lectures on the course while Rhodes University carried out the 
theoretical training.  With the support of the Institute of Personnel Management in London, 
White was eventually drawn into setting up a Port Elizabeth branch which was given the 
status of a local branch of the mother body in the UK.  In 1947, membership in South Africa 
was strong enough to form a South African Institute of Personnel Management with a 
membership of 147 (Louw, 1993a: 67). 
                                                                                                                                                        
textbooks on Industrial or Workplace Sociology with the following textbook from Industrial Psychology: Nik 
Chmiel (Ed.) (2000) Introduction to Work and Organizational Psychology. Oxford Blackwell. 
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5.8.5 Applied Psychology and its Military and Industrial 
Applications 
The two world wars were testing grounds of the potential large scale uses that industrial 
psychology presented.  The United States army in particular made extensive use of selection 
techniques in which soldiers were assigned to military jobs for which they were best 
equipped to serve.  Aptitude testing was presumed to be the most efficient technique of 
matching individual abilities and potential with highly specialised tasks such as flying 
aircraft.  Two psychologists, Walter Dill and Robert Yerkes oversaw much of this application 
of psychological methods to the war effort.  According to Vorster (1967) over two million 
men were subjected to intelligence tests during this period in the USA alone.  In other 
countries, similar techniques were used to select aircrews, drivers, submarine crews and so 
forth.  These efforts were opposed by psychiatrists who reasoned that it was within their 
domain and competence to eliminate the unfit from the armed forces.  Armed with 
intelligence testing, the psychologists gained success over the particular problems which the 
military establishment encountered but it also elevated their prestige within the business 
community where their techniques gained increasing applications after the war (See Louw, 
1990 as well as Vorster, 1967).  The Second World War meant that the emergency manpower 
classification process of the First World War was repeated on an even bigger scale. 
 
South Africa’s entry into the Second World War meant that particular prominent public and 
private firms within different industries were drawn into the manufacture of war materials 
(e.g. bomb shells, fuses, explosives, acetone, small arms spares and aircraft parts and radio 
equipment), provisions (e.g. canned meat and vegetables) and support supplies such as army 
boots (Martin and Orphen, 1979.  See also in Martin and Orphen, DGWS Annexure Factories 
and their Production where a list is provided of firms and their factories that were involved in 
production of goods for the military establishment).  The South African Railway and Harbour 
Workshops too played a prominent part in war material manufacture (Martin and Orphen, 
1979: 138). 
 
The massive increase in new output demand as a result of the war effort on the armed forces 
as well as within the industries that could potentially support these forces naturally created 
new challenges around labour supply.  The challenge was about moving towards the efficient 
streaming and training of those selected for recruitment – particularly for military tasks and 
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operations.  Flying aircraft was the most complex task within the armed forces and the 
training required as well as being of the longest duration, was also the most expensive.  From 
a small peacetime nucleus, the country’s participation in the war required it to build a larger 
air force.  Although the Psychology Department at the University of Pretoria (Transvaal 
University College) had been involved with the Aptitude Test Section (ATS) of the South 
African Air Force prior to the war, Van Ryneveld who was chief of General Staff, 
approached Raikes, principal of the University of the Witwatersrand about whether it could 
set up a unit for the selection and classification of pilots (Louw, 1993a: 68).  Simon 
Biesheuvel, a lecturer in the Department of Psychology was given the task of expanding the 
ATS and improving its aptitude selection and psychological testing capacity. 
 
At the end of the War, the ATS had grown into the largest body of scientific staff involved in 
the application of industrial and personnel psychology in South Africa.  It had a staff 
complement of almost ninety.  But the army was in no position to financially sustain such a 
unit size under peacetime conditions. 
 
Since the ATS had assembled a team of highly skilled experts in the application of industrial 
psychology including laboratories and equipment, it started progressively demobilising staff 
after the war.  The Board of Trade and Industries (1945) recommended that the ATS be re-
constituted as a national institute of personnel selection and research (Louw, 1993a: 72).  
This was also consonant with the advice of Basil Schonland to Prime Minister Smuts 
(Kingwill, 1990: 259).  During the Second World War, Schonland served as a scientific 
advisor to the Smuts government.  Schonland was also responsible for overseeing South 
Africa’s wartime radar application development (Austin, 2001).  This occurred at roughly the 
same time as Schonland was preparing to preside over the newly constituted Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1945 – South Africa’s own version of ‘big 
science’
24
.  However since the National Bureau of Education and Social Research (NBESR) 
of the Union Department of Education, previously under Malherbe and at the time under 
Cook was involved in aptitude and psychological test construction for scholastic and 
educational purposes, the CSIR was cautious about defining the scope and functions of the 
new bureau of research into industrial psychology.  Thus, when the Bureau for Personnel 
                                                 
24
 See the overview article by S. Meiring Naude and A.C.Brown, ‘The Growth of Scientific Institutions in South 
Africa’ in the collection edited by A.C.Brown celebrating the centenary of the Royal Society of South Africa 
titled: A History of Scientific Endeavour in South Africa. 
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Research was established in 1946 as very much a temporary bureau, it was oriented for 
applications in industry (Kingwill, 1990: 259-260).  Its name was changed in 1947 to the 
National Bureau for Personnel Research (NBPR).  Biesheuvel’s ability to attract substantial 
contract work from both the mining industry and the public service (Post Office and the 
South African Railways and Harbours) enabled it to become a national institute known as the 
National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) in 1948. 
5.8.6 Industrial Psychology as an Industrial Management 
Technique and Tool to Skill Formation 
The first non-government contract generated by the NIPR was with the Transvaal Clothing 
Manufacturers Association.  It required the NIPR to construct and standardise a test battery of 
selection and classification for garment workers (Kingwill 1990: 263).  An assignment for 
ISCOR was multifaceted and investigated absenteeism and labour turnover, job evaluation, 
apprenticeship selection and the development of screening and classification tests.  This was 
followed by what Biesheuvel regarded as the most successful venture undertaken by the 
NIPR, namely developing a system of ‘boss-boy’ selection for the gold mining industry.  The 
Institute’s work also included the provision of vocational guidance services which it began to 
do from 1955 onwards (Kingwill 1990: 271).  In the mid-1960s, the NIPR applied electro-
encephalography (EEG) with the requisite equipment in its screening techniques.  This period 
also witnessed the expansion of its research activities into problems around work 
measurement, training and problems associated with employee attitudes and motivation or in 
Kingwill’s words, ‘the psycho-social factors’ of productivity, job satisfaction, absenteeism 
and labour turnover.  Its work in the 1960s covered experimental training programmes for 
black supervisors including programmes for the accelerated identification and promotion of 
black workers to management level positions, both of which was undertaken for the Transkei 
Development Corporation (Kingwill 1990: 270). 
 
By the late 1970s the NIPR had designed a simulation model called the 6M Training 
Simulation and it was designed mainly for black rural employees.  6M was the abbreviation 
for: Men, Machines, Materials, Money, Management and Market.  The programme largely 
mirrored the functioning of a modern industrial organisation.  It was essentially a simulation 
training programme for employees into business and industrial economics.  The progressive 
trade union movement perceived 6M training as an apology for the apartheid status quo and 
were extremely critical of it (Chisholm, 1984: 401).  This criticism has been echoed in a 
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number of academic studies such as Terre Blanche and Seedat (2001) and Dubow (1995).   
Thus, Dubow (1995: 242) accuses the NIPR of using testing procedures which accepted 
white domination as well as the subordination of black workers to menial forms of labour.  
While these criticisms are quite valid from the perspective of a democratic dispensation in 
South Africa, it is important that it does not over-shadow the emergence of applied 
disciplinary-based research that was starting to emerge in response to industrial management 
challenges under a growing and modernising enterprise economy.  Researchers in new social 
science fields were equipped with a more up to date scientific and disciplinary knowledge 
and were thus better placed to understand the problems of industrial management.  Thus one 
should acknowledge the significance of attempts by the NIPR under the leadership of 
Biesheuvel to use industrial psychology to intervene in industrial management and 
fundamentally shape the coordination process to human resource development and enterprise 
skill formation.  This seems to be very obvious when the work of the NIPR is – not seen in 
isolation – but seen as forming part of a set of wider interventions that were taking place in 
South Africa.  These wider interventions were being driven only partially by means of central 
coordination. 
 
In other respects these seemingly parallel interventions were being constituted with a degree 
of voluntarism and in a contingent manner.  It thus embodied high levels of creativity and 
originality and despite the limitations concerning overt planning it can still be usefully 
conceived as characterising an emerging system of human resource development, however 
uneven this appears to have been.  While contemporary academics may be less sympathetic 
to these associations, the participants at a Social Science Conference convened by the 
University of Natal in 1954 under the chairmanship of Ernst Malherbe were given a 
favourable address by Professor MacCrone of Wits.  MacCrone’s address conveyed the 
sentiments of the leading social scientists in South Africa concerning these emerging 
systems.  A synopsis of MacCrone’s presentation which appeared in the Conference 
Proceedings, reads as follows: 
‘Our limited manpower makes it urgent to press ahead with the scientific assessment 
of human abilities and aptitudes among both the European and Non-European 
population.  The personnel required for staffing higher scientific, professional and 
technical posts is in short supply.  This is understandable in view of our small 
population, but the absence of sound traditions in South Africa, comparable with the 
traditions of the Public Service in the United Kingdom, heightens the need to 
concentrate on producing an elite.  South Africa cannot afford to waste talent and the 
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best student material must be discovered and guided by the Universities.  The 
National Institute for Personnel Research and the Bureau of Social and Educational 
Research have done valuable pioneer work but research in this area must be 
intensified and extended’ (Social Science Conference 1954: 38). 
In other words, in a context where the institutions of learning were the main pillars to 
sustaining the country’s labour supplies, the work of the NIPR and the NBESR had to be 
intensified and extended.  Taking the argument of MacCrone further, this intensification and 
extension would result in a more visible application of work which had already started and 
was largely on a path that would prevail and be cemented over the next three decades in 
South Africa.  The final architecture in the human resource development intervention which 
MacCrone and others were articulating was being strategically assembled in institutions 
which were already in existence such as the NIPR and the NBESR.  Industrial psychology 
opened the door to personnel management or as H.P. Langehoven head of the Department of 
Industrial Psychology at the University of the Orange Free State in a preface to a Research 
Report which was issued by his Department expressed it, ‘one of the more important sub-
processes of personnel management is personnel or labour force or manpower planning’ (See 
Preface in Uys, 1981). 
 
The role of intellectuals tied to specific disciplinary and organisational programmes which 
presumably advocated principled intentions that were often uncompromising in respect of 
coordinating their programme was an important element to the wider societal coordination 
within which they were located.  These were merely the intellectual footprints that were 
being laid down for a road whose construction was inevitable.  Benson (1982) has referred to 
the work of such activist programmatic intellectuals as ‘coordinating groups’.  It is significant 
that such coordinating groups were replete throughout South Africa’s history: before 
apartheid, during apartheid and after apartheid.  This is how Benson characterises them: 
‘Coordinating Groups.  There are also groups engaged in the rationalization of 
programs within and between sectors.  These groups have an interest in reducing 
inefficiencies, consolidating programs, and creating more effective divisions of labor.  
The groups are not merely moralizers lacking structural attachment to the system.  
Rather, they are located in organizational units with rationalizing functions.  Their 
career interests depend upon the success of rationalizing efforts.  Some are attached to 
federal agencies attempting to coordinate a diverse array of federal, state and local 
programs.  Others are in “network organizations” (Metcalfe, 1974) such as planning 
agencies that operate between diverse groups.  Some are attached to “public interest” 
and “good government” associations. 
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Coordinating interests are very prominent in the contemporary situation.  In many 
different policy sectors provisions for rationalized central planning have been made, 
and agencies designed to accomplish it have been created.  In addition a variety of 
management tools (for example P.P.B.S) to increase administrative controls of diverse 
programs have been introduced.  Alford (1975) treated the “corporate rationalizers” as 
a major interest in health care politics.  There were groups who proposed a more 
centrally controlled, functionally oriented health care system’ (Benson, 1982: 158). 
Industrial psychology on its own did not necessarily constitute manpower planning.  In South 
Africa manpower planning was brought about by the convergence of industrial psychology 
and educational psychology.  Most important, it was cemented with the statistical 
applications which each discipline sought to institutionalise by strengthening the empirical 
and applied proofs that substantiated its disciplinary activities: psychometrics and its 
ancillary techniques that tested for results.  The other was the statistical collection of 
educational supply data which had become a common feature of the HSRC since its inception 
in 1969.  Manpower planning was driven by a strenuous application of research in the 
industrial management of human resources in particular and linked to predicting the labour 
supply situation in the country for different professions, occupational and racial groups.  
Despite ideological cleavages that arose out of the different sites of application which the 
industrial psychologists at the NIPR found themselves vis-à-vis the educational psychologists 
at the HSRC (Louw 1993b) the absorption of the NIPR into the HSRC in 1985 actually 
incorporated the two research institutions into a common vision.  This vision of course was 
not shared by intellectuals who were brought in opposition to the above initiatives under the 
banner of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC).  The NECC provided the 
vehicle in which the broad architecture of an anti-apartheid human resource development 
strategy was outlined (McGrath, 1996: 139). 
 
Even the anti-apartheid intellectuals that were engaged in policy making appeared to have 
become infested with the idea that nothing was impossible.  Coordinating groups are pioneers 
and often throw caution to the wind.  A degree of absolutism can became ingrained in the 
policy prescriptions which are advanced.  Typically, there is absolute conviction in the 
correctness of the policy trajectory that is put forward.  There is often absolute certainty that 
the aims and objectives that are being set in policy would be achieved.  There is often 
absolute optimism that the goal of establishing the new institutions to implement and deliver 
on the promises of a programme would be effectively and efficiently coordinated.  Often little 
thought is given to culpability being assigned for failures which potentially could arise from 
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incorrect policy prescriptions.  Johan Muller, the South African educational theorist has 
described this phase of the post-apartheid project in South Africa as the phase of critical 
reconstruction.  It is characterised by the shift in the role intellectuals perform from being 
previous critics against the apartheid regime to becoming re-constructors under the new 
democratic dispensation which came into existence after the demise of apartheid.  According 
to Muller, as intellectuals make the shift from critics to re-constructors, they discard their 
previous functional role as critics and fulfil another as policy makers and re-constructors 
(Muller, 2000: chapter 7) (also see Powell & Lolwana, 2012).  It is quite logical to impute the 
existence of such critical re-constructors in South African policy history, even before the 
Union government was formed (before 1910) and before apartheid became official state 
policy (before 1948).  It only means that the re-constructors are represented on different sides 
of the political divide, but more particularly, the side about to experience victory. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 of this thesis sketches a broad historical narrative to the coordination of skill 
formation, especially as it culminated in South Africa.  Bearing in mind that the 
apprenticeship training system was the bedrock on which skill formation in the country was 
organised, the model of apprenticeship training which emerged in South Africa drew 
inspiration from the divergent routes which Germany and Britain mirrored.  The borrowing of 
specific laudatory features or components from either the German or British apprenticeship 
system occurred in South Africa at various junctures over the last one hundred years.  I tried 
to sketch this scenario in an earlier paper (Lundall, 1998).  However, while these influences 
were strong, the South African model to apprenticeship training had unique features and 
characteristics.  While the system in South Africa may also have been more rudimentary, it 
was shaped by concrete conditions and endemic struggles to ameliorate these. 
 
Unlike either Germany or Britain, the South African state played a more active role in the 
regulation of apprenticeship training.  And although it did not police it effectively, it still 
allowed firms significant latitude and autonomy to put the system into practice.  It could even 
be argued that if the state had not been as legalistic in its regulatory interventions, the 
apprenticeship system would have become weaker and perhaps even moribund.  Perhaps if it 
was entirely employer-driven, the skills formation system in South Africa would have 
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evolved in a different way.  Aside from a few very large South African enterprises (e.g. 
ISCOR or the South African Railways & Harbours), very few private firms possessed in-
house training schools or workshops for apprentices and trainees.  Consequently, the extent 
of the state’s regulation of apprenticeship training in South Africa, extended beyond the 
location of the firm to include provision for academic training provided through technical 
colleges spread throughout the country.  The ability of the South African state to intervene 
and coordinate enterprise training was highly significant.  Evidence illustrating the increased 
role which the state assumed to improve the coordination of enterprise skill formation is 
depicted mainly through the impressions captured in Commissions of Inquiry.  These showed 
the degree to which Apprenticeship Committees served as coordinating mechanisms for the 
advancement of enterprise skill formation.  A National Apprenticeship Board was 
institutionalised in the mid-1940s with the purpose of strengthening the coordination function 
of apprenticeship committees.  It was an important building block that the state used to find 
an appropriate structure to control apprenticeship training policy.  It also promoted 
decentralised implementation through individual apprenticeship committees spread across the 
country.  In combination, apprenticeship committees and the National Apprenticeship Board 
constituted a significant coordinating mechanism designed to support enterprise skill 
formation in the country. 
 
In a less direct but more strategic manner, professions and professional organisations put 
enormous effort into winning the confidence of leading private enterprises and state 
organisations particularly in respect of charting the adoption of the new techniques and 
principles.  It was believed that these would enhance productivity and labour organisation.  
Central to these was the promise of contributing to improved coordination of services that 
shaped skill formation especially within the labour force of enterprises in both the state sector 
(including state enterprises) and firms in the private profit sector.  The scientific and research 
benefits which stemmed from these initiatives were spread across all occupational levels.  
There was also a coalescence, between new professions in the field of human resource 
development, their professional organisations and the national applied research institutions 
established to harness and promote benefits from applied scientific research and especially in 
the social sciences.  In some instance these became a national strategic resource but the 





Chapter 6: The Coordination Mechanism in 
National Skills Policy during the Apartheid 
Period: 1960s to early 1990s 
6.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter, an analysis is provided of the coordination mechanism in national 
skills policy.  This broadly covers the period when South Africa became a republic in 1961 to 
the period immediately after the announcement by FW De Klerk of the dismantling of 
apartheid in 1990.  In particular, the chapter gives attention to the formation of institutions 
which enabled the development and application of mechanisms to enhance national skills 
policy.  The chapter discusses the thinking that informed this process as well as the thinking 
and results that were generated to reform the national skills development system.  In the last 
phases of the apartheid regime this goal was to construct a more inclusive labour market that 
also incorporated the excluded majority.  Proposals for a coordination mechanism to national 
skills policy was challenged both practically and theoretically by a broad movement of 
opposition to the apartheid regime.  It was from these struggles that the National Education 
Policy Initiative (NEPI) gained prominence.  The critics at NEPI saw the need to go beyond 
the reformist measures of the apartheid state and indeed they laid the basis for work to be 
taken forward towards developing a comprehensive national levy grant system in South 
Africa.  This chapter covers the period from the early 1960s to the early 1990s when 
bureaucrats and managers within both the state and the private sector economy in particular, 
attempted to construct an appropriate coordination mechanism to national skills policy.  Such 
a coordination mechanism had advantages.  It enabled more firms to support and participate 
in a more extensive system of workplace skills training. 
 
6.2 Skills Coordination in the 1960s 
In the last section of Chapter 5, some background is provided about discourses and 
organisational formations which claim a competence to intervene in human resource 
investigation and human resource management at the enterprise or firm level.  The 
pervasiveness of a regular supply of skilled labour into the national economy in South Africa, 
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complicated further by deleterious racial policies, meant that ideas, discourses and 
institutional interventions that offered a resolution to these intractable South African 
dilemmas automatically generated greater attention from policy makers within and outside 
the state.  These discourses and organisational formations were often mediated through 
academic and research institutions and professional bodies. 
 
In the South African experience, personnel managers, as well as industrial psychologists, 
educational and manpower planners were at the forefront of this process.  However, they 
were also supported by experts from a host of proto-disciplines (e.g. work-study officers, 
aptitude testers, training managers) each claiming, either accurately or exaggeratedly, some 
aspect of the enterprise as a key objective of its knowledge enquiry and specific ‘competent’ 
application.  The process which set the trend for these new organisational programmes in 
South Africa mirrored trends from abroad (e.g. Industrial Psychology, Social Work, 
Accounting and Auditing). 
 
The personalities introducing the new organisational and knowledge system into South 
Africa, the host country, were often civic-minded intellectuals and academics (e.g. Ernst 
Malherbe, Simon Bieshuevel, Isobel White, Edward Batson).  Some may have spent time 
abroad and become inducted into this new thinking (e.g. Malherbe and Biesheuvel).  Others 
may have immigrated to their new homeland, quickly surveyed the landscape and saw needs 
which knowledge of the advanced techniques of a home country could help fill.  Immigrants 
such as Isobel White and Edward Batson became champions in their new homeland to an 
agenda that elevated them in a manner which they could not have anticipated had they not 
immigrated to South Africa from Britain. 
 
Many of these initiatives in South Africa were spearheaded by civic mined intellectuals and 
academics (e.g. Ernest Malherbe, Simon Biesheuvel, Isobel White, Edward Batson). At the 
inception of their involvement these intellectuals and academics were structurally based 
within institutions and organisations which were outside the confines of the profit-generating 
sector of the economy.  Typically too, at the inception they were also outside the confines of 
the state.  Despite being outside the private market sector and the state sector, there was 
steady support especially from private philanthropic sources for the work in which they were 
involved to continue.  For instance, Malherbe’s salary at the NBESR was heavily subsidised 
by the Carnegie Corporation.  Gradually too, state institutions saw the usefulness of the new 
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ideas being espoused and rendered support in different ways.  Perhaps the first footprint 
towards establishing a movement for human resource development occurred through the 
work of the Leather Industries Research Institute (LIRI).  Under the directorship of Dr 
Stanley Shuttleworth, LIRI had begun to undertake industrial research to improve economic 
performance of leather firms mainly in the Port-Elizabeth regional economy.  It was also 
coincidental that Isobel White whose husband had been appointed to the chair of Classics at 
Rhodes University in Grahamstown in 1939 soon came into contact with Shuttleworth and 
took up part-time employment with LIRI in Port Elizabeth (Legg, 2004: 59-64). 
 
Almost a decade before Isobel White’s arrival in South Africa, Ernest Malherbe who had just 
returned to South Africa with a doctorate in Educational Psychology from Columbia 
University in the United States was instrumental in establishing the National Bureau of 
Educational and Social Research (NBESR) in 1929.  It was envisaged that the Bureau would 
undertake educational research (e.g. involving among other items, the relationship between 
poverty and intelligence among poor-white children) for the Union Department of Education.  
Since the Department did not have a sufficient budget to cover the operational costs of this 
new research bureau, the Carnegie Corporation subsidised his salary costs from its inception 
until 1931.  During this period, Malherbe was also engaged in writing the educational report 
to the Carnegie Commission into Poor White poverty.  These events are recorded in 
Malherbe’s (1981) autobiography. 
 
For the NBESR to become a more permanent fixture on the South African landscape meant 
securing a financial support base that went beyond philanthropic benefaction.  Just as is the 
case today (2017), without philanthropic assistance, a new secular institutional entity such as 
the NBESR could not possibly be supported even in part by resources from the social 
development sector, albeit it a philanthropic institution.  Neither could the association of 
firms in the private sector render it such support without it first ministering to its specific 
enterprise needs.  It was therefore inevitable for the state to be lobbied as a more generous 
benefactor to give the research programme of new organisations such as the NBESR 
incubational protection and ultimately a more permanent institutional presence that could 
justify the visionary outlook of its founder.  This would have been quite clear to Malherbe in 
the 1920s and 1930s, just as it would have been quite clear for civic minded intellectuals and 
academics in the 1950s and 1960s who were captivated by the possibilities of big science 
programmes underwritten by the state.  Basil Schonland the first director of the Council for 
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Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) which was established in 1945 was the ultimate 
trend-setter to this process (Austin, 2001).  These visionary expectations would also have 
permeated the consciousness of the conglomeration of intellectuals and academics that were 
assembled to form the CSIR in the late 1940s.  At the behest of Schonland and against Smut’s 
reservations, a seat at the table was reserved for the Industrial Psychologists represented by 
Simon Biesheuvel.  Brian Austin, Schonland’s biographer adds more nuance to the story: 
‘An idea also lurking there, and one stimulated very much by the success achieved in 
South Africa under Dr. Simon Biesheuvel in the selection of aircrews during the war, 
was to set up a facility for research into industrial psychology.  When he first put this 
suggestion to Smuts, the Prime Minister responded by telling Schonland that it sounds 
like ‘pretty good nonsense’ but Schonland argued that Biesheuvel had developed 
scientific techniques of selection that were well in advance of those employed 
elsewhere and their application to industry would be of great benefit in the longer 
term.  Though Smut’s own assessment of people was sometimes criticised, his 
philosophy, once he had selected the right man, was to allow him full rein and so, 
having put his faith in Basil Schonland, he now accepted his judgement and allowed 
him to proceed.  Schonland’s faith in Biesheuvel would indeed be vindicated in the 
years to come’ (Austin, 2001: 313-314)
25
. 
Similarly, under the changing conditions of the 1990s in South Africa, educational and skills 
development activists would have harboured similar visions of relevant knowledge 
production, for a new state and a transforming social formation. 
 
In the human resource development sphere – which covered the spectrum of educational and 
training development from infancy to old age; from workforce development and training to 
the educational and training development of practitioners under a new South African 
democratic society, there was a much clearer demarcation between the old order and the new 
order. 
 
                                                 
25
 Schonland was by far the most prominent South African scientist at the time having studied under the New 
Zealander, Sir Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge University where he completed his 
doctorate shortly after the end of the First World War.  Coupled with his work on radar technology which he 
undertook at the Bernard Price Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand, Schonland was virtually the de 
facto scientific advisor to the South African government under the United Party.  Of course it did help that 
Schonland’s wife was a distant relative of Smuts.  Austin relates an incident when Smuts made his first war time 
visit to Britain in October 1942 and addressed the combined House of Lords and Commons on the 21
st
 of 
October.  A special film of the address was given a day or two later at South Africa House.  The Schonlands’ 
were guests at the garden party in Smut’s honour after the screening.  When they were finally presented to the 
Prime Minister, Smuts immediately broke into Afrikaans and said: “Maar dis ou vriende die – ons is mos 
familie, almal Hofmeyrs’ [PL’s translation: ‘But these are old friends – we are actually family – we are all 
Hofmeyrs’] (Austin, 2001: 251). 
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Just as the state was supported by a spectrum of institutions delving within the human 
resource development environment from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, a similar process 
started to unfold as new institutions exhibiting a human resource development agenda began 
to emerge from roughly 1990.  Before the onset of democracy in South Africa in 1994 and its 
full consummation after 1994, this emergence in its multiple configurations was mainly 
mirrored in the community or non-profit sector which I often refer to as the social 
development economy.  Before 1994, human resource development initiatives and proposals 
were eagerly formulated within NGOs (e.g. the Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
(CASE) in Johannesburg and Careers Resource and Information Centre (CRIC) in Cape 
Town), research units attached to universities (e.g. the Education Policy Units (EPUs) at Wits 
and the University of Natal) as well as through study groups and research initiatives within 
trade unions (e.g. NUMSA) and emerging educational coordinating bodies (e.g. the National 
Educational Crisis Committee which eventually spawned the National Educational Policy 
Initiative (NEPI)).  Though much earlier on, a similar process started to emerge when the 
Union of South Africa became a republic in 1961.  This episode requires brief focus because 
it holds continuities to the shape of educational and training policy with the onset of 
democracy in South Africa after 1990. 
6.2.1 Organisation and the Force of Disciplinary Knowledge 
In May 1961 South Africa abrogated its status as a dominion to Britain and became a 
republic.  By then, the contours to the disciplinary landscape which mirrored the quest to 
investigate human resource development in South Africa had already begun to congeal.  
Occupying a lower rung in professional status were the personnel managers who had access 
to enterprises through their employment in firms which operated personnel departments.  
Personnel managers existed to serve the human resources, personnel and training needs of the 
enterprises with which they were associated.  They were also represented professionally 
through the Institute of Personnel Management.  Dominating the field were the Industrial 
Psychologists on the one side and the Educational Psychologists who were the most dominant 
sub-disciplinary grouping in the field of education and social science research on the other.  
Each was attached to a dominant disciplinary discourse which had specific features of the 
human resource development field as its object of investigation.  These disciplines were 
represented at the apex of national research production in the country through organisations 




In 1955, the National Institute for Personnel Research with Simon Biesheuvel at its helm had 
a staff complement of 88 and operated a number of research laboratories and field research 
divisions covering the sub-fields of theoretical psychology, psychometrics, African studies 
and mathematical statistics.  The principal discipline responsible for coordinating the research 
programme of the NIPR was undoubtedly Industrial Psychology.  In addition, the NIPR also 
operated field research divisions which conducted research on personnel selection and 
classification, job evaluation and industrial relations, job adjustment including absenteeism, 
labour turnover and accidents, conducted attitudinal studies of workers and also explored 
measures of efficiency through trade testing (Masson, 1955: 15-17; Kingwill, 1990: 258-273) 
 
At the time, the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research was the apex national 
research institute in South Africa that operated in the field of educational and social research.  
In 1955 it had a staff complement of 25 (Masson, 1955: 99).  The NBESR was established 
under the Department of Education, Arts and Science and as was indicated above had been 
established in 1929 by Ernest Malherbe.  Shortly after the CSIR came into existence in 1945, 
the Union government also established the National Council for Social Research (NCSR) in 
1946.  The National Council for Social Research would eventually evolve into the Human 
Sciences Research Council when it was established in 1969. 
 
There was significant overlap between the NBESR and the National Council for Social 
Research (NCSR).  In a directory of social research organisation in the Union of South 
Africa, published in 1955, the functions of each is clearly outlined.  The NBESR was 
required to undertake research in education and psychology, physical education and ‘Native’ 
education.  It was also required to serve as a ‘clearing-house for information on education and 
research in South Africa’ as well as act as the secretariat for the NCSR or any of its special 
committees when this was needed (Masson, 1955: 99).  Under the directorship of Dr P. 
Olckers, the NBESR had a staff complement of 25 in 1955.  While operating from basically 
the same building, the NCSR possessed a broader functional mandate than the NBESR.  Its 
functions and objectives as spelt out in 1955 included the following: 
a) ‘to promote, organise, co-ordinate and assist educational, sociological and 
humanistic research on a national basis, but not to dominate or monopolise the 
field; 
b) to encourage and to undertake the planning of research projects; 
123 
 
c) to ensure efficient and economic use of monies; 
d) to create, where necessary, bodies for carrying out long-term researches; 
e) to encourage the training of highly qualified research workers by means of 
grants, scholarships and fellowships to selected individuals for attachment to 
university departments, government departments or other institutions; 
f) to provide information, liaison and statistical services as well as to assist in the 
publication of results and other material likely to be valuable for research; 
g) to promote library services; 
h) to formulate in general terms research policy, and to put forward to the 
government and the country the needs of research; 
i) to obtain and administer endowments; 
j) to issue a Journal of Social Research twice yearly, an annual Register of 
Current Research in the Humanities undertaken by Universities and other 
organisations, and an annual report (Masson, 1955: 100). 
As one takes a broad historical sweep of the period since the 1950s, one can only marvel at 
the foresight which went into elaborating the core objectives and functions of the NCSR.  
These replicated almost verbatim the functions and objectives of the HSRC when it was 
formed in 1969.  Most astonishing is that the objectives set out for the NCSR remained 
broadly similar to that set out for the HSRC over twenty years later and beyond.  It is what 
one would imagine apex national research organisations which have a broader mandate to 
what either the NBESR or the NIPR with their more disciplinary orientation could not be.  
Neither would these original functions be inconsistent with an organisational structure which 
witnessed the NIPR being cast off from the CSIR in 1985 and being absorbed into the HSRC. 
6.2.2 Schism in Professional Organisation and Disciplinary 
Knowledge 
By 1960, the terrain of human resource development and skills development more 
specifically already clearly occupied the knowledge disciplines that could epistemologically 
and legitimately claim this space as its unique patch in its research investigations.  Minor 
enterprise tools, techniques and organisational stratagems that had less claim to disciplinary 
status such as Personnel Management and Work Study did not attain the same level of 
professional status and was mainly diffused and exchanged among managers within firms.  In 
respect of personnel management, coordination of its professional standing and future 
direction was achieved through the Institute of Personnel Management.  This did not mean 
that national research institutes such as the NIPR abdicated its claim on the scientific 
nurturing of ‘Personnel Management’.  This would have been seen only as a component to 
the theoretical principles of industrial psychology, as was evident from the curriculum 




Nonetheless, by the time that South Africa became a republic in 1961, the entire disciplinary 
field which could legitimately lay claim to the spawning investigation into the requirements 
and resolution of human resource/skills development in South Africa that had started to gain 
momentum was largely under the auspices of psychologists.  Generally, the content 
orientation of these psychologists was of two types: industrial psychologists or educational 
psychologists.  Other disciplines in the human sciences which had previously addressed 
specific features of the human resource/skills development concerns such as social work 
(previously a more influential grouping as social welfare officers), economists and 
sociologists were no match to the psychologists.  Whereas, economists and other technical 
enumerators (statisticians, operations researchers) had the technical skills to measure and 
forecast predictable events, they were not able to match the applications and organising logic 
of the psychologists and were therefore no more than foot soldiers.  Despite the NIPR 
establishing an Industrial Sociology Department (see South African Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research, 1955: 17&19), sociology as a discipline and the sociologists as a 
profession were almost invisible to the process. 
 
Institutionally too, the national apex institutions which conveyed the disciplinary outlook of 
either the industrial psychologists (NIPR) or the educational psychologists (NBESR & 
NCSR) had largely become institutionalised.  In general, any white South African post-
graduate student studying in the field of industrial psychology or educational psychology 
knew that if not selected for an academic or research post at a university, they had equally 
good prospects of continuing their research investigations at a national apex institution in 
their field of training, albeit that these institutions were located on the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg or Pretoria. 
 
In 1962, the industrial psychology and educational psychology communities were affected by 
a split in the professional mother-body.  The South African Psychological Association, 
founded in 1949, to which most psychologists in the country belonged, split (Legg, 2004: 92; 
Louw, 1993b).  The split was brought about by an insistence in government policy to enforce 
separation among professional societies so that different racial groups would each have their 
own professional society.  A breakaway all-white body, known as the Psychological Institute 
of the Republic of South Africa (or the more popular Afrikaans designation: die Sielkundige 
Instituut van die Republiek van Suid Afrika (SIRSA), was formed.  As Legg notes, ‘SIRSA’s 
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membership strength lay largely in the Afrikaans language universities and the state 
departments’ (Legg, 2004: 92; also see Louw, 1993b: 256-257).  It immediately received 
statutory recognition.  Both psychology societies published separate journals until their 
eventual merger in the late 1970s.  Thus, little collaboration could take place between the two 
but as Louw (1993b) argues, it resulted in two effects on the field of practice among 
educational and industrial psychologists: 
‘First, PIRSA initiated a recruitment drive, and for the first time included educational 
psychologists in their definition of professional psychologists.  This allowed them to 
swell their numbers considerably, as educational psychologists were the largest group 
in the country.  Second, because the majority of NIPR personnel stayed with SAPA, 
the industrial psychology side of PIRSA activities were weakened.  Thus PIRSA 
would show mainly educational applications, and SAPA predominantly industrial 
applications.  PIRSA members tended to be in the counselling, educational and 
psychometric fields, while SAPA members were slightly in the majority in the 
industrial, clinical and social fields’ (Louw, 1993b: 257). 
This split meant that the future organisation of professional coordination among 
psychologists in South Africa would henceforth require more careful navigation to be 
effective.  Reflecting on this episode almost thirty years later Cloete and Muller (1991) noted 
that the split also immediately influenced the relationship between psychologists deployed 
within the apex research institutes that were doing applied psychology in South Africa, 
namely the NIPR and the NBESR/NCSR constellation, which would subsequently be 
consolidated to form the HSRC.  Cloete and Muller’s characterisation is extremely insightful: 
‘First and most visibly, the HSRC was predominantly Afrikaner Nationalist while the 
NIPR was English and associated with the liberal SAP (South African Party).  
Furthermore this meant that the NBESR and later the HSRC usually pursued research 
of national (and Nationalist) priority, while the NIPR pursued the prerogatives of 
English-owned capital.  Political differences aside, there was a difference in style of 
research too which is less easy to characterise.  The Afrikaners of the HSRC, coming 
as they did from an idealist, hermeneutical, continental tradition of human scientific 
research, were always more concerned with the human (and political) side of social 
commerce, with research into attitudes, aptitudes and aspirations as empirical 
signposts of the state of health of the national spirit. 
The English at the NIPR, following the British and American positivist tradition, were 
always more concerned with methodological niceties, on the one hand, and with 
technical improvements in human performance with a view to enhancing productivity, 
on the other’ (Cloete & Muller, 1991: 146). 
While the discipline may have been fractured with an ideologically engineered split within 
the professional society of psychologists in South Africa, the apex institutions which 
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supported investigation into aspects of human resource/skills development in South Africa 
were still intact.  Financially too, this research would continue to receive state support.  More 
importantly, as a result of the new relationships that were forged in the 1960s between the 
wielders of political power and the scientific research community, scientific research 
conducted by the NBESR/NCSR would necessarily generate more serious consideration and 
political endorsement by those in power. 
 
Despite these schisms in the professional organisation of the psychology community in South 
Africa, the industrial psychologists made a significant contribution through their work to the 
skill formation process.  It included more systematic personnel and classification methods, 
the selection and training of mine workers, the design and construction of test batteries in 
psychometrics as well as training programmes and the generation of vocational guidance 
services.  On the training front, as was indicated in Section 5.8 of Chapter 5, the 6M Training 
and Simulation Programme was a result of this theoretical and applied work in industrial 
psychology (also see Kingwill, 1990: 258-273 for a celebratory overview). 
6.2.3 Measuring the Skills Crisis in the 1960s 
From the 1960s, the NBESR set about conducting employer-surveys that measured the 
demand and supply of critical sources of labour in South Africa.  The surveys were important 
because it set in place a methodology to measure demand and supply in the intermediate and 
high occupational levels (e.g. scientists, engineers, technicians and artisans).  It also provided 
state officials and policy commentators in the private market economy and non-profit sector 
or social development economy with access to this type of data.  This allowed all concerned 
to have a better understanding of the provisioning of educational and training production to 
support intermediate and high level occupations.  These surveys also provided evidence for 
the routine enquiries, investigations and interventions which a modern state typically plans 
and executes.  Perhaps the most important of these in the years immediately after the 
establishment of the apartheid republic was the Straszacker Commission into the existing 
methods of training the engineering, scientific and ancillary labour corps in South Africa.  
The Straszacker Commission was completed in 1965 and there were many other commissions 
set up in subsequent years that required similar research and technical support.  The NBESR 
was intimately involved in generating empirical and policy insights that were used in these 




A brief glimpse into a report completed in 1960 by the NBESR into the training and 
employment of scientists and engineers is instructive.  Data for the report was generated 
through an employer survey conducted by the NBESR.  The survey initially included 
government departments, municipalities, state corporations and private sector firms.  
Unfortunately it over-represented public sector employer responses while under-representing 
private employer responses of the demand and supply for scientific labour.  The data 
generated from the survey enabled the NBESR researchers to calculate vacancy rates for 
different categories of scientific labour.  An illustration of the type of data generated and the 
form of its representation by the NBESR is reproduced in Table 6.1 below: 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Education and Social Research (1960), Table 33, p.32. 
 
In subsequent years, data from similar surveys were produced showing vacancy levels for 
technicians, artisans and other categories of labour.  From 1969, annual Manpower Surveys 
were produced that depicted similar trends for workers at different occupational levels in the 
manufacturing sector.  The data from these surveys informed the national dialogue on skills 
shortages throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.  Even at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Manpower Surveys embodied the best available data from which to measure occupational 
mobility and the effects of industrial training on the racial division of labour in South Africa 
(see Crankshaw, 1997; Lundall & Kimmie, 1992). 
 
Table 6.1: Vacancies for Engineers in Different Categories
Category of Engineering Posts Posts Posts Percentage 
 Existing Filled Vacant Vacancies
Civil** 2618 2250 368 14
Electrical or mechanical 1327 1220 107 9
Electrical 696 628 68 10
Mechanical 392 317 75 23
Mining 587 575 12 2
Industrial* 302 300 2 1
Chemical 207 180 27 15
Metallurgy 188 186 2 1
Note: * Industrial includes Mechanical, Electrical and Chemical Engineering
           ** Civil includes Agricultural Engineering
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The political climate of the 1960s, coupled with a more constant generation of evidence of 
skills shortages across many occupational tiers of the South African labour market, reinforced 
the critique that the racialized job reservation policies of the Nationalist Party government 
had perpetuated these skilled labour shortages.  In the main, South African liberal 
intellectuals, academics and activists (e.g. South African Institute of Race Relations) were at 
the forefront in advancing this critique.  These racial and political policies reverberated across 
society with a wide spectrum of institutions, practices and effects contributing to shortages of 
skills.  Apprenticeship committees were seen to police access to training opportunities 
especially for potential coloured and Indian apprentices (Hemple, 1969).  Through the 
reinforcement of mediocrity an acute shortage of personnel particularly in the fields of 
physics and mathematics was perpetuated (Horrell, 1963).  The thrust of the criticism was 
about reversing apartheid policies which inhibited participation from ‘non-white’ South 
Africans who had the requisite educational and experiential credentials but were prevented 
from participating in the labour market and contributing to the overall economic prosperity of 
the country.  While most of these commentators remained true to the evidence at their 
disposal, there were those who occasionally exaggerated the problem of skills shortages.  For 
them skills shortages was a national crisis.  Even the staunch liberal academic and doyen of 
educational research for policy change in South Africa, the founder of the NBESR under the 
fusion government
26
 – Ernest Malherbe – ventured into the debate.  Almost reminiscent of 
Walter Rostow’s stages of economic growth theory (popularised in South Africa during the 
1970s by Michael O’Dowd), Malherbe postulated a scenario in South Africa of intense labour 
shortages that by the 1970s would inhibit economic growth in the South African economy.  
Using the estimates made by a certain Dr Meyer in 1960 when he was the President of the 
National Development Foundation of South Africa, Malherbe (1967) writing in 1967 
extended Meyer’s projections to 1970.  As Malherbe put it: 
‘In order to give some idea as to how many persons South Africa will need at 
managerial level if it were geared to the industrial and economic efficiency of the 
                                                 
26
 The fusion government in South Africa arose as a result of the formation of a unity government of the ruling 
Nationalist Party in South Africa under General JBM Hertzog and the opposition South African Party under the 
leadership of General JC Smuts in 1933.  Both had been prominent Boer generals who had fought the British 
during the Anglo-Boer War.  Under the unity government Hertzog was Prime Minister and Smuts was deputy 
Prime Minister.  The unity government was formed in response to the effects of the economic crisis which the 
Great Depression wrought on the South African economy.  Unity between the two parties was a motivation for 
their merger and fusion particularly after they comfortably won the 1934 general election.  The merger and 
fusion between these two parties was complete when Hertzog and Smuts respectively led the majority factions 
of each party to form the United South African National Party at the end of 1934, which was simply known as 
the United Party. 
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United States, he [i.e. Dr Meyer P.L.] applied the U.S.A. percentages to South 
Africa’s present gainfully employed proportion.  According to this reckoning Dr 
Meyer estimates that the Republic of South Africa now needs: 
(i) 560,000 managers, officials and working owners, 
(ii) 710,000 foremen, craftsmen and kindred workers, 
(iii) 550,000 technical, professional and kindred workers, making a total of 
1,820,000 trained people required for our present national economic needs.  
By 1970 this figure will rise to 2,345,000 trained people in terms of our 
estimated gainfully employed population of 1970’(Malherbe, 1967: 5). 
While morally correct, in Malherbe the liberal critique of the racial exclusionary training 
policies of the apartheid regime was not empirically grounded.  Even though he was at the 
time a university administrator (vice-chancellor at the University of Natal) he could not 
influence the coordination mechanism of state human resource/skills development policy.  He 
did however draw the attention of those opposing the job reservation policies of the NP 
government.  Although, the liberal programme of critique was supported by many holders of 
disciplinary knowledge within state funded research institutions (e.g. the NIPR as well as the 
source to Hellman’s statement about the quality of white entrants in apprenticeship 
programmes), Malherbe the Columbia University trained educationalist did not invoke this 
disciplinary grounding strongly enough in defence of his argument.  Like a prodigal son, his 
utterance represented those of someone who had abdicated his disciplinary knowledge as well 
as his authority in the state economy.  Despite sympathies to his cause from the liberal 
segments of the organised business community, neither did he occupy the structural location 
and authority to represent the sentiments of firms and enterprises in the private sector on this 
matter.  It was as if, his political and disciplinary voice had been relegated to the wilderness 
of the community sector. 
 
Malherbe’s critique was just a step away from characterising the skill shortages as a skills 
crisis.  But from the mid-1980s, the notion of a skills crisis had already begun to filter into the 
pantheon of critique against the training policies of the apartheid regime.  A more sober 
perspective to Malherbe emerges from Meth (1979) but the general argument which he 
advanced was unfortunately not seriously taken up by the radical scholarship of the 1970s 
which he himself formed part.  In Meth’s words: 
‘The problem with the skills shortages melody is that it has been played too often.  
Over the years, various authorities have taken it upon themselves to pronounce on this 
important matter.  Gibson for example, quotes an Education Panel prediction made in 
1961 which estimated that 49 000 apprentices would have to be in training in 1965 
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and 110 000 in 1980, to meet the demand for artisans.  With the benefit of hindsight 
we know that only 46 000 apprentices were in training in 1977 and we also know that 
shortages were negligible’ (Meth, 1979: 82). 
Meth (1979: 82) argued that while skilled labour shortages did exist in the South African 
economy these did not inhibit the post-war growth in the South African economy.  Meth 
argued that it would be extremely difficult to prove that the South African economy would 
have grown faster had these shortages not existed.  Even though it was likely to generate 
conflict between trade unions and employers, Meth (1979: 83) maintained it would have been 
perfectly feasible to increase productivity and economic growth through mechanisation and 
extensions through the division of labour using job fragmentation. In fact both processes 
according to Meth were important in the post-war growth spurt in South Africa.  Both 
processes would have elevated employer discourses on industrial training to the helm. 
 
But why did employers not choose this route?  Actually they did.  Jon Lewis (1984, chap.7) 
elegantly documented the struggle between employers and white craft unions in South Africa 
over the introduction of job dilution and job fragmentation particularly in the period 
preceding and immediately after the Second World War when machinery was introduced on a 
large scale within the manufacturing industries.  Similarly Eddie Webster did corresponding 
research on the Iron Moulders (Webster, 1985).  Correlating this picture of job fragmentation 
and job dilution with what employers said they were doing in contrast to what they actually 
did do at the workplace will get us closer to differentiating between the ideological and the 
real.  When the 1958 government Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the 
Protection of Industries invited evidence from employers about the major inhibitions that they 
had experienced and were continuing to experience, during the post-war industrial 
development of the Union, there was not a wide chasm between the submission from the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce of South Africa (ASSOCOM) from the position liberal 
critics were starting to put forward.  ASSOCOM’s response to the questions raised by the 
Commission raised the following concerns: 
‘In the Association’s view, the main limiting factors in the post-war industrial 
development of the Union have been, labour shortages, relative capital shortages, 
inadequate transport services, and a limited market for the Union’s products. 
Restrictive legislative policies have hindered the full utilisation of existing labour 
resources.  The Industrial Conciliation Act by excluding Natives from collective 
bargaining has had an indirect effect of retarding the acquisition by them of skills 
necessary to perform tasks for which there is now a shortage of trained labour.  The 
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manner in which influx control is administered has created a greater non-European 
labour turnover than would normally prevail, by establishing an artificial situation of 
full employment.  Restrictive trade union practices have also limited the extent to 
which non-European labour is able to acquire skills’ (ASSOCOM, 1957: 16-17). 
ASSOCOM did not refer to the process of job dilution and job fragmentation with which 
employers had already experimented.  It instead gave a generalised viewpoint about 
mechanisation: 
‘The advantages of increased mechanisation, and the increased use of mechanised 
methods, have been limited by the size of the market in the Union, and it is important 
therefore that industry should develop export markets.  This limiting factor could be 
lessened if immigrants were encouraged to the Union and more attention was paid to 
the non-European as a consumer.  By increasing the non-European’s ability to 
produce we could increase our national income and our internal market’ (ASSOCOM, 
1957: 18) 
Extracting evidence from earlier Commissions of Enquiry however provides useful insights 
into the process of job fragmentation which was occurring, particularly in the furniture 
industry.  The process of job fragmentation taking place in this industry did not necessarily 
imply that there was a dilution in the skills composition of workers subjected to it.  The 
breadth of skills would certainly have been reduced but its depth may have been preserved. 
 
In its 1935 report, the Industrial Legislation Commission mentions in passing that ‘until a few 
years ago’, one of three active apprenticeship committees in the furniture industry had started 
to substitute a system of learnership for that of apprenticeship (U.G. 37/1935, para.709).  
Learnership was a form of ‘in-plant’ or on-the-job training.  It corresponded closely to 
apprenticeships but levels of obligatory skill required to successfully complete learnerships 
was not as high as apprenticeships and the training periods were shorter.  In other words, 
following the evidence of the Industrial Legislation Commission of 1935, young workers 
who qualified for apprenticeship programmes were instead undergoing training in 
learnerships.  The Commission did however recommend that a substitution of a learnership 
system for an apprenticeship system seemed preferable where there were marked advances in 
production techniques.  It was suggested that where an earlier requirement to possess a skill 
for a job that minors as well as adults would typically do was no longer relevant, ‘a system of 
learnership should be substituted for apprenticeship (U.G. 37/1935, para. 724).  The 
Industrial Legislation Commission was therefore condoning the substitution of learnership 
training for apprenticeship training where production requirements had changed.  These 
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production requirements can only suggest that already by 1935, the onset of job 
fragmentation and job dilution which necessitated the introduction of learnership training 
schemes had already started gaining momentum, particularly in the more marginal industries 
such as furniture-making.  In trades that had been affected by mechanisation but where skills 
were still an important factor, the Commission suggested that the length of apprenticeship 
indenture periods could be reduced: 
‘It appears also from evidence that there are some trades in which, despite the 
introduction of machinery and other new methods of manufacture, skills still plays an 
important part.  Designation of these trades is still fully warranted, though the present 
lengthy period of apprenticeship may no longer be necessary’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 
725). 
Since skill in workmanship continued being an important factor that required demonstrating 
‘a considerable knowledge of material’, even when machine processes as the Commission 
pointed out had already become quite pervasive, the Commission suggested that under such 
conditions learnership training programmes were not an effective substitute: 
‘The mere displacement of manual by machine processes is in itself no justification 
for removing a trade from the skilled to the semi-skilled category.  Machine processes 
often involve a high degree of skill in workmanship and a considerable knowledge of 
material and it is in the interests of employer and employee alike that in suitable 
occupations a proper period and course of training under indenture should be 
prescribed.  Learnership is not an effective substitute for apprenticeship in these 
cases’ (U.G. 37/1935, para. 726). 
The subject reared its head again thirteen years later with the release of the report to the 
Commission on Technical and Vocational Education (De Villiers Commission) in 1948.  
Since learnership training fell under the auspices of industrial councils, they could bypass 
apprenticeship committees.  Because the promotion of learnerships had an affinity to in-plant 
or on-the-job training, these potentially could remain undetected, especially outside the 
purview of the state and apprenticeship committees.  Since fewer third party-agents were 
involved in overseeing its regulation, employers therefore had much more discretion and 
control over learnership training programmes.  This is what the De Villiers Commission had 
to say about learnership: 
‘In the Union, learnership as opposed to apprenticeship is undertaken in non-
designated trades, to which apprenticeship regulations do not apply.  Learnership may 
also be served in a designated trade which is not covered by an apprenticeship 
committee.  Learnership is at present a matter of in-plant training or “training on the 
job”.  Its aims are in general the same as apprenticeship training.  It differs from 
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apprenticeship training in that the trainee is not under contract, does not have to attend 
technical classes and normally does not have to attain as high a level of skill as the 
apprentice.  Learnership periods are thus often very much shorter than apprenticeship 
periods’ (U.G. 65/1948, para. 1230) 
If we return to the issue which Meth (1979) raised about the tendency to exaggerate the 
degree of skills shortages in South Africa as well as examine the relative flexibility of 
employers to covertly subvert apprenticeship training and have it substituted with learnership 
training, we have to ask what would the losses in relation to skills have been?  Lewis (1984) 
alludes to the fact that because of job dilution, the production of craft skills had in many 
instances throughout the 1950s become so only in name.  Craft had become synonymous with 
a particular supervisory function and station of control in the division of labour.  It is quite 
conceivable that the dilution of skill for artisan and craft positions could have occurred 
almost simultaneously as increased levels of skill became concentrated in semi-skilled 
workers.  Seen from the perspective of the craft worker, if a specific type of formal training 
system (i.e. apprenticeship) is being substituted by another (i.e. learnership), a substitution 
where a lower status system replaces another with a higher status system, in the aggregate the 
skills in the occupation of the craft worker should register a decline.  But seen from the 
perspective of the operator or semi-skilled worker, if a new type of formal training system 
(i.e. learnership) is being introduced where nothing such as this existed before, it elevates the 
status of the operator from one with no formal qualifications to that where the qualification is 
a learnership.  In the aggregate, the occupation of the operator or semi-skilled worker would 
be marginally elevated because a definite accumulation of skills would be shown.  If the 
training period reserved for the substituting training system is almost equivalent to what was 
in place before, it seems obvious that a significant accumulation in skill was covertly taking 
place.  Training programmes designated as learnership training by the De Villiers 
Commission would probably have exhibited similar traits.  The view of the Commission on 
learnerships was a follows: 
‘The position regarding learnership in the Union cannot be regarded as satisfactory, as 
there are cases where the period of learnership is equal to that of apprenticeship.  
Learnership is controlled by Industrial Council agreements and not by learnership 
comittees.  In the case of the furniture industry, the period of apprenticeship has been 
laid down as four years by all committees, functioning in the various parts of the 
Union.  The Witwatersrand Furniture Apprenticeship Committee was dissolved in 
1936 and a learnership system introduced, the duration of which is four years, the 
same as that of apprenticeship, and there is no requirement to allow such learners off 
work to attend technical classes or carry out any other obligations laid down in the 
Apprenticeship Act.  There are many other cases of learnership where the period is 
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four years, e.g. for steel furniture making, 5 years; for steel chain-making (certain 
sections) 4 to 5 years; and in the case of gate and fence making, 4 to 5 years’ (U.G. 
65/1948, para. 1231) 
In the furniture industry in particular, learnership training was being used as a substitute for 
apprenticeship training from at least the mid-1930s.  By the 1970s when Charles Meth 
examined the evidence of division of labour in the furniture industry, with the exception of 
supervisory positions (e.g. foreman, charge-hand, supervisor and maintenance fitter) where 
white personnel were in significant numbers, the operator and craft segments of employment 
in the furniture industry was predominantly held by coloured and Indian workers.  According 
to Meth (1978: 15) by 1959 – except for the Orange Free State – in the three other provinces 
of the Union, coloured and Asian artisans out-numbered white artisans in the furniture 
industry.  By 1964, ‘there were roughly 5 Coloured or Asian artisans in the furniture industry 
for every White’ (Meth, 1978: 15).  Essentially, while the uptake of learernships was under 
the auspices of industrial councils, the industrial councils did not necessarily give blanket 
endorsement for the expansion and uptake of learnerships.  It only meant that it was used 
more frequently in industries which had a low representation of craft workers (and typically 
white craft workers who potentially could enforce job reservation) engaged in the production 
work within enterprises and firms.  In industries such as furniture where the operator and 
craft segment was predominantly coloured or Indian, the Industrial Council would probably 
have been more generous to the expansion of learnership training.  The owners and managers 
of these firms as well as the workers involved would have perceived it as categorical 
evidence of skill formation.  Under the apartheid system this would just have had to be 
coordinated through a haze of smoke and mirrors.  This is a pertinent example of how market 
coordination was invoked to secure the coordination in the supply of requisite skilled labour.  
Incidentally, this occurred in opposition to the regulatory and compliance requirement that 
was upheld by the state through the Apprenticeship Act. 
 
Presumably the workers that qualified to undergo learnership training during the 1960s when 
the skills shortage debate was furiously ablaze would have been classified in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, as workers.  This means that black workers would have been 
excluded from gaining access to such programmes and in the main, it would have been 
directed to coloured and Indian workers who were less likely to gain access to apprenticeship 
programmes.  White workers, both male and female but particularly women, who failed to 
secure early indenture in apprenticeship training programmes may too have been recipients 
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for such training.  But such learnership programmes fell outside the scrutiny of the 
apprenticeship committees and the state and were instituted through on-the-job programmes 
under the auspices of Industrial Councils.  If the skills shortages were as pervasive as the 
critics claimed what for instance would have prevented firms from discarding the formal 
designation of the training in learnerships and assigned such training to black workers for 
instance?  It would have been equivalent to selling a brand consumer good to middle-class 
customers and selling a no-name brand to a customer classified below the middle class.  
While commentators such as Malherbe and the liberal critics of Apartheid may have raised 
concerns about the pervasiveness of skills shortages in the 1960s particularly in the 
manufacturing industries, they may have inadvertently under-estimated the skills embodiment 
within the black labour force particularly those occupying the semi-skilled and operator job 
categories who potentially would have been able to undertake more skill-intensive job tasks 
despite their low skilled occupational designation. 
 
This point has enormous significance particularly considering the multiple-dimension which 
the discussion of skill showed in Chapter 3.  The point which Francis Green (2011) raised is 
pertinent particularly concerning the three pronged notion of skill.  To reiterate the PES 
principle which affirms the existence of skill: it would show that the new skill embodies 
attributes which are productive of value (P), its focus on black unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers in the 1960s would signal that its quality could be expanded further (E) and finally 
the process would be embedded in social construction (S).  All three of Green’s attributes of 
the existence of skill would apply.  The summary which I provided to Chapter 3 furthermore 
identified four sources to the acquisition of skill.  One can confidently surmise that two of 
these sources would have applied particularly among employers who surreptitiously 
increased the skills embodiment of black workers in defiance to the job reservation stance 
which they were obliged to uphold.  Under these non-ideal circumstances, a limited form of 
on-the-job training as well as skill acquisition through surreptitious work experience in the 
new positions would still formally indicate that marginal but important elements of upward 
skill formation would actually have occurred.  Job fragmentation would have camouflaged 
this process from official scrutiny as was the case in the furniture industry since at least the 
late 1930s.  Of course underlying the entire process would have been the spectre of skill 
shortages to which job dilution and fragmentation would have been an automatic response.  
Employers would have also perceived and promoted these as cost saving measures.  
Nonetheless, the argument that Meth advanced and with which I agree was that the skills 
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crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s as advanced by the liberal critics of the apartheid regime 
was overstated.  Moreover, the process confirms levels of persistence which actors used 
against forms of state coordination which they experienced as illogical.  Against this, a form 
of opportunism and subversion was used to uphold market coordination. 
6.2.4 Locating the Skills Development Levy 
The skills development levy
27
 at the national level only became an overt and deliberate 
instrument in national skills policy in South Africa through its first formal elaboration in the 
Green Paper on Skills Development.  This was published in 1997.  It was further entrenched 
in legislation promulgated since 1998, principally in the Skills Development Act and through 
subsequent amendments and legislation which followed thereafter.  There is some writing 
which provides a tentative evaluation of the effectiveness of the skills development levy in 
national skills policy in South Africa (e.g. Paterson (2005); Kraak (2008a)).  The broad 
consensus which exists, affirms the notion that the skills development levy is a coordination 
tool, instrument or mechanism in national skills policy that is wholly a product of the 
democratic South Africa.  It is however also important to note that attempts to devise industry 
specific levy collecting tools was only put into practice on an extended scale after the 
Wiehahn Commission.  However, there were instances provided through the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956 and in collaboration with Industrial Councils where training levies 
in some industries was instituted. 
 
Typically, levies took the form in some instances of a fixed amount calculated on each 
employee engaged in an enterprise and in other instances as a proportion of overall payroll.  
Strictly speaking, in the beginning (i.e. mid-1960s and early 1970s) the state played only a 
minimal role in the process which was underpinned by the voluntary participation of firms 
within specific industries.  Where these initiatives were successful it did not go amiss to the 
policy eye of functionaries within the state that a limited role for the state in such a process 
was an opportunity to ensure that it would be more successful.  But ultimately, industrial 
training was seen as the responsibility of private industry.  The success of enterprise training 
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 This is a one percent payroll levy imposed on all firms with a turnover that is presently larger than R500 000 
per annual.  The levy is designed to compel firms to train and improve the skills composition of the workforce.  
Firms that undertake training and other approved skills development initiatives can reclaim a proportion of their 
training expenditure from government through their designated SETA.  In theory prior to 2013 firms could 
claim back up to 70% of the levy for training costs.  Since 2013 this has been adjusted to 69.5% although it must 
be stated that this is the theoretical limit for a claim.  In practice because of tight regulatory conditions the 
proportion of returns to firms would be lower. 
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was therefore seen to depend on the crucial command of private industry in driving the 
process.  This philosophy was reinforced in a pattern that mimicked the state instituting 
policies which had seemingly been tested earlier in practice within private sector firms.  It 
was usually the case of the process being decentralised from overt state control with industry 
assuming command of training, as will be shown below. 
 
These decentralised experiments in designated industries were allowed in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956.  The identification of the incidence of training levies 
affirms an argument put forward by Picard (2005) that in so far as the growth in the civil 
service under both the apartheid and post-apartheid regimes is concerned, there were 
continuities between these two phases.  The specific policy capacities and results in 
coordination mechanisms towards training and skills development between the apartheid and 
post-apartheid regimes bears implications about how the successes and failures of these 
coordination mechanisms can be evaluated. 
 
Since I am not aware of authors writing about the skills levy as a coordination mechanism 
under both the apartheid and post-apartheid regimes, there is a lot of merit in at least 
contrasting the process between these specific regimes.  This is especially pertinent since it is 
often nostalgically implied that the process of training during the phase when industrial 
training boards (ITBs) were the principle delivery and coordination mechanisms in workplace 
training (stretching from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s) was comparatively more effective 
than under the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) which started to operate 
from 2000.  Even if we only address this question partially, we can at least reflect on the 
continuities and discontinuities between the two regimes.  It also allows one to situate the 
place that the skills development levy as a coordination mechanism in national skills policy 
occupies in either. 
 
It is in fact a mechanism, tool or an instrument of coordination.  It nestles between the micro-
level (i.e. enterprises) and meso-level (e.g. government delivery agencies that consist of 
Sector Education Training Authorities (SETAs), the National Skills Fund (NSF) and the 
National Skills Authority (NSA)).  As the work of Alexander (1995) has demonstrated, the 
levy-grant system allows one to conceive how the imperative of market, hierarchical and 
community or solidarity frameworks (mandates) come into play through financial allocations.  
These financial allocations are to firms, state bodies as well as organisations in the non-profit 
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sector.  The skills development levy is a mechanism, tool or instrument that is an outcome of 
state building and formation.  It is an entry-point or bridgehead to the formation of a national 
training market.  It bridges the visibility of structural coordination at the micro- and meso-
levels with the apparent invisibility of coordinating the entire skills development system. 
 
Allow me to elaborate.  A national skills development levy, instituted for the first time in 
2000 (using legislation promulgated the year before) corresponded with a new democratic 
state in South Africa which began to establish new institutions to manage and direct the 
proceeds of monies from skills development levies to workforce training and enterprise skill 
formation.  A similar process started tentatively after the Wiehahn Commission but had not 
yet evolved into a national levy-grant system by the time a new democratic regime with new 
institutions was installed.  In both instances, these initiatives from the state was instrumental 
in the construction of a market for training and while initially targeting mainly businesses in 
the private profit-driven sector, it would ultimately grow so that its influence and impact 
eventually spanned all sectors: profit sector, state sector and the non-profit sector.  This point 
has been aptly captured by Fligstein who says: 
‘Indeed, any new markets that comes into existence do so under a given set of 
institutions.  This is one of the most remarkable features of institutions: they enable 
newly organised actors to act.  They do not just support the status quo, but allow 
entrepreneurs to come into existence without having to invent new ways to organise’ 
(Fligstein, 2001: 40). 
Essentially therefore, the skills development levy in the South African context is therefore an 
instrument, tool or mechanism used at the behest of the state with the design of pooling 
resources to ensure that state implementation agencies at a meso-societal level are structurally 
established.  These meso-level institutions are meant to support and ensure that skill 
formation outcomes are achieved at a micro-level.  But at this micro-level, firms themselves 
possess the agency to give the strategy – which the state underwrites – a veneer of feasibility 
and success. 
 
With respect to the skills development levy, the state has a high degree of manoeuvrability to 
centrally steer the skills development system or skill formation system.  But steerage can 
imply either more overt decentralisation or more overt centralisation.  Alternatively, a 
stronger form of cooperation and consensus can exist between the state as the hierarchical 
custodian of the skills development levy in the background with the implementation agencies 
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at the core that are responsible for skill acquisition outcomes.  Firms represented through 
different organised national groupings would have significant input and feedback into the 
coordination of enterprise skill formation.  In this second scenario, the skills levy has the 
potential of being adapted to become a more sophisticated mechanism of coordination. 
 
6.3 State Modernisation, Apartheid Reforms and Industrial 
Training: Discoveries and Contingency Measures 
The spontaneous conflagration of strike action by non-unionised African workers in Durban 
in 1973 set in motion initiatives and investigations by the state during the late 1970s to 
evaluate and reform the industrial relations system in South Africa.  This first started with a 
battery of new legislation starting with the Bantu Labour Relations Act of 1973.  This 
particular statute however did not specifically address the question of skills.  Issues relating 
to training and skills were initially covered by the Black In-Service Training Act of 1976.  
These preceded the setting into motion of two important and parallel Commissions of 
Enquiry (Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions).  The Wiehahn Commission was designed to 
incorporate African workers into the country’s industrial relations system.  The Riekert 
Commissions sought to create coherence into the disparate items of legislation affecting the 
movement of African workers throughout the country which had piled up in increasing 
amounts since 1948 – notwithstanding what had been on the statute books before then.  These 
were especially in respect to urban rights for black workers outside the Bantustans.  Both 
Commissions bore significant implications for the evolution of the industrial training of all 
South African workers.  It is this dimension that I want to explore in more detail. 
 
Since the apartheid system was such a reprehensible system it is hard to identify civil 
servants that were genuinely competent administrative managers and policy implementers 
without insinuating that their service was on behalf of Mephistopheles.  Yet this is a question 
one has to broach if an effective comparison is to be made between the administrative 
competence and quality of the industrial training system separating the old from the new.  
Although huge discretionary powers was vested in the apartheid civil service, particularly 
with respect to the control of the black population in South Africa, a relatively small band of 
civil servants held the educational credentials, administrative experience and policy expertise 
to manage the process of the gradual reform and modernisation of the overall system.  But 
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these civil servants were always in the shadow of their political masters and were drawn upon 
to patch up the system and smooth over contradictions within the limits allowed. 
6.3.1 The Testimony of Jan Heunis on the Quality of State Officials 
that were drawn to support the Modernization and Reform Process 
The process towards gradual internal reform of the apartheid system particularly in respect of 
ameliorating the harsh repressive conditions which conceded more scope for the training of 
black workers in South Africa started hesitantly under the leadership of Prime Minister John 
Vorster.  But it was under the leadership of P.W. Botha that the process gained momentum.  
Even though his interpersonal relationships with his colleagues and subordinates could at 
times be characterised as boorish fuelled by a fiery temper and a deeply ingrained 
vindictiveness (see the apt description provided by Jan Heunis (2007) as well as Giliomee 
(2012)), P.W. Botha kick-started the modernisation and reform of the more important 
departments of government and organs of the state.  As Jan Heunis shows in his book The 
Inner Circle, when nationalist party cabinet politicians had trust in their professional civil 
servant advisors, they tended to give careful consideration to the advice they received even 
when this went against their traditional ideological sentiments.  The civil servants that were 
drawn to manage the stuttering but gradual state modernisation and apartheid reform process 
were typically drawn from the elite echelons of the Nationalist Party (NP).  They were elite in 
the sense of NP family connections which were middle and upper middle class by 
background but elite also by possessing meritorious academic credentials which were capable 
of extending the technocratic capabilities of NP rule.  Most of these were bright hard working 
students and some had even entered academic teaching and research. 
 
Jan Heunis, son of Chris Heunis – who was later to become Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Planning – epitomises the academic and technical qualities which out of 
necessity was required from state officials who as it were, had to run ahead of the hounds. 
 
In 1975 after completing his university studies, Jan Heunis joined the ‘legal section of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs as a rookie State Law Advisor’ (Heunis, 2007: 18).  At the 
time the Minister of the Department was Dr. Hilgard Muller and Roelof Frederick Botha 
(‘Pik’) was South Africa’s ambassador to the United Nations.  Heunis gives an account of his 
immediate superiors at the legal section of the Foreign Affairs Department in 1976: 
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‘The legal section comprised John Viall, who was Chief State Law Advisor, and Piet 
Oelofson and George Barrie, who were Viall’s deputies.  Viall was an exceptionally 
studious person with a keen intellect, and one of the best law advisors I ever had the 
privilege to work with.  Both Oelofson and Barrie were former professors of law, 
Oelofson at the University of Natal and Barrie at the Rand Afrikaans University.  
They were also legal scholars of note, and I learned a lot from all three of 
them’(Heunis, 2007: 19-20). 
In 1977, Hilgard Muller resigned from active politics and John Vorster appointed Pik Botha 
as his successor (Heunis, 2007: 20).  Heunis gives some insight into the manner Botha started 
assembling his technical and administrative teams in the Department: 
‘Following his appointment, Pik wasted no time in surrounding himself with some of 
the most competent officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs, such as Neil van 
Heerden, Derek Auret and Herbert Beukes. 
‘To his credit, Pik was not intimidated by sharp minds.  He used them to his best 
advantage although he did overlook the most competent official in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs at the time, Sean Cleary, later political counsel at the South African 
embassy in Washington, was once described to me by an American visitor to South 
Africa at a function held by Herman Nickel, the then American ambassador to South 
Africa, as the most skilful diplomat ever to work on the Hill – a reference to Capitol 
Hill in Washington’ (Heunis, 2007: 20-21) 
Heunis described the managerial style of Pik Botha in the following terms: 
‘What made it easy for a law adviser to work for him was that he never second-
guessed advice based on his own knowledge of the law.  What made it difficult was 
his tremendous energy and drive.  He lived hard and fast, frequently drinking too 
much even on the eve of major international events, such as meetings of the Security 
Council at which he was scheduled to speak’ (Heunis, 2007: 24). 
In 1984 after the adoption of the Tri-cameral Constitution, Jan Heunis left the Department of 
Foreign Affairs to take up the position of Chief State Law Advisor in the State President’s 
Office.  When P.W. Botha became executive President of the Republic of South Africa 
holding greater powers than he previously held as a Prime Minister, it resulted in a significant 
expansion of the staff complement in his office.  One of the new positions that arose was that 




During the last years of the apartheid system, Chris Heunis, a more enlightened member 
(‘verligte’) of P.W. Botha’s cabinet was Minister of Constitutional Development and 
Planning.  This Department had the task of investigating constitutional pathways which had 
                                                 
28
 This background is drawn from Heunis (2007: chapter 4) 
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the potential of addressing the exclusion of the African majority from the political process.  
Similar to Departments such as Foreign Affairs, the Department of Constitutional 
Development put a high premium on obtaining the services of efficient and effective civil 
servants but civil servants that appeared mainly in the guise of state law advisors or advisors 
on government and politics.  If one merely examines the subsequent career trajectories of 
these individuals after they had left the civil service, it provides a useful comparison to the 
intellect of civil servants who were similarly placed in other reform oriented Departments of 
government such as the Department of Labour from which tentative proposals for the design 
of levy paying mechanisms on training emerged.  Heunis writes: 
‘My father was the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning during the 
first half of the 1980s.  Fanie Cloete was one of his senior advisers during this time.  
He is now a professor at the University of Stellenbosch.  Ich Rautenbach and Rassie 
Malherbe, other senior advisers, are now professors of law at the University of 
Johannesburg (formerly the Rand Afrikaans University).  The director-general, 
Andreas van Wyk, became the vice chancellor and rector of the University of 
Stellenbosch.  Willie Breytenbach, another senior official, is also a professor at 
Stellenbosch University (Heunis, 2007: 123) 
Anyone who reads government policy documents for any given period but more particularly 
documents covering the period of state modernisation and apartheid reform (1974-1989) will 
clearly notice the pivotal role which state advisors played in supporting departmental 
ministers and state leaders who purportedly held a reform agenda.  This was especially 
noticeable in South African ministerial and government departments that were under the 
control of ‘verligte’ or reform minded ministers.  In principle these advisors were shaped by 
the disciplinary orientation of the problems that their counsel addressed.  Typically these 
advisers were classified as state law advisers and economic advisers but they could also have 
been designated as scientific advisors.  Most of the government ministries, departments and 
agencies that were orientated to reform and modernisation measures were embedded in fields 
where there was an intersection of economic, political and sociological interests (essentially 
the challenge of a specific political economy).  Legal and economic discourse held elevated 
importance in guiding their ministers through the complex policy maze and potentially new 
institutional architecture which such a process necessitated.  In the case of Jan Heunis and his 
civil servant colleagues at the Department of Foreign Affairs, state law advisors were the 
principal technocrats supporting ‘verligte’ government ministers in treading a path towards 
some apartheid reform.  Apart from Pik Botha at Foreign Affairs and Chris Heunis at 
Constitutional Development and Planning, a verligte member of John Vorster’s cabinet, S.P. 
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Botha (‘Fanie’) was in charge of the Ministry of Labour and of course the Department of 
Labour which it oversaw. 
6.3.2 Background to the Main Protagonists Driving the Wiehahn 
and Riekert Commissions 
Shortly after his appointment as Minister of Labour in the cabinet of John Vorster, Stephanus 
P. (‘Fanie’) Botha started installing new staff within his ministry and Department who were 
more sympathetic to his ideas.  He replaced Ben Lindeque as Labour Secretary – putting him 
on early retirement – with Jaap Cilliers.  Jaap Cilliers was a divisional labour inspector for 
Port Elizabeth and a friend of Wiehahn (Friedman, 1987). 
 
Nicolas Wiehahn a former railway worker who had started his academic career at the 
University of Port Elizabeth was appointed advisor to Minister Fanie Botha in 1976.  At the 
time a professor at the School of Business Leadership at the University of South Africa in 
Pretoria, Wiehahn was relatively unknown.  In May 1977 at the behest of Fanie Botha, 
Wiehahn was appointed to lead a Commission of Enquiry into the reform of labour 
legislation in South Africa.  To mitigate the unregulated participation of African workers in 
industrial relations disputes – which was perhaps the most pivotal lesson which wise counsel 
within the apartheid State could draw from the Durban strikes of 1973 in particular – a 
burning necessity for industrial relations reform in South Africa – legislative reform had to be 
provided for African worker participation in trade union organisation with a degree of state 
oversight and control over their activities.  As a result of this work on the Commission, 
Nicolas Wiehahn rose significantly in stature, a rise which ‘soon installed him’ in the words 
of Steven Friedman ‘as a folk hero among employers and government reformers’ (Friedman, 
1987: 149). 
 
As was the case for Jan Heunis discussed earlier in this chapter, modernising and reform 
minded politicians within the Nationalist Party systematically drew upon strategic advisers 
and policy thinkers from networks within their own ranks.  Many of these individuals were 
themselves second and third generation offspring of earlier Afrikaner nationalist ideologues 
who had the advantage of undergoing training in the strategic policy disciplines 
(incorporating especially high concentrations of academic and professional training in law 
and economics) upon which a crisis-ridden apartheid political economy was becoming more 
dependent as a navigation tool towards calmer waters.  These individuals also constituted a 
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broad network and had a propensity of showing degrees of abhorrence to many of the petty 
and crude segregationist features of apartheid.  As students of the policy sciences, these 
individuals also understood the bigger picture.  As agents of those who wielded power and as 
servants of the state, their function was to ensure the maintenance of power and control in the 
growth and reform of institutions through which society was organised in South Africa.  As a 
last resort, as their post-apartheid testimonials indicate, many would jettison the ideologies to 
which they were historically accustomed. 
 
Many of these individuals were either ensconced within the Afrikaner medium universities or 
bore a close alumni relationship with these institutions.  Once the reform process began, 
hesitantly but more pronounced after the Durban strikes of 1973, Fanie Botha, also appointed 
Wiehahn Commissioner, P.J. (Petrus Jacobus) Van der Merwe to the position of deputy-
director of the Department of Labour.  When the National Manpower Commission was 
established on the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, another former University 
of Pretoria economist, Hennie Reynders was appointed chairman with P.J. Van der Merwe as 
vice-chairman
29
.  As reform minded state officials many of these individuals held either 
higher university degrees or doctoral qualifications. 
 
P.J. Van der Merwe’s inclusion in the apartheid labour market reform process is fascinating.  
From the late 1960s Van der Merwe was a staff member in the Department of Economics at 
the University of Pretoria.  He was awarded a doctorate in economics from the same 
university for a thesis titled: The Bantu Labour Market in South Africa
30
.  In his foreword to 
the thesis, Van der Merwe acknowledged the influence of P.J. Riekert, at the time economic 
advisor to Prime Minister Vorster, for encouraging him to pursue this study and for showing 
an interest in his progress.  Van der Merwe proceeded to contribute significant articles and 
papers on the dynamics of the South African labour market.  Riekert was subsequently 
appointed the chairman and only member of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation 
Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower.  As a commissioner on the Commission of Inquiry 
into Labour Legislation (Wiehahn Commission), P.J. Van der Merwe consulted extensively 
with Pieter Jacobus Riekert on specific matters involving coordination between the two 
Commissions.  As the Riekert Commission noted: 
                                                 
29
 This background is drawn from Friedman (1987: 174&177). 
30
 Original author and title: Petrus Jacobus Van der Merwe (1971) Die Bantoe-Arbeitsmark in Suid Afrika. 
Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis in Economics, University of Pretoria, Parts 1&2. 
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‘The Commission did find it necessary to discuss fully its approaches, findings and 
recommendations in respect of certain areas of contact between its terms of reference 
and those of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (Wiehahn 
Commission) with the Chairman of the latter Commission in order to delimit each 
Commission’s sphere and to ensure co-ordination.  Continuous co-ordination was 
possible because Professor P.J. van der Merwe, a Commissioner of the Wiehahn 
Commission, also assisted with drawing up this report’ (Riekert Commission, 1979: 
para. 1.5) 
6.3.3 Precedents to Levy Financed Training and the Riekert and 
Wiehahn Commissions 
The reform measures and shifts in industrial training policy were not perpetuated solely as a 
result of the recommendations stemming from the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions.  
Although very little has been written about this episode, there is sufficient evidence to 
reconstruct the picture depicting the plethora of schemes that were conceived to eliminate 
contradictions and crises which contributed to renewing the industrial training system.  From 
the description of the system given in the Riekert Report, it mirrored a rather ramshackle 
entity before the ending of Union in 1961 to an octopus with many tentacles during the 
apartheid Republic.  It was to this broad and uneven system that the Riekert and Wiehahn 
Commissions recommended drastic pruning and consolidation.  The results of this pruning 
and consolidation only became evident with the promulgation of the Manpower Training Act 
of 1981 (Act No. 56).  However, even before the findings of the Riekert and Wiehahn 
Commissions were presented, a whole spectrum of actions and legislative instruments which 
coordinated industrial training policy and forms of levy-based funding for workplace training 
purposes came into operation. 
6.3.4 Riekert 
The Riekert Commission provides quite a detailed and precise documentation of sometimes 
half-hearted and incomplete attempts to design training schemes for black South Africans.  In 
this process the burden was not solely borne by the state.  In a very crude and elementary 
form, these attempts predated a system of levy-financed training borne mainly by employers 
which evolved after some of the findings of the Wiehahn Commission was adopted by the 
South African government in the early 1980s.  To establish a record of the actual initiatives 
on the road to the design of a mechanism, tool or instrument in the form of a training levy 
that could be adopted in a more systematic and wholescale manner, it is necessary to capture 
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some of the initiatives which different government departments and agencies of the apartheid 
government had started to experiment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
The full report of the Riekert Commission was released in 1979.  In the same year, the first of 
six reports of the Wiehahn Commission was also released.  But the Wiehahn Commission 
would still convene for a further two years before the release of its fifth and sixth reports in 
1981.  The first Wiehahn report (RP 47/1979) was however presented as a framework to a 
future industrial relations system in South Africa.  The second Wiehahn report (RP 38/1980 
and referred to as Part 2), released in 1980, dealt with the subject of ‘Training’ in South 
Africa.  The second report provides greater detail and substance of the concerns around 
‘vocational training’ and ‘skill formation’ which the Riekert Commission discussed.  On 
matters of vocational training policy, both Commissions represented a common starting point 
and framework.  Apart from putting forward recommendations for the place of black workers 
in a future training dispensation in South Africa, the Riekert Commission presented a 
systematic overview and evaluation of training initiatives for black workers which was in 
operation at the time of the Commission’s tenure (1977-1979). 
 
The major item of legislation operating at the time, pertaining to black workers in South 
Africa was the Black Employees In-Service Training Act of 1976.  But even before the 
promulgation of the Black Employees In-Service Training Act, significant tax allowances for 
the training of black workers was provided in the 1974 national budget.  These provisions 
were channelled through the Income Tax Act of 1974 (See NDMF, 1975).  The Black 
Employees In-Service Training Act was administered by the Department of Education and 
Training.  Its promulgation sparked a mini-training revolution in progressive companies in 
South Africa.  It would not be amiss to conclude that it kick-started initiatives to reform the 
South African industrial relations and vocational training system after the Durban strikes of 
1973.  However the authorities at the time (including chairman Riekert) advance different 
explanations for its promulgation.  The Black Employees In-Service Training Act gave 
prominence and leverage to personnel departments in progressive companies in South Africa 
to employ personnel managers and training officers to oversee the coordination of the 
training and skilling of mostly unskilled black employees.  The occupational position of the 
training manager or training officer represented a real occupational and career ladder 
protruding into corporations for individuals occupying these positions.  The Act contained 
three cogs: first it provided government funding to public training centres; second, it provided 
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tax-incentives for companies that invested and made use of private training centres and 
private training schemes (Riekert Commission, para.3.365); third, it introduced the idea or 
notion of training schemes which could be financed through levies on employers. 
 
The training arena thus became a new occupational field which higher education graduates 
could potentially enter and cement their places within the managerial and technical 
occupational ladder within firms.  It also enabled universities throughout the country to 
extend the curriculum so that future industrial training managers and practitioners were able 
to acquire theoretical training and earn recognised qualifications to operate in the field.  At 
the white Afrikaans universities, such potential industrial training practitioners acquired their 
disciplinary grounding in Psychology and Industrial Psychology (see Schreuder, 2001: 3-4).  
At the liberal English universities navigation into the field could potentially occur through a 
number of disciplines including psychology, industrial psychology, adult education and 
industrial sociology
31
.  By the late eighties many honours dissertations in industrial sociology 
dealt with different aspects of enterprise training within private firms and state-owned 
enterprises and other public organisations (e.g. city municipalities). 
 
The idea of public manual training centres, private industrial training centres as well as the 
‘introduction of a tax concession scheme with a view to partial defrayment of training costs 
incurred by industrialists’ (Riekert Commission, para.3.367) grew out of government’s 
decentralisation policies and according to the Riekert Commission could be dated as far back 
as 1970.  As it was explained by the the Riekert Commission: 
‘A subsidised in-service training scheme for the training of factory operatives to meet 
the needs of specific industrialists was instituted in 1969 by the Department of 
Education and Training to provide financial aid for industrialists who erected 
decentralised factories in border areas.  The industrialists provide a training centre, 
specialised equipment and material.  The Department of Education and Training 
provides financial assistance by paying subsidies on the salaries of instructors at a rate 
equal to the basic salary payable to a teacher having similar qualifications employed 
by the Department of Education and Training (Riekert Commission, 1979: 
para.3.373). 
Using international practice as a barometer of the potential to the introduction of training 
levies in South Africa, the Riekert Commission devoted quite a lot of attention to the 
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 These were career options that were available and which some of my university student colleagues earnestly 
pursued during the 1980s. 
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payment of levies by employers.  But in any event as the Commission observed a precedent 
for such a process was already embodied in South African law through the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, an Act which also governed the functioning of Industrial Councils 
which were the institutions best placed to formalise a levy-payment system for industrial 
training. 
‘The principal that employers should, on an industrial basis, pay levies in respect of 
the in-service training of workers for particular industries is generally accepted in 
various countries of the world, and in South Africa is embodied in section 48 of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956.  In the United Kingdom, for example, all firms have 
to pay a training levy equivalent to one per cent of their total pay-roll, unless they 
have specifically been granted exemption.  In France there are two training levies, 
namely 0.5 per cent of the total pay-roll in respect of apprentices and 2 per cent in 
respect of other workers.  In West Germany employers and employees must together 
pay 1.8 per cent of the total pay-roll in the form of a training levy’ (Riekert 
Commission, 1979: para. 4.477 (l)). 
Placing the onus on employers to administer the funds that would be used to train their own 
workers meant that employers would take a greater responsibility in ensuring that the 
vocational training process had higher prospects for success. 
‘Levies for training purposes should be collected by industrial councils or governing 
bodies of training centres themselves, and not by a Government body, as is at present 
the case where certain levies are collected by administration boards and paid over to 
governing bodies.  The underlying principle is that employers’ organisations 
themselves should accept all the responsibilities, including the collection of levies 
associated with the training of their workers’. (Riekert Commission, 1979: para. 4.477 
(m)) 
Ultimately, as the Riekert Commission recommended, levy-financed training schemes in 
respect of the in-service training of black workers should replace tax-incentive schemes. 
‘The responsibility of the in-service training of workers should be placed primarily on 
the shoulders of employers and tax and other concessions, etc., for the promotion of 
such training should be regarded only as temporary measures that should be phased 
out as quickly as possible.  In this connection industrial councils should be motivated 
to establish training schemes themselves and to impose levies on employers in 
accordance of the provisions of section 48 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956.  
For this purpose it should be made possible for industrial councils or governing 
bodies to acquire the existing training centres, where possible, on the basis of costs of 
erection’ (Riekert Commission, 1979: para. 4.478 (g)). 
The de facto involvement of a large number of industrial councils in sponsoring and 
encouraging the formation of industrial training boards certainly influenced the place Riekert 
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accorded to industrial councils as the institutional vehicle that was best placed to coordinate 
the imposition and collection of an employer funded training levy scheme. 
‘Industrial councils should be encouraged to establish training schemes and to impose 
levies on firms for training purposes.  The collection of levies should be undertaken 
by industrial councils themselves’ (Riekert Commission, 1979: para.4478 (k)). 
In terms of the statutory outcomes that stemmed from its commission, as well as deferring to 
the Wiehahn Commission, the Riekert Commission foresaw the fragmentary statutory 
framework of the time (1979) being replaced by ‘a non-discriminatory consolidated statutory 
framework relating to manpower matters in respect of all population groups’ (para. 6.13).  As 
well as anticipating a single Act to regulate labour relations and a single Act for the social 
security of workers, Riekert also foresaw a single Act which would deal with employment 
and training matters.  It would consolidate: the Black Labour Act of 1964, the Black 
Employees In-Service Training Act of 1976, the Apprenticeship Act of 1944, the Training of 
Artisans Act of 1951 and the Registration of Employment Act of 1945.  After the White 
Paper which followed the Wiehahn Commission in the following year, this would become 
known as the Manpower Training Act of 1981. 
6.3.5 Wiehahn 
The Wiehahn Commission had a narrower but more specific mandate compared to the 
Riekert Commission.  In a nutshell, its concern was to consolidate and coordinate labour 
market policy, labour legislation and identify and assist in eliminating critical bottlenecks 
within the ambit of the existing political structure – which prevailed in the late 1970s as PW 
Botha assumed power.  In the broader political economy of national governments which 
confronted similar political reforms to the existing dispensations, the Wiehahn Commission 
and its reform agenda could arguably be compared with the reforms of a similar gravity 
particularly in pre-revolutionary France and pre-Revolutionary Russia.  In view of the 
dormant 1960s after the Sharpville resistance, the worker and student struggles of the 1970s 
signified the possibility that a revolution could displace apartheid and white minority rule in 
South Africa.  This was clear to friend and foe of the NP regime.  The Wiehahn reforms 
coupled with the failed political reforms to institutionalise a tri-cameral parliamentary system 




However these reforms in France and Russia failed and were overcome by the revolutionary 
overthrow of the existing political establishment.  The reforms in question were the Turgot 
reforms creating the ‘liberty of labour’ in 1776 that abolished state control on trade and craft 
guilds.  Turgot’s reforms also attempted to abolish royal corvee and spread the tax burden 
from the peasantry and transfer some of it onto land proprietors (Pierre Goubert, 1988).  In 
Russia there were the Stolypin reforms of 1907 which were instituted after the abortive 
revolution of 1905.  These involved a scheme to uplift the peasantry and broaden the social 
base for the reform and modernisation of Czarism in Russia shifting it from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.  Improvements to peasant agriculture that included 
increases in productivity and the encouragement of individual initiative among the peasantry, 
was seen as crucial.  Instead of embarking on outright expropriation of the 130 000 large and 
medium sized landlord properties, which for him and the nobles remained inviolable, 
Solypin’s solution was to dismantle the village commune which conservative opinion in 
Russia had characterised as a ‘socialist institution and source of sedition’ (Gooding, 1996: 
112).  The idea was that once the peasantry had property of their own, they would become 
hard-working and respect the property rights of others.  As Gooding notes, for this to be 
successful, peasant rights to land had to be converted into private property and the scattered 
landholding strips which they worked ‘had to be consolidated into a compact enclosed farm’ 
(Gooding, 1996: 112).  In Russia, the implementation of this process largely failed.  Poor 
peasants, who were not the target of the initiative, responded in droves by selling their strips 
and getting off the land altogether.  Those who wanted to become independent farmers found 
their passage blocked by the refusal of the commune authorities to let their strips be 
consolidated (Golding, 1996: 112).  Thus Golding observes that between 1906 and 1916 little 
more than 20% of households with communal tenure applied for private property rights.  
When the February 1917 Revolution broke out, the Russian agrarian economy was still an 
economy of strip farming and only 10% of peasant households had entered independent 
farming.  The peasants themselves rejected the Stolypin reforms.  But the nobility too 
withdrew their initial support for Stolypin’s peasant-monarchist reform in the Duma and 
frustrated his tenure as Prime Minister.  Even before his assassination in the Kiev Opera 
House in September 1911, Stolypin faced imminent dismissal as Prime Minister (Gooding, 
1996: 115). 
 
Unlike Turgot and Stolypin, Wiehahn’s stature in the eyes of the regime and the 
overwhelming majority of employers in South Africa was unsullied.  It was immensely 
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enhanced after each instalment of the Commission’s reports.  However, Wiehahn did relate a 
tale to Clive Thompson about the actions of one particular detractor in Pretoria.  After 
referring to Wiehahn as a ‘decidedly larger-than-life figure, he was and probably remains 
affable, visionary, supremely confident and egotistical’ (Thompson, 2004: vii), Thompson 
immediately qualifies his portrait of Wiehahn with the following note captured in a footnote.  
He writes: 
‘The Wiehahn phenomenon spawned a cottage industry of commissions, and I had the 
interesting experience of serving in his tenth one, tasked with the reform of the dismal 
labour laws of the Transkei.  Wiehahn took great glee in recounting to co-
commissioner Halton Cheadle and me how, one day, walking confidently down a 
Pretoria street nattily dressed in a cream suit and sporting his signature bowtie and 
matching handkerchief, he was approached by a complete stranger and asked whether 
he was “the” Wiehahn.  When he cheerfully confirmed that he was, instead of 
receiving what by now had become the customary reverential word of praise from yet 
another member of his admiring public, he was unceremoniously dumped on the seat 
of his pants and told, “That’s for stuffing up the country” (Thompson, 2004: vii, note 
7). 
 
6.4 Inter-related Influences on Wiehahn and Riekert and 
the elevation of Coordination 
The Wiehahn reforms in South Africa set into motion the process of the gradual 
democratisation and the awarding of rights to the broader segment of the South African 
labour force.  In terms of the vocational training system, the motivation for the Wiehahn (and 
the Riekert) reforms centred on two interrelated influences.  The first of these was 
international best-practice that was seen as appropriate for modelling a modern industrial 
training system in South Africa.  Many of the insightful Commissions of Inquiry which had 
been undertaken in South Africa were often chaired by jurists or economists who themselves 
could be classified as intellectuals in their own right.  More particularly when the subject 
matter of the Commission of Inquiry called for a departure from the old ways of thinking 
(e.g. university financing, the reform of the tax system, exchange rate policy, monopolistic 
policy or in the case of Riekert and Wiehahn, the problem of labour migration and mobility 
and the extension of labour legislation and the inclusion and incorporation of black workers 
into the industrial relations system), its commission chairmen and a number of its 
commissioners generally (see Giliomee’s (2012: 153) discussion of the differences between 
reform and conservative commissioners on the Wiehahn Commission) rose to the occasion by 
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inducting themselves in the academic and policy literature which emerged from what they 
considered the free world and nations with democratic dispensations.  This in itself is the 
starkest irony but is verified in bibliographical references especially that listed for the Riekert 
and Wiehahn Commissions.   
 
The second influence which had already largely begun to shape the content and the practice 
of industrial training in South Africa were the concrete conditions in South Africa.  These 
concrete conditions gave expression to policy responses from the apartheid state to the 
requirements for industrial training by employers and black people in general.  In the more 
radical neo-Marxist nomenclature of the late 1970s and 1980s this would have been referred 
to as the ‘current conjuncture’ (see Poulantzas, 1973: 93-98; Althusser & Balibar, 1970).  As 
the evidence of Riekert showed, the conjuncture of the late 1960s and 1970s contributed to 
the formation of an industrial training octopus which he and Wiehahn set about to streamline.  
The Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions did not refrain from reiterating the common strand to 
both Inquiries which was an attempt to coordinate and simplify the policy terrain each was 
mandated to investigate.  This was expressed as follows in the report of the Wiehahn 
Commission: 
‘It is obvious from this Report and from the Riekert Report that over the years the 
industrial training dispensation has developed into a rather complex network of 
legislation administered by a multiplicity of Government departments and other 
bodies.  The inevitable consequences are overlapping and gaps, lack of 
standardisation and co-ordination and dissipation of scarce resources in terms of 
money, manpower and time.  There has also been a proliferation of training 
programmes produced by various institutions, giving rise to problems in regard to co-
ordination of policy formulation and planning.  Countries such as Sweden, France, 
West Germany, Eire, the United Kingdom and Australia have all addressed 
themselves to the problem of fragmentation of the training system.  A recent study by 
the National Productivity Institute indicates that these countries have all found the 
solution to be the consolidation of training under one body which is so constituted as 
to maximise the impact of training on the economy.  This body assumes different 
forms in the various countries, but in all cases it is the only national body involved in 
training, overseeing the whole spectrum of training in the particular country.  The 
time has obviously come for South Africa also to simplify, rationalise and consolidate 
its training system so far as legislation, administration and facilities are 
concerned’(WC 2, 1980, para. 3.53) 





Established in 1977, the first of six reports to the Wiehahn Commission was released in 1979.  
Five additional reports were subsequently released in 1980 and 1981.  Each report was 
rapidly followed by a sequence of government White Papers.  For the purpose of this thesis, 
the first (RP 47/1979) and second (RP 38/1980) reports to the Wiehahn Commission are of 
primary importance.  
6.4.1 Conceptions of Policy Coordination in the Wiehahn 
Commission 
In submitting Part 1 as ‘Key Issues’, the Commission  postulated a different conception of 
coordination to what appears in Part 2, particularly in respect of vocational education and 
training
32
.  In Part 1 or WC1, the Commission deploys a conception of coordination which 
has a strong orientation towards policy coordination.  In WC2, as will subsequently be 
shown, the conception of coordination is one of institutional coordination. 
 
WC1 embarked upon this policy coordination trajectory by first proposing a name change to 
the existing national Department of Labour.  The Commission then proceeds to discuss the 
issue of a national coordinating and advisory body and recommend that as an ameliorate to 
the heavier demands which the Department of Labour carries in terms of labour 
administration, a separation is established between the recommended coordination body and 
the department.  Such a body was seen as necessary to improve the state’s prognostic 
function of the ‘future planning, rationalisation and development of manpower in the 
country’ (WC1, 1979: para. 2.19).  The implication was drawn that requirements for a more 
dynamic role for the state (WC1, para. 2.22) which went beyond the normal administrative 
and regulatory role which the Department of Labour played was necessary.  This necessity 
was to be curtailed by the abiding ‘principle that the state would however exert as little 
intervention as possible in the relationship between employer and employee (WC1, 1979: 
para. 2.22). 
 
Using the evidence of witnesses, WC1 held the unambiguous opinion that the State should 
introduce active policies and programmes in regard to: (i) the training and retraining of 
workers; (ii) the creation of employment opportunities; (iii) the provision of labour market 
facilities and services; (iv) research; (v) ongoing evaluation of the efficiency of labour market 
                                                 
32
 The abbreviation WC1 and WC2 will respectively be used to distinguish between the first report or Part 1 and 
the second report or Part 2 of the Wiehahn Commission. 
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programmes and the review of labour policy, legislation and administrative practice; and 
finally (vi) the preservation and promotion of industrial peace (WC1, 1979: para. 2.22).  The 
third point elaborated above embodies the overall thrust of the policy coordination conception 
in WC1 and to clarify the matter further, a verbatim reproduction of the point made in the 
Commission report is useful: 
‘The provision of labour market facilities and services to promote and facilitate: 
(a) the functioning of the labour market in ensuring the availability of the right 
quantity of labour of the right quality at the right place and at the right time, i.e. 
the coordination of supply and demand; 
(b) genuine freedom of choice by workers; and 
(c) the optimal utilisation of available manpower resources’. [WC1, 1979: para. 2.22 
(iii)]. 
The Commission invoked comparative international experiences in which national bodies had 
been established, in order to advise on labour matters.  These countries included: Belgium, 
the Netherlands, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.  Further examples 
were said to exist in countries such as Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal, Zaire, Malaysia and 
Sierre Leone.  The Commission then proceeded to recount the historical evolution of policy 
coordination in South Africa (WC1, 1979: para.2.24).  A summarised version of this evidence 
is replicated here. 
 
Soon after the Department of Labour was formed, an Advisory Council of Labour was 
established in South Africa in 1924.  These were institutional designs and reforms that were 
instituted after the suppression of the white mine-workers rebellion on the Witwatersrand in 
1922.  Its objective was to investigate labour matters across the industries and sectors of the 
national economy.  Immediately thereafter, the Advisory Council of Labour established 
specialist committees to examine immediate concerns of the period such as ‘unemployment, 
labour conditions on the alluvial diggings, registration of trade unions, poor relief and labour 
legislation’(WC1, 1979: para.2.25).  In 1930, after 13 meetings, the Advisory Council 
became defunct.  It was later resuscitated by the Minister of Labour in 1937 and its functions 
remained consultative and advisory.  It continued to function in this way until 1941.  The 
absence of records of its existence, suggest that it was again dormant between 1942 and 1945.  
Three meetings of the Advisory Council of Labour which then consisted of 20 members with 
seven alternates took place in 1946.  But after 1946, as the Wiehahn Commission noted, ‘the 
Council was never convened again and no record of the dissolution of the Council can be 




A completely different type of body which gave ‘a great deal of attention to manpower 
matters’ came into existence when South Africa became a republic in 1961 and was known as 
the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council.  From time to time it launched 
investigations into specific aspects of labour policy such as education and training.  In 1968 a 
working committee on manpower training was appointed by the Council to report on training 
programmes in various sectors of the economy.  The intention of appointing such a 
committee was to monitor progress as well as stimulate further training efforts (WC1, 1979: 
para. 2.27).  In 1970, the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower which drew 
representatives from the Economic Advisory Council was established.  Its task was to advise 
the Economic Advisory Council ‘on the better utilisation of manpower’ within the framework 
of apartheid government policy (WC1, 1979: para. 2.28).  The Secretary of Labour acted as 
the convener of the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower.  Representatives of 
the Department of Physical Planning and Bantu Administration and Development were co-
opted to the Committee.  Subsequently, membership to the Committee was extended to 
include representatives of the South African Railways, the National Productivity Institute, the 
Human Sciences Research Council, the economic advisor to the Prime Minister and other 
Government Departments (WC1, 1979: para.2.28).  Early in February 1979, the Economic 
Advisory Council recommended that the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower 
should function as the standing committee of the Economic Advisory Council.  This function 
also meant that it would incorporate the Working Committee on Manpower Training (WC2, 
1980: para. 1.9). 
 
In the second Wiehahn Report (WC2) more detail is given of the three core objectives for the 
Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower.  These three objectives consisted of: (a) 
The compilation of a manpower balance sheet; (b) The supplementation and upgrading of 
White labour; (c) The upgrading and greater employment of Non-White labour (WC2, para. 
1.9).  According to the Commission, the task of compiling a manpower balance sheet was 
assigned to the Human Sciences Research Council.  Many of its reports and publications 
during this period were guided by the logic of manpower planning within a framework of 
racial discrimination.  In fact manpower planning at the time was the dominant discourse 
infusing education change even on the African continent (see Cash, 1965).  Unpacking 
briefly two interrelated items to the second and third objectives of the Committee for the 
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Better Utilisation of Manpower, WC2 states that (apart from encouraging accelerated 
immigration) with respect to the upgrading of White labour, the Committee provided: 
‘Encouragement of the utilisation of White labour in more productive directions’ 
(WC2, para. 1.9 [b] [ii]). 
Similarly, with respect to the upgrading and greater employment of Non-White labour, the 
Committe encouraged: 
‘The employment of Blacks in more advanced semi-skilled work together with the 
upgrading of White labour from such occupations by means of collective bargaining 
in consultation with trade unions or the Divisional Inspector of Labour where there 
were no industrial councils’(WC2, para.1.9 [c] [ii]) 
The two arms of the intervention meant that the definition of skill within the labour process 
would have to be redefined so that previous high level skills could be performed by ‘semi-
skilled’ black workers.  Such forms of work reclassification would have required the trust and 
support of the white artisan trade unions to succeed but in most instances they rebelled 
against it.  Later however to ensure their survival, the white unions organised either parallel 
unions for ‘non-white’ workers or began to actively recruit skilled black workers (see 
Webster, 1985, chapter 7).  Significantly, this was largely the electoral constituency that the 
Nationalist Party government drew upon to maintain power.  The literature of the period 
often captured the contradictory signals which appeared to shape such policies by 
government.  Questions were often asked whether the crisis of skill was real or whether it 
was a mask to entrench the interests of big business (Meth, 1979; Webster, 1985, chapter 7 
considers the views of the actors on the ground).  As we examine the policy coordination 
process that shaped firm and enterprise-level skill outcomes in South Africa in the period 
prior to Wiehahn, it is quite apparent that the flow of expert recommendations was being 
constantly made available to help coordinate and steer government policy implementation 
during this period.  Policy coordination was rationally formulated and systematically 
transmitted to the institutions that had the task of implementing the policy.  But whether these 
policies were implemented in such a clinical and rational manner is an altogether different 
and debatable question.  In 1971 the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower 
became a standing committee to the Economic Advisory Council. 
 
The introduction of schemes for a system of ‘tax incentives for approved training schemes’ 
according to WC1, was ‘a direct outcome of the recommendations made by the Committee 
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for the Better Utilisation of Manpower which was forwarded to the Economic Advisory 
Council’ (WC1, para. 2.31).  The idea of a National Manpower Commission rose from the 
work that the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower had done from its inception 
in 1970.  Witnesses to the Wiehahn Commission posed the question of an expanded national 
role with a higher statutory status for the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower 
and recommended that the Wiehahn Commission consider this idea further.  It led to the 
Wiehahn Commission recommending the establishment of a national tripartite coordinating 
body (WC1, para. 2.32) that could perform an advisory role and report annually to the 
Minister of Labour on the factual labour situation in the country and on its activities.  This led 
to the Wiehahn Commission recommending the establishment of a National Manpower 
Commission which came into being shortly after in 1979
33
.  Due to the importance and 
urgency attached to its establishment, the National Manpower Commission was established 
by Ministerial decree.  On this matter the Wiehahn Commission recommended that: 
‘the Committee for the Better Utilisation of Manpower be dissolved with effect from 
the date upon which the National Manpower Commission is constituted; further, in 
the interests of the co-ordination and integration of labour policy and programmes 
with overall economic policies and programmes, that the chairman of the National 
Manpower Commission shall have a seat on the Economic Advisory Council and 
prepare reports on the labour situation for the Economic Advisory Council; and that  
‘the National Manpower Commission shall report regularly and shall submit an 
annual report to the Minister of Labour on the Commission’s activities and the labour 
situation in the Republic’ (WC1, 1979: para. 2.45.12 & 2.45.13) 
Except for pointing out that the ‘National Manpower Commission will have to guard against 
encroaching unduly on the territory of the Department of Labour’ (White Paper to WC1, 
1979: para. 5.2.3), the above recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission was wholly 
endorsed by the Nationalist Party government in the White Paper released in response to 
WC1. 
 
The establishment of the National Manpower Commission set in motion a process for the 
design and invention of radically new institutions for the coordination of the vocational 
training and skill formation dispensation in the late apartheid period.  1979 can therefore be 
postulated as the historical rupture and the date that can be used for a periodization to the 
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 WC1 was submitted to the South African government on the 19
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 of February 1979.  A short while later the 
White Paper to WC1 was released.  The National Manpower Commission was established by Ministerial decree 




modernisation and reform process under the late apartheid period, particularly in respect of 
the vocational training system and the coordination process that was set up to make it work as 
effectively as possible.  This rupture could only have occurred after the findings of the 
Wiehahn Commission were submitted to government.  Most of the findings of WC1 were 
adopted in the subsequent White Paper to WC1 following the first report of the Wiehahn 
Commission. 
6.4.2 Conceptions of Institutional Coordination in the Wiehahn 
Commission 
The second report to the Wiehahn Commission dealt with ‘Training’.  Chapters in WC2 were 
devoted to human resources development and industrial relations training in South Africa 
[Wiehahn Commission, 1980 hereafter referred to as WC2 (1980)] 
 
The initial conditions to influence and shape the adoption of international best practice into 
the vocational training system in South Africa came about through attempts within the 
industrial training lobby in the country to align policy-borrowing and imitation of 
institutional designs to what was considered appropriate international best-practice.  
Moreover, best-practice appropriated from the closest colonial country relative to South 
Africa, directed attention to the United Kingdom
34
 and the progress that had been achieved 
there with the design of its own vocational training system.  From a South African 
perspective this meant examining the evolution and progress of recent United Kingdom 
training reforms and institutional designs.  Thus reforms and designs that occurred after the 
promulgation of the British 1964 Industrial Training Act generated intense interest.  These 
were reforms that were instituted under the reign of Harold Wilson’s Labour Party 
government in the United Kingdom.  Reference was also made to the industrial training 
regime in the United States where the Manpower Training Development Act of 1962 served 
as an exemplar of best-practice and a model from which lessons for South Africa could be 
gleaned (HSRC/NTB, 1989: 23). 
 
                                                 
34
 From the end of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 until the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, 
the unified South Africa was a British colony.  The Cape Province and the province of Natal became British 
possessions and colonies during the 19
th
 century.  From 1910, until the declaration of South Africa as a republic 
under the leadership of Hendrick Verwoerd in 1961, South Africa like Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
today, was a British dominion. 
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In the words of WC2 as ‘a result of criticisms levelled at the apprenticeship system’ (WC 2, 
1980: para.2.39), the National Apprenticeship Board which performed coordinating and 
policy functions and had the role of advising the Minister of Labour on all apprenticeship 
matters was requested in the mid-1960s to address these criticisms and submit 
recommendations for improvement (WC 2, 1980: para. 2.39).  The Wiehahn Commission 
however did not elaborate the content of these criticisms but the veiled responses from some 
employers suggest that it concerned issues of funding as well as the tempo at which the 
apprenticeship system produced skilled artisans and other lower level skilled workers. 
 
It is necessary to reiterate that the activities of Apprenticeship Committees and the National 
Apprenticeship Board, was regulated by the Apprenticeship Act of 1944.  Subsequent 
proposals and actions in 1967 among employers signalled support for a quest toward new 
institutional configurations that diverged from existing training policies then in existence.  
The existing policies were framed by the ‘Verwoerdian’ application of apartheid.  In 
response, the National Apprenticeship Board presented a unanimous finding that the present 
industrial training system in South Africa was sound (Wiehahn Commission, 1980, para. 
2.39).  Despite this, the Board of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South 
Africa (SEIFSA) submitted details of a training scheme designed to increase the tempo of 
apprenticeship training by making use of training levies.  This proposal was designed to 
mitigate free-riding and prevent the appropriation of skilled personnel by employers (a 
practice referred to in South Africa as ‘poaching’) who did not contribute to employee 
training costs.  In the eyes of the Wiehahn Commission ‘poaching’ was problematic because 
it discouraged training by individual employers (WC 2, 1980: para.3.57).  This deviation by 
SEIFSA and its supporters from the orthodoxy which the Apprenticeship Board clearly 
embodied was not influenced by the Apprenticeship Act but instead by sections 48 and 48A 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 which made provision for training schemes. 
 
In fact, as the Wiehahn Commission noted, the National Apprenticeship Board was 
favourably disposed to the SEIFA proposal and established a subcommittee to investigate and 
report on the matter (WC 2, 1980: para.2.39). Ironically, this broader purview of the 
challenge would certainly not have been entertained by the apprenticeship committees – or at 
least the majority of these.  An overseas study trip to the United Kingdom was arranged for 
the SEIFSA representative on the National Apprenticeship Board to study applicable training 
schemes there.  Since the notion of Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) in the United Kingdom 
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appeared attractive for specific industrial training lobbies in South Africa, the findings from 
the trip was meant to inform the specific industries or groups of industries in South Africa to 
which these lobbies were attached about the feasibility, actual legislative requirements and 
institutional accommodation that was necessary for the establishment of ITBs. 
 
Apart from promulgating new legislation which would have been a time consuming and 
onerous policy formulation process, the Apprenticeship Act (1944) and the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (1956) were probably the only existing items of legislation that could have 
served as a potential legislative tool to amend and generate the resources to finance 
implementation and delivery of training beyond apprenticeships using ITBs (WC 2, 1980: 
para. 2.39).  While the National Apprenticeship Board investigation was still underway, a 
member of the Opposition in Parliament put forward a private motion in 1969 in which a 
draft Manpower Training Bill was debated in the House of Assembly.  Incidentally, this Bill 
was modelled on the British Industrial Training Act of 1964 (Compare with Sheldrake & 
Vickerstaff (1987) & Hansen (1967)).  The motion was however rejected by the Government.  
Instead the Minister of Labour sought to control the situation and took the initiative to 
introduce an Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill in February 1970 to neutralise the 
Opposition’s attempt the previous year.  The Bill was adopted by Parliament.  Thus, the 1970 
Amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) made provision for Industrial Councils 
to introduce training schemes.  The amending legislation also made provision for training 
schemes to be established in unorganised industries which did not fall under an Industrial 
Council (WC 2, 1980: para.2.40)
35
.  Both types of training scheme qualified for tax 
concessions under the Income Tax Amendment Act of 1962 (No. 58). 
 
Between 1970 and 1979, which was the period from which the Wiehahn Commission 
collected a large bulk of its evidence, eleven training schemes under the auspices of Industrial 
Councils were in existence.  Depending on the industry, most of these were financed through 
fixed monetary levies on employers (e.g. 40 cents or 10 cents per worker per week).  In some 
instances there was even a contribution from employees built into the funding mechanism but 
these were soon discontinued and were eventually covered wholly by employer contributions.  
Initially the schemes were identified with the industrial council through which they were 
managed but some schemes acquired the appellation of ‘Training Board’ even though they 
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 In official documentation these are referred to as training schemes in terms of sections 48 and 48A of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 (Act 28). 
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were under the control of an Industrial Council.  Training schemes that were clear extensions 
of a specific industrial council included the Metal and Engineering Industries Education and 
Training Fund Industrial Council Agreement
36
 and the Training Schemes Fund of the 
National Industrial Council of the Printing and Newspaper Industry of South Africa which 
came into operation in January 1973.  Some of the training schemes that were regulated under 
the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) were referred to as Training Boards even though they 
were under the auspices of an Industrial Council.  Examples of this are the Furniture Industry 
Training Board, the Civil Engineering Industry Training Board and the Clothing Industry 
Training Board.  Factually, in South Africa, ITBs as autonomous institutions were only 
formally established from 1981 when they came under the regulation of the Manpower 
Training Act of 1981. 
 
These nuances defining institutional forms, was sometimes unclear, even in official sources.  
Similarly, the distinction between Industrial Council training schemes and ITBs was often 
misread in secondary analysis (e.g. Bennell, 1992).  But it is also true that in many instances 
Industrial Council training schemes did evolve, especially when the enabling legislation was 
promulgated, into ITBs.  This occurred with different degrees of alignment taking place 
between the parent Industrial Council and the new ITBs which gradually asserted their 
autonomy and independence. 
 
Nonetheless, even in its elementary form as an Industrial Council training scheme, each of 
these schemes was embedded with a strong orientation to industrial training coordination.  
This is evident for instance, in the prescribed nature and scope of the training scheme for the 
Civil Engineering Industry, which came into operation on January 1973.  Coordination 
encompassed running specific courses at specialised training centres for management 
personnel, technical personnel and the general labour force.  It also encompassed the design 
of training materials in collaboration with relevant industry bodies.  This training scheme was 
known as the Civil Engineering Training Board.  The designated functions for this specific 
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 This was the main SEIFSA Training Scheme but there were several secondary training schemes which were 
also associated with SEIFSA.  These included the SEIFSA Technological Fund Industrial Agreement and the 
Journeyman Recognition Scheme which continues to this day as the Artisan Training Recognition Agreement of 
the Metal Industries (ATRAMI).  At the present time (2017), while SEIFSA’s ATRAMI programme still 
operates (see Lundall, Maree & Godfrey, 2008), MERSETA too oversees an artisan acceleration programme.  
The MERSETA programme has wider coverage but overlaps with the original SEIFSA ATRAMI programme.  
The current MERSETA programme is referred to as the Accelerated Artisan Training Programme (AATP) (see 
Akoojee & Brown (2009). 
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training board was broadly symptomatic of most of the bodies known as training boards that 
were established prior to the release of the second report to the Wiehahn Commission in 
1980.  The industrial training coordination functions of these so-called training boards was 
highlighted through five pillars.  These were: 
‘(i) Courses run centrally by the Training Board in each of the main centres at which 
specialised training courses are provided for instructors, training officers and 
management and supervisory personnel; 
(ii) package courses developed by the Training Board to cover all general civil 
engineering tasks at operation and construction hand level;  
(iii) in-company courses developed by employers to meet their own training needs; 
(iv) national courses for technicians and apprentices; external courses in first aid, 
safety, etc.; certain correspondence courses covering highway engineering, quantity 
surveying, etc.; and 
(v) training material for use at public centres established under the Black Employees 
In-Service Training Act, 1976.  Courses in construction management have also been 
developed in collaboration with BIFSA
37
 for two universities.  Assistance has been 
rendered to technikons with a view to developing syllabuses for utilisation in the 
training of technicians’ (WC2, 1980, para.2.54) 
Industry training boards established in other industries mimicked the process that the Civil 
Engineering Industry followed. 
 
Finally, in its overview of industrial training in South Africa, WC2 arrived at a similar verdict 
which the Riekert Commission reached a year before.  Essentially, this was about a 
proliferation of training programmes which made it difficult to coordinate policy formulation 
and planning in South Africa.  As WC2 observed: 
‘It is obvious from this Report and from the Riekert Report that over the years the 
industrial training dispensation has developed into a rather complex network of 
legislation administered by a multiplicity of Government departments and other 
bodies.  The inevitable consequences are overlapping and gaps, lack of 
standardisation and co-ordination and dissipation of scarce resources in terms of 
money, manpower and time.  There has been a proliferation of training programmes 
produced by various institutions, giving rise to problems in regard to co-ordination of 
policy formulation and planning.  ….The time has obviously come for South Africa 
also to simplify, rationalise and consolidate its training system so far as legislation, 
administration and facilities are concerned’ (WC2, 1980: para. 2.53). 
To address the problem of free-riders within industrial training among South African 
employers, the Wiehahn Commission mentioned measures from Western countries that were 
introduced to overcome a similar problem.  It defined free-riders as ‘employers who do not 
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themselves undertake training but merely entice trained workers away from other firms’ 
(WC2, 1980: para. 3.57).  In the selected examples cited from Western countries where the 
free-rider problem was tackled, the Wiehahn Commission mentioned that introduction of 
training levies were used to over-come the problem.  The Commission further suggested that 
a training levy calculated on training costs should be imposed on firms in South Africa. 
 
The Wiehahn Commission recommended a radical institutional redesign which would 
consolidate and streamline all the coordinating structures which dealt with technical 
vocational and educational programmes at the enterprise or firm-level in South Africa.  The 
suggestion was that these ought to be consolidated into one body which would be known as 
the National Training Board.  The Wiehahn Commission formulated its recommendations 
which would lead to the formation of the National Training Board as follows: 
‘the scope of responsibility and designation of the National Apprenticeship Board be 
broadened to enable the Board to serve as a National Training Board; that the Co-
ordinating Council for In-Service Training of Black Employers and the Council for 
In-Service Training be incorporated into the National Training Board and that 
membership of the National Apprenticeship Board and apprenticeship committees be 
enlarged to include members who are expert in training and who also have knowledge 
of training requirements over the whole field of employment; 
The National Training Board: 
(i) take active steps to co-ordinate, encourage and facilitate all forms of training, 
but especially those aimed at the provision of technical skills; 
(ii) conduct continuous research into modern training technology, testing and 
patterns of utilisation, demand and supply of skilled workers and other related 
matters; 
(iii) monitor and control the effectiveness of all training to predetermined 
standards; 
(iv) be empowered to subpoena any person, to demand certain information and to 
administer the oath; 
(v) be requested to investigate the desirability and feasibility of a system of 
graded training and intermediate and subsequent testing of technical workers; 
(vi) be requested to investigate the possibility of establishing a central training 
fund; 
(vii) give attention to the question of representatives on apprenticeship committees 
(industrial training committees) with a view to making recommendations to 
the Minister of Manpower Utilisation; 
(viii) investigate the merit of stipulating a basic minimum age only in regard to both 
apprenticeship training and adult artisan training in the proposed consolidated 
Employment and Training Act, with due regard to the wage and other 
implications of such a stipulation’ (WC, 1980: para. 3.60.6 (i)-(viii)). 
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In the subsequent White Paper which was issued shortly after the release of the second 
Wiehahn Report (WC2, 1980), the government in principle supported its recommendations to 
establish a National Training Board.  However the state invoked its prerogative to investigate 
the matter further, through the Department of Manpower Utilisation and in consultation with 
interested bodies.  These prerogatives therefore applied to the determination of the functions 
and administrative and organisation framework of such a body.  Even the apartheid regime 
adhered to governance standards which were sensitive to potential inter-institutional conflicts 
within government departments and ministries as well as the necessity of rallying broader 
interest groups to strengthen its position on contentious matters.   This process ensued until 
the passage of the Manpower Training Act of 1981 through which the National Training 
Board was established. 
 
6.5 Coordination in Support of the Prevailing State Sector 
Ideologically, the apartheid state – as would be the case for all states – constantly and 
consistently tried to mobilise forces which were structurally outside the state sector as a 
bulwark to advance the success of its cause.  These parallel forces were located in the private 
market sector and the social development economy or non-profit sector.  In the social 
development economy a disciplinary outlook oriented to relevance and practical necessity 
became entrenched and it fuelled large fractions of the regime’s support base.  In addition, 
strong ideological allegiance to support the state using all the necessary disciplinary 
knowledge to sustain intellectual production and output was cultivated over a long period. 
6.5.1 Skill Coordination in the Private Market Sector as reflected 
through Employers 
Although employers were active throughout the period – from the 1960s until the 
establishment of the Wiehahn Commission – in formulating ideas which could be translated 
into policy in respect of skilled labour shortages and the burning topic of the composition of 
national aggregate skills in general, it was mainly the more liberal components of the 
business community that were the most vocal.  Some of these ideas were channelled through 
the National Development and Management Foundation of South Africa.  Beyond the liberal 
segments of the business community were those that either supported the NP government or 
remained muted and did not gain an identifiable public presence on these matters. 
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6.5.2 Skill Coordination and Disciplinary Knowledge Support in the 
State Sector 
The national apex research institutions and its network of academic researchers and research 
institutions, was aided by coherent disciplinary strands where industrial psychology was 
influential in the scientific research scene around human resource/skills development 
concerns
38
.  This process played itself out in the higher education system which ensured the 
production and reproduction of disciplinary knowledge through the production of research by 
staff and higher-level supervision and training.  It contributed to dissertations on pertinent 
matters.  A broad overview of locally produced publications deposited in the libraries of the 
University of Cape Town and Stellenbosch University provides a cursory road map into 
university-based research in Industrial Psychology from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s.  The 
Afrikaans-language universities appeared to dominate the outputs of theses and research 
reports in the field, complimenting research which the more educationally orientated 
psychologists were doing at the National Council for Social Research (NCSR) and 
subsequently at the HSRC. 
 
Until roughly 1985, the majority of theses in Industrial Psychology in the library deposits of 
these two universities were awarded either at Stellenbosch University or the University of 
South Africa.  Between 1975 and 1983 the production and dissemination of a journal, 
Perspectives in Industrial Psychology was hosted and controlled by the Industrial Psychology 
Department of Stellenbosch University.  From 1984 the journal was hosted by the Rand 
Afrikaans University (RAU), changing its name to Journal of Industrial Psychology in 
1986
39
.  While the disciplinary axes to Industrial Psychology within the higher educational 
system in South Africa appears to have a noticeable presence at Stellenbosch University, the 
University of South Africa and subsequently RAU, a shift in the quantity and quality of 
output in the Industrial Psychology from the early 1970s became pronounced at the 
University of the Free State.  Tracing the date and number of publications generated, the 
name H.P. Langenhoven appears to have had an influence within the Department of 
Industrial Psychology and its Research Division within this university.  In 1964 a research 
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 The NIPR was the apex national institution which addressed research concerns in Industrial Psychology.  Its 
orientation and ambit of concern however was primarily the needs of the private market economy.  Although 
Education Psychology as a discipline was entrenched at the NCSR, the organisation itself pursued research in 
Industrial Psychology which had wider national interests especially in respect of serving the state. As was stated 
earlier, the NIPR was oriented to the needs of the private market economy whereas the NCSR supported the 
research needs of the state sector. 
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 Since 2001 it is known as the South African Journal of Industrial Psychology. 
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report which he authored was published by the NCSR in Pretoria (Langenhoven, 1964).  The 
first sign of post-graduate dissertation research to emerge from this Department at the UOFS 
was the award of a Masters and a PhD degree in 1971 respectively completed through the 
Department.  The Stellenbosch University library holdings indicated that in 1976, four 
doctorates were awarded to candidates registered for Industrial Psychology at the Free State 
University.  Two of these went to candidates (Ryno Verster and Willem Wehlburg van 
Breda) who also subsequently authored research reports disseminated under the auspices of 
the Personnel Research Division in the Department of Industrial Psychology at the University 
of the Orange Free State, which was the university’s official name at the time. 
 
6.6 Institutional Coordination after Wiehahn: National 
Manpower Commission (NMC), National Training Board 
(NTB) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
From the period of the establishment of the National Training Board in 1981 until the 
announcement of the abolition of apartheid in February 1990 by President F.W. De Klerk and 
the beginning of constitutional negotiations thereafter, the institutions which had been 
established to coordinate the institutional landscape for industrial and vocational training in 
South Africa methodically proceeded to execute the tasks which had been assigned to it by 
the apartheid government.  A triumvirate of institutions which worked in coordination to 
shape strategy, undertake research and coordinate the vocational education and training realm 
in South Africa proceeded to reconfigure the apartheid skills development system in the 
country.  These triumvirate institutions consisted of the National Training Board established 
hastily in 1979, the Human Science Research Council which acquired even greater status or 
notoriety with proposals to reform the entire South African educational system after the 
Soweto upheaval, and the National Manpower Commission.  The HSRC was from 1981 
involved in a gigantic educational commission of enquiry that was chaired by Professor 
Pieter De Lange rector of the Rand Afrikaans University.  All three institutions which often 
worked in unison had a healthy predilection to address its most pressing problems through 
systematic research enquiries and investigations that mirrored the format of the traditional 
commission of enquiry.  Over a period of no more than a decade, a substantial number of 




The larger and more complex investigations on different facets of vocational training and 
skills development were often completed as joint inter-institutional collaborations.  While the 
reports were completed through the collaboration of a collective of experts and key 
informants, each of these were generated internally either single-handed or in collaboration 
using expert staff within its employ.  In the absence of such expertise, competent personnel 
who usually chaired these proceedings were seconded typically from academic and research 
institutions elsewhere in the country (e.g. Pittendrigh and De Lange).  A lot of attention was 
devoted to the development of a levy system for the promotion and financing of industrial 
training.  These reports also covered ancillary matters related to the overall skills 
development system as it was being imagined and incrementally contructed.  A sample of the 
reports completed covering themes related to the overall system and the skills levy in 
particular were the following:  
 Report of the National Manpower Commission on Training in Labour Relations in South 
Africa and a Levy System for the Promotion and Financing of Industrial Training 
(National Manpower Commission, 1982) 
 
 Implementation of a Cash Grant System Instead of Tax Concessions (Department of 
Manpower & National Training Board, August 1986) 
 
 Devolution of Training: Establishment of Additional Private Sector Industry Training 
Boards (Department of Manpower & National Training Board, August 1986) 
 
 Guidelines for the Establishment, Management, Financing and Function of an Industry 
Training Board (within a system of cash grants and accreditation) (National Training 
Board & Department of Labour, First Draft, December 1986) 
 
 Guidelines for the Accreditation of Training (Department of Manpower & National 
Training Board, 1986) 
 
 High-level and middle-level manpower in South Africa: Recent Developments 
(Department of Manpower & National Manpower Commission, 1987) 
 
 Guidelines for the Introduction of Modular Training for Apprentices (Department of 
Manpower & National Training Board, 1987) 
 
 Guidelines for the Restructuring of In-Service Training Programmes for Student 
Technicians (Department of Manpower & National Training Board, 1989) 
 
 Guidelines for Apprenticeship Agreements (Department of Manpower & National 
Training Board, July 1989) 
 
 Guidelines for the Implementation of competence-based modular training: a manual for 




In addition to the above, under the chairmanship of Alan Pittendrigh the Human Science 
Research Council and the National Training Board also completed reports from two 
substantial commissions of enquiry on the Training of Artisans (HSRC/NTB, 1984) and 
Skills Training in the RSA (HSRC/NTB, 1989) in 1984 and 1989 respectively. 
 
The Commission of Inquiry into Skills Training in the RSA gave an outline of the functions 
of the National Training Board as well as the objects and functions of what it referred to as 
Accredited Training Boards (ATBs).  ATBs were just a different expression for ITBs.  At the 
time of the Commission, the revisions to the anticipated amended Manpower Training Act 
were still in a draft form and the draft changes were still tentative.  However, structured 
interviews had at the time of the Commission already been conducted ‘with representatives of 
training schemes/boards and major national concerns’
40
 (HSRC/NTB, 1989: 242).  The 
inclusion of the feedback from the interviews in the Commission report suggest that the 
proposals generated from these were extremely significant and likely to be adopted in some 
form by the Commission and also likely to be accepted in principle by the government.  It 
also signified the probable policy direction to which the Commission was veering.  There is 
definitely merit in reproducing the verbatim findings of the interviews which the Commission 
replicated in its report. 
 
On the issue of skills training, the interviews which the Commission conducted suggested the 
following: 
1. ‘Skills Training: Most training boards make provision for training their people in a wide 
variety of skills at all levels of manpower and in combination of human, conceptual, 
intellectual and manipulative skills.  This training is designed by taking the industries’ 
needs into consideration and concentrating on universal skills.  Needs that cannot be met 
are most often contracted out, often to group training centres.  Training is most often 
stimulated by newsletters and seminars on the introduction of new courses’ (HSRC/NTB, 
1989: para. 9.8, F9.1) 
 
2. ‘Existing Training Structures: The majority of respondents believe that proposed 
legislation concerning manpower training should be extended to include all skills training.  
This legislation should not, however, be prescriptive but rather allow for flexibility and 
adaptation.  The training board was the most favoured instrument proposed to achieve 
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 By national concerns was meant the concerns of large private and state-owned enterprises. 
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this.  However, some organisations felt it would be unnecessary to create new 
infrastructures where adequate facilities already existed’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989: para. 9.8, 
F9.2). 
 
3. ‘The basis of financing a training board should be a levy on the employers in the industry 
but it is not desirable that such a levy should exceed 1% of the employer’s payroll.  The 
overseas experience shows that once the employer’s payment into a training fund exceeds 
1% it causes resentment and default which is harmful to the training fund’ (HSRC/NTB, 
1989: para. 9.8, F9.5). 
On the basis of its conception of the trajectory to the evolving skills development system as 
well as the findings which it gleaned from the interview process, the Commission proceeded 
to advance a range of proposals.  These were considered to be strategic and necessary.  First, 
the Commission proposed that ‘there should be devolution of control of all manpower 
training, to accredited training boards’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989: para. 9.9, P9.1).  It also proposed 
that ITBs should ‘assume the responsibility of all skills training within their particular 
industry’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989, para. 9.9, P9.2).  Thus, accredited training boards would not be 
exclusively confined to concerns with artisan training. 
 
The Commission also proposed that the system of tax concessions for training from 
government should be phased out and be replaced by a system of cash grants to accredited 
training boards.  This was consistent with the policy suggestions which had emanated earlier 
from the National Manpower Commission shortly after WC2 was released.  This policy was 
subsequently strengthened through research and discussion proposed by the National 
Training Board.  Thus the Commission’s proposal in 1989 was that: 
‘The cash grant from the state must be ongoing and be based on a formula that 
ensures the training of skills of primary importance to the nation.  This grant should 
furthermore be based on actual training produced rather than size of industry, size of 
proposed budget or any other factor’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989, para. 9.9, P9.10). 
An increased role and function which the NTB should play in shaping national strategy for 
human resource development in South Africa also featured in the Commission’s proposals: 
‘It is proposed that the National Training Board should give consideration to the 
formulation of a national strategy for human resource development in the RSA.  This 
strategy should also determine priority areas which should be updated on a regular 
basis making use of information from bodies such as the proposed association of 
training boards’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989, para. 9.9, P9.14) 
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A prominent place was also assigned to Technical Colleges in the proposals of the 
Commission and it was suggested that it should be open to all employees (in 1989 this meant 
open to all races) whom industry wants trained: 
‘The technical college should play a much greater role in training to meet the needs of 
industry in the RSA, possibly also in the retraining of adult learners, owing to the vast 
need for skilled workers, changing needs of industry as well as the equitable use of 
resources, attempts should be made to bridge the barriers between training and the 
formal education system. The technical colleges should be available to all the 
employees whom industry wants trained within the region of such technical colleges’ 
(HSRC/NTB, 1989, para. 9.9,  
The Commission also recognised the importance of the manpower and industrial training 
board matters being consolidated under a single state department: 
‘All manpower and training board matters should fall under a single state department.  
It is proposed that the training board for local government should be administered, 
with all other training schemes by the Department of Manpower’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989: 
para. 9.9, P9.20). 
Finally, just as the progressive training practitioners in South Africa had cast their eyes to the 
antipodes to draw innovative lessons of education and training practice, the Commission too 
was not immune to similar tendencies.  Predictably the Commission emphasised the 
coordination lesson that the effort possibly could generate: 
‘Further research should be undertaken on the co-ordination of efforts between formal 
education and training.  The successful Australian example of a single department, 
linking education and training, including, all their resources, could be considered in 
such research’ (HSRC/NTB, 1989: para. 9.9, P9.21). 
All of the above was written and recommended in 1989.  The impact of the Commission’s 
recommendations was however submitted in a period that would be characterised by 
immense political and social change in South Africa.  Within less than a year the previously 
banned liberation movements would be unbanned and South Africa’s long-term political 
prisoners including the iconic Nelson Mandela would be released from detention.  The terrain 
started to shift rapidly and the managerial and intellectual leadership embedded in national 
coordinating and training institutions that managed and governed the skills formation system 
under the apartheid regime such as the National Training Board were not effectively versed in 
navigating the stormy waters that lay ahead.  Moreover, these institutions faced strenuous 
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tests of legitimacy in the technical vocational education and training reform as new centres of 
power gained prominence. 
 
6.7  Skill Coordination under a Regime in Waiting 
The ideological and political alternatives to the apartheid system of skill coordination 
occurred consciously and unconsciously long before it was even possible to witness the broad 
unfolding of events during the last years of the apartheid regime.  While it may have been 
vague and general in orientation, it was enshrined in the imagination of political opposition to 
apartheid as embodied in nationalist anti-apartheid movements and blurred even perhaps as 
nationalist anti-capitalist movements.  Here the activities of the Unity Movement, the African 
National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Black Consciousness Movement and 
various left groupings exhibited a noticeable collective voice.  Each of these organisational 
formations was capable too of articulating different perspectives of the ideal skills 
dispensation under a democratic post-apartheid regime.  The evidence suggests that it is the 
Durban strikes and the work of intellectuals like Rick Turner who anchored this vision in a 
more credible framework (Webster, 1993).  It enabled successive generations of intellectuals 
to think about and imagine the process of coordinating the education, training and skills 
development dispensation of a new non-racial democratic South Africa.  The sections below 
trace the influences and forces which enriched this process. 
6.7.1 Impact of the Durban Strikes and the Student Uprisings on the 
Coordination of Skill Development Initiatives 
While research production exploring aspects of skills development coordination were being 
authored and produced within research programmes that were largely aligned to the apartheid 
state, radical alternative types of research with similar objectives had begun to gain a 
different purpose after the cataclysmic Durban strikes of 1973.  These strikes gave 
momentum for more organised and systematic interventions to workers education and 
technical training and support (e.g. labour law, collective bargaining, the calculation of 
inflation on the preservation of real wages and nominal wage dispersion, conditions of 
employment etc.).  A large spectrum of non-profit sector organisations was established to 
address this need (See the Bridge Directories for 1984 and 1987 published by the Human 




The Institute of Industrial Education (IIE) in Durban and the Urban Training Project (UTP) in 
Johannesburg were among the first organisational entities which started to play this role in 
support of an independent black trade union movement.  When the IIE was launched by Rick 
Turner along with colleagues from the University of Natal in May 1974, its scope, in the 
words of Webster ‘included a correspondence course for black workers, a research institute 
(Charles Simkins was the first employee) and the South African Labour Bulletin’ (Webster, 
1993: 5).  According to Eddie Webster, who was a key informant and participant in the IIE’s 
early activities, the Institute was torn between two poles: 
‘… either to be a resource to build the shop floor leadership of the new unions, or to 
be an adult education centre with the aim of educating workers in general in union 
and community leadership.  Both tendencies were represented in the IIE and it 
vacillated between the two until, towards the end of 1975, the union position came out 
on top and the IIE was brought directly into the educational work of unions’ 
(Webster, 1993: 5-6). 
In an article written for the South African Labour Bulletin, and on the basis of access to 
primary material, Johann Maree captured the contentions between the two tendencies by 
assigning names and personalities of the preferred approach to worker education which each 
advocated.  As he observed: 
‘The political and ideological differences between the two sides was shown clearly at 
a Council meeting in July 1974 when professor [Lawrence –PL] Schlemmer proposed 
that the IIE should introduce a Diploma in Community Studies.  He motivated the 
proposal on the grounds that there was a need to train leaders in Black communities, 
that a workers’ organisation needed to have a leadership with knowledge of 
community problems and an awareness of the organisation’s relationship to the 
community.  [Johnny – PL] Copelyn opposed the proposal on the grounds that it was 
not related to the needs of the trade unions and that priority should be given to 
establishing trade union structures in the factories.  He felt that the IIE should be a 
trade union school training shop stewards and should not distance itself from the 
factory’ (Maree, 1984: 82-83). 
Apparently the IIE could initially not resolve the matter and vacillated on making a decision 
until the end of 1975 when the Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC) which 
controlled the IIE wrenched control away from Turner and his partner Foszia Fisher.  
Unfortunately the TUACC unionists were not able to balance the organisational demands 
required to train workers to build trade union organisation and still devote sufficient time to 
worker education.  The IIE and the initiative into worker education subsequently collapsed.  
Maree notes that only after a number of years when the unions were well established and 
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confident could general worker education commence once again (Maree, 1984: 90; also see 
Copelyn, 2016: 17). 
 
At roughly the same period when Rick Turner and his colleagues in the east of the country 
were strategizing, in the western part of the country, a restructuring within the Department of 
Economics at the University of Cape Town took place.  It was restructured into a School of 
Economics with three Divisions: a Division of Economics, a Division of Economic History 
and a Division of Research.  Francis Wilson, the son of arguably South Africa’s most 
renowned social anthropologist, Monica Wilson (nee Hunter) was appointed head of the 
division of research.  Wilson bore the mantle as an impeccable development and labour 
market scholar and anti-apartheid liberal activist (see chapter 5 to his 1972 study of the South 
African Gold Mining Industry).  Once funding had been secured, Wilson established the 
Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) as the first unit within 
the research division (SALDRU, 2005).  SALDRU’s aim was to research and advance the 
challenges faced by labour and development in South Africa. 
 
In 1976, a second cataclysmic set of events unfolded with the Soweto student uprising which 
reverberated to many corners of the country, including schools in Cape Town which 
experienced massive educational turmoil, student mobilisation, politicalisation and 
radicalisation.  The events of 1973 and 1976 were merely the opening salvoes in the 
mobilisation of workers and students in South Africa.  Whereas, the mobilisation of workers 
led to the formation of an independent trade union movement in South Africa, continuing 
student mobilisation and struggle against the apartheid regime led to a perennial and 
deepening educational crisis in the country.  Many politically engaged intellectuals and 
academics made a commitment to support the worker trade union organisations by taking up 
technical, educational and organisational roles in these bodies
41
.  Others rendered assistance 
by creating technical, educational and support institutions to the union movement both inside 
and outside of the universities (see Human Awareness Programme (1984; 1987) for the 
relevant organisations listed).  As the effects of ongoing struggles in the education system 
became manifest, the educational provision to large cohorts of learners throughout the 
schooling system was severely disrupted.  Many left school prematurely.  These learners 
became known as the lost generation. 
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Educationalists with similar perspectives to those who rendered support to the independent 
trade union movement followed a similar trajectory.  Many started organisations and NGOs 
to help ameliorate and improve the educational outcomes and progression of those that were 
affected by the ongoing crisis and struggles in the educational system. One of these which 
came to be known as the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED), was 
established earlier in 1959.  It was established as a response to the Extension of University 
Education Act excluding black students from white universities and the creation of tribal 
universities for different black ethnic groups.  SACHED initially promoted the support for 
black students studying for university degrees initially through the University of London and 
later through the University of South Africa (UNISA).  From the mid-1970s its activities 
spread to the support of secondary school learners, adults and subsequently workers 
education (see Nonyongo, 1998).  Thus, the NGO sector was instrumental in responding to 
conditions of crisis that the apartheid regime created.  These conditions led to the adult 
education movement in South Africa gaining prominence and influence.  Hence the structural 
events that gave momentum to the coalescence of policy inclined activists and intellectuals, 
has to be located in the events of 1973, 1976 and in the reforms of the Wiehahn dispensation. 
These intellectuals and activists would again rise to prominence with the shift towards 
democracy from 1990s onwards, through policy formulation in the skills development arena.  
These reforms gave rise to the construction of mass-based organisations with the capacity and 
ability to engage in a more robust manner with state institutions and institutions in the private 
market economy.  It established within the non-profit or social development sector a network 
of supporting institutions which could match those of the state and the private market 
economy, particularly in respect of policy thinking to advance the human resource/skills 




 of developing research expertise along a wide spectrum of 
developmental concerns had the potential to gain a presence in the educational and skills 
development arenas.  However it did not achieve this.  Roughly until 1979, SALDRU’s 
research outputs reflected a wide diversity of topics covering migration, unemployment, farm 
labour, the economics of health, the mining industry as well as surveys of squatter and other 
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 Because I was probably the longest serving intern at SALDRU starting from June 1983 to December 1993 
with a seventeen month break between 1986 and 1987, I have taken the licence to reflect on the unit particularly 
through the literature on skills development which passed through its library and which I read avidly from the 
beginning of 1990. 
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communities.  With the publication of the first Wiehahn Commission report in 1979, a more 
systematic endeavour was made to coordinate its labour market research.  This was done by 
producing a series of directories and compendia on wages and statistics.  An effort was also 
made at mapping the imprint of active trade unions in South Africa.  The production of these 
publications required an efficient coordination of research teams supervised by senior staff 
members within SALDRU.  To effectively undertake the data extraction and data processing 
for these enlarged directories and compendia, a large cohort of student interns were employed 
and trained to work with a high level of accuracy.  Thus, under the guidance of Dudley 
Horner, Gordon Young, Debbie Budlender and Delia Hendrie, by 1984 in a series aptly 
referred to as the Labour Statistics Series, the first statistical compendiums on Industrial 
Council Wage Rates (Budlender, Young & Hendrie, 1984), Wage Determination Wage Rates 
(Pillay, Budlender & Young, 1985), Conditions of Employment set by Industrial Councils 
and the Wage Board (Schroeder & Young, 1985) as well as a comprehensive Directory of 
Trade Unions (Lundall, Schroeder & Young, 1984) was produced over an intense period 
spanning roughly three years. 
 
The research of the Labour Research programme at SALDRU remained extremely relevant in 
the latter period of the apartheid regime because it was a more credible and legitimate source 
of social statistics compared to what the state potentially could generate.  When the winds of 
change were unleashed in February 1990 with F.W. de Klerk’s opening speech in Parliament 
announcing the release from prison of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of liberation political 
organisations and the process to commence dialogue towards a political settlement in South 
Africa, the labour intensive research work contained in the information directories and 
statistical compendia which SALDRU had been producing, no longer had the same urgency. 
 
The urgency had shifted towards supporting a government in waiting with policy proposals 
for an entirely new system of government.  These policy proposals applied to the broad 
education and training development arena as well.  Even though there was an attempt by 
some researchers at SALDRU to enter the fray by generating statistics of the growth of 
artisan and apprentice numbers over the recent period, this was insufficient (Mohamed & 
Kimmie, 1992 & Lundall & Kimmie, 1992).  Researchers elsewhere in the country were 
better placed to enter the fray and take up the cudgels.  What was learnt was that while 
institutional support to expand and extend research programmes in critical fields where there 
was a demand from society (e.g. the field of education and training or skills development), it 
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was specific individuals that were endowed with an entrepreneurial disposition about the 
immediate policy requirements of society who were better placed to respond to the rapidly 
changing policy environment.  Foresight also enabled these individuals to reap the earlier 
intellectual investments which they may have incurred.  As much as foresight was a factor, 
individuals who gravitated towards making a contribution towards constructing a new 
educational and training system in South Africa entered the fray from different disciplinary 
perspectives and with different levels of institutional commitment to support this new work.  
Lane and Maxfield (1996) draw parallels to this process when reflecting on the lessons of 
forging relationships but do so within a different context involving formal business 
enterprises and start-ups. 
6.7.2 Skill Coordination Initiatives in the Social Development Sector 
at the cusp of Democracy with a Government in Waiting 
Throughout the 1980s in South Africa, heightened acceleration in internal resistance to 
apartheid across a wide spectrum took place.  This resistance took the form of community, 
student and worker struggles.  Initiatives by the state to incorporate sectional interest (e.g. the 
emerging black business community) or exploit racial and ethnic cleavages within the non-
white population (e.g. the tri-cameral constitutional experiment which Chris Heunis Minister 
of Constitutional Development and Planning in the PW Cabinet advocated) backfired.  It 
heightened resistance against the regime.  New organisational formations connected in some 
way to these struggles arose.  These formations sought to strengthen the organisational and 
strategic orientation to these struggles but also gave moral expression to sectional or societal 
interests which these emerging forces represented.  Examples of these new organisational 
formations which emerged during this period included the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
an umbrella body uniting a large spectrum of community organisations, civic bodies, student 
organisations, cultural groupings, trade unions and worker organisations as well as religious 
bodies that remained ideologically sympathetic to the ideals of the Freedom Charter and loyal 
to the ANC in exile.  Among the examples of new organisational formations distinct from the 
UDF was the socialist inclined National Forum (National Forum, 1986).  Other formations 
included bodies which consolidated trade union organisations under two different umbrella 
federations, namely the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the 




These social struggles resonated deeply into the conceptual outlook of activists and 
intellectuals identifying with these struggles, particularly in the manner which they conceived 
the often fluid South African trajectory and its immediate future.  In critiquing the 
perspective of policies and programmes around education and training which the existing 
state and its apparatus fervently advanced, those that were ideologically in opposition and in 
resistance to the current state policies were drawn to slowly construct an alternative vision 
and platform for new policies and programmes in the education and training field.  As the 
expression ‘the early bird catches the worm’ implies, those who were previously 
investigating and researching the crisis of education and training in South Africa, were better 
positioned to contribute to a progressive or radical alternative.  This was especially true for 
those who presciently judged that the wheel of change would eventually turn.  This wheel did 
suggest that a future education, training and skills development system, while having not yet 
emerged was not far off from being born anew
43
 (Saul & Gelb, 1981). 
 
Those best placed to meet this challenge were either academics or research students working 
in the more liberal English universities (UCT, Wits, UND) or the progressive historically 
black universities (e.g. UWC, UDW, North, UniBo) on the one side.  Or as organisational 
practitioners providing support services including education and training that were designed 
as creative responses to the crisis of human resources development in South Africa.  
Organisational practitioners were drawn from diverse fields and educational arenas located in 
universities, community organisations and trade unions.  These organisations gradually built 
competence and specialisation which addressed concerns about adult education and the 
incorporation of youth into the labour market.  They did so through customised support 
services which drew attention, among others, to the concerns of school leavers and drop-outs 
from the schooling system and unemployed individuals in need of career guidance and 
counselling (e.g. the Careers Resource and Information Centre (CRIC) in Athlone, Cape 
Town).  Trade unions too began to enter the fray, the most prominent being NUMSA, which 
formulated policies to address issues of job grading, outcomes from job-training initiatives at 
the workplace as well as devising measures to overcome stunted career paths which many 
workers had experienced (Forrest, 2011; McGrath, 1996).  Similarly, the Adult Education 
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 In order to capture the mood of the period, the allusion to the crisis of the apartheid system and the impending 
birth of a new system is borrowed from John Saul & Stephen Gelb (1981) The Crisis in South Africa: class 
defence, class revolution (Monthly Review Press).  Although banned from possession in South Africa it was 
widely and deftly circulated among university students in photocopy.  More importantly, for some of us, it 
stimulated a renewed interest in reading Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. 
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Movement also rose in prominence with centres of influence located simultaneously in 
community organisations as well as through academic departments within universities and 
colleges of education.  Perhaps the symbolic epicentre of the adult education movement in 
South Africa was the Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) at the University of 
the Western Cape with Shirley Walters as its director and key policy lobbyist (see Walters, 
1989 and the conference articles in Walters, 1997).  The Certificate and Diploma courses 
offered by CACE was a significant success because this offering coincided with a strong 
application of the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) which enabled many individuals with 
incomplete school leaving qualifications to gain access to university undergraduate 
programmes.  Thus RPL as an access option also enable many to study for post-graduate 
qualifications through CACE at the University of the Western Cape. 
 
Thus, just below the radar, a plethora of initiatives exhibiting multiple features of human 
resource development were already established, often in response to specific crises in the 
educational and training field in South Africa.  Many of these interventions embodied support 
services which were provided to marginalised communities and people.  It is out of this 
amalgam of coalescing forces and struggles that a critical number of perceptive studies 
documenting the crisis of human resource development in South Africa emerged (Matiwana 
& Walters, 1986).  Organisations which had a strong orientation towards lobbying and 
critique such as the South African Institute of Race Relations also filled a void by providing 
critical insights through an alternative literature to that produced by the state and its 
institutions (e.g. Bot, 1988). 
 
Perhaps the research in the education, training and skills development arena of Andre Kraak 
epitomises most vividly the intricate mix between foresight and opportunity which elevated 
him as the front runner and key analyst in the movement towards an alternative to the 
apartheid education and training discourse.  Kraak completed a highly original masters’ thesis 
in 1988 while lecturing in the Department of Comparative Education at the University of the 
Western Cape on capital’s initiatives in the black education and industrial training arenas 
since 1976 (Kraak, 1988).  Shortly afterwards he undertook a doctoral study on the education 
and training policy options of a future South Africa which he completed in 1994 (Kraak, 
1994).  Thus Kraak immersed himself thoroughly in understanding the policy shifts spanning 
the apartheid and post-apartheid periods which is the subject matter that the current chapter of 
this thesis also covers.  Essentially therefore Kraak’s work provides critical insights into the 
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policy background that informed institutional coordination in the post-Wiehahn period both 
as a commentator and as an active participant in the proceedings for an alternative view to 
Wiehahn. 
 
From the mid-1990s, as his research developed a direct linkage to support the policies and 
implementation imperatives of a new government that ruled the country, the challenge of 
coordination in the overall skills development system in South Africa permeated into Kraak’s 
work.  Thus, like Edward Batson and Nicolas Everhardus Wiehahn before him, Kraak can be 
classified as a South African ‘coordination’ theorist, who has transmitted a framework of 
coordination into his research of the South African skills development system.  This is 
demonstrated most poignantly in Kraak’s introductory chapter to a book which he edited in 
2009 entitled Sectors and Skills: the Need for Policy Alignment. 
6.7.3 Insights from the Commonwealth Expert Group 
On the basis of interviews conducted and discussions by members of the Commonwealth 
Expert Group (CEG) with prominent actors on the ground during a fact finding visit to South 
Africa in 1990, John Harker and the team from the Commonwealth Expert Group provide a 
perspicacious overview of the contending groups which were mainly but not exclusively 
based in the social development sector.  These groups were well placed to influence and 
shape the evolving education and training policy in South Africa (Harker, et.al, 1991).  At the 
forefront of the process was the National Educational Coordinating Committee (NECC) 
which was responsible for launching the National Educational Policy Investigation (NEPI).  
The NECC, previously known as the National Education Crisis Committee was renamed the 
National Education Coordinating Committee in 1990 (Harker et.al., 1991: 24).  NEPI was 
tasked with the research of policy options for the entire education and training system in 
South Africa but it also had to dislodge and displace the influence on society at large of the 
Educational Renewal Strategy which the NP government launched in 1990.  The Report of 
the Commonwealth Expert Group noted that close cooperation existed between the Education 
Policy Units at Wits and Durban.  Similar units existed at UWC (REPPESA), 
Pietermaritzburg (Macro-Economic Development Unit (MEDU)) as well as in London 
(Research on Education in South Africa (RESA) based at the Institute of Education at 
London University).  In the early 1990s, RESA relocated to Cape Town and was located at 
UWC where it merged with REPPESA to form the Education Policy Unit at the University of 
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the Western Cape.  The Education Policy Unit at UWC was under the directorship of Harold 
Wolpe, the former Rivonia trialist, escapee from probable long-term imprisonment in a South 
African jail-cell and exiled South African intellectual. 
 
The Commonwealth Expert Group also sketched the parameters of non-formal organisations 
and the training programmes in which they were active.  A survey was conducted to map 
these non-formal organisations which were associated with a wide diversity of training 
activities.  Some organisations operated independently while others such as the Centre for 
Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) were attached to universities.  Many of the 
organisations that the Commonwealth Expert Group classified as non-formal organisations 
developed to assist young people and adults who had fallen out of the schooling system.  
Ideologically many of these could be classified as forming part of the Adult Education 
Movement which generally was a post-1976 phenomenon. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth Expert Group also identified a trend in which trade unions such 
as NUMSA were able to intervene in national discussions concerning training policy because 
of the experience and the results achieved through collective bargaining at gaining 
concessions around education and training of its members.  As the Commonwealth Expert 
Group expressed the matter: 
‘NUMSA has recently reached agreement with employers in the car assembly sector 
in respect of South Africa’s first industrial training board with equal union and 
employer representation and employer funding.  The purpose will be to consolidate 
and broaden existing flat-based training according to national standards and link it to 
industry needs and restructuring; training will be modular and competency-based and 
offer opportunities for all workers ‘from sweeper to engineer’.  Included in the 
board’s scope will be adult basic education and literacy as well as dealing with race 
and gender discrimination and educational disadvantage’ (Harker et.al, 1991: 85, Box 
5.7) 
Thus the overview which Harker and his team mapped confirms and complements the outline 
that I have sketched from my own observations and experiences of the period of political 
transition in South Africa. 
6.7.4 NEPI and Proposals on the Skills Levy 
The unbanning of liberation movement organisations, coincided with the release from 
imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and the beginning of constitutional negotiations.  It brought 
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into existence the policy formulation moment in progressive discourse in South Africa.  The 
policy formulation moment corresponded with ideas about the institutional design of the new 




The National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC) which enjoyed strong links with 
the ANC in exile played a pivotal role in kick-starting research and policy proposals for a 
new dispensation in the educational and training arena in South Africa.  The drive for 
research and policy was initiated through a NECC initiative known as the National Education 
Policy Investigation (NEPI) which was conducted between December 1990 and August 1992. 
 
NEPI consisted of twelve research groups that investigated various components of the South 
African educational and training system across a spectrum ranging from early childhood 
development to higher education.  One of these research groups covered human resource 
development and was convened by the British academic Nicola Swainson
45
.  It consisted of 
fifteen participants.  Twenty three papers by members of the group as well as additional 
participants were delivered at a NEPI Conference on Human Resources Policy for a New 
South Africa held over four days in Durban from the 7
th
 to the 10
th
 of May 1992.  The 
conference was followed by a consolidated report of the findings of the human resources 
development research group published subsequently during 1992 (NEPI, 1992).  A 
conference paper respectively by Paul Bennell, Adrienne Bird as well as three papers by 
Andre Kraak broached in particular, policy recommendations, which covered the subject of 
levy payment systems in South Africa.  These three individuals were at the cutting edge of 
the assault against the apartheid industrial training dispensation. 
 
Kraak’s (1991) monograph report for the Wits EPU set the scene for the conception of the 
reform and coordination of the skills and training development system which the participants 
of the NEPI human resources development group confronted between 1990 and 1992.  In this 
report Kraak (1991) emphasised the urgent need for fundamental restructuring of the existing 
educational and labour market institutions in South Africa to take effect.  As he expressed the 
point: 
                                                 
44
 I remember quite vividly seminar discussions and corridor and lunch time discussions afterwards that ensued 
at the EPU at UWC at which I was engaged as a researcher during the 1990s, where Dave Cooper, the Cape 
Town educational sociologist spent a lot of time arguing among other things about the merits of periodising the 
‘policy formulation moment’ that we confronted. 
45
 Swainson and her partner, Paul Bennell along with Michael Young from the Institute of Education at the 
University of London participated actively in the NEPI human resources development research group. 
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‘Many of the existing institutions are weak and ineffectual coordinating or advisory 
bodies.  They need to be transformed into powerful tripartite bargaining forums’ 
(Kraak, 1991: 59). 
Consequently, Kraak concluded that: 
‘Reconstruction in South Africa must be comprehensive.  This is because of the 
complex network of labour market, education and economic institutional forces which 
together powerfully determine the character of VET and economic performance.  
Successful restructuring in each of these institutional spheres requires that they be 
restructured together’ (Kraak, 1991: 75). 
Thus the proposal which Kraak advance was about national comprehensive restructuring.  
This drew the following concluding remarks from Kraak: 
‘The proposal made here is that the current South African state Departments of 
Economic Coordination, Trade and Industry, Manpower, and the proposed unified 
Education & Training Department sit together on an Inter-Ministry Planning 
Commission which would be responsible for all long term comprehensive planning in 
the spheres of education, employment and economic growth.  This proposal is 
modelled on the success of the French Commissariat du Plan.  The Planning 
Commission would constitute a higher authority structure than the individual 
ministeries, and its recommendations would be binding on all affiliated Departments.  
The Planning Commission would also incorporate within its deliberations the 
recommendations of the tripartite LMC [Labour Market Council], NTB and ERC 
[Economic Restructuring Council]’ (Kraak, 1991: 75). 
Kraak argued that the proposals which were advanced in this monograph ‘would provide 
South Africa with a sound institutional framework capable of coordinating a coherent and 
comprehensive plan for economic growth, secure employment and high quality education and 
training’ (Kraak, 1991: 75-76).  Paul Bennell was more categorical about the urgency of 
restructuring the existing state institutions that were mandated to spearhead human resource 
development.  At the time that he was writing, the transition to democracy in South Africa 
was inexorably but also painfully underway: 
‘It is generally acknowledged that the National Training Board is a “dead duck” 
which has proved to be quite incapable of formulating the kind of innovative and 
visionary training strategies and policies needed to create a highly skilled work force 
throughout South Africa.  The NTB should therefore be scrapped’ (Bennell, 1992: 
19). 
The alternative Bennell argued was that: 
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‘The new state should establish in its place a broadly constituted, high profile 
National Council for Human Resources Development (or some similar body) with the 
necessary technical backstopping to develop comprehensive training strategies and 
policies.  This support role could perhaps be provided by a National (or even Southern 
African) Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (RIVET). A 
detailed assessment of existing and potential skill requirements in all sectors of the 
economy must underpin the planning process’ (Bennell, 1992: 19). 
Bennell did not add significant insight into the levy grant system to what had already been 
formulated and tested by the National Training Board over at least the preceding seven years.  
He did however call for caution when implementing levy grant schemes: 
‘For a variety of reasons, training levy and grant schemes must be very carefully 
implemented if they are to be effective.  While an across-the-board levy for all 
industries appears attractive, it is clear that training requirements vary markedly from 
among industry to industry (especially during periods of restructuring) and the 
capacities of enterprises to pay levies is far from uniform’ (Bennell, 1992: 19). 
Armed mainly with evidence from telephonic interviews with ITB managers, Bennell was 
absolutely certain that: 
‘For ITBs to play a pivotal role in industrial training and, in particular, for them to 
control relatively sizeable training grant funds, the training levy should be at least one 
per cent of the total payroll of all enterprises and probably higher still for larger 
enterprises, i.e. those with over 500 employees’ 
Adrienne Bird’s NEPI paper was more concerned about presenting a COSATU perspective to 
redefinitions of human resources development.  However, while not providing a clear 
perspective on the institutional landscape for human resources development in South Africa 
particularly in respect of existing institutions such as the National Manpower Commission, 
the NTB and ITBs, she held comprehensive insights into the challenge of coordination which 
had to be confronted within the education, training and skills systems in South Africa.  
Drawing on Kraak’s work, Bird argued that the existing institutions were marred by the lack 
of coordination and the lack of power to challenge the state.  Bird’s argument contained a 
number of propositions which I have tried to capture by quoting from her NEPI paper in more 
detail.  She argued: 
‘The administrative functions of the state are highly disaggregated.  Coordination at 
the level of policy formulation has tended to be driven through the cabinet where 
ministers co-ordinate under the strong leadership of a powerful state president.  Even 
the white community has enjoyed relatively little real representative democracy and 
no participatory democracy.  The black community has had none of either. 
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‘A semblance of democracy has been introduced since 1981. Ministers of different 
departments have increasingly been advised by statutory advisory bodies such as the 
NMC and the NTB.  However these bodies have no power at all – the Minister 
concerned is free to completely ignore the advice and table recommendations of his 
own to parliament.  The difficulties of COSATU’s battles to democratise these 
institutions should not be underestimated. 
‘Central to the struggle to democratise the statutory advisory bodies is the need for co-
ordination between these bodies.  Whilst the cabinet is the only forum for policy 
integration, civil society has limited institutional possibilities to bring about 
meaningful pressure on the state.  COSATU has argued that these labour market 
institutions should have the right to table recommendations directly to parliament 
(preferably a democratically elected one) in order for the political representatives to 
make the final determination – not an individual minister. 
‘Strengthened alliances will also be needed to break down the segmentation of the 
South African labour market as a prerequisite to an equitable, democratic and 
ultimately socialist society.  Civics, rural organisations and women’s organisations 
need to become involved in the restructuring of labour market institutions’ (Bird, 
1992: 6-7). 
The systemic orientation to Bird’s arguments is embedded throughout her paper.  A broader 
spectrum of interest-based organisations was deemed as a necessary bulwark to ensure 
democratic restructuring of existing labour market institutions.  To her own question about 
what a co-ordinated human resources policy is, Bird advanced the following response: 
 ‘Formal education, adult basic education and vocational skill formation 
programmes must be brought together under a single co-ordinating structure – 
both in terms of state structures and in terms of negotiating forums of civil 
society.  This is not to deny the relative autonomy of these different areas which 
must be given institutional expression within the broader co-ordinating structures. 
 ‘Education (both formal and ABE) and training must be coherently linked through 
a national certification system which ensures national recognition and portability 
for knowledge and skills acquired. 
 ‘The human resources development provision must anticipate and contribute to 
economic growth and employment creation and security. 
 ‘Recognise the relative autonomy of different sectors’. (Bird, 1992: 19) 
There tended to be a strong thrust for consolidation and centralisation in many of the 
proposals that were advanced in the democratic movement during this period.  Thus, the 
proposals from the human resources development group in NEPI were infused with a lot of 
similar thinking and argument.  Seemingly, this was a product of the milieu.  Reflecting on it 
years later as a senior civil servant in government, Ihron Rensburg (2001) who was a central 
participant in the NEPI process, albeit not the human resources development group, 
acknowledge this strong tendency within ‘an anti-apartheid and national liberation movement 
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whose culture was one of democratic centralism, with an emphasis on centralism rather than 
localised voluntarism’ (Rensburg, 2001: 126). 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the multiple forms of coordination in enterprise skill formation that 
ensued in South Africa over roughly a thirty year period, starting in the early 1960s and 
extending into the 1990s.  One has to treat with caution assertions to the effect that this period 
in the history of vocational education and training in South Africa was entirely 
uncoordinated.  Indeed the system may have been characterised by weak forms of 
coordination at the enterprise level, which on first sight may have appeared to be highly 
voluntarist.  Indeed while the process of coordinating enterprise skill formation at the level of 
the enterprise was indeed weak, the institutions of the state attempted to fill this void with the 
design of new state institutions.  Furthermore, attempts at coordinating specific dimensions of 
the skill formation process mainly within the private market economy contributed to strategic 
thinking about this challenge from administrators, bureaucrats and researchers attached to the 
state and its wider apparatus.  It was manifest particularly through the research and policy 
arms of its apex research institutions (e.g. NCSR, NIPR & HSRC). 
 
But even within the private market economy, attempts were made to modify existing state 
policies and shift the institutional configuration and design that addressed the coordination to 
the formation of skills at an enterprise level.  There is certainly evidence of collective 
attempts made by employers to modify the racial composition of the division of labour which 
certainly can be construed as an initiative at coordinating labour inputs and production 
outputs.  But except for evidence of applications for exemption to job grading, the process 
was highly diffused.  Consequently the evidence to this process did not leave behind the 
testimony of witnesses.  Instead, it was a proposal from sectional interests among employers 
that led to the adoption of the UK ITB model in South Africa in the late 1960s.  To prevent 
the business leaning parliamentary opposition gaining mileage in imitating this UK ITB 
training model, the NP government hijacked the process.  Instead it promoted it as its own 
model in South Africa.  Although this was an initial start to the establishment of institutions 
that were crucial to the coordination of enterprise skill formation (i.e. future South African 
industrial training boards), the British ITB model only started becoming established on a 
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solid footing and under substantially different legislation after the Riekert and Wiehahn 
Commissions presented its findings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
Both Riekert and Wiehahn are crucial to understanding the phenomenon of enterprise 
coordination in South Africa.  Although Riekert’s report was completed while the Wiehahn 
Commission was still mid-way in its work, Riekert suggested that the future industrial 
training of black South African workers could be financed through levies imposed on firms.  
However it was the Wiehahn Commission which elevated the importance of coordination 
within the South African state to a higher level.  Wiehahn put emphasis on the broad policy 
contours which make coordination in a modern state successful, particularly in addressing 
strategic issues, such as, the utilisation of labour supplies.  For the process of coordination of 
labour supplies to be successful it was important to give it attention at the highest levels.  
Wiehahn also emphasised the importance of using the correct institutions to promote and 
accelerate the upgrading of labour supplies in an economy.  In this respect I have suggested 
that as well as being a proponent of policy coordination, Wiehahn was also an advocate of 
institutional coordination.  Thus he did not refrain from supporting the formation of new 
institutions that were more efficient and capable at advancing enterprise skill formation.  The 
National Training Board and the National Manpower Commission, as well as Industrial 
Training Boards, were established on the basis of the recommendations of the Wiehahn 
Commission.  A significant amount of attention was later devoted by the National Training 
Board to investigate and promote the introduction of levy based financing mechanisms on 
firms and enterprises for the purpose of industrial training in South Africa. 
 
Finally this chapter shows that despite the control and rule that was exercised by the 
apartheid state on the black majority population in South Africa, there was also a concerted 
attempt from those aligned to oppositional and democratic forces to formulate alternative 
ideas about the coordination of enterprise related skills.  This process gained momentum after 
the unbanning of oppositional political parties opposed to the apartheid government.  It 
gained further momentum with the release from detention of Nelson Mandela in February 
1990.  The shifting political climate led to a plethora of initiatives from a new cohort of 
policy analysts who started investigating alternative policies for a new government in 
waiting.  This process started taking shape as the constitutional negotiations gained 
momentum resulting in a successful political settlement.  It contributed to new policy 
formulation capacities in the individuals themselves and in the new government for whom 
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they could potentially be hired.  This policy formulation capacity in the field of enterprise 
skills development and human resource development ensured that a capacity to shape the 
policy trajectory of enterprise skill formation in South Africa was no longer dormant.  NEPI 
which convened between 1990 and 1991 was the first significant expression of this new 
capability and as will be shown in chapter 7, there were significant continuities between 





Chapter 7: Case Study of the Effect of the 
Skills Development Levy on the Coordination 
of Firm-Level Training: late 1990s to 2013 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews recent studies and evidence about the incidence and experience that 
firms had with the skills development levy in South Africa.  The discussion of the skills 
development levy is meant to provide insights into a form of statutory and regulatory 
coordination.  Here the state carries out legal and regulatory coordination.  Firms are 
compelled to respond either directly and indirectly to the compliance conditions which the 
legal and regulatory coordination requires.  The behaviour of firms which is signalled through 
often contradictory data gives one a window into how firms actually relate to such statutory 
and regulatory coordination.  Behind the façade of compliance to the legal and regulatory 
coordination which the data represents, is it possible for firms to surreptitiously engage in 
training and skills development practices about which we are unaware? 
 
There are a whole lot of preconceptions about the behaviour of firms and markets which 
administrators and bureaucrats that favoured adopting legal and regulatory coordination 
mechanisms have preferred.  As part of an historical introduction into the influence that the 
skills development levy as a coordinating instrument has had on firm-level training, these 
preconceptions about the behaviour of firms and markets will first be explored in greater 
detail.  This is especially applicable to vocational skills and training policy.  It also relates to 
the perception and experiences that firms had of the skills development levy which we can 
infer from different sources of data.  These data sources are mainly from two national skills 
surveys of firms undertaken by the HSRC in 2003 and 2007.  I have also used data from an 
unpublished pilot survey to test the probability that firms are inclined to engage in training 
activities which fall outside the purview of levy contributing scrutiny.  It gives firms more 
control and flexibility to align training more spontaneously to their operational imperatives.  
However, the success of doing this successfully is the incurring of further expenditure beyond 
the levy.  I have termed this further expenditure which firms are not statutorily obliged to 




The chapter has four components.  The first component covers historical background to the 
introduction of a national levy grant system in South Africa (or a national skills development 
levy), before its formal adoption in 1999.  In South Africa the levy grant system is 
underpinned by payroll levies.  The second component covers the legal application and 
administration of the skills development levy system in South Africa.  It also includes a 
discussion of legislative shifts in the administration and allocation of monies accumulated 
under the national levy grant system.  The third component discusses the incentive structure 
on firms as anticipated in government policy.   This extends from the Green Paper in 1997 to 
the Report of the Ministerial Task Team on SETAs.  Incentives are a double-edged sword and 
can simultaneously also serve as a disincentive.  The fourth component of the chapter 
explores evidence of the incidence of firm-level training as well as evidence of the out-of-
pocket expenditure on training from firms under the current national skills development 
system. 
 
Since this is the third chapter in which the evidence of the thesis is being elaborated (ie. 
Chapters 5 to 7), it is perhaps timely to reiterate, apart from the empirical content, a 
conceptual thrust which pervades this thesis.  In particular, it has to do with the Thelen thesis 
of continuity or discontinuity between the different phases of the skill formation system in 
South Africa.  This includes the segregationist, apartheid and post-apartheid training 
dispensations.  It has to do with either continuity or discontinuity with the system which was 
established from the beginning or at least in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
 
Thus, even if characterised by quite an active process to advance the supply of enterprise skill 
formation, the late 1950s still exhibited strong features of a liberal training dispensation, with 
a strong voluntarist current.  These foundations were set into motion in the period before and 
after the promulgation of the 1922 Apprenticeship Act.  Similarly, from the period of 
rigorous formalised Verwoerdian apartheid until the emergence of a reformist apartheid 
labour market, despite a plethora of new institutional configurations, there was continuity in 
the liberal training dispensation (see Kraak, 2004a).  It corresponds with the Thelen thesis of 
continuity.  However, in the post-apartheid period, fervent and definite attempts were made to 
reverse the features of a liberal market training dispensation by actively constructing a 
coordinated and integrated training system.  Under the new system, the vestiges of voluntarist 
employer training practices were and are, it is claimed, being gradually eroded although 
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Kraak (2004c) cautioned that this was not inevitable.  It would seem then, that the systematic 
experience to build a training dispensation that was underpinned by a more active and 
expansive role for state supporting skill formation institutions, contradicts the Thelen thesis 
of continuity.  After examining the evidence, if this argument is correct, an argument for 
discontinuity will have been made. 
 
7.2 The Adoption of a National Levy Grant System in 
South Africa 
A national levy grant system in South Africa came into operation for the first time after the 
promulgation of the Skills Development Levies Act in 1999.  Starting in 2000, in the first 
year of its application, under the National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS l), it mandated 
all formal sector businesses with an annual payroll above R250 000 per annum to contribute 
half-a-percent (0.5%) of annual payroll costs towards a skills levy.  The ratio of the national 
skills levy was increased to 1% of payroll in 2001 for the second year of the collection 
process.  At the end of NSDS l, the minimum payroll threshold of firms for payment of skills 
levies was increased from R250 000 to R500 000 per annum. 
 
Investigation into the options for the structure, finance and organisation of a national levy 
grant system in South Africa started roughly in the mid-1990s.  Its architecture and design 
was embodied in the 1997 Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy.  Except for Paul 
Bennell (1992) almost nothing about the resources that would be required and the level of 
financing needed to support a vocational education and training system was made in papers 
and submissions during the NEPI process.  Even the earlier financing of firm-level training 
which shifted away from tax concessions to a cash grant system had not yet reached the phase 
of it becoming a national system.  Whatever changes had been anticipated seemed almost 
irrelevant in terms of the impending shifts and changes in vocational training policy which 
would become an object of attention for the unity government in which the ANC was the 
dominant party.  These policy insights and proposals to a national levy grant system in the 
NTB/NEDLAC study were drafted in 1994/1995 and fed into the 1997 Green Paper on Skills 
Development.  The thrust of these vocational training and skills policies and proposals are 
examined in the next section of this chapter. 
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7.2.1 The NTB/NEDLAC Study 
To address the conceptual and practical lacunae of a national levy grant system, the National 
Training Board (NTB) in conjunction with the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) initiated research between 1994 and 1997 into mechanisms of financing 
training in South Africa.  A broad spectrum of research expertise was commissioned to carry 
out the research.  Coopers and Lybrand, an accounting and consultancy firm conducted the 
research into industry training.  The findings of one of these reports entitled: Industry 
Training – Supply and Competition, are examined in more detail because it provided much of 
the empirical evidence on the extensiveness and precise rate to be set for a national skills 
levy.  It  substantiated the proposals made and conclusions drawn in the Green Paper on 
Skills Development which subsequently followed. 
The findings of the Coopers and Lybrand report was released under the authorship of the 
National Training Board and NEDLAC just over a year after it was commissioned (NTB & 
NEDLAC, 1997a & 1997b) although it is likely that the authors of the Green Paper had 
access to this and other reports as soon as these were released.  The report on Industry 
Training – Supply and Competition (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b) undertook an extensive 
survey of currently existing Industrial Training Boards.  It also surveyed 19 employers spread 
across large, medium and small sized firms to help understand expenditure on training in 
firms. 
 
The NTB/NEDLAC Funding Mechanism research into the supply and competition of training 
placed the absence of a statutory mechanism in South Africa as a crucial stumbling block 
from allowing government to directly raise funds for training (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, 
para. 1.13).  Through the Manpower Training Act (MTA) of 1981, the Minister of Labour 
could however enforce a training levy on employers but this could only operate on a sector 
basis and under the auspices of a specific training board.  Under the MTA, accredited 
Industry Training Boards (ITBs) had statutory powers to collect levies from employers (NTB 
& NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 1.14).  It meant that employers could choose between two options 
to fund training: either indirectly through the ITBs or directly through ‘out of pocket’ 




At the time that the NTB/NEDLAC Funding Mechanism research was being conducted in 
1994/1995, 27 ITBs had become accredited and several others were in the process of 
achieving accreditation.  Slightly more than half (55%) of ITBs had been operating for more 
than five years or to reiterate the same point, 45% had been in operation for under five years.  
The NTB/NEDLAC noted that there was significant participation or ‘domination’ of 
employers on ITBs.  In contrast there was an absence of employee representation especially 
by trade unions (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 2.6).  This domination of ITBs by 
employers was by 1997 however changing.  In many instances, the ratio of employee 
representation on boards of ITBs was on par at 50:50 with that of employers (NTB & 
NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 2.6). 
 
Seventeen ITB respondents indicated that their funding was based on a levy system.  A 
further two ITBs intended introducing a levy system in the near future.  All the ITBs had 
developed their own levy formulas which were roughly based on three calculations.  These 
included: 
 The total cost of remuneration; 
 The number of employees engaged within the enterprise; 
 A fixed monetary amount levied on each enterprise within an ITB sector (NTB & 
NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 2.23). 
 
Different ITBs also gave the Coopers & Lybrand team their own views on alternative funding 
systems that would address inefficiencies and inadequacies of the system then currently in 
use (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 2.28). 
 
Taking into account that only nineteen employers responded with evidence of enterprise costs 
incurred for training, quite a lot of suggestive but also categorical pronouncements about the 
actual levels of costs for training incurred by enterprises of different sizes was made.  As the 
Funding Mechanism report indicated: ‘On average training costs for large, medium and small 
sized employers amounts to 3%, 3% and 1% of total costs respectively.  The highest is 9% 
and the lowest 0%.  One-third of small employers did not undertake any training during 1994 
(NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 5.13).  The study acknowledges that the real costs of 
training were likely to be even higher because the majority of companies did not keep 
information of the costs from the loss of production plus the cost of wages and salaries which 
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still had to be paid while employees were away from work on training (NTB & NEDLAC, 
1997b, para. 5.16). 
 
The importance of a national coordinating body in countries with national schemes designed 
to fund enterprise training was consistently articulated in the NTB/NEDLAC Funding 
Mechanism research.  Whether these were payroll levy schemes or tax incentive schemes, ‘a 
national co-ordinating body’ (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 7.25) was a precondition for 
the operation of such schemes.  Typically, for such a body to exist, it was necessary 
according to the policy suggestions in the Funding Mechanism research, for it to be subjected 
to tri-partite control by government, employers and trade unions.  It was suggested that the 
co-ordinating body would also be composed of regional structures.  Expanding further on this 
suggestion and taking the formulation into the future, the research team from Coopers and 
Lybrand perceived the core task of such a national coordinating body as follows: 
‘This body is normally subject to tri-partite control by government, employers and 
trade unions, and will have regional structures.  This body will control the collection 
and disbursement of funds.  In some countries the collection and disbursement of 
funds may be controlled by separate bodies – particularly where there is a tax 
incentive scheme in place, in which case the tax authority is often the collection body’ 
(NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 7.25) 
The NTB/NEDLAC study presented four possible options which new funding mechanisms 
for training could take in South Africa.  A summary of the four options given by the research 
team was as follows: 
‘Option 1: Retain the system as it is with voluntary ITBs, levies set at industry level 
and no central co-ordinating body; 
Option 2: Retain an industry based system with compulsory establishment of ITBs, 
compulsory industry based levies and the possibility of a national co-ordinating body; 
Option 3: Introduce a national levy scheme and a national co-ordinating body to 
collect and disburse the funds; 
Option 4: Introduce a national tax incentive scheme and a national collection agency’ 
(NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 7.50). 
Subsequently, as was to be reflected in the Skills Development legislation introduced in 1998 
and 1999, Option 3 was incorporated into South African national skills policy.  Option 3 
represented a definitive shift from sectoral as well as industry-based levies, which had 
become associated with ITBs, towards a national training levy.  The rationale for this as 
constantly reiterated in the NTB/NEDLAC Funding Mechanism research was ‘to establish a 
strong national capacity to direct and co-ordinate the training system, and to provide a 
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mechanism for targeting funding in accordance with agreed priorities’ (NTB & NEDLAC, 
1997b, para. 7.57). 
 
Indeed, the state occupied a central place in the discussion of a strong national capacity for 
the coordination of the overall training system.  Ultimately:  
‘A national training levy could take the form of a levy grant system where levies are 
disbursed back to employers in the form of grants for agreed training activities.  A 
levy exemption scheme could be considered, where employers are exempted from 
paying a levy if they conduct training in accordance with agreed standards.  More 
innovative funding methods could also be considered under this option, including 
levies on products or services, or on an increase in VAT’ (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, 
para. 5.58). 
National coordination as proposed in Option 3 enabled national standards being met.  It 
allowed the targeting of funds for training and strengthened national strategy.  It advanced 
equity or ‘equitability’ which was the term used in the Funding Mechanism research and 
contributed to greater but also more stable financing.  Among the disadvantages that were 
recognised in choosing Option 3 was the loss of flexibility which a sector based system 
presented under the prevailing arrangement of ITBs.  It was also anticipated that some 
stakeholders would resist the policy proposed in Option 3.  The insinuation was that such 
resistance would come from employers because ‘the concept of a national levy… removes 
decision making further away from the workplace’ (NTB & NEDLAC, 1997b, para. 7.60). 
 
The evidence marshalled above clearly shows the evolution of vocational training policy in 
South Africa particularly with respect to the formulation of policy for a national levy grant 
system that would be anchored by payroll levies.  The period in which these policy 
formulations occurred was under the regime of a government of national unity led by 
President Nelson Mandela.  The period was marked with  the high hopes of building a more 
democratic and equal society. 
 
While the NTB/NEDLAC Funding Mechanism Research process was designed to understand 
the options which could be pursued in a coordinated vocational training system which was 
adequately funded, this research was also designed to shape and inform impending vocational 
and training policy in South Africa  This applied especially to policy which would be 
succeeded by the eventual promulgation of legislation on skills development.  Perhaps the 
most crucial policy pronouncement which preceded such legislation was the Green Paper on 
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a Skills Development Strategy which was released by the Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni 
in March 1997.  The question that remains in our minds is what continuities and disjuncture 
were there between the NTB/NEDLAC Funding Mechanism research and the Green Paper on 
Skills Development.  Moreover what precise prescriptions for a national levy system to 
coordinate and finance vocational training and skills development in South Africa was made 
in the Green Paper on a skills development strategy. 
7.2.2 The Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy 
The Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment Growth in 
South Africa was released by the Department of Labour in March 1997.  An earlier version 
appeared in 1996 as a Human Resources and Training Strategy for South Africa.  However, 
the team that was engaged in drafting it was required to make significant revisions.  In his 
forward to the subsequent Green Paper, the Minister of Labour at the time noted: 
‘When the Draft Green Paper was presented to us, we agreed with the principles and 
substance of the proposals but were nonetheless concerned about the complexity of 
some of the institutional and financial arrangements suggested.  The Green Paper 
simplifies the original proposals.  There has also been substantial work on an 
implementation plan for the strategy which was a necessary pre-condition for the 
publication of this document’ (Tito Moboweni in Foreword to Green Paper, 
Department of Labour, 1997). 
The Green Paper started on an optimistic note by informing readers that the Department of 
Labour believed that a new Skills Development Strategy which was being proposed will 
‘achieve the restructuring and upgrading of [the] education and training system to produce 
the skills…people need to succeed in the 21
st
 century’ (DoL, 1997: 8).  It was further argued 
that conceptually, the strategy which the Green Paper advocated was ‘based on a demand-led 
skills development system which is flexible and responsive to the economic and social needs 
of the country at the same time as it promotes development of new skills demands’ (DoL, 
1997: 13).  In the understanding of the Green Paper, demand-led training referred ‘to the need 
for skills formation to be linked to the requirements of work’.  It had ‘to be of sufficient 
quality and relevance to support increases in productivity in the workplace’ (DoL, 1997: 13).  
A specific set of measures was required to ensure that the process was a success.  These 
included encouraging the increased ‘incidence of in-company education and training and the 
growing competitive provider market, as well as providing labour market information which 
signals industrial and occupational growth areas in the economy, to the marketplace’ (DoL, 
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1997: 13-14)  A basic and stable infrastructure was however needed to support a competitive 
training market and provide for technically more advanced capabilities using substantial 
plant, equipment and technology (DoL, 1997: 15)  For this to occur: 
‘Large investments in plant, training equipment, curriculum development and the 
training of trainers are needed.  These require a stable environment and funding 
beyond the immediate learning requirements of individual firms.  Furthermore, 
medium-term planning is required to meet the higher level of skills demands of the 
economy which take time to develop.  All these factors suggest that while training 
systems are becoming more responsive to industry’s immediate skills needs, it is 
important to maintain and develop “supply-side” capacity through institutions which 
enjoy a reasonable level of stable funding’ (DoL, 1997: 15). 
The Green Paper made a stern commitment to the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
labour market information in relation to vocational training and skills development.  It 
advocated using strategically positioned institutions within the national skills development 
arena (firms, sector intermediaries, education and training provider institutions, the National 
Skills Authority, the National Skills Fund, the South African Qualifications Authority) to 
manage and oversee the process.  A unique manifestation of the skills generated from the 
skills development system would be embodied in learnerships which would bridge formal 
work experience with theoretically infused learning.  Learnerships would give preparation in 
technical or specialist skills as well as business skills (DoL, 1997: 35).   The learnership 
ultimately was a recognised qualification.  The various parts of the skills development system 
which fuses cooperation between workplaces, educational and training providers, learners 
themselves coupled with the strategic developmental needs of the country as a whole, would 
be supported by a process of sectoral intermediaries and national coordination.  Running 
virtually parallel to the process which contributed to the formulation of the Green Paper on 
Skills Development was a much more complicated and contentious process of the 
certification and accreditation of learning outcomes on the NQF which gave substance to 
learnership qualifications (Lugg, 2007: 207).  These debates informed the framing of 
learnerships as articulated through the Green Paper. 
 
This is the crux of my interest in the Green Paper: essentially the question of coordination of 
institutional participation and delivery through defined outcomes in the national skills 
development system.  The manner in which the entire process is financed is also important.  
As will be shown, the financing of the skills development system in South Africa is through a 
national levy grant system.  There are clear policy continuities between the NTB/NEDLAC 
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Study and the Green Paper, particularly in respect of the choice of a national levy-grant 
system which is depicted as preferable. 
 
Apart from proposing the replacement of Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) with a new body 
that would be responsible for sectoral intermediation and coordination between firms, 
learners, education and training providers and aligning the activities of these socially defined 
collective categories with the requirements of the sector, room was provided for a system of 
national coordination.  It was thought that this would give the process strategic direction.  
Thus the Green Paper averred: 
‘The achievement of the objectives of this strategy requires that current arrangements 
at the national level be restructured.  The current National Training Board (NTB), 
established under the Manpower Training Act (No. 56 of 1981, amended 1990), has 
research and advisory powers only.  It has insufficient status and authority to exercise 
the functions required to significantly improve the status, profile and effectiveness of 
skills development in the country.  It is therefore proposed that the NTB be 
restructured to form a National Skills Authority (NSA).  This Authority will have 
much stronger advisory powers than the old National Training Board, giving industry, 
community representatives and other government departments a much stronger voice 
and influence over skills development in the country.  In particular, these 
constituencies will play a critical role in ensuring that education and training is 
relevant to industry and development needs, that it is of high quality and that its 
impact on social and economic growth improves meaningfully.  The proposal for 
establishing the NSA is accompanied by new functions of the Department of Labour, 
to support the implementation of the new strategy, all under the authority of the 
Minister of Labour’ (DoL, 1997: 60). 
The approach which the Green Paper recommended with respect to funding was ‘guided by 
the need to mobilise adequate resources for education and training and to establish 
institutional capacity and incentives which support high quality, relevant and cost-effective 
education and training’ (DoL, 1997: 64).  It was envisaged that a funding partnership that 
involved employers, workers, individual students and society at large was ‘necessary and 
appropriate to realise the objectives of the new strategy’ (DoL, 1997: 64).   
 
The Green Paper contained a number of proposals which were eventually mirrored in the 
legislation on a national levy grant system in South Africa.  These will be briefly considered 
here. 
 
A premise to the logic for the funding of skills development in industry which the Green 
Paper held was that it was ‘appropriate for the private sector to bear its fair share of the costs 
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of training’ (DoL, 1997: 67).  It was therefore imperative for the private sector to support 
education and training that was directly linked to enterprises and industries.  At the same 
time, the provision of grants ‘act as incentives for enterprises to train’ particularly in areas of 
strategic skills needs.  To buttress the position that it favoured in relation to levy grant 
schemes the Green Paper declared: 
‘It is proposed that grants be funded by a private sector levy on payroll supported by a 
clearly defined fiscal contribution.  A levy/grant scheme is an efficient mechanism to 
the extent that those that pay the levy are able to benefit directly by claiming the grant 
to compensate them for costs incurred while training in defined areas.  Where levy 
grant schemes are managed at sectoral level, investment in industry-wide prioritised 
skills requirements can also be levered with grants’ (DoL, 1997: 67). 
Throughout the analysis provided by the Green Paper, firms and industries were treated as 
passive actors.  The real actors given priority was primarily government and secondarily, 
training providers.  Essentially the Green Paper held the view that government leverage 
through a levy grant scheme would result in predictable behaviour from firms.  In their quest 
to access the grant, firms would be confronted with ‘conditions that they are required to meet’ 
(DoL, 1997: 67) and would succumb to leverage.  Essentially, leverage as conceived under 
this perspective works on the premise that if you take money away from firms and then 
subsequently present them with an opportunity to retrieve some of the money which was 
taken away, like greedy capitalists they will dart at what is offered so that they can get the 
money.  The conception works on the premise that capitalist firms are by nature avaricious.  
As Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain (1977 & 1978) argued such considerations are plagued 
by essentialist arguments.  Consequently the method of leverage that was proposed in the 
Green Paper was perceived to have wider application: 
‘It can also be used to expand structured entry level education and training – which is 
proposed.  The levy/grant scheme also provides the means to establish or transform 
the infrastructure required to support improvements in enterprise training and to 
establish linkages between individual learners, training providers and industry.  The 
scheme also supports a growing and competitive provider market due to increasing 
enterprise demand for a diverse range of training requirements’ (DoL, 1997: 67). 
Because firms will pay and contribute to the levy grant scheme, the authors of the Green 
Paper believed that whatever they choose to do, their actions will have a positive impact on 
the skills development process.  With the leverage imposed on firms by the levy, firms who 
had not previously undertaken enterprise training will subsequently do so in order to recoup 
their levy contributions.  Firms that are not moved to recoup their levy contributions are 
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essentially leaving monies behind which the industry can deploy for skills development 
purposes.  The incentive for firms was perceived in the proportion of the levy contributions 
that could be recouped for training undertaken.  The Green Paper advanced its argument with 
assurance and certainty: 
‘Such a scheme will not obstruct behaviour on the part of firms.  Those firms that are 
training at competitive levels will continue to do so with the added requirement that 
they must access their levy contributions through the grant mechanism.  Companies 
that are not training, or are training at very low levels, will be induced to raise their 
skills development levels in order to recoup their levy contributions.  Should they 
decide not to do so, however, they will be contributing to a general rise in the skill 
profile of their industry, thereby ensuring a fair distribution of education and training 
costs and benefits within the industry’ (DoL, 1997: 67-68). 
On the basis of the above arguments, the Green Paper proposed that a national payroll levy to 
fund industry based training in South Africa should be established.  The proposal was for a 
80%:20% split in the total levy revenue that would be collected.  The larger proportion of 
80% would be allocated to sector based training and would tentatively form part of Sectoral 
Development Funds that would be managed by Sector Education Training Organisations 
(SETOs) (the designation eventually adopted was Sector Education and Training Authorities 
or abbreviated as SETAs).  The balance of 20% of total levy revenue would be assigned to a 
National Skills Fund which the Green Paper suggested would be used to ‘fund training 
targeted at priority skill needs within industry, which are identified by government and the 
National Skills Authority’ (DoL, 1997: 68). 
 
The Sectoral Development Funds, which the SETAs would manage were in turn to be 
disaggregated into two forms of training: enterprise training and learnership training.  The 
Green Paper described the two forms of training as follows: Enterprise training was ‘where 
companies will be able to access training grants to reimburse part or all of the costs of their 
training, subject to certain conditions set by the Minister of Labour on the advice of the 
National Skills Authority’ (DoL, 1997: 69).  Learnership training was that ‘which the SETOs 
will develop and manage themselves, again subject to certain conditions’ (DoL, 1997: 69). 
 
Conditions or criteria were set at different junctures for the allocation of funding from the 
national revenue collection agency (South African Revenue Services) to the Sector Education 
and Training Authorities.  These in turn would impose conditions and criteria on firms.  Let 
us observe some of this thinking which the Green Paper adumbrates and which we must 
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remember was incorporated with only minor modifications as will be shown subsequently in 
the legislation that supported the new skills development strategy.  In respect of SETAs, 
conditions and criteria were set for the submission of annual training plans: 
‘In order to access their funds, SETOs must first develop broad annual training plans 
reflecting industry skills priorities in their sector.  This serves to ensure that SETOs 
are abreast of these priorities and are therefore capable of making effective allocative 
decisions when disbursing funds and that they are in a position to support training 
within their sector’ (DoL, 1997: 69). 
The Green Paper even had the boldness to specify the process which had to be followed in 
practice between the SETAs (or SETOs) and the Department of Labour and the Minister of 
Labour.  This is how it was spelt out in the Green Paper: 
‘Process: Training plans should be submitted to the Department of Labour which will 
process the plans, and submit a consolidated report with recommendations to the 
National Skills Authority.  The National Skills Authority will consider the report from 
the Department and make recommendations regarding the approval of SETO plans to 
the Minister.  Once the Minister has approved the plans, SETOs can access their 
portion of sectoral levy revenue.  The process will follow strict time guidelines’ (DoL, 
1997: 69-70). 
A further set of criteria was set to govern the disbursement of funds from SETAs: 
‘SETOs must allocate levy funds according to criteria set by the Minister of Labour 
on the advice of the National Skills Authority’. 
‘It is proposed that SETO disbursement of levy funds be through a number of training 
schemes which are approved by the Minster of Labour, on the advice of the National 
Skills Authority.  Each scheme will set out certain criteria that must be met in order 
for funds to be accessed.  The Minister should have the power to alter these schemes 
to meet changing conditions’ (DoL, 1997: 70). 
 
In addition to the conditions and criteria described above, the Green Paper also proposed 
various training schemes which were partially incorporated into the legislation as well as the 
first instalment of the National Skills Development Strategy of 2001 to 2005 (NSDS l).  
These schemes encompassed the following: the enterprise training scheme, the small 
enterprise training support scheme, the enterprise training plan support scheme and the 
learnership scheme.  With the exception of the enterprise training plan support scheme which 
was specified as a condition for firms to receive a first tranche of mandatory grant benefits 
for firms that successfully completed and submitted a Workplace Skills Plan (WSP) at a 
specified date during each training year, the remaining training schemes were partially 
201 
 
incorporated as one of the five strategic objectives under the NSDS 1.  Strategic objectives 
that related directly to internal enterprise training tended to be financed through the 
mandatory grant allocation.  Strategic objectives that were more inclined to national 
objectives (e.g. learnership targets or small enterprise training support), were more likely to 
be financed by discretionary fund allocations.  I will discuss the structure of the levy in more 
detail, further below.  These schemes gradually evolved into the strategic objectives of NSDS 
1. 
 
Finally, the Green Paper also recognised the importance which the then technical colleges 
held in respect of supporting the generation of the country’s mid-to-high level technical skills 
(DoL, 1997: 77).  The Green Paper alluded to the difficulty which graduates ‘from these 
institutions’ often had of not being able ‘to find placements in industry’ (DoL, 1997: 77).  
The Green Paper suggested that the proposed learnership system and a revised funding 
mechanism for technical colleges could resolve the problem.  As the Green Paper noted: 
‘…additional general public revenue for skills development is unlikely, and a portion 
of the technical college budget could legitimately constitute a part of government’s 
contribution to funding the structured learning component of the learnership.  This 
link between the learnership and technical colleges will,  however, depend on the 
technical colleges improving the quality and relevance of their outcomes in relation to 
industry’ (DoL, 1997: 77-78). 
But typically whenever the Green Paper advanced what was purported to be a solution, a 
further set of bureaucratic loops and hurdles were set in motion and had to be navigated with 
new conditions and criteria which was intended to cultivate the necessary leverage that was 
referred to earlier: 
‘These linkages’ [between employers and technical colleges] could be achieved by 
earmarking a certain percentage of the technical college budget for learnerships and 
requiring that the money only be released once a college has entered into a SETO-
registered learnership contract with an employer and learner.  This proportion of the 
budget could be retained within Provincial Education Departments (forcing 
competition between technical colleges across provinces), or placed in the proposed 
National Skills Fund (possibly with access opened up to other providers as 
well)’(DoL, 1997: 78). 
With respect to the employer-technical college linkage the Green Paper placed a high 
premium on the importance of work experience.  ‘Structured practical components, in a 
workshop or simulated workplace, may also be included (but may not replace work 
experience)’(DoL, 1997: 27).  A technical college is however structurally bifurcated between 
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the provision of theoretical training and workshop simulated training.  Historically, the entire 
problem with the placement of graduates from a technical college to a workplace was the 
crucial exposure to workshop simulated training.  In some industries such as the Furniture 
Industry, industry-based training centres attempted to retain the relationship between learning 
and work experience for apprentices (See Gamble, 2004: 31).  Where there was only 
theoretical instruction without workshop simulated training of a prerequisite duration, the 
technical college graduate battled to find a placement in formal employment.  Where the 
opposite prevailed and theoretical instruction was followed up with the prerequisite workshop 
simulated training, the technical college graduates were snapped up by employers.  This was 
not only unique to technical colleges
46
.  Trainees attached to Skill Centres would have had 
similar experiences.  Similar evidence was confirmed through fieldwork which I conducted in 
Pretoria and Cape Town in 2002 and 2003 (Lundall, 2002; National Access Consortium 
Western Cape, 2003; Gamble, 2004: 33-34). 
 
Indeed this was also shown in international experience particularly at workshops associated 
with Della Vos in imperial Russia (John Schenck, 1984; Bennett, 1937: 46-47; Greinert, 
2005: 48-50).  At the time the Green Paper was being written in 1997, proposals were being 
advanced for consolidation and reform of the technical college sector (DoE, 1997) The 
workshop simulated training programmes at technical colleges during this period was 
uneven: some were still of a very high quality and provided relatively useful entry level 
technical skills to employers; other workshop simulated training programmes had started to 
decline in quality (Lundall, 2002). 
 
While the motivation for the particular distribution in money collected through a national 
skills levy was quite insightful, the administrative and procedural conditions and criteria for 
levy funds to be deployed and put to actual use second-guessed employer intentions towards 
enterprise training.  It treated them as passive agents.  It was less concerned about creating a 
balanced incentive for employers and more concerned to maintain leverage and through it – 
control. 
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 Research by third-year under-graduate students that I taught at the University of Cape Town in 2011 showed 
this applied even in low skilled occupations.  The example cited was the Salesian Training Centre in Green 
Point, Cape Town which operated under the auspices of the Catholic Church and put a high emphasis on civic 
discipline and the importance of manual labour.  It had a waiting list of employers who sought to employ 
trainees that had completed courses in brick-laying and cooking. 
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When the Green Paper was released for public comment in 1997, there was not much debate 
on the issues of funding.  Debate focussed more on the approach to political economy which 
underpinned it.  This issue was raised mainly by left-wing critics.  There was the complaint 
that the Green Paper was trying to ‘balance demand-led with supply-side measures’, and it 
was argued instead that what was required was a skills development strategy that would ‘curb 
the logic of the market’ (Vally, 1997: 88).  Melanie Samson (1997) at the time working in the 
same Wits-EPU as Vally, claimed that the Green Paper was, ‘neo-liberalising skills’.  Kraak 
on the other hand defended the Green Paper for setting conditions for tighter coordination 
which were a better incentive to firms: 
‘A new industry learning culture will require policy coordination across education and 
training, labour market, science and technology and industrial policies, with a view to 
creating a favourable set of incentives for companies to make the shift to a higher-
skill mentality’ (Kraak, 1997: 78). 
According to Kraak, for this process to take place successfully it was essential to recognise 
the importance of developing a stable and sustainable education and training infrastructure.  
As he put it: 
‘The creation of a high-quality training system requires “a stable infrastructure to both 
support a competitive training market and to provide more technically advanced 
capabilities which have long lead times and require substantial investments in plant, 
equipment and technology” – qualities not delivered in the short term through market 
considerations alone.  “Medium-term planning is required to meet the higher level 
skill demands of the economy which take time to develop … while training systems 
are becoming more responsive to industry’s immediate skills needs, it is important to 
maintain and develop ‘supply-side’ capacity through institutions which enjoy a 
reasonable level of stable funding”’(Kraak, 1997: 79-80). 
Kraak ’s defense increased the public’s understanding of the emerging skills development 
system.  While difficult to understand all the conditions and criteria and the nooks and 
crannies which the Green Paper contained, it also legitimized the policy stance that the Green 
Paper took and vanquished most critics to the status of bystanders. 
 
From the paper trail of responses to the Green Paper captured and preserved in the public 
electronic domain, the voices of employers and employer associations appear muted.  It is 
possible that a more robust position was articulated within employer associations and 
circulated exclusively among members.  This has however not been indicated through the 
public record.  However, considering the persistence of left-wing critique against the 1997 
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Green Paper on Skills (e.g. Vally (1997); Kgobe (1997) & Samson (1997)), one would be 
given the impression that it was the most profound gift of manna to have fallen from the 
heavens which the ANC government was presenting to employers to institute an employer-
centric skills development training system in South Africa.  Such damnation from the left-
wing may have disarmed the employers into believing that the new revolutionary skills 
dispensation which the government boasted about, was indeed manna from heaven. 
 
The Green Paper was soon followed by legislation regulating skills development and the 
collection and distribution of monies derived from a national levy grant system in South 
Africa.  The legislative and regulative requirements of the skills development system in South 
Africa is examined in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
7.3 The Structure and Operation of a National Levy Grant 
System in South Africa 
A set of enabling legislation first had to be promulgated before a national levy grant system 
could be established in South Africa.  The first component of this legislation established the 
institutions that were necessary for a national levy grant system to become operational.  The 
second component related to legislation concerning the size of levy collections as a 
percentage, its distribution through different pools of funding (referred to in South Africa as 
funding windows) and the regulations that governed it. 
7.3.1  Prescriptions in the Skills Development Act of 1998 
The Skills Development Act of 1998 (No. 97) established the core institutions designed to 
promote skills development in South Africa.  Apart from establishing the institutional and 
financial framework for skills development, the Skills Development Act of 1998 set out the 
powers and functions these core institutions (i.e. the National Skills Authority, the National 
Skills Fund, the levy scheme itself, SETAs etc.) possessed.  The Skills Development Act also 
clearly specified transitional provisions for institutions and programmes that had been 
cultivated and established under the Manpower Training Act (MTA).  These transitional 
provisions specifically referred to the National Training Board
47
, the Manpower 
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, the winding up and incorporation of ITBs into a designated SETA and 
the eventual replacement of apprenticeship programmes with learnership programmes. 
 
The Skills Development Act of 1998 did not make provision for apprenticeship training.  
There was the tacit understanding that learnership training would ultimately displace 
apprenticeship training.  Learnership training had a dual combination consisting of a 
structured learning component and a practical work experience component which together 
constituted a qualification.  The learnership model was seen to be superior and more modern 
to the apprenticeship model.  The Skills Development Act therefore made provision for 
learnerships.  Learnerships would result in the award of a qualification. 
 
Skills Programmes were the units that made up a learnership and could be acquired during 
shorter blocks of learning and training time.  An appropriate combination of skills 
programmes could efficiently be tailored for the requisite credits to be eventually assembled 
into a learnership qualification. 
 
While the Skills Development Act did not make provision for apprenticeship training, the Act 
contained transitional provisions for all apprenticeship contracts that were already under way, 
to be completed and regulated by invoking provisions of the Manpower Training Act of 1981 
(amended in 1990).  Thus, the specific clauses of the MTA regulating apprenticeship training, 
specifically training which had already been initiated through apprenticeship contracts, would 
continue to be regulated by the MTA.  These provisions were to remain in force ‘until a date 
determined by the Minister [of Labour] by notice in the Gazette’ (Skills Development Act, 
Schedule Two, 4(5)).  Immediately after this gazette date had ostensibly been made, any 
contract of apprenticeship registered under section 18 of the MTA, would be deemed to be a 
learnership agreement, registered in terms of section 17(3) of the Skills Development Act 
(SDA, Schedule Two 4(6b).  But the date to be determined by the Minister was never set and 
was therefore not published in the Government Gazette.  Instead, the specific clauses of the 
MTA were again invoked in the Skills Development Amendment Act of 2003 ‘as if that Act 
[MTA] had not been repealed until a date determined by the Minister by notice in the 
Gazette’(RSA, 2003: para.25(a)). 
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 All the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of the Manpower Development Fund was to be transferred to 
the National Skills Fund. 
206 
 
This indecisiveness on the part of the Minister of Labour to rescind the apprenticeship 
requirements under the MTA however did not at first unambiguously establish the 
apprenticeship route to a skilled intermediate occupation as one which coexisted in parallel 
with a skilled occupational route through learnership training.  Later, after JIPSA was 
established in 2006 (discussed further in section 7.33 of this chapter) and critique began 
being levelled at the DoL and the NSA for pursuing policies which retarded the uptake of 
apprenticeship contracts, the Minister of Labour and the senior public servants at the DoL 
responsible for the implementation of the skills development strategy eluded responsibility 
for this by saying that the MTA provisions regulating apprenticeship training in South Africa 
was never rescinded.  This meant that the criticism levelled against the Minister of Labour, 
the DoL and the NSA was misguided.  Technically on matters of fact, they were correct.  
Since the provisions of the MTA regulating apprenticeship training remained on the statute 
book, the DoL continued its regulatory oversight over these statutes.  In June 2002, the then 
Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana issued a notice in the Government Gazette 
designating trades and prescribing conditions of apprenticeship for the Diamond and Jewel 
Setting and the Precious Metal Working and Mounting Trades (Department of Labour, 2002).  
Nonetheless on matters of policy, this response evaded responsibility for policy confusion 
which emanated directly from the Ministry and was conveyed by the DoL. 
 
This policy ambiguity towards apprenticeships training was generally supported by other 
representatives in government and state agencies serving on the NSA.  Though less grounded 
in the merits of the existing transitional provisions, the position that gave positive 
endorsement to learnership training coupled with a negative posture towards apprenticeship 
training was entrenched among a majority of labour and community constituency members 
on the NSA
49
.  Resistance on this matter was stronger within the business consistency on the 
NSA.  However, members of this constituency may have gradually become muted once the 
debate had been lost in favour of the learnership route as a pathway for the training of the 
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 Between 2005 and 2007 when I served on the NSA as a resource person to assist the community constituency 
with policy capacity support on matters of skills development I observed this personally and persuaded my 
community constituency colleagues that the position was definitely incorrect.  At the time of my association 
with the NSA, since the NSDS ll Strategy had not yet been finalised, and until it was (April 2006), the Strategy 
and Indicators used under NSDS1 continued to shape discussion and deliberation on the NSA.  The Community 
Constituency chairperson on the NSA, Mzoli Toni listened attentively to my argument and worked to facilitate a 
working group at the NSA to deal with the matter of formulating and presenting the Authority with arguments 




intermediate and craft layers of the labour force
50
.  Soon after the promulgation of the Skills 
Development Act in 1998, the attention and momentum shifted to the levy grant instruments 
in the Skills Levies Act which was promulgated six months later at the end of April 1999. 
 
The Skills Development Act gave impetus to the design, construction and operation of the 
institutions that constitute the South African Skills Development System.  The principle 
mechanism through which the entire system is financed is through a levy-grant system that is 
made possible by the Skills Development Levies Act.  The skills development levy is 
designed as a deduction to finance enterprise training.  It is calculated as a proportion of the 
annual payroll costs of firms and business enterprises.  In this thesis the levy serves as a 
crucial instrument to direct and increase the leverage on enterprises and firms towards more 
extensive and intensive involvement in the training and skills development of employees and 
the workforce.  One can measure the degree of enterprise coordination and enterprise 
regulation through the implementation of the skills development levy.  Before we proceed to 
discuss the shifts in grant levy policy, I start by first discussing the core prescriptions in the 
Skills Development Levies Act. 
7.3.2 Prescriptions in the Skills Development Levies Act of 1999 
The notion of a levy calculated on aggregate payroll costs of employers which had already 
been accepted under the Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy (which I discussed 
earlier in this chapter), was put into operation through the Skills Development Levies Act, 
No. 9 of 1999.  The Skills Development Levies Act
51
 set the percentage contribution to the 
payroll levy that would be collected from employers from the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS).  Importantly, it also defined the distribution of aggregate monies that was 




By and large, adhering to the recommendations of the Green Paper, the distribution 
breakdown of the skills levy was set as the following: 
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 This is the impression that I got from my conversations with Janet Lopez who at the time was a business 
representative on the NSA and was associated with the Steel Engineering Employers Association of South 
Africa (SEIFSA).  An interview conducted later by Lugg (2007: 241) with another employer representative from 
the NSA appears to suggest that these different positions may also have been infused with complex racial and 
class dynamics. 
51
 Typically abbreviated as SLA. 
52
 Each financial and training year ranged from 1 April of a current year to the 31
st
 of March of the succeeding 
year, a period consistent with the financial year cycle of most public sector entities in South Africa. 
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20% was allocated to the National Skills Fund; 
80% was allocated to the SETAs.  Each SETA received its share in accordance with 
the number of levy contributors – mostly formal sector firms and enterprises – that 
were under its sectoral jurisdiction. 
 
The 80% of the skills levy is distributed into two pools. 
 
One pool amounting to 10% of the overall skills levy is dedicated to cover the administration 
costs of SETA activities.  While in the aggregate this amounts to 10% of the overall levy, if 
one excludes the allocation that is made to the National Skills Fund, it is in fact equivalent to 
an administration cost of 12.5% (i.e. 10/80 x 100).  It is for this reason that the DoL, 
periodically reiterated in regulations and notices that the administration costs of SETAs was 
not to exceed 12.5%. 
‘A SETA may in terms of section 14(3)(b) of the Act [Skills Development Act] not 
use more than 12.5% of the moneys it receives in terms of the Skills Development 
Levies Act to pay for its administration costs’(DoL, 2001: para.3(1)). 
 
The other pool amounting to 70% was earmarked for skills development and was spread 
between two types of grants: mandatory and discretionary grants.  From 2000, until the end 
of NSDS 2, in March 2012, the percentage of the overall skills levy which was allocated to 
each of these grants remained constant
53
.  Thus, 50% of the overall skills levy was for 
mandatory grant disbursements of which contributing levy paying firms were the sole 
recipients.  The remaining balance of 20% was earmarked for discretionary grant and project 
disbursements.  Discretionary grants could be awarded to employers as well as ‘education 
and training providers and workers,’ that ‘submitted an application for a discretionary 
grant’(DoL, 2001, para. 6(3)(b)).  Such grants could be awarded for projects, programmes 
and research activities that were perceived to support the implementation of the sector skills 
plan that each SETA had developed (DoL, 2001: Skills Development Regulations: 
Guidelines, para.4). 
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 A high court ruling in 2015 in the matter of Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) versus the NSA and the 
SETAs has resulted in the original 50%:20% mandatory versus discretionary allocation to the national skills 
development levy in South Africa being upheld.  The original levy grant distribution ratios will again be in force 
from 1
st
 April 2016. At the time of writing, a Labour Court judgement on the matter with potential challenges 
from the applicant (BUSA) and respondents on the matter (DHET, NSA and NSA) was still pending. 
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For the purposes of capturing the administrative and procedural requirements to the 
Guidelines accompanying the initial set of regulations to the Skills Development Act and the 
Skills Levies Act, which is what firms intending to apply for grants would confront, there is 
some merit in tracing and describing the process in more detail.  What were employers 
required to do in order to access either mandatory or discretionary grants?  As a start, only 
employers who were up-to-date with the payment of the skills levy could apply and lodge a 
claim for skills grants from their SETA.  The 2001 Skills Development Regulations indicated 
that there were six grants from which employers could claim.  If they were applying for 
mandatory grants, they could make two grant applications.  If they were applying for 
discretionary grants, they could make four grant applications (DoL, 2001: Skills 
Development Regulations: Guidelines, para.5). 
 
As was indicated earlier the mandatory grant allowed employers to claim back up to 50% of 
their annual contribution to the skills levy.  Mandatory grant receipts to employers depended 
on specific deliverables.  The Guidelines were meant to be just that.  Later, many SETAs 
modified the guidelines to suit their own sectors.  However in following the more generic 
2001 Guidelines, one would be given a flavor of the process that employers confronted.  The 
two mandatory grant applications from which employers could receive disbursements was 
first for the completion of a workplace skills plan and second for the satisfactory completion 
and submission of a workplace skills implementation report.  Where the application of a 
workplace skills plan was submitted on time and correctly, the employer would receive a 
percentage of the total levy paid (DoL, 2001: Skills Development Regulations: Guidelines, 
para.7).  The remainder was paid in varying proportions for a number of further submissions 
including on submission of the workplace skills implementation report to the designated 
SETA.  Citing skills development regulations that were issued a year earlier in 2000
54
 a 
SAQA discussion document listed the payment structure of mandatory grant disbursements 
that employers were assured.  These were listed as follows: 
‘15% (Grant A) on the appointment of a skills development facilitator and the 
submission of the name of this person; 
10% (Grant B) on submission of a workplace skills plan; 
20% (Grant C) on submission of a report on the implementation of the skills plan; 
5% (Grant D) for the implementation of specific skills initiatives recommended by the 
SETA’ (SAQA, 2002: 3). 
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 The 2000 Skills Development Regulation were applicable until the 21
st
 of June 2001 when the new 
regulations of 22 June 2001 came into effect. 
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It appears that the Skills Development Regulations issued in 2001 made provision for two 
additional forms to be submitted to the designated SETA by employers as part of the 
mandatory grant application process
55
.  The first of these forms [Form for Regulation 
6(1)(a)] was a Workplace Skills Plan (WSP).  It required a restatement of the list of 
educational and training priorities ranked by NQF levels on the further and higher education 
bands.  It also required a numerical tabulation of the beneficiaries of skills priorities by 
population group and occupational category at the one digit level of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system (e.g. professionals, technicians, skilled workers etc.).  Under the 
section eliciting open-ended replies on the development and consultative processes, there 
were four questions.  In order of sequence these were as follows: 
 ‘Describe the processes used to develop the workplace skills plan. 
 How does the plan relate to the organisation’s Employment Equity Plan? 
  If a Skills Development Committee has been established, please outline its 
composition.  Was the draft plan reviewed and considered by the Committee? 
 If no Committee exists, please outline the steps taken to consult employees about 
the workplace skills plan.’(DoL, 2001: Skills Development Regulations: 
Annexure A, section A4). 
 
A similar procedure was required in the second form [Form for Regulation 6(1)(b)] from 
employers that was referred to as a workplace skills report: it eventually became known as 
the Annual Training Report (ATR).  As with the WSP, for the ATR, employers had to 
provide a list of education and training programmes that were provided by the enterprise, 
ranked by NQF levels on the further and higher education bands.  A corresponding tabulation 
of education and training programmes provided (i.e. priorities) by population group and 
occupational category.  This was followed by four questions similar to that shown above but 
with reference to the implementation of the workplace skills plan.  Thereafter in both 
instances the form had to be authorized with witness signatures and signatures of 
employer/management and ‘workforce’ representatives.  This is how the Workplace Skills 
Report (WSR later known as the ATR) was described in the Skills Development Regulation 
Guidelines of 2001: 
‘Employers who are up-to-date with their levy payments can claim a grant from the 
appropriate SETA if they submit a report each year on the implementation of their 
workplace skills plan before the date stipulated by the SETA.  The form of this report 
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 The Forms (i.e. both the WSP and the ATR) were gradually improved over the years, with the questions asked 
below being discarded on later versions. 
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is Annexure B of the Regulations, but a SETA is able to modify this to take account 
of sector differences.  The implementation report is important to: 
 Employers and workers to assess the progress that is being made 
 SETAs, to review progress and problems and to assist employers, workers and 
the sectors as a whole to determine any additional support and advice that 
might be required 
 Government, to inform the monitoring of progress in addressing skills 
development priorities and in identifying any problems that might need to be 
addressed’ (DoL, 2001: Skills Development Regulations: Guidelines, para.20). 
Submission of the WSP led to employers receiving a proportion of the mandatory grant.  
Only after accomplishing some of the education and training priorities on the WSP as well as 
completing and submitting an ATR did the employer qualify for receipts of mandatory grant 
disbursements from the SETA.  In both the Green Paper and in subsequent policy documents 
that emerged from the Department of Labour it was argued that employers who do not 
engage in training also benefit because more money will be available for those that do 
training.  This is how it was put in one of the documents that formed part of the Leadership 
Pack at the time the first NSDS was launched: 
‘The employers who benefit pay.  All employers who pay R250 000
56
 or more in 
monthly wages and salaries or who pay income tax must pay the levy.  Employers 
who use a skills development facilitator and who make and implement a workplace 
skills plan can claim money back.  This is an incentive, or reward, which encourages 
employers to provide training for their employees.  Employers who do not organise 
training also benefit because there are more people with skills in the labour market.  
From April 2001 there will also be an incentive for employers who take part in 
learnerships or skills programmes’(DoL, 2001a: 36). 
Employer contributions to the levy that were not claimed through mandatory disbursements 
would automatically be transferred to the discretionary grant fund.  Since it went into a 
general SETA discretionary fund it could be awarded to all discretionary grant applicants.  
This was inferred as leverage from the state and its implementing agencies (SETAs) and an 
incentive on firms (employers).  It was however not a perspective which firms necessarily 
shared. 
 
The institutions of the skills development strategy armed with the appropriate statutes (acts 
and regulations) were constantly cultivating and coordinating the emergence of a successful 
skills development system.  Leverage was seen as being applied against potentially 
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 In April 2005 this minimum salary floor requiring employers to contribute to the skills development levy was 
raised to R500 000 (PL). 
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voluntarist agents (firms) who were presented with incentives (successful disbursement of 
mandatory and discretionary grants) that would elicit a more active and enthusiastic response 
from firms.  These were packaged in the form of ‘National Skills Development Strategies’ 
which were periodically monitored and critically evaluated at the end of each five-year cycle.  
The lessons learnt from failure in the institutions and the instruments led to revisions that 
were incorporated into the revised and renewed strategy. 
7.3.3 The Shift from NSDS l to NSDS lll and the status of the Skills 
Levy 
The promulgation of legislation in 1998 (Skills Development Act or SDA) and 1999 (Skills 
Levies Act or SLA) initiated the groundwork towards the demarcation of industries assigned 
to SETAs.  The process was formally completed in 1999 (DoL, 1999).  Twenty-five SETAs 
were originally established by the end of March 2000.  Some SETAs started afresh as 
completely new entities, while others which overlapped with the jurisdiction of ITBs also 
acquired the appropriate ITB/s which were dismantled and incorporated into the relevant 
SETA.  In the latter instance the new SETA inherited some material assets, some staff 
personnel, records and databases and an institutional memory which was potentially 
beneficial in navigating unchartered territory. 
 
The DoL in conjunction with the NSA and its stakeholders formulated a National Skills 
Development Strategy to cover the first five years of skills development and implementation 
in South Africa.  Due perhaps to a delay in formulating its content and delays in getting the 
SETAs up and running, NSDS l was released one year after the establishment of the twenty-
five SETAs.  Thus NSDS 1 spanned the four year period from 1 April 2001 to 31 March 
2005. 
 
NSDS l contained five objectives (see Appendix 1).  Although not specified as such, these 
objectives were all strategic objectives.  Each objective in turn contained targets or success 
indicators designed to measure the outcome of each objective.  Accompanying the objectives 
were twelve success indicators.  Equity considerations as informed by the Employment 
Equity Act (55 of 1998) also permeated and cut across all the strategic objectives and success 
indicators.  Under NSDS l these cross-cutting national equity targets were as follows: 
 85 per cent to be black 
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 54 per cent to be female 
 4 per cent to be people with disabilities. 
 
The design of the five objectives and twelve success indicators to NSDS l was quite elegant, 
particularly in relation to what was to follow under NSDS ll.  Ten of the success indicators 
made provision for clear quantitative measurement targets to the indicators that could be 
generated using external statistical sources or through surveys or tracer studies of internally 
assembled source material.  Only two indicators, one which promised a precise target with 
the agreement of the SETA made use of a qualitative measurement.  These two exceptions 
were the following: 
Success Indicator (2.3): By March 2005, learnerships are available to workers in 
every sector (Precise targets will be agreed with each Sector Education and Training 
Authority) (NSDS l) 
 
Success Indicator (4.1): By March 2003, 100 per cent of the National Skills Fund 
apportionment to social development is spent on viable development projects (NSDS 
l). 
 
Under NSDS l, three success indicators (2.3; 5.1 & 5.2) made a direct reference to 
learnerships.  None of the twelve success indicators mentioned ‘apprenticeships’.  Typically, 
since all twelve indicators were outcome indicators, the measurement of the progress of these 
under NSDS was through an evaluation by outside agencies and contractors. 
 
The increase in the payroll threshold for firms that were required to contribute to the skills 
development levy from R250 000 under NSDS l to R500 000 under NSDS ll was highly 
significant.  It benefitted small firms and it corresponded with the government rhetoric to 
support small firms in the country.  However, as the data of the Department of Labour 
showed (Kraak, 2008: 6, Table 4) it led to a 79% decline in the number of firms participating 
in the NSDS with only a marginal impact on levy income.  While there would have been a 
growth in the number of firms above the payroll threshold who had not previously been levy 
contributors that were now paying six months after the new thresholds were set, the 
percentage increase in levy income received by the SETAs actually increased by 9.4% 
(Kraak, 2008, ibid).  One can only imagine that a 79% decrease in the submission of WSPs 
and other compliance documents from small firms would have freed up a huge amount of 




NSDS ll had a similar structure to NSDS l: it contained five objectives (see Appendix 2).  But 
the content and specification of the objectives had changed.  NSDS ll also experienced an 
expansion in the number of success indicators from twelve under NSDS l to twenty.  An 
innovation for NSDS ll was the introduction of ‘levers’ which accompanied each success 
indicator.  Each lever served as an instrument to facilitate the successful achievement of the 
success indicator.  To illustrate, Success Indicator 2.8 was defined as follows: 
‘By March 2010, at least 125 000 workers assisted to enter and at least 50% 
successfully complete programmes, including learnerships and apprenticeships, 
leading to basic entry, intermediate and high level scarce skills.  Impact of assessment 
is measured’ (NSDS ll). 
The lever accompanying Success Indicator 2.8 above was referred to as Success Lever 2.8 
and had the following scope: 
‘SETA discretionary grants to include 18(1) grants for learnerships, bursary grants, 
internship grants and study support to learners acquiring basic entry, intermediate and 
high level scarce skills identified as scarce in their sectors (NSDS ll). 
18(1) grants were specifically meant for those who were already engaged in employment 
when awarded the grant and remained so for the duration of the grant. 
 
Importantly, NSDS ll had discarded the absolutist ‘repudiation’ of apprenticeships training 
which NSDS l embodied.  However, although as was noted above, there was a discernible 
increase in the number of success indicators under NSDS ll, it was associated with an even 
greater increase in ambiguous, vague or absent targets in eight of the twenty success 
indicators.  Statistically this amounts to 40%.  This would have been a challenge for the 
evaluators who ostensibly would have been contracted to evaluate the performance of NSDS 
ll against the indicators.  These were specifically for the following success indicators: 1.1; 
1.2; 2.4; 2.5; 2.6; 4.2; 5.3 and 5.4 (See Appendix 2). 
 
As an illustration, two success indicators which have a more visible bearing on the non-profit 
sector is given.  These read as follows: 
Success Indicator (2.5): ‘Annually increasing number of small BEE firms and BEE 
co-operatives supported by skills development.  Progress measured through an annual 
survey of BEE firms and BEE co-operatives within the sector from the second year 




Success Indicator (5.4): ‘By March 2010, there is an NSA constituency based 
assessment of an improvement in stakeholder capacity and commitment to the 
National Skills Development Strategy’ (NSDS ll). 
I have no knowledge whether external evaluation reports on the outcome of success 
indicators 2.5 and 5.4 were commissioned and produced for the DoL.  Unless produced by 
public research agencies such as the HSRC, such reports were for internal DoL and NSA use 
only. 
 
Thus, with NSDS ll, twelve success indicators contained clear measurable targets that could 
be evaluated at the end of the strategy.  But even here, the measure in the target was 
compromised by further conditional attributes which were not guaranteed by any 
measurement criteria.  Again, for illustrative purposes, both of these targets are reproduced 
below: 
Success Indicator (5.1): ‘By March 2010 each SETA recognizes and supports at least 
five Institutes of Sectoral or Occupational Excellence (ISOE) within public or private 
institutions and through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) where appropriate, spread 
as widely as possible geographically for the development of people to attain identified 
critical occupational skills, whose excellence is measured in the number of learners 
successfully placed in the sector and employer satisfaction ratings of their training’ 
(NSDS ll). 
And again: 
Success Indicator (5.2): ‘By March 2010, each province has at least two provider 
institutions accredited to manage the delivery of the new venture creation 
qualification.  70% of new ventures still operating after 12 months will be used as a 
measure of the institutions’ success’ (NSDS ll). 
Bearing in mind that outside the mandatory grants – the situation until the end of NSDS ll 
and for perhaps a period until new SETA funding regulations came into play (these were 
subsequently issued in December 2012 for implementation from April 2013
57
), all twenty 
success indicators would have been financed from SETA discretionary grants as well as from 
the National Skills Fund.  In theory, taking account of the 10% SETA administration fee, the 
funds needed to finance these NSDS activities to meet the requirements of the success 
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indicators that had been put into place would have been financed from the balance of 40% of 
the levies on employers (i.e. 20% discretionary fund plus 20% National Skills Fund). 
 
In a critical review of NSDS l in South Africa, Kraak (2008a) noted that after resolutions 
were passed at the Growth and Development Summit (GDS) in 2003 to tackle unemployment 
and poverty, there was a dramatic shift ‘away from a joint focus on employed and 
unemployed workers towards the prioritization of the training of unemployed youth’ (Kraak, 
2008: 14).  This clearly dented the demand-driven imperatives of NSDS l.  This trend 
however continued unabated under NSDS ll.  Of the five objectives to NSDS ll, only one 
categorically addressed training at the workplace (Objective 2 which stated ‘Promoting and 
accelerating training for all in the workplace’ (NSDS ll). 
 
Broadly, in terms of the needs and responsibilities of collective groups, the eight Success 
Indicators included under Objective 2 focused attention on employers (3 Success Indicators), 
government (1 Success Indicator) and citizens and employees (3 Success Indicators).  One 
indicator was concerned with achieving a national standard of good practice in skills 
development approved by the Minister of Labour (Success Indicator 2.4) had a more 
generalist ambit.  However, what is relevant to the discussion of policy towards payment of 
the skills levy in South Africa are the success indicators which dealt with private enterprises 
and firms in general and levy paying firms in particular.  Since the NSDS was a policy 
statement with respect to national skills policy, framed at the time through a strategy under 
the auspices of the DoL as the lead department in government, its orientation to different 
enterprise size cohorts is highly relevant.  A standard approach would embody a standardized 
incentive orientation whereas differentiation in the approach would exhibit a differential 
orientation to the incentive.  NSDS ll adopted a differentiated approach to firms.  A 
formalistic application of conditions was applied to large and medium-sized firms.  NSDS ll 
literally bent over backwards to accommodate small firms as well as non-levy paying 
emerging enterprises. 
 
Success Indicator 2.1 was tailored for large and medium sized firms and specifically stated: 
‘By March 2010 at least 80% of large firms’ and at least 60% of medium firms’ 
employment equity targets are supported by skills development.  Impact on overall 
equity profile assessed’ (NDSD ll). 
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Success Indicator 2.1 was supported by Lever 2.1.  It specified the requirements that large 
and medium sized firms had to comply with respect to annual WSP submissions.  From 2006 
WSPs were to be judged against the performance of the previous year’s WSP.  If this step 
was successful, then the full 50% mandatory grant according to Lever 2.1 would be paid to 
the large or medium sized firm in quarterly tranches.  However Lever 2.1 put a qualification 
on this 50% grant award by stating that: ‘Firms failing to meet the set criteria will 
automatically forfeit the WSP grant for the given financial year.  Forfeited grants will be 
transferred directly into SETA discretionary funds’ (NSDS ll).  This procedure within SETA 
circles popularly became known as ‘sweeping’. 
 
The Success Indicator which dealt with small levy paying firms had less onerous 
specifications least of which was a threat of forfeiture of levy income to SETA discretionary 
funds.  The Success Indicator for Small Firms (Success Indicator 2.2) had the following 
target: ‘By March 2010 skills development in at least 40% of small levy paying firms 
supported and the impact of the support measured’.  What was commendable about the 
indicator was a discernible level of support that would be given to small firms, albeit 40% of 
levy paying small firms which was the set target under the NSDS.  Small firms that qualified 
would indeed receive a high level of support from the relevant SETA: but small levy paying 
firms that did not qualify would find themselves also contributing against their wishes or 
‘knowledge’ to SETA discretionary fund accumulation.  The lever linked to the indicator 
(Lever 2.2) specified the following criteria for small levy paying firms: 
‘The SETA determines the best form of intervention and grant, such as WSP grants or 
or the provision of free courses.  40% of total population of small firms in sector to be 
reached by such initiatives is the target.  SETAs to spend at least 80% of the total levy 
income from small firms on the achievement of the indicator’ (NSDS ll). 
Finally, the Success Indicator (2.5) which dealt with small non-levy paying firms and 
enterprises was quite vague.  It suggested that the increasing number of BEE firms and BEE 
co-operatives supported by skills development would be measured through an annual survey 
of BEE firms and BEE co-operatives from the second year of NSDS ll.  Lever 2.5 contained 
few words merely stating ‘SETA discretionary grants’ (NSDS ll). 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to depict as accurately as possible the structure of the 





Although the DoL and the NSA were the strategic institutions driving the implementation of 
the NSDS, neither of these were at the forefront of the skills implementation process.  This 
responsibility fell onto the SETAs.  Unfortunately, the strategic leadership from the DoL and 
NSA was also weak, marred by acrimonious debates and struggles within the NSA.  Even 
before the NSDS had reached finality, a groundswell of disgruntlement had started to brew as 
a result of the slow pace of skills delivery which the SETAs had until then achieved.  The 
South African government therefore experimented with extra-administrative interventions 
that would accelerate the momentum of delivery in strategic fields on which a high growth 
rate was dependent. 
 
Launched in February 2006, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA) was a government growth programme designed to achieve an annual growth rate of 
6%.  Its interventions covered macroeconomic issues, infrastructure, education, skills, sector 
development strategies, challenges embedded in the ‘Second’ economy and issues related to 
governance and administration (also see McGrath & Akoojee, 2007).  The Joint Initiative on 
Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) was an initiative within AsgiSA to accelerate the 
provision of priority skills to meet AsgiSA objectives.  As the 2006 JIPSA annual report 
expressed the matter: 
‘JIPSA is thus an initiative that sets skills priorities in support of AsgiSA’s economic 
growth objectives.  It advises on aligning training and skills development efforts of 
the public and private sector with the objectives of AsgiSA, without undermining the 
development and implementation of longer HRD strategies’ (JIPSA, 2007: 7) 
JIPSA inaugurated an extensive research process that analysed the blockages and 
shortcomings of the key institutions of the skills development system in South Africa and 
particularly the SETAs.  It was a research jamboree which drew in a host of other players (e.g 
NEDLAC stakeholders i.e. business, labour and the state).  At the time, even among leading 
government officials, business and labour leaders serving on the NSA – JIPSA and not the 
NSA – was where the action was.  Many of the research reports that emerged out of this 
process, particularly that which was commissioned by the research consortium representing 
the HSRC, the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town and the 
Sociology of Work Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand analysed and put 
forward recommendations to resolve the skills crisis and the shortcomings of skills delivery 
institutions in South Africa (Grawitzky, 2007 & 2008; Marock et.al., 2008).  Many of these 
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analyses drew attention to issues of capacity, governance as well as goal and programme drift 
and expansion in the scope of SETAs.  None really dealt in any comprehensive manner with 
issues of the function of the skills levy.  Among its short-term recommendations however, the 
NEDLAC report suggested a reduction in the level of the mandatory grant (NEDLAC, 2007: 
37) but it did not elaborate further. 
 
What is presented above is merely a brief synopsis of the multiple initiatives to improve skills 
delivery and institutional functioning (particularly for SETAs) in South Africa.  It shifted 
public perception about the effectiveness of the DoL and its ancillary institutions in 
strategically managing the vaunted skills revolution about which Minister of Labour 
Membathisi Mdladlana periodically boasted.  The NSA and the Department of Labour were 
therefore confronted with providing a credible response that would avert the perception of 
institutional failure from it and its implementing agencies.  There was also a need to address 
the limitations embodied in the legislation.  Thus, it was under these conditions that new 
proposals to improve the regulatory system for skills provision in South Africa began to be 
discussed within the NSA.  This culminated in the promulgation of amendments to the Skills 
Development Act in 2008 which functioned as the bridge between NSDS ll and NSDS lll. 
 
The 2008 Skills Development Amendment Act introduced three significant new features to 
the legislative framework for skills development in South Africa.  First, it gave prominence to 
the establishment of a Provincial Skills Development Forum (PSDF) in each province.  The 
Act did not dictate the institutional form to the PSDF.  It left scope for interpretation to such 
an institutional form, but as is usually the practice from convention, these are normally 
shaped by departmental regulations and consultations between the national department 
(currently DHET) and provincial authorities responsible for implementing the spirit of the 
Act at a provincial level. 
 
Second, the Act attempted to reverse any inkling that the quality of artisan training in South 
Africa was in the doldrums.  Subtly, the Act was an abrogation of an earlier perception which 
the Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1998 cultivated where the new learnerships were 
favoured over apprenticeships.  Apprenticeships were seen to be less flexible.  The Skills 
Development Amendment Act of 2008 attempted to reverse this by assembling a more 
strenuous moderation process that would guarantee and uphold the quality of apprenticeship 
training.  This was to be done through the establishment of a national artisan moderation 
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body which was to be responsible for monitoring the performance of accredited artisan trade 
test centres as well as moderating the tests that would be devised to measure the competence 
of artisans.  The Amended Act further makes provision for artisans who have qualified as 
artisans as well as those working as artisans to be registered with the Department of Labour.  
The rigid separation which the SDA of 1998 promoted, between learnerships and 
apprenticeships, was curtailed under the 2008 amendment to the SDA.  Learnerships were 
now seen as a pathway and apprenticeships were recognized as an occupational designation.  
These distinctions were acknowledged in the secondary literature (see Kraak (2008a); Maree, 
Lundall & Godfrey (2009: 96-97)) 
 
Third, the Skills Development Amendment Act of 2008 made provision for the establishment 
of a Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO).  What the national artisan 
moderation body performed in relation to the occupations that were within the artisan 
occupational category was applied to all occupations that upheld general performance 
standards deemed appropriate for the work environment.  Linked to this is the regulation and 
approval by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) in terms of the National 
Qualifications Framework of all qualifications that are held or presented to individuals 
occupying or aspiring for positions within occupations that have a presence at the workplace.  
Thus the amendments to the SDA was an attempt to regulate occupational standards and 
qualifications and the entire infrastructure of learning programmes, occupational curricular, 
accreditation and delivery providers, the assessment, moderation and certification of 
occupational standards and qualifications.  The 2008 Amendment to the SDA has an 
ambitious intent which also makes provision for internships and the recognition of prior 
learning of occupational qualifications. 
 
Following the new amendments to the SDA, the entire administration and steerage of the 
skills development system in South Africa underwent dramatic change, particularly after the 
2009 general elections.  The Department of Education was split into two resulting in general 
school education being assigned to the Department of Basic Education and Further Education 
and Higher Education being assigned to a new Department of Higher Education and Training.  
Towards the end of 2009 there occurred a constitutional transfer of the administration, 
powers and functions of the legislation supporting the national skills development strategy 
from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of Higher Education and Training.  This 
effectively meant that the Ministry of Higher Education and Training assumed political 
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responsibility for directing skills development in South Africa, with the Department of 
Higher Education and Training assuming the responsibility of its delivery.  Apart from 
changes in responsibility for the application of the skills legislation, in practical terms this 
transfer process also led to the entire branch in the Department of Labour known as the 
branch for Employment and Skills Development Services/Human Resources Development 
being transferred to the new Department of Higher Education and Training. 
 
In April 2010, as a precursor to NSDS lll, the DHET released a consultative document titled: 
Framework for the National Skills Development Strategy 2011/12-2015/16.  The framework 
document introduced a number of new ideas suggesting fundamental change to the existing 
structure in the allocation and disbursement of money through the skills levy.  It presented a 
radical departure from indicator driven strategies in which clearly set targets such as those 
that informed NSDS l and NSDS ll had been set.  The Consultative document as well as 
NSDS lll which mirrors it, therefore appeared to break fundamentally with the demand-
driven conception of economic planning which notionally permeated NSDS l and NSDS ll.  
However, in the case of NSDS lll the form of economic planning advocated was merely about 
achieving general economic targets to advance skills development.  There was also an 
acknowledgement of the importance of coordination to achieve its objectives.  But this 
rhetoric of economic planning and coordination under NSDS lll is not fundamentally new and 
there is nothing to suggest that its practice will differ to what occurred under NSDS l and 
NSDS ll. 
 
When NSDS l was launched in 2001, the notion of economic planning was clearly articulated 
within the Department of Labour.  At the time, a skills planning directorate was established to 
monitor and evaluate the progress of skills delivery under the NSDS.  There was not much 
difference in the conception of planning that was associated with NSDS l or NSDS ll.  
Although a lot of fuss is made in NSDS lll about the absence of an institutional mechanism to 
provide for credible skills planning, NSDS lll invokes a form of economic planning that has 
an even weaker demand-led imperative.  This is the case, notwithstanding invocations that 
align it with economic planning.  It is unlikely that the poor system of planning that prevailed 
under NSDS l and NSDS ll will suddenly be overcome under NSDS lll.  Perhaps a 
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description of how the collection and processing of information for skills planning which 
occurred under NSDS l and NSDS ll
58
 can help explain why. 
 
Despite making provision for baseline data of the skills embodiment of the working 
population in South Africa being collected partially through Sector Skills Plans (SSPs) and 
Workplace Skills Plans (WSPs), there was virtually no attempt to generate indicators of 
progress in the skills delivery system through information collected on an industry or sectoral 
basis (as in sector skills plans) or at the level of enterprises (as in workplace skills plans).  In 
any case, enterprise level data would only be reliable if the firms had trust in the exercise: a 
propensity of firms providing ‘rubbish’ data to outsiders and keeping the ‘good’ data for 
themselves exists.  Furthermore, it is more difficult when those receiving the data do not have 
the capacity to analyse it timeously.  What else should one expect?  To mitigate this problem, 
for NSDS l and NSDS ll, broad baseline indicators (e.g. the indicators and targets under 
NSDS l and NSDS ll) were generated for the entire macro economy.  Where the data allowed, 
these baseline indicators were also generated for specific sectors of the economy (e.g. mining, 
manufacturing etc.).  In a number of instances the data generated from this exercise was 
applied to industries that were demarcated to specific SETAs.  Unfortunately, the DoL was 
not able to undertake the detailed analysis in which baseline conditions could consistently be 
developed for each sector.  Industrial census data in South Africa is shockingly inadequate.  
In any event, the DoL subcontracted the work to academic research units and to the HSRC 
who inadvertently made use of the national household survey data to draw inferences on the 
labour market dynamics of industries and economic sectors in South Africa.  This was 
essentially a modelling exercise using imperfect data.  However, the HSRC did undertake a 
national enterprise skills benchmark study in 2000 (cited in Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 
2008).  It was followed up with further national enterprise skills surveys in 2003 and 2008 
(Paterson, McGrath & Badroodien, 2005; Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008), which will be 
reviewed in our analysis of the incidence of employee training in South African firms. 
 
The SETAs themselves often employed the same methodology to obtain baseline data for 
their SSPs.  In many instances the data sources to the SSPs were very different from the data 
sources used by the DoL to generate baseline evidence.  Many SSPs used data from industry 
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 These reflections are based on personal experience first as a researcher at the University of Cape Town who 
worked on some of the initial documents that fed into NSDS l, later as a board member to the NSA (2005-2007) 
and much later still as a board member to two SETAs during the last phases of NSDS ll. 
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associations which did not necessarily concur with the evidence on hand in the reports used 
by the DoL, which was mainly generated from the October Household Surveys and 
subsequently the Labour Force Surveys.  In the early period of the NSDS (2000-2004), many 
SETAs did not have the capacity to generate useful or reliable data to populate the SSPs.  It 
meant that baseline evidence in SSPs could not be established.  This was not a deterrent to the 
DoL.  Using the aggregate baseline evidence which it had commissioned, the DoL proceeded 
to establish targets that were considered feasible within each of the time-frames of the 
different phases of the NSDS (i.e. 2001-2005 and 2005 to 2010).  It gave the appearance of 
elegance but embodied crudity to the extreme.  These targets were then adapted for each 
SETA so that the aggregate target for all the SETAs neatly corresponded with the aggregated 
macro target.  Thus, from the beginning the DoL was the custodian of baseline evidence for 
the NSDS and it was the custodian of the implementation targets. 
 
The National Skills Authority did not have the capacity to vet these, nor did it have the 
capacity to suggest alternative target measures once a specific phase of the NSDS had started.  
Under NSDS ll, the stakeholders to the NSA played an important role in formulating target 
indicators.  Unfortunately, the evidence to the new socially responsive targets was not 
verifiable externally and was thus highly reliant on DoL data and evidence.  Consequently, 
the capacity constraints to formulate targets presented by the DoL were endorsed probably 
with only slight modification.  Each SETA would have been allocated targets before the onset 
of the NSDS that would appear could be feasibly met within the time-frame of both the first 
and second phases of NSDS.  Economic planning under both NSDS l and NSDS ll was 
therefore highly centralized.  One did not need reminding about this when conversing with 
DoL officials who typically referred to the SETAs as the implementing agencies of the 
Department.  SETAs that produced accurate and good SSPs would have had an added 
advantage but SETAs that produced inaccurate and poor SSPs would not necessarily have 
been at a disadvantage.  All they would have to do was to adhere to the prescribed targets 
assigned to them by the DoL.  This scenario prevailed for each of the two phases of the 
NSDS.  The NSDS lll signaled that this conception of planning was about to end.  It only 
appears credible under a less demand-driven skills strategy.  But since the structure of the 
levy is still intact and in fact reinforced further so that bigger allocations from levy 
disbursements are made for work-integrated learning, there would be a tendency for planning 




Despite the capacity constraints which were confronted in the implementation of both NSDS 
l and NSDS ll, NSDS lll had an even more ambitious ambit.  A cursory reading of NSDS lll 
may give the impression that NSDS lll embodied less strategy and more policy.  It would be a 
mistake to conclude this because the NSDS lll contains both more policy with expanded 
strategic goals as well as an increase in the number of indicators that is used to measure the 
goals.  Whereas NSDS l and NSDS ll adhered to five objectives, NSDS lll embodies eight 
goals.  These are listed as the following: 
 Establishing a credible institutional mechanism for skills planning (Goal One); 
 Increasing access to occupationally-directed programmes (Goal Two); 
 Promoting the growth of a public FET college system that is responsive to sector, local, 
regional and national skills needs and necessities (Goal Three); 
 Addressing the low level of youth and adult language and numeracy skills to enable 
additional training (Goal Four); 
 Encouraging better use of workplace-based skills development (Goal Five); 
 Encouraging and supporting cooperatives, small enterprises, worker-initiated, NGO and 
community training initiatives (Goal Six); 
 Increasing public sector capacity for improved service delivery and supporting the 
building of a developmental state (Goal Seven) and  
 Building career and vocational guidance (Goal Eight). 
 
These eight goals are supported by 16 outcome indicators.  Each goal contains one or more 
outcome indicators.  Each outcome indicator is further underpinned by one or more output 
indicators.  In total NSDS lll has 16 outcome indicators and 39 output indicators. 
 
Goal 5 which deals with workplace-based skills development, makes no direct mention of 
firms and enterprises.  In fact the two output indicators which make the strongest linkage to 
actual firms do so in the vaguest manner possible.  In the one instance the output indicator 
states that ‘SETA stakeholders agree on the provision of substantial quality programmes for 
employed workers and report on the impact of the training (Output 4.5.1.1).  In the second 
instance the output indicator states: ‘Cross-sectoral projects are established to address skills 





Under NSDS ll weak vestiges to labour-demand imperatives still permeated the strategy.  
Under NSDS lll these weak vestiges have virtually vanished to be replaced by a wholly 
supply-driven skills development strategy.  The banishment of ‘apprenticeships’ that was 
observed to have occurred under NSDS l, is matched under NSDS lll by the de facto 
banishment of profit-driven enterprises and firms as active agents in the formation and 
production of skills.  Public educational and training institutions now begin to assume a more 
active role in the production of skills for the national economy. 
7.3.4 Change in the Allocation and Distribution to the Skills Levy 
In April 2010, the Department of Higher Education and Training released a consultative 
Framework for the NSDS.  In this document a proposal was made for the introduction of a 
new component or ‘incentive’ that firms would be able to use when they submitted their WSP 
applications.  In addition to the mandatory and discretionary grant funds which firms could 
use to finance their specific training needs, this new grant was referred to as a PIVOTAL 
grant and amounted to 10% of the overall skills levy.  But just as there was a gain to be got of 
10% on one side, it also led to a loss of 10% elsewhere in the distribution of the levy.  Thus 
the proposal which DHET advanced was for a PIVOTAL grant that amounted to 10% of the 
skills levy.  It would be funded by an equal 10% reduction in the mandatory grant.  This 
means that the mandatory grant would decrease from 50% to 40%.  Essentially, PIVOTAL 
grants were conceived to finance work-integrated learning programmes which the 
Department referred to as PIVOTAL programmes.  PIVOTAL programmes were defined as 
follows: 
‘Pivotal programmes are those ‘Professional, Vocational, Technical and Academic 
Learning’ programmes that meet the critical needs for economic growth and social 
development.  They are also programmes that generally combine course work at 
universities, universities of technology and colleges with structured learning at work.  
This is achieved by means of professional placements, work-integrated learning, 
apprenticeships, learnerships, internships and the like.  To achieve this goal, there 
must not only be improved access to, and success at post-school learning sites, such as 
universities and colleges, but there must also be structured bridges to the world of 
work and quality learning upon arrival there’(DHET, 2010a: 15). 
 
This conception was cemented in NSDS lll with a more precise definition a few months later 
in which the educational supply dimension of PIVOTAL Programmes was elevated above the 
labour demand dimension.  Under NSDS lll, PIVOTAL programmes: 
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‘… are programmes which provide a full occupationally-directed qualification.  Such 
courses will normally begin in a college or university and would include supervised 
practical learning in a workplace as part of their requirement.  The courses – 
especially for workers – could in some cases start in the workplace and then move to a 
college or university.  The courses would culminate in an occupational qualification.  
PIVOTAL courses will normally be offered by arrangement between a SETA, an 
educational institution, an employer and a learner.  Fundamental to the successful 
implementation of PIVOTAL programmes will be a model of cooperation between a 
SETA, a higher or further education and training institution and an employer.  This 
will help ensure responsive curricula and courses’ (NSDS lll: 2012: 9). 
 
By introducing pivotal grants into the skills development equation in South Africa, SETAs 
and workplaces that offered the work-instruction component to pivotal programmes will be 
obliged to work with education and training providers particularly the public providers which 
the DHET preferred. 
 
With the proposed changes to the disbursement of the levy being advanced through the 
consultative document to the NSDS lll Framework, comments from multiple stakeholders to 
the skills development system in South Africa was elicited from by the DHET. 
 
A small sample of responses highlights the contrasting positions taken by labour and business 
organisations – as custodians of demand-driven interests.  Responses from the affiliated 
unions generally conformed to the position adopted by COSATU.  Thus the COSATU 
submission supported the initial proposal which the Consultative document advanced: 
‘We agree that these grants [i.e. Discretionary Grants P.L.] should be dedicated to the 
achievements of the Approved Sector Skills Plan imperatives.  We also propose that 
the Total percentage of the Funds for this grant should be 30%.  This is in line with 
the progressive approach to Discretionary Grant envisaged from the previous NSDS.  
This will also ensure that companies focus on the economic imperatives identified by 
the SSP including the social development imperatives as well’ (COSATU, Draft 
Alliance Response to NSDS lll Proposals, undated). 
The position from NUMSA echoed the sentiments of COSATU.  In respect of PIVOTAL 
Programmes: 
‘NUMSA support the introduction of Pivotal programmes. 
That SETA’s support FET’s and public providers to better produce graduates 
qualified and needed by industry. 
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Means should be made to ensure that workers can be released during working hours to 
attend training – block release.  National Curriculum (Vocational), NCV, must be 
reviewed to make provision for this need.  We need Labour to be represented in the 
body/board that develops Vocational curriculum. 
A labour pool should be created to ensure manning of the production line whilst 
workers go on training. 
The labour pool would ensure that workers are not torn between training and overtime 
because shortages and extra demand would be taken care of by the labour pool’ 
(NUMSA Submission to the NSDS lll, undated). 
While conforming to the COSATU position, SACTWU’s argument was as follows: 
‘The NSDS Framework proposes that firms continue submitting WSPs and Annual 
Training Report (ATRs) and in return receive a WSP grant consisting of a guaranteed 
40% of levy paid plus an additional pivotal grant. 
SACTWU supports this proposal, specifically the reduction in the mandatory grant 
from 50% to 40%.  This will encourage firms to desist from only submitting WSPs – 
as so many do – and encourage them to move increasingly towards implementation. 
While SACTWU agrees with the reduction of mandatory grants from 50% to 40%, it 
is problematic for discretionary grants to exceed the mandatory grant threshold.  The 
discretionary grant ought to be proportionately the same as the mandatory grants of 
40%.  In view of the importance accorded to pivotal grant programmes, which in a 
definite sense anticipates a shift towards more intelligent forms of economic planning, 
the Framework has set the amounts of the levy dedicated for pivotal programmes at an 
unrealistically low level.  It is our contention that the pivotal grants be increased from 
10% and rather be set at 20% of the skills development levy’ (SACTWU Submission 
on Draft NSDS lll, 15 July 2010). 
Essentially the position of COSATU and its affiliates was for a 20% allocation of the levy for 
pivotal grants.  If one includes the 20% that was already assigned to discretionary grant 
funding, it would mean a reduction in the mandatory grant allocation from 50% to 30%.  This 
position also meant that the combined discretionary and pivotal grant would shift to 40% of 
the overall skills levy.  Thus the position which COSATU and two of its affiliates put 
forward in its engagement with the Framework document to NSDS lll was similar. 
 
BUSA as the employer body put forward a wholly different position.  It argued: 
‘Business is not opposed to the introduction of the PIVOTAL Grants from the WSP.  
Many SETAs are already supporting such programmes and companies should benefit 
from this grant.  As mentioned above, the challenge remains the rate of disbursement.  
Business insists on a significant decrease in unspent funds by SETAs before a major 
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change is introduced in the two types of grants (Mandatory and Discretionary).  
Reducing the Mandatory Grant by 10% may lead to a further accumulation of SETA 
funds given the current status of SETA reserves. 
Business supports the principle of a gradual decline in mandatory grants over a period 
of time and an increase in discretionary grants only once SETAs (and NSF) can show 
that they are spending discretionary grants on training.  As mentioned above this 
should happen when a better levy/grant model has been proposed and when SETAs 
have significantly reduced their reserves’ (BUSA Submission: NSDS lll Framework, 
undated). 
Subsequently, in respect to the allocation mechanism to the skills development levy, NSDS 
lll echoed the earlier Framework document.  Thus, NSDS lll set out:  
‘To give greater effect to these programmes and ensure greater employer 
participation, a PIVOTAL grant has also been incorporated into NSDS lll.  Ten 
percent of the mandatory grant will be dedicated to this initiative.  Employers who 
provide workplace-based opportunities can supplement the cost of the programme 
with the grant from the SETAs.  The SETAs, in turn are expected to ensure that 10% 
of the mandatory grants is ring-fenced to fund workplace-based training 
opportunities’ (NSDS lll, 2012: 14). 
The ratio in the distribution of the levy between mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL 
grants had initially been set as 40:20:10 in April 2010.  This was endorsed in NSDS lll in an 
earlier version which was already in circulation in late 2010.  A final version of NSDS lll 
which can be downloaded from the government electronic portal
59
 is however dated 30
th
 
March 2012.  DHET initially appears to have been quite tentative about the funding 
regulations that it issued on the new levy disbursement ratio.  On the 29
th
 of April 2011 the 
first amendment to the SETA Grant Regulations (Government Gazette, 29 April 2011) where 
the 40:20:10 ratio allocating levy funds to mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL grants 
was formalized.  In practice nothing really changed because the original regulations 
governing grant regulations under NSDS ll was still in force.  However in January 2012, new 
SETA grant regulations were again issued by government notice in the Government Gazette. 
 
As is customary, DHET’s SETA Grant Regulations for January 2012 invited comments from 
interested parties.  These grant regulations reaffirmed the mandatory grant allocations would 
henceforth be reduced from 50% to 40% of the overall skills levy.  Discretionary grant 
allocations continued at 20% of the overall skills levy while PIVOTAL programmes would 
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make up 10% of the overall levy paid by employers.  The amendment to the Skills 
Development Act of 2008 made provision for the establishment of a Quality Council for 
Trades and Occupations (QCTO).  The long term vision was that the QCTO would absorb 
the function of all SETA ETQAs.  The SETA Grant Regulations of 3 December reaffirmed 
that from 1 April 2013, each SETA, will transfer an amount equivalent to 0.5% of the 
aggregate skills levy for the sector to the QCTO.  On the 1
st
 of April the Minister of Higher 
Education issued a notice declaring that the QCTO would become operational from this date 
onwards. 
 
Provision was made in the SETA Grant Regulations of January 2012 for all SETAs to 
transfer 0.5% of the total levy received by each SETA to the QCTO for it to perform its 
quality assurance functions.  The regulations also clarified how surplus funds in mandatory 
and discretionary programmes would be treated at the end of each financial year.  Thus, the 
draft regulations indicated that all surplus funds which a SETA had at the end of a financial 
year (i.e. 31
st
 March starting in 2013) was to be transferred annually to the PIVOTAL grant 
fund within ten working days after the 31
st
 of August.  Funding commitments from a SETA 
beyond a particular training year using discretionary funds would now only be made for 
learners in PIVOTAL programmes.  Formally – for the duration of NSDS l and NSDS ll – 
SETA surpluses were held in a SETA discretionary grant account.  Unclaimed mandatory 
grant funds would automatically be transferred to the discretionary grant account.  The 
January 2012 grant regulations effectively meant that unclaimed mandatory grant funds 
would now instead be automatically transferred to the PIVOTAL grant account.  The same 
would apply to surplus discretionary grant monies. 
 
For almost twelve months from the time the January 2012 SETA Grant Regulations were 
published, except for DHET insiders, most analysts who had taken an interest in the matter, 
lived under the illusion that the matter had been finalized and the 40:20:10 grant levy 
allocation between mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL grant funding would eventually 
become operational.  Personal conversations that I had with officials at numerous SETAs, 
confirmed that the original Grant Regulations of 1999 were still in place.  For shorthand, 
these regulations specified a mandatory/discretionary split of 50:20 to the overall skills levy.  
The split recommended in the new SETA grant regulations of January 2012, as was argued 
above, had changed to 40:20:10, with PIVOTAL grants making up a new category which 




A third set of SETA grant regulations was published in the Government Gazette on the 3
rd
 of 
December 2012.  Over the twelve months beween the publication of the second and third 
SETA grant regulations, something however dramatic had changed the understanding of the 
allocation to each of the grant windows: the mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL.  We 
can only surmise that it may have been as a result of behind the scene consultation and 
lobbying from constituencies other than business though it is not amiss to note that the 
recommendations of the Inter-Ministerial Task Team which was published in August the 
following year, contains recommendations that echo what the SETA grant regulations of 
December 2012 specified. 
 
The SETA grant regulations of 3 December 2012 mandated that mandatory grants were to 
decline from 50% to 20%.  Ceteris paribus, in the context where only mandatory, 
discretionary and pivotal grant allocations were under consideration, a reduction of the 
mandatory grant to 20% unambiguously implied that the combined discretionary-pivotal 
allocation would be increased to 50%.  Further provisions that the PIVOTAL grant amount 
would be 80% of this designated 50% allocation means that the discretionary allocation 
would be 10% and the PIVOTAL allocation would be 40%.  Apart from the 20% mandatory 
allocation which the Grant Regulations for 3 December 2012 declares, it does not declare 
these accompanying figures for the discretionary and pivotal allocations as unambiguously as 
I am stating it.  But this is the only valid interpretation. 
 
Following the earlier January grant regulations, the SETA grant regulations of December 
2012 makes provision for 0.5% of the total levy received by each SETA to be transferred 
annually to fund the QCTO.  Provision is made for all unclaimed mandatory funds and 
interest earned in the financial year ended to be transferred to the discretionary fund by 15 
August of each financial year.  Unspent SETA ‘administrative funds and any interest earned 
on funds must on 31 March of each financial year be placed in the discretionary fund’ 
(DHET, 2012c: para. 3(4)).  Furthermore: ‘A SETA is required to allocate 80% of its 
available discretionary grants within a financial year to PIVOTAL programmes that address 
scarce and critical skills in its sectors’ (DHET, 2012c, para. 3(6)).  The funding regulations 
bind the SETAs to short-term expenditure cycles.  Consequently, at least 95% of 
discretionary funds have to be committed or spent at the end of each financial year and it is 
permissible for only a maximum of 5% of uncommitted funds to be carried over to the next 
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financial year (DHET, 2012c, para. 3(11)).  Remaining surplus discretionary funds must be 
transferred by the SETA by 1 October of each year into the National Skills Fund (NSF) 
(DHET, 2012c, para. 3 (12)).  Only in exceptional circumstances can such surpluses be 
carried over. 
 
Under NSDS l and NSDS ll, the SETA discretionary accounts were accounts of last resort 
from which all surplus monies were ‘swept’.  These changes in the criteria of the most recent 
SETA grant regulations means that this account of last resort is no longer housed within 
SETAs.  Its function has been transferred to the National Skills Fund. 
 
More significantly the December 2012 SETA grant regulations reduced the proportion of the 
mandatory grant that can be awarded to employers who meet the eligibility criteria to 20% 
and not the 40% initially proposed in the Framework document and in NSDS lll.  Unclaimed 
mandatory grant monies would automatically be transferred to the discretionary grant by 15 
August of each year.  The December 2012 SETA grant regulations makes provision for at 
least 80% of discretionary grant funding to be allocated to PIVOTAL programmes.  The 
remaining 20% of discretionary grant funding are for the funding of programmes designed to 
develop the sector in accordance with the priorities outlined in the SSP (DHET, 2012c, para. 
6(14).  Quite intentionally the December 2012 SETA grant regulations displaced the funding 
allocations that were suggested at the end of NSDS ll which had the sequence of 40:20:10 for 
mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL programmes. 
 
Excluding the 20% that is received by the NSF, the remaining 80% of the allocations to the 
one percent skills levy for each SETA are structured in the following manner: 
 10% is designated for SETA operations 
 0.5% goes to the QCTO 
 20% is the amount of the mandatory grant which employers can access if they meet all 
the eligibility criteria; 
 49.5% is the amount allocated to the discretionary fund.  For the purpose of illustration let 
us round this off to 50%.  A further 80% of this is allocated for PIVOTAL Programmes.  
Essentially this means that PIVOTAL programmes receive roughly 40% of the original 
one percent payroll levy.  In contrast, the discretionary grant is reduced to 10% of the 




Thus in terms of the allocation ratios of the one percent skills levy, for mandatory, 
discretionary and PIVOTAL funds,  the splits under the December 2012 SETA grant 
regulations have changed to 20:10: 40.  Mirroring a complete revolution from what prevailed 
until the end of NSDS ll where the split was 50:20 to what was proposed (40:20:10), the 
world of the monies disbursed by SETAs from the 1
st
 of April 2013 had certainly been turned 
upside down. 
7.3.5 Nuances to PIVOTAL Programmes and the Practice of 
Sweeping 
As was already shown (see Section 7.3.4), the final SETA grant regulations that DHET 
published in December 2012, proposed a reduction in the mandatory grant from the 40% that 
was originally proposed to 20%.  Correspondingly this meant that the increase in the size 
allocation of the discretionary grant to 30% as was originally proposed would instead be 
increased to 50% of the aggregate skills levy
60
.  From this 50%, an amount of 80% is to be 
allocated as PIVOTAL grants meant for individuals on PIVOTAL programmes.  Thus, under 
the new arrangement PIVOTAL grant funds would be roughly equivalent to 40% of the 
aggregate skills levy.  The mandatory grant in turn would constitute 20% of the overall skills 
development levy.  The new arrangement means that the discretionary grant funding (after 
allowing for the 80% portion to be spent as a PIVOTAL grant on PIVOTAL programmes) 
would in turn amount to 10% of the overall skills levy.  Thus a ratio signifying the 
relationship between allocations to mandatory grants, discretionary grants and PIVOTAL 
grants would take the following form: 20:10:40. 
At all SETAs, discretionary grant income was supplemented annually in the new financial 
year with unclaimed mandatory levy grant income from the preceding year.  In SETA 
parlance this is referred to as ‘sweeping’ or transferring funds from one type of grant fund 
(e.g. mandatory) to another (discretionary).  Unclaimed monies on the mandatory grant fund 
also meant that the actual ratios of levy income that was assigned to workplace skills training 
was in aggregate usually lower than 70% of overall funds collected from the skills levy.  
Thus it meant that the discretionary reserve account (all monies available for discretionary 
expenditure) always tended to be larger than the discretionary grant income for a particular 
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year (or the 20% of the skills levy income).  In all instances however, all income available for 
discretionary grant disbursements even if not spent in the year in which the collections were 
generated is committed to projects and ring-fenced for discretionary project expenditure.  
However, the more complex nature of discretionary funded projects result in real time 
constraints becoming inscribed into the process of project execution.  Thus for a significant 
proportion of discretionary expenditure there is the appearance of an hiatus between the skill 
levy collections and its almost simultaneous allocations to the discretionary grant accounts 
within SETAs and the manner through which discretionary grant utilisation of these funds is 
reflected within a given financial year.  Thus the notion of ‘committed’ funds in discretionary 
accounts was used to mitigate the impression that the funds were merely idle and not being 
put into use. 
 
In practice, discretionary projects are as a rule more complex to execute compared to firm-
based mandatory projects (e.g. learnership and apprenticeship programmes versus 
programmes typically specified in WSPs which are normally classified as mandatory 
programmes and cater for the specific internal training needs of firms).  Therefore the process 
of scrutiny and quality assurance from the side of the SETA requires greater technical, 
administrative and managerial competence and skill.  This is especially evident when 
compared to the routine processing of mandatory grant applications that are conveyed 
through employer WSPs. 
 
At the end of the 2009/2010 financial year, the newly appointed Minister for Higher 
Education and Training certainly perceived a more alarming picture of discretionary grant 
fund reserves – which while being committed to projects – remained unused for the financial 
year end.  In the intervening years that led to this condition, many SETAs were able to 
acquire National Treasury permission to roll-over such ‘committed’ funds to the new 
financial year.  Such roll-overs almost seemed routine until the Minister of Higher Education 
signalled an intention to put an end to it.  It was reflected in the draft regulations for 
PIVOTAL Grant funding and subsequent SETA grant regulations which I discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
In part, a way to speed up the processing of discretionary fund applications is to create a grant 
mechanism which has a more rapid outflow of expenditure built into it.  The idea of 
PIVOTAL grants which would ostensibly finance experiential learning may be attractive in 
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addressing the slow outflows of discretionary fund expenditure that was operating in practice 
at the time.  PIVOTAL Grants occupy an additional parameter from which levy funds can be 
applied for use in the provision of private sector skills development.  But even with the onset 
of PIVOTAL Grant funding, the challenge to process PIVOTAL Grant applications at the 
same pace and speed at which PIVOTAL Grant income enters the aggregated SETA funding 
system is not automatically guaranteed.  Essentially, one specific mechanism which has 
worked poorly has been replaced with a new funding entity which potentially has similar 
limitations.  This limitation is the inability to process fund inflows at the same pace as fund 
outflows.  It means that expenditure on either discretionary or PIVOTAL programmes and 
projects takes place too slowly.  If employers do not take up PIVOTAL programmes rapidly 
enough, fund accumulations on PIVOTAL grant accumulations may mirror what occurred 
under discretionary grant accumulations. 
 
Since the NSF will become the ultimate fund ‘swept’ into, the same problem of slow 
expenditure outflows versus rapid income inflows may in future also plague the reserve and 
expenditure accounts of the NSF.  If this were to happen, the NSF would receive more funds 
than it is capable of spending, but on a much larger scale than has hitherto occurred. 
7.3.6 The Higher Education and Training Ministerial Task Team on 
SETA Performance: 2013 
The Ministerial Task Team (MTT) on SETA Performance was established by the Minister of 
Higher Education and Training in March 2011.  The work of the task team extended over 
thirteen months, between March 2011 and May 2012.  One can therefore logically presume 
that a draft report of the Task Team’s findings may have also influenced the conception of the 
December 2012 SETA grant regulations discussed in the previous section.  The present 
overview of the MTT report, which was officially released in August 2013, will only be 
concerned with its conception and recommendation of distributive allocations for different 
SETA grant funding windows as well as its recommended allocation from the overall one 
percent skills development levy to the National Skills Fund. 
 
The MTT formulated seventeen recommendations for the reform of SETA performance and 
related matters.  However, in order of priority, roughly five recommendations have 
pertinence to the discussion in this chapter on the effect of the skills development levy on the 




I shall start with recommendation 2(b) for which the MTT proposed an increase in the 
proportionate allocation of the skills levy to the National Skills Fund (NSF) from 20% to 
30%.  This was despite informing readers that the total revenue of the NSF in 2010-2011 was 
R2.1 billion, with operating expenses of R560 million, leaving a surplus of R1.4 billion.  This 
surplus was incorporated into nett accumulated funds of R6.6 billion that was estimated 
would rise to R7.4 billion for the 2011-2012 financial year (DHET, 2013: 14).  The MTT 
nonetheless suggested that the recommended increment in the allocation from 20% to 30% of 
skills levy income to the NSF was necessary to ensure that it had sufficient administrative 
capacity to perform its revised mandate.  This was really a desperate measure to reverse a 
perennial problem of under-performance over a number of years in the overall skills 
development system in South Africa. 
 
Under recommendation 4, the MTT proposed that the function and amount of the mandatory 
grant be changed.  The recommended change was for the mandatory grant to decrease from 
the earlier 40% that NSDS lll proposed to 20%.  In its explanatory note to the 
recommendation the MTT explains that: ‘The remaining 30% that had been within the 
mandatory grant should form part of the discretionary grant allocations so as to enable the 
SETA to play an increased steering role’ (DHET, 2013: 15). 
 
Recommendation 4 leads directly into recommendation 5 of the MTT report which is worded 
as follows: ‘Strengthen steering through tighter use of an increased discretionary grant’.  
According to the MTT the discretionary grant ‘should be targeted at substantive training for 
employed people in the different sectors as well as unemployed people entering the sectors in 
line with agreed upon sector priorities’ (DHET, 2013: 17).  The MTT suggested that funding 
from the levy-grant system should complement the medium term priorities of the fiscus.  As 
the MTT report meticulously explained: 
‘Particularly with regards to medium term imperatives, funding from the levy-grant 
system should complement this programme funding through their discretionary grant 
funding and through their contributions to National Student Financial Aid Scheme 
(NSFAS) where programmes are consistent with sector priorities.  This is critical to 
ensure that it becomes possible for learners to progress into, for example, a post-
graduate programme in a priority field by accessing a bursary (the current system 
makes accessing of full bursaries very difficult at these levels).  The approach, of 
SETAs giving monies to the NSFAS to complement the monies from the fiscus will 
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ensure that bursaries are centralized within the NSFAS and can be efficiently 
managed’ (DHET, 2013: 17). 
 
The MTT appears to have discarded the demand-driven approach to skills development in 
South Africa, replacing it with a supply-driven approach which elevates the needs of full-time 
students (those outside and about to enter the labour market) above that of competing firms 
(with employees inside the labour market) in the national economy.  The MTT Report puts 
the requirements of students and young people earmarked to be inducted into the workplace 
above the needs of the established workforce who are the backbone to the productivity and 
innovation thrusts upon which firms make their calculations about economic growth and 
expansion. 
 
Under recommendation 6, the MTT reinforces the idea that that SETA grant allocations 
should be reduced from 80% to 70% of skills development levy monies with a corresponding 
increased allocation from 20% to 30% to the NSF. 
 
Finally, the MTT recommended under 12(c) that non-accredited short courses ‘should be 
allowed (and offered by both public and private providers) but funded by employers (DHET, 
2013: 28, recommendation 12(c)). 
 
While DHET has not yet acceded to the recommendation for the aggregate allocation from 
skills levies to the NSF be increased from 20% to 30%, it did implement the radical reversals 
in the allocations to mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL grants to the ratio of 20:50 or 
(ignoring for ease of calculation the 0.5% allocated to the QCTO) as the December 2012 
grant regulations specified, a ratio of 20:10:40 for mandatory, discretionary and PIVOTAL 
programmes respectively. 
 
In its 17 recommendations to the Minister of Higher Education and Training, the Ministerial 
Task Team makes recommendations for a more coordinated training system.  Thus, what the 
MTT proposed was for a central mechanism or body through which the short-term, medium-
term and long-term demands of skills can be analysed
61
.  The recommendation is as follows: 
                                                 
61
 In the body of the report this is listed as recommendation 9 (DHET, 2013: 21) but is unfortunately assigned a 
different number and labelled as recommendation 3 in the summary of the recommendations (DHET, 2013: 35). 
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‘There needs to be a central mechanism/body through which skills demands in the 
short, medium and long-term are analyzed’ (DHET, 2013: 21). 
 
The Ministerial Task Team reaffirms the notion of a central mechanism to facilitate skills 
planning.  Thus, central coordination with a high level of planning would be mainly 
controlled and instituted by the state through national skills institutions with representation 
from other stakeholders.  However, within this process, the state and its organs are the 
dominant coordinating force within the national skills development system. 
 
Almost a century long quest to coordinate education and training and subsequently skills 
development starting with the 1911 Conference on technical, industrial and commercial 
education (discussed in chapter 5), maturing through the work of the Riekert and Wiehahn 
Commissions and ending with the NEPI process (discussed in chapter 6) with a healthy 
balance of decentralization and consensus particularly from private sector firms and 
enterprises is obliterated in one clean sweep.  The institutional legacy of these efforts which 
led to the construction of the National Training Board in the mid-1980s and later with the 
consolidation of the National Skills Authority which incorporated and expanded the functions 
of the NTB, was instead prefaced by abbreviated remarks and discussion by the Ministerial 
Task Team that gives state planning a central role in the South African skills development 
system. 
 
But the notion of planning which the Ministerial Task Team holds is one of central planning.  
The model of central planning that the MTT holds is one which will be controlled by the 
Department of Higher Education and Training.  The discretion and degree of autonomy of 
SETAs to respond to employer needs – as tenuous as this is already perceived to be – would 
be further eroded.  In truth, the DHET would take the discretion away from SETAs to act by 
alone exercising such discretion.  Central planning and democratic coordination do not have 
an affiliation.  The relegation of coordination also corresponds with the recommendation by 
the Ministerial Task Team for the disestablishment or abolition of the National Skills 
Authority (DHET, 2013, recommendation 3, p.14). 
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7.3.7 The Green and White Papers on Post-School Education and 
Training 
A Green Paper for Post-School Education and Training was released by the Department of 
Higher Education and Training in January 2012 (DHET, 2012d).  It was followed by the 
release of a White Paper for Post-School Education and Training in November 2013 (DHET, 
2013b).  Both Green and White Papers embody the mission of the Ministry and Department 
of Higher Education and Training to build an expanded, effective and integrated post-school 
system.  The intention is to achieve this mission by 2030. 
 
While both the Green and White Papers cover a spectrum of the most important challenges 
confronting the post-school education and training system in South Africa, my focus in this 
section is to only analyse the components from these Papers which are relevant to the thrust 
of the concerns that the thesis addresses: which is the coordination of the supply of enterprise 
skill formation.  Furthermore, because documents in respect of strategy, legislation, 
regulations including  recommendations as embodied in the MTT Report on SETA 
Performance, has already been analysed in previous sections,  this section merely captures the 
unique contributions which the Green and White Papers make in respect of a levy-grant 
system for enterprise training.  Even though the report of the MTT on SETA performance 
was released more than a year after the Green Paper, the influence of the thinking from 
deliberations with members of the MTT are readily acknowledged in shaping specific 
proposals advanced in the Green Paper. 
 
More importantly in respect of the overall integrity and strength of the South African skills 
development system, the Green Paper acknowledges limitations with the WSPs and ATRs 
despite being platforms to enabling firms to lodge initial mandatory grant claims.  The 
problems were not with the claims lodged by employers but with the training and enterprise 
data which WSPs and ATRs provide.  WSPs were seen not to reflect the real priorities of 
business.  There was also a tendency in WSPs to ‘exclude programmes that result in a 
qualification, as these may take longer than a financial year’ (DHET, 2012d: 65).  In other 
words, the Green Paper was being euphemistic about what SETA officials (with whom I 
spoke on different occasions) would describe the data and information that is conveyed by 
WSPs as ‘thumb sucks’.  Thus WSPs provide ‘rubbish’ data and information.  A similar 




For instance, the Green Paper recognized that ATRs generally reflected compliance driven 
training that is financed through the levy-grant system: 
‘In addition the Annual Training Report tends to reflect only the training linked to the 
amount claimed in the mandatory grant rather than to provide a picture of all training 
that has taken place in the workplace (DHET, 2012d: 65-66) 
Thus the Green Paper on Post-School Education and Training tacitly admits that there is a 
segment of training which is financed wholly by employers.  From my perspective, I have 
designated this as ‘out-of-pocket’ training expenditure.  The Green Paper therefore tacitly 
acknowledges that neither the WSP nor the ATR provide outsiders with adequate information 
about the training activities which take place within firms and enterprises.  It is clear that the 
authors of the Green Paper harboured the belief that both the WSP and ATR could be revised 
to provide a more reliable source of data to measure the process of acquisition of enterprise 
skills.  These initial ideas did not lead to fully structured proposals but certainly provided an 
outlet for a more in-depth formulation which is postulated in greater detail in the White Paper 
released in 2013. 
 
In the White Paper for Post-School Education and Training, the problem of information flow 
about the activity of workplaces and the provision of training that the WSPs and ATRs are 
meant to record, to which the Green Paper alludes, is reaffirmed.  As the White Paper put it: 
Problems include the format specifying what information companies are supposed to 
provide, the accuracy and comprehensiveness of information provided, and the 
number of enterprises which are actually submitting the required documentation.  The 
number of large enterprises submitting plans has been dropping, and for smaller 
businesses the numbers that complete are insignificant compared to those that pay the 
levy.  Another problem is that SETAs lack the capacity to evaluate the annual training 
reports against the workplace skills plans or to be aware of what employers are 
actually doing in terms of training’ (DHET, 2013b: 60). 
The information flow problem between the enterprise at the micro level and institutions of the 
coordination of skill formation at the meso- and meta- societal levels (see Table 4.2 in 
chapter 4) inhibits coordination.  It prevents SETAs, the Department of Higher Education and 
Training as well as other ancillary institutions that constitute the skills development system 





Thus the White Paper recommended that the mandatory grant no longer be awarded to firms 
and enterprises on the basis of achievements in training employees but exclusively on the 
basis of accurate data.  This data will be captured and recorded in WSPs and ATRs.  In 
future, employers will not have to report on how mandatory grants are spent by firms.  
Instead:  
‘Employers must ensure that the WSP/ATR report includes comprehensive 
information about all training that is taking place in the workplace, current levels of 
skills, experience and qualifications of employees, and skills priorities and gaps for 
the short as well as medium term.  Submission of this information will entitle the 
employer to receive the mandatory grant from the SETA.  This grant will only require 
companies to submit useful and accurate data; there will be no need for employers to 
report how the mandatory grant was spent.  Once the SETAs are able to obtain 
accurate data from workplaces, they can supply valuable information for the national 
skills planning process as well as plan and support educational provision.  This will be 
a substantial benefit to employers, as it will enable skills gaps to be addressed’ 
(DHET, 2013b: 60). 
Both the Green and White Papers are perhaps unrealistically optimistic about eventually 
obtaining information which is crucial for evaluating progress in the formation of workplace 
skills in South Africa. 
 
In reaction to the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s (Boettke, 2001), where similar 
problems to that posed in the Green and White Papers on post-school education and training 
in South Africa were raised, intellectuals of the Austrian school of economics such as Hayek 
(1948) warned that this was patently impossible to overcome.  The authors of the Green and 
White papers work from the assumption that firms have accurate knowledge of all training 
that takes place in enterprises and firms.  As well as including training that occurs through 
formal-on-the-job training, training in enterprises is also acquired through work experience as 
well as through learning-by-doing (see chapter 3).  However, it is unlikely that firms will 
have developed systems or the capacity to collect and process information at this level. 
 
Even data about formal on-the-job training may be difficult to assemble without evidence of 
the formal award of the qualifications acquired.  What the means of verification there will be 
within firms and enterprises as well as the consistency of the method of such verification is 
not even broached.  Yet this is what will be required.  Questions such as: was a certificate 
awarded to an incumbent and is it a valid qualification from a valid and registered training 
institution will probably have to be posed in detail and audited by an army of skills 
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development facilitators.  In reality, it is extremely difficult to obtain this type of information 
in an accurate and reliable form even from consenting enterprises.  It will be necessary to 
distinguish between good and poor information.  Some firms and enterprises may not be 
averse to engaging in tactics of dissent and creative obstruction by providing false 
information.  This can be the result when the award of the mandatory grant is no longer an 
incentive to firms.  When is a presumed incentive, actually an incentive? 
 
7.4 Incentives and Disincentives on Firms: From the 
Green Paper and Beyond 
There is a paucity of literature on the effect of incentives within the system of enterprise 
vocational training and skill formation.  It has been difficult to glean lessons that can be 
borrowed from scientific literature in ancillary fields where incentives are important 
(Diamond, 2008; Galán, Sánchez-Bueno & Zúñiga-Vicente, 2012).  By a long stretch, it is 
the writing of the South African economist, Sean Archer (2010 & 2012) who perhaps 
provides the most suggestive insights into the multi-dimensional categories of incentives or 
dis-incentives which can potentially infest the skill formation system.  This is contextualized 
in its current South African form. 
 
Archer (2012) highlights especially the failure for information about the training needs and 
intentions of firms to be shared between themselves as well as with intermediaries.  Archer 
(2012: 162) argues that this is a critical barrier which prevents outside interventions from 
influencing the rate of skills investment.  Unfortunately, through the intermediary 
institutional function which was designed to generate the incentive for the system, a process 
of unanticipated hurdles which are disincentives creeps into the process.  Archer’s writing 
allows us to join the missing pieces in the jig-saw puzzle.  He makes the following remarks: 
‘To increase skills useful in production, intermediary institutions have to mediate the 
different interests of the employer, the worker, the training provider and the state.  
They do so (1) by compensating for the negative effects of incomplete information; 
(2) by lowering transaction costs for workers and employers; (3) by providing finance 
where workers face a capital market failure because they cannot borrow to enter 
training; and (4) by enabling the benefits of scale to be reaped by individuals and 
organisations engaged in training.  This is a formidable list of compensatory functions 
not sufficiently recognized (Archer, 2012: 163). 
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In his earlier report, Archer (2010) made explicit reference to administrative and regulatory 
functions that SETAs performed through the current levy-grant policy in South Africa. 
 
The object of concern in the intermediary functions that Archer discusses actually covers 
most of what SETAs do as well as the broad thrust of incentives which the overall national 
skill development in South Africa exhibits.  One can reinterpret this more precisely as three 
clear incentive types which may also serve as a disincentive where the regulatory burden 
becomes too onerous.  I refer to these three types of incentives as: financial incentives, 
collective interest incentives, and informational incentives.  I shall discuss each of these three 
types of incentives that can conversely also serve as a disincentive. 
7.4.1 Financial Incentives 
The shift from a tax-incentivised training system to a levy-based system was an innovative 
attempt to construct a more comprehensive skills development system in South Africa.  It 
was motivated less by the gains of financial returns and more to get commitment and 
involvement from employers and firms to advance training at the workplace.  As was shown 
in Chapter 6 of this thesis, the Wiehahn Commission was the first to recommend this path 
which it did as early as 1980.  The underlying postulates to the skills levy disbursement 
system in South Africa which was elaborated during the early phases of the new political 
dispensation (1994-1997) mirrored this motive.  It was captured in the 1997 Green Paper on 
Skills Development.  Embedded in the institutional design of the idea was an incentive 
encouraging firms to become involved and take joint control of the training function in their 
establishments. 
 
The idea was based on a delicate balance between enterprise needs that firms would 
implement, sector needs which sectoral intermediaries (SETOs/SETAs) would coordinate and 
national strategic needs which the state through the National Skills Fund would fulfill.  If a 
firm adhered to the policy prescriptions and effectively implemented its planned workplace 
skill needs it could retrieve up to 50% of the skills levies (through mandatory grants) that had 
been imposed on it within a given financial or training year.  To get 50% back for what was 
conceived to be mainly modest on-the-job training requirements represented the marginal 
point at being either switched-on (incentivised) or switched-off (disincentivised).  The 
literature on coordination drawn in particular from computer science and information systems 
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cited in the introduction of chapter 4 is useful in being able to model and mimic this process.  
In the case where firms opted out of the process, meant that even more was available to firms 
that responded positively to the incentive.  Such firms would be able to retrieve 50% of their 
skills levy through mandatory grants and also qualify for discretionary grants.  In theory, if 
they went beyond the call of duty and fulfilled their discretionary training obligations through 
the implementation of learnerships, it was possible to qualify for expanded discretionary 
funding thereby contributing further to the skills development process.  The compliance 
obligations which firms were required to conform could nonetheless be experienced as 
onerous and bureaucratic. 
 
Gradually, over time, as the contrast was drawn between firms that had initially shunned the 
system and firms which remained steadfast and participated became more noticeable, firms 
previously disenchanted changed their stance and participated as the evidence of the DoL 
showed (see Kraak, 2008a).  Thus, there is a point where financial incentives can elicit a 
reasonable level of engagement and participation from firms. 
 
The shift in the levy disbursement under NSDS lll reduces the incentive to employers even 
further particularly on their mandatory training commitments.  The administrative route to 
accessing such funding becomes more complex to firms than it was before.  Mandatory grant 
funding under NSDS lll was reduced from 50% to 20%.  Discretionary grant funding was 
increased to 50%, but the criteria to access it introduced new conditions.  These are 
administratively more complex to manage and implement from the position of the firm.  Thus 
firms that had previously been switched-on with the possibility to retrieve 50% of the 
mandatory grant under previous disbursement policies have a much higher propensity to be 
switched-off when the same mandatory grant is reduced to 20% under NSDS lll.  In 
percentage terms, the fall in mandatory grant levels from 50% previously to 20% under 
NSDS lll is equivalent to a 60% fall in training funds for on-the-job training, albeit mainly for 
non-accredited and short courses. 
 
Even though it is more desirable at a macro-level for firms to expand their involvement on 
longer term qualification-yielding training programmes, which are typically financed through 
discretionary expenditure under the NSDS, the fact that they experience a decline in 
mandatory grant allocations will be perceived by the firms themselves as an immediate 
disincentive.  It is possible that evidence can show there to be a pattern of substitution from 
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participating in formal government regulated programmes where emphasis is placed on 
longer qualification bearing programmes and instead opting out.  Opting out can mean not 
undertaking any training at all but it can also mean expanding training on their own account.  
It can take place if firms expand their out-of-pocket training commitments on programmes 
which have immediate operational imperatives.  These are typically short courses and short 
training programmes.  The shift in the incentive certainly brings into play other options which 
firms can access and use to undertake their enterprise related training obligations.  Data from 
an HSRC Survey (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008) showed that there is in fact a high 
likelihood of this occurring. 
7.4.2 Collective Interest Incentives 
Unlike the situation in Germany where the formation of  Craft Chambers at the end of the 
nineteenth century contributed to the emergence of a guild sector among small employers 
which has consistently reinforced the expression of collective interests among employers in 
the sector, the existence of collective employer interests under the NSDS was highly 
dispersed. 
 
Moreover, in South Africa, it was harder to fathom what precisely collective incentives 
would be without differentiating the cluster of interests among employers.  Ivor Blumenthal 
(2013), a flamboyant but controversial former SETA CEO, suggested that business as a 
whole had become weaker with the onset of democracy in South Africa.  Cleavages between 
large and small business is often hard to discern resulting in business being presented as an 
amorphous whole. In terms of the skill formation process Blumenthal believes that business 
has become complacent and resigned from asserting its robust civic obligations within the 
new South Africa.  He claims that this is done by accepting ‘its status as the whipping boy of 
government and organized labour’ (Blumenthal, 2013: 38).  As Blumenthal remarks: 
‘Organised business lost its will to exist as a proud collective entity asserting the 
rights of the business constituency in this country.  The small business lobby 
completely disappeared and the version of a small business lobby which arose has 
been completely ineffective, while big business has become resigned to operating 
outside formal structures of government and the social partnership’ (Blumenthal, 
2013: 38). 
In the Western Cape metal and engineering industry, small and medium-sized metal and 
engineering firms dominate the industry numerically and through their voice in the Cape 
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Manufacturers and Founders Association.  While constituting a relative niche segment, in the 
context of national organization (e.g. SEIFSA) and national policy interest (e.g. BUSA), the 
voice of the Cape Manufacturers and Founders Association would be drowned by bigger 
associations as well as large metal and engineering firms.  Its specific interests in respect of 
public supported training provision would be missed.  Specifically, the mainly small and 
medium sized enterprises of the Cape Manufacturers and Founders Association (CMFA) do 
not have the size advantages to operate in-house training schools or in-house training 
facilities.  But these firms have a keen interest and commitment to enterprise skills 
development (Lundall, 2005; 2006).  However, these firms generally require the availability 
of adequately provisioned ‘neighbourhood’ training schools/workshops to which their trainee 
apprentice and technicians can attend preferably on a block-release system.  After theoretical 
and practical training of a trainee apprentice or technician at such neighbhourhood or FET 
college or university of technology has been completed, it is preferred that the trainee returns 
immediately to the firm where employed.  It allows him or her to round-off the training 
received with practical application at the workplace (Discussion with Ewald Wessels a retired 
member of the CMFA in October 2015).  Unfortunately the levy-grant disbursement system 
does not cater for the expression of collective interests as discussed above and the manner by 
which their actions can be strengthened by an incentive system.  This is because the national 
strategic needs of such employer groupings was  not likely to be entertained by the National 
Skills Fund under NSDS ll and is even less likelier under NSDS lll. 
7.4.3 Informational Incentives 
Friedrich Hayek (1948) was perhaps among the first political economists to theorise the 
contours of informational incentives and disincentives.  Hayek’s reflection on the matter can 
even serve as a postulate.  As he noted: 
‘…practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he 
possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which 
use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with 
his active co-operation’ (Hayek, 1948: 80). 
Skills development and training at an enterprise level which is financed through retrievals on 
the levy-grant disbursement would automatically bring into play a degree of input and 
evaluation from SETA officials into the firm’s training activities.  Firms may construe this as 
a trade-off between relinquishing some control to the SETA in exchange for the finances 
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which are provided.  However, a line will be drawn in relinquishing such control over 
programmes which are financed solely on the basis of self-initiated out-of-pocket financing.  
Firms would perceive the training activities which stem from out-of-pocket expenses as 
simply none of a SETA’s business.  It is in this light that the concept of informational 
incentives to which Archer (2010 & 2012) earlier alluded has a lot of relevance as the third 
component to my discussion of incentives and disincentives. 
 
7.5 Studies on Enterprise Training 
Using evidence from Australia, Smith (1996/1997) argues that the notion of transferable 
general and non-transferable firm-specific training does not necessarily correspond to the 
evidence from actual firm surveys.  Smith (1996/1997?) noted that firms in fact value general 
training which is easily transferable for its communication benefits, rather than for its 
technical content.  From case-study evidence that Smith (1996/1997?) drew upon concerning 
evidence of technical training or firm specific training which was supposed to be less 
transferable, it tended to be outsourced to equipment vendors.  Similarly, the view within 
Australian government agencies advising or overseeing skill formation policies and supported 
by academic research (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 1991) was that managers 
generally view training as a cost instead of an investment.  It was presumed that managers 
within enterprises undertook decisions which reinforced short-term training goals.  The case 
study evidence which Smith (1996/1997?) marshalled did not fully endorse this view.  In fact, 
senior managers in the case-study enterprises were deeply committed to training because they 
viewed a skilled labour force as an essential feature of the long-term survival of the 
enterprise.  It was the middle and junior managers at the operation level who held a more 
short-term vision.  These lower level managers were unfortunately also responsible for the 
implementation of training in enterprises which usually led to less optimal results (Smith, 
1996/1997?). 
 
Similarly, there is the common view, confirmed by survey results, that small enterprises 
generally do not train their employees.  Where training does occur, it is significantly less than 
the amount of training undertaken in large firms.  However Smith (1996/1997?) noted that 
these results generally reflect the pattern of formal off-the-job training and enterprise 
expenditure on training.  Informal and non-traditional forms of training which are common in 
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small firms are usually not recorded in such surveys.  Thus, the evidence does not capture the 
commitment small firms have towards enterprise training.  And as Smith (1996/1997?) 
remarks:  
‘The nature of training is often different in small enterprises.  The restrictions on 
resources and their isolation from training networks means that training may be 
delivered through a wide variety of largely informal means.  Staff meetings, problem-
solving sessions and the close day-to-day contact between employers in small 
enterprises are means by which employers in these enterprises learn.  … However, it 
would be unlikely that this form of training would be reported as training expenditure 
by the enterprise in a national survey’ (Smith, 1996/1997?: 148). 
In subsequent work which referred to Smith’s earlier inferences, Smith and his co-authors 
(Smith et al., 2008) review different approaches that were applied in firm surveys conducted 
in Australia, the UK and Europe to measure and understand employer training expenditure. 
 
Three components of their review (Smith et. al., 2008) is relevant to the discussion.  The first 
point was to determine how these surveys measured the distribution of vocational expenditure 
borne by employers versus other groups.  Second was to ascertain what training was funded 
by government, employers and individual employees.  Third, was to ascertain what data firms 
maintained about training activity and how this training activity was measured. 
 
In the survey of Employer Training Expenditure and Practices conducted by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 2001-2002, over one-third of employers who provided training 
were not able to report on the incidence of unstructured training.  This is because they had 
insufficient records of the incidence of unstructured training.  Similarly, a number of 
employers were also not able to report on their expenditure on structured training.  This again 
was due to the absence of accurate records or the absence of relevant data (Smith et al. 2008: 
13).  This was more pervasive in firms with a decentralised structure (e.g. franchise firms).  
Firms which had to conform to more stringent quality arrangements such as ISO quality 
standards where keeping more systematic records about training expenditure is a prerequisite 
(see Smith et al. 2008: 31) were an exception.  But most firms generally do not keep good 
records which measure the duration in hours away from work that employees attended for 
training.  (Smith et al. 2008: 13-14). 
 
Similar measurement problems are also endemic to surveys conducted overseas (the UK and 
Europe).  An example is the 2005 National Employers Skills Survey which was conducted by 
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a private research company for the Learning and Skills Council in the UK.  The survey had a 
question about the out-of-pocket training expenditure of firms but did not measure staff time 
associated with the activity, as a cost to firms.  Furthermore, the survey captured the amount 
of total expenditure but did not make provision for expenditure on constituent elements of the 
training (Smith et al. 2008: 17).  While the UK National Employers Skills Survey represents 
a breakthrough in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure of firms, both the Australian and UK 
Surveys continue to under-estimate firm level training expenditure.  Thus, where such under-
expenditure is recorded, firms themselves bear the burden.  Typically, this is the product of 
the unrecorded out-of-pocket expenses which enterprises themselves bear.  In their 
summation of the data which firms kept about training activity and its measurement, Smith et 
al. (2008) made the following observation: 
‘There was considerable variation in the training expenditure data kept by the case 
study organisations.  In the case of smaller organisations, very few records were kept, 
and estimates of training expenditure by managers in these organisations were little 
more than informal guesses.  In the larger organisations, more extensive records were 
kept of training activities and of expenditure on training.  However, although larger 
organisations kept good records of the training carried out and the training received 
by individual staff members, records of expenditure on training were much more 
difficult to access.  Often data on training expenditure were not kept by training 
departments but might be found in other areas of the organisation.  Sometime, 
expenditure data were scattered across a number of locations, especially in 
organisations with a number of divisions and therefore a number of different training 
“centres”.  This made it very difficult even for the best organised firms to report on 
their training expenditure patterns with any degree of accuracy.  This lack of data or 
lack of data accessibility was reflected in the fact that all of the case study 
organisations experienced significant problems with the questions in the Training 
Expenditure and Practices Survey questionnaire (Smith et al, 2008: 37). 
Measurement problems such as these may even be endemic to South African enterprise skill 
surveys which try to measure the incidence of enterprise training. 
7.5.1 The HSRC National Skills Survey and Out-Of-Pocket 
Expenses 
Quite an extensive literature on enterprise training has in the recent period gradually also 
been assembled in South Africa (Badroodien, 2003, 2004, 2005; McGrath & Paterson, 2008).  
These discussions draw on data derived mainly from three national skills surveys conducted 
in South Africa by the HSRC.  These surveys consisted of a baseline survey conducted in 
2000 (Kraak, Paterson, Visser & Tustin, 2000 cited in Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008), and 
two national skills surveys conducted in 2003 (Paterson, McGrath & Badroodien (Eds.), 
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2005) and 2007 (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008).  The 2003 and 2007 national skills 
surveys (NSS) used a similar methodology and with only minor amendments, deployed the 
same question.  Since the report of the results to the 2007 survey provides comparison with 
the results from the 2003 NSS and the 2000 Baseline Survey, the 2007 NSS is the basis of my 
own interpretation of these surveys.  Thus, illustrative data will only be drawn from tables 
presented in the report authored by Paterson, Visser & du Toit (2008). 
 
The problems which Smith (1996/1997?) identified as endemic to Australian and European 
enterprise skill surveys are not absent from corresponding South African surveys.  Firms can 
engage in out-of-pocket expenditure as a contingent measure to counter unresolved 
expectations which the existing state regulated training levy fails to resolve.  Here firms can 
treat the levy as a tax and disengage from the levy altogether or they can treat the levy as a 
tax and still continue to engage with the levy.  Where firms expend on out-of-pocket 
expenditure at the same time as engaging with the skills levy, it is quite likely for them to 
operate a system of dual investment training expenditure.  They themselves would manage it 
as an internal calculative practice.  The points on calculative practice where raised earlier by 
Cutler et al. (1977; 1978) and (Miller, 2008).  However, when firms engage in calculative 
practice, they are likely to engage in a practice of ‘substituting’ the results of their training 
outputs to retrieve levy income: if their levy training performance does poorly (with the 
potential of enduring penalties on delivery failure).  Thus, they are likely to substitute the 
results of their positive out-of-pocket results and impute this as positive results from levy-
induced training.  It is merely a smart way of masking under-performance which is subject to 
government compliance conditions but also to maximise the benefits of full levy retrievals. 
 
Badroodien was quite explicit about the imprecisions in measuring the incidence of training 
in South African firms: 
‘There are three reasons why it is not yet possible to predict accurately the number of 
workers presently being trained in South Africa.  Many firms may be training workers 
but are not yet participating in the levy-grant scheme; otherwise, they are not claiming 
back their levies (thus treating the skills levy as a form of tax); alternatively they are 
training workers and not being registered because their annual turnover is less than 
R250 000’ (Badroodien, 2003: 442). 
Although the HSRC surveys were not able to differentiate between the incidence of firm-led 
training performed as a result of compulsory obligations to the 1% national skills levy, versus 
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training that occurred beyond the ambit of the levy which firms voluntary undertook (i.e. out-
of-pocket-expenses), the evidence from these surveys are still insightful.  In the 2000/1 
financial year, the HSRC Baseline Survey suggested that across all sectors, firms in the 
aggregate spent 1.3% of their payroll on training (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008, Table 
4.27).  The 2003 HSRC NSS showed that this aggregate training expenditure for firms in all 
sectors increased to 2.0% of payroll in the 2002/3 financial year (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 
2008, ibid.).  It increased further to 3.0% of payroll in the 2006/7 financial year according to 
the 2007 HSRC NSS (Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 2008, ibid.). 
 
Supposing that all firms that responded positively to the HSRC National Skills Survey for 
both 2003 and 2007 were compliant with paying the 1% skills development levy for each of 
the time periods of the survey, we can deduce that firms in 2002/3 contributed an extra 1% 
(i.e. 2% minus the 1% skills levy) and firms in 2006/7 contributed an extra 2% (i.e. 3% minus 
the 1% skills levy) to training above and beyond the 1% skills development levy which they 
incurred.  These amounts can actually be inferred as ‘out of pocket’ expenses incurred on 
training.  If we concentrate our analysis on firms by enterprise class size, there is even greater 
variation in the incidence of the out of pocket expenses.  For small enterprises the incidence 
of out of pocket expenses increase from 0% in 2002/3 to 0.6% in 2006/7.  In the case of 
medium sized enterprises, out of pocket expenses increased from 0.3% in 2002/3 to 0.8% in 
2006/7.  Finally, (bearing in mind that we are doing a mental calculation of the percentage 
shown in Table 7.1 minus the 1% skills development levy as has been done in the cases cited 
above) in large enterprises with an employee class size exceeding 150 employees, out of 
pocket expenses increased from 1.5% in 2002/3 to 2.8% in 2006/7. 
 
Table 7.1 Expenditure on Training by Enterprise Size: 2000/1 to 2006/7 
 
 
Under the most conducive scenario, levy compliant firms that fulfill all the regulatory 
requirements under the NSDS for the period (i.e. the tenure of NSDS 1 & ll) when the 
Training Expenditure as a % of payroll for different survey periods
Enterprise Size 2000/2001 2002/2003 2006/2007
Small (11-49) n.d. 1.0 1.6
Medium (50-149) n.d. 1.3 1.8
Large (150+) n.d. 2.5 3.8
Total 1.3 2.0 3.0
Source: National Skills Survey 2007, ESSD Research Programme, HSRC, Table 4.27
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surveys were conducted, would receive up to a maximum of 0.7% of their returnable levy 
income.  Thus, out-of-pocket expenditure is a sunk cost that can only be retrieved as training 
benefits generated from the productivity of employees over the duration that they are engaged 
with a firm.  None of the above surveys conducted in South Africa by the HSRC however 
tested for evidence of the incidence of out-of-pocket expenditure from firms – over and above 
the skills levy.  I have tried to demonstrate the existence of out-of-pocket expenses through a 
small pilot survey which I conducted in preparation for this thesis.  Only selected evidence is 
used to illustrate the results of this pilot survey. 
7.5.2 Piloting Evidence of Out-Of-Pocket Expenses 
My original postulate to search for evidence of out-of-pocket expenses was motivated by the 
work of Gregory Lee, a South African academic economist.  In 2004, Lee suggested that 
‘companies may choose not to participate in some or all of the activities’ (Lee, 2004: 247) in 
respect of skills training.  ‘Instead’, he noted, ‘it is feasible that some organisations will pay 
the levy and have nothing more to do with the process (i.e. not participate in the SETA, not 
attempt to regain money from grants, and above all not change their training activities).  
Other companies may choose to participate in some of the initial activities, but not all’ (Lee, 
2004: 247).  This postulate also became enticing through my reading of the work of 
Alexandre Koyre, an historian of science (Koyre, 1943a; 1943b; 1953; 1955; 1968).  Koyre’s 
work poses the possibility that mental modelling or thought experiments (Mach, 1976; 
Popper, 1980 [1959]; Nersessian, 1991; 1992; Boorsboom, Mellenbergh & Van Heerden, 
2002) can lead to the clarification and testing of postulates used in social enquiry. 
 
I tried to test this idea in pilot survey work involving a sample of 43 firms.  I attempted to test 
whether firms viewed the existing skills levy as an adequate mechanism for training.  I also 
attempted to ascertain the extent to which firms resorted to out-of-pocket training 
expenditures to fulfill their training needs.  This pilot survey yielded the following answers as 
depicted in the tables below. 
 
Table 7.2 
Question 1 Has this business been able to fulfil all its skills and training needs through 





From Table 7.2, 53% of firms (23 out of 43) indicated that the skills and training needs of the 
business was met through mandatory and discretionary grant claims lodged with the 
designated SETA.  This figure is slightly more than half of the total in the return sample.  The 
balance amounting to 47% or 20 firms that indicated the skills and training needs of the 
business was not provided through mandatory and discretionary grants from the relevant 
SETA. 
 
The concept of out of pocket expenses ascertains whether firms that give a positive response 
(by answering ‘Yes’) and a negative response (by answering ‘No’) were required to make 
additional out of pocket expenses – that is expenses over and above the amount derived from 
the SETA for skills development and training undertaken.  Firms that answered either: ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’ to Question 1 theoretically could still incur out of pocket expenses to undertake firm 
level skills development and training.  Answering ‘Yes’, as shown in Table 7.2 implies that 
the skills and training needs of firms had been met through either mandatory or discretionary 
claims lodged with the SETA. 
 
However, in Question 2 of the Firm Survey, firms appeared to qualify the answer previously 
given in Question 1 by giving a more nuanced answer.  Similarly the options shown in 
Question 2 allowed firms that responded with a ‘No’ to Question 1 to give a somewhat more 
nuanced reply.  The response given to Question 2 suggested that firms that answered either 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in Question 1, suddenly conceded that the business nonetheless had to incur 
extra out of pocket expenses to fulfill some of its skills and training needs.  Table 7.3 which 
contains this data is shown below. 
Table 7.3 
Question 2: Did this business have to incur extra out of pocket costs (outside the levy) to 
fulfil some of its skills and training needs?  Please tick. 
 
Yes No Total
Skills & training needs of business provided through Number 23 20 43
mandatory & discretionary grants from relevant SETA Percentage 53.5 46.5 100
Yes No Not sure Total
Had to incur extra out of pocket costs to fulfill Number 36 4 3 43
skills & training needs of business Percentage 83.7 9.3 7.0 100
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Not all the respondents to Question 2 were sure (3 out of 43 respondents were unsure) about 
the actual situation with respect to out of pocket firm expenses for skills development and 
training costs.  Four out of forty-three firms (9.3%) claimed not to have incurred out of 
pocket expenses for its skills and training needs.  Significantly however, 36 out of 43 firms in 
the return sample (83.72%) acknowledged that they had to incur additional out of pocket 
expenses to fulfill the skills and training needs of the business. 
 
The clear identification of ‘out of pocket’ expenses as a concept which firms perceived (via 
the managers who completed the Firm Survey) as being applicable to their unique 
circumstances, enables one to rank ‘out of pocket expenses’ as a category aimed at enabling 
firms to realize their specific skills and training needs.  A number of options come up.  The 
first realization can be exclusively as out of pocket expenses without financial support from 
the SETA.  We can call this Option One.  Or it can be as out of pocket expenses in 
combination with financial support from the SETA which disburses the levy grant directly to 
firms.  We can call this Option Two.  Finally, firms may shun having to incur out of pocket 
expenses.  They can do it using two additional options which we refer to as Option Three and 
Option Four.  For Option Three, they can categorically refuse to incur out of pocket expenses 
but be amenable to receiving levy grant disbursements from the SETA.  This means that the 
firm will do some skills training.  Finally for Option Four, they can categorically refuse to 
incur out of pocket expenses and similarly refuse to have any financial dealings with the 
SETA.  A firm that chooses the latter option will also choose not to do any firm level skills 
development training whatsoever.  This ranking was obtained by interrogating the evidence 
obtained through Question 3 of the Firm Survey and is shown in Table 7.4 below. 
Table 7.4 
Question 3: Indicate which skills development training provision has been more important 
for this business? Please tick one option only. 
 
 
Most important skills development and training options to business Number Percentage
Skills & training provision acquired through SETA grants 3 7.0
Skills & training provision obtained through out of pocket expenses 16 37.2
Both options are equally important for the business 23 53.5




It can be seen from Table 7.4 that only a very small proportion of firms (7% or 3 out of 43) 
relied solely on SETA grants as a means of financing the skills and training provision of the 
firm.  Although the return sample in this Pilot Survey of 43 firms is only of modest size, there 
was not any firm shown which shunned both the SETA grants and the payment of out of 
pocket expenses.  One respondent was not sure about the firm’s position on any of the 
options and therefore indicated ‘Not sure’ as a reply. 
 
Two categories stand out.  Slightly more than one-third of firms in the return sample (16 
firms or 37.21% of the sample) maintained that the skills and training provision of the firm is 
financed wholly through out of pocket expenses.  In contrast, as was shown in the preceding 
paragraph above (3 firms or 7% of the sample) only three firms obtained their skills and 
training provision exclusively from SETA grants.  Thus, out of pocket expenses of skills and 
training provision occurs more than five-times more frequently than financing of skills and 
training provision exclusively through SETA grants (i.e. 16 firms versus 3 firms).  However, 
more than half of the firms in the return sample (23 firms or 53.49% of the sample) indicated 
that financing of skills and training provision for firms are equally important to using SETA 
grants as well as out of pocket expenses of firms.  The fact that all firms with the exception of 
one that gave a reply of ‘Not Sure’, had selected one of three options for the financing of 
skills and training provision within firms, namely: through SETA grants, through out of 
pocket expenses as well as through importance being attributed to both of the aforementioned 
options.  It suggests that the skills development and training provision within the firms in the 
pilot survey sample receive significant attention. 
7.5.3 Typical Out-of-pocket Expenses 
Question 4 of the Firm Survey attempted to gauge the typical out-of-pocket expenses that a 
firm was likely to incur during any given training year.  Although the question was structured 
and required each respondent firm to indicate from a pre-determined list what the out-of-
pocket expenses were likely to be, it did make provision for open-ended responses under 
‘Other’.  Unfortunately the open-ended part of the question had a very low response rate.  





Question 4: Please indicate from the box below, the typical out of pocket expenses (outside 




An ordinal ranking of the highest number of responses obtained for typical out-of-pocket 
expenses during an average training year (i.e. April Year One to March Year 2) showed that 
the most important expenses for firms in the return sample were as follows: 
 Wages and salaries of staff attending skills and training course or programmes (30 firms); 
 Course fees (27 firms); 
 Transport costs (21 firms); 
 Training fees or salaries; lecturer fees or salaries (19 firms) 
 Stipends for trainees attending skills and training courses and programmes (16 firms); 
 Books, stationery and study material (15 firms). 
 
The fact that a very low response rate was received from the open-ended section to Question 
21 justifies the selection of the structured option that respondents were given.  Had I relied 
exclusively on open-ended responses to frame the interpretation of out-of-pocket expenses, 
there would probably have been serious data deficiencies from the replies that firms would 
Typical out of pocket expenses  likely to be incurred during an Number of Firms
average training year
Stipends for trainees attending skills and training courses and programmes 16
Catering costs 11
Transport costs 21
Books, stationery & study material 15
Course Fees 27
Training Fees/Salaries; Lecturer Fees/Salaries 19
Wages & salaries of staff attending skills & training courses/programmes 30
Hiring costs (venue, tools, equipment) 6
None of the above 1
Other:
Costs for overseas training 1
Internal training 1
Not prepared to divulge this information 1
Not sure; can't think on a Monday 1
Payment to training provider 1
Training 2
Loss of production for course attendance 1
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have given.  Among the open-ended responses mentioned of typical out-of-pocket expenses 
that could be incurred by a firm in a given year included: 
 Costs for overseas training (1 firm); 
 Payment to a training provider (1 firm); 
 Loss of production for course attendance (1 firm). 
 
Among the responses obtained where no data was provided were the following: 
 Not prepared to divulge this information (1 firm) 
 Not sure; can’t think on a Monday (1 firm) 
 
Following from Table 7.5 above, Question 5 sought to ascertain the type of skills and training 
programmes that firms in the return sample typically sent their staff to attend during an 
average training year.  If we do an ordinal ranking of the responses obtained, short courses 
and on-the-job training received the highest response.  This was followed by specialized 
courses and programmes, accredited courses and programmes and skills programmes all 
showing an equal number of responses.  Learnership and apprenticeship programmes were 
pegged further below.  Surprisingly programmes offered through off-the-job institutional 
training provision involving FET college courses and programmes, university courses and 
programmes and university of technology courses and programmes received a significantly 





Question 5: Typically what kind of skills and training programmes would this business 
require for staff to attend during an average training year?  Please tick the relevant courses 
and programmes. 
 
The ordinal ranking of the data shown in Table 7.7 is reproduced again below.  It shows the 
following: 
 Short courses of less than five days were the most prominent manner that firms in the 
sample typically used to train their staff during an average business year (34 firms); 
 This was followed by 33 firms that typically made use of on-the-job training provided 
either by senior or skilled staff during an average training year (33 firms); 
 There was an equal spread among firms that preferred to obtain the skills that were 
required by staff members through three routes: Accredited courses and programmes; 
specialized courses and programmes and skills programmes (all three routes attained 27 
responses from firms; 
 The use of Learnership and Apprenticeship programmes as a route towards fulfilling the 
training needs of firms also both recorded an equal number of responses each obtaining 
19 responses; 
 This was followed by non-accredited courses and programmes which 14 firms gave as 
skills and training programmes that staff typically used during an average year; 
Typical skills and training programmes that this business is Number of Firms
likely to use during an average training year
Non-accredited courses and programmes 14
On-the-job training provided by senior & skilled staff 33
Accredited courses and programmes 27
Short courses (less than five days) 34
Long courses (six months or more) 11





FET College Courses & Programmes 7
University of Technology Courses & Programmes 5
University Courses & Programmes 6
Private College and Private University Courses & Programmes 2
Other




 Attendance on long courses which extended over six or more months received a lower 
preference: only 11 out of potentially 43 firms chose this option; 
 Finally as was noted above, institutional training either through course attendance at an 
FET, university or university of technology had potentially under 20% of responding 
firms choosing this option as a typical programme to enhance the skills composition of 
staff during an average training year. 
7.5.4 Accredited versus Non-Accredited Enterprise Training 
Among the glaring oversights which the researchers at the HSRC recorded is the notion of an 
aggregate training rate (Badroodien, 2003: 445-446; Paterson, 2005: 480-483; 490-494; 
Badroodien, 2005: 99; McGrath & Paterson, 2008: 303-304; Paterson, Visser & du Toit, 
2008: 22-32).  One would have expected evidence of this phenomenon to show up either as a 
training rate that has a lower or higher intensity (more hours assigned to training or training 
which leads to the acquisition of higher credentials).  However, the HSRC data merely used 
this notion of ‘training rate’ to show the incidence of a greater number of employees 
undergoing training. 
 
Nonetheless, the 2007 National Skills Survey
62
 does provide a breakdown of the firm level 
training undergone by employees within enterprises according to employee-class sizes for the 
periods: 2002/3 and 2006/7.  This data is shown in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 in Paterson, Visser 
& du Toit (2008).  I present the data from these two tables again as a consolidated table with 
the vertical and horizontal axes tilted so that a column of training standards could be 
represented as a column on the left-size of Table 7.7.  Table 7.7 is merely a consolidation of 




I make the assumption that training which the HSRC National Skills Development Survey 
labelled as training ‘according to standards’ is a proxy for accredited courses.  These can be 
short or long courses.  The accreditation as is shown in Table 7.7 is in terms of: SAQA/NQF, 
other nationally recognized standards, ISO 9000 as well as other internationally recognized 
standards.  Thus the total number of employees in small, medium and large enterprises that 
                                                 
62
 Unfortunately, I have not been able to scrutinise the raw data and undertake my own tests; neither have I been 
able to peruse a copy of the 2007 questionnaire which is not attached as an appendix to the National Skills 
Report that I have downloaded from the Department of Labour website.  Essentially I have relied solely on the 
data and analysis contained in the report authored by Paterson, Visser & du Toit (2008). 
63
 There is just a slight variation for numbers in the total columns that I have corrected. 
259 
 
were trained according to standards represents the provision of accredited training.  The third 
row from the bottom of Table 7.7 shows the percentage of employees who received training 
according to standards for these two time periods as a percentage of employees who received 
all types of training.  Here we see that for 2002/3 versus 2006/7, the percentage of employees 
that received training according to standards was as follows: 38.7% and 37% in small 
enterprises, 36.8% and 29.9% in medium enterprises and 25.2% and 29.5% in large 
enterprises.  We therefore notice that overall, for the two time segments, employees 
undergoing training according to standards in all enterprises captured in the survey increased 
by 1.9% as a share compared to the proportion of employees undergoing training classified as 
not to standards where an overall decline aggregate decline of 0.8% was recorded (see last 
row in Table 7.7; far right column). 
 
The converse of this of course is the percentage change in the incidence of employees 
undergoing training (in small, medium and large enterprises) classified as ‘not to standard’.  I 
make the second assumption that training which is not to standard represents non-accredited 
courses and programmes.  We can work with the assumption that a large segment of this non-
accredited training that was presented as training not to standards is training on short courses.  
As was indicated above, in the aggregate, for the period 2002/3 to 2006/7, the number of 
employees across all class-sizes of enterprises undergoing non-accredited training declined 
by -0.8%.  In large enterprises non-accredited training over the period also declined in fact by 
a larger margin of -5.8%.  This suggests that large firms were using accredited training at a 
faster rate than they were using non-accredited training.  However, there was still a 140% 
increase in the use of non-accredited training among large enterprises.  The increase of both 
accredited and non-accredited training occurred over this four year period for both small and 
medium sized enterprises.  Importantly however, the share in the distribution of non-
accredited training (i.e. training not to standards) increased at a faster tempo in both small 
enterprises (by 2.9% or from 61% to 63%) and medium sized enterprises (by 10.9% or from 
63.2% to 70.1%). 
 
A limitation of the HSRC data is that it is spread over a relatively short period: 2002/3 to 
2006/7.  Had there been follow-up national skills surveys for subsequent years, one would 
have had access to a much better time-line of data.  But despite this limited time-span, there 
is an emergent trend which the data documents even if rather tentatively.  In an earlier work, I 
drew similar tentative conclusions from the trend of discretionary account accumulations, 
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which only became obvious and incontrovertible many years later (Lundall, 2003b).  The 
trend that is observable on the basis of the HSRC National Skills Surveys for 2003 and 2007 
can of course be demonstrated with more a more up to date national skills survey which is of 
dire necessity.  Only a large institution such as the HSRC is likely to successfully execute 
such a survey in the present period. 
 
What is this trend?  All firms (small, medium and large) increased their incidence 
numerically of employee training for both accredited training (according to standards) and 
non-accredited training (not to standards).  Overall, there was a marginal increase in growth 
of accredited training: it increased from 30% to 30.6%, a shift equal to 1.9%.  This means 
that there was a marginal decrease in the growth of non-accredited training: it decreased from 
70% to 69.4%, a shift equal to 0.8%.  But there were differences in the shifts between 
accredited and non-accredited training for enterprises by class size.  Large firms increase 
their uptake of accredited training.  In small and medium sized enterprises, this uptake 
declined.  Large firms decreased their uptake of non-accredited training (as a share).  In small 
and medium sized enterprises, this uptake increased. 
 
Small and medium sized enterprises were embarking on a gradual substitution of accredited 
training programmes for non-accredited training programmes at a relatively early stage of 
NSDS 1 and NSDS ll.  This is probably because of the stiffer compliance conditions that 
were being instituted through the application of the skills development levy.  But they were 
not necessarily decreasing their involvement with accredited training programmes, merely 
hedging their bets, and spreading their risk.  In large enterprises the opposite trends were 
being encountered.  It is also possible that the incidence of non-accredited training  for 
enterprises of all sizes was more likely to be funded by out-of-pocket expenses.  Accredited 
training was more likely to be funded by the funds that could be claimed back from the levy 
(at either 50% via the mandatory grant or from discretionary grant claims for the remaining 
20%). 
 
We actually know very little about the structure of the claims for levy returns (for both 
mandatory and discretionary claims).  But it is likely that firms would report on the progress 
of achievements for levy returns in a smart way.  This means that potential failures for 
mandatory grant and discretionary grant reporting could potentially be substituted with 
reports on successes which firms are more likely to show on out-of-pocket expenditures.  
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Who would actually check to ascertain whether employee X who was to represent the firm 
for levy-grant training but departed the company prematurely versus employee Y who 
received training paid by the out-of-pocket firm training expenditure and successfully 
completed the programme is included or excluded from the final audit of completed training 
which is sent to the designated SETA?  While this may be somewhat speculative on my part, 
I am trying to demonstrate that a much more complex process of working the books is at play 
here (Powell, 1990: 311)
64
.  Thus, the sociological concept of out-of-pocket expenses bears 
strong parallels to the concept of working off-the-books which firms in other contexts 
typically use to avoid contributions to social security and minimum wages (Also see the 
research work of Colin Williams and his colleagues (2013) at Sheffield University). 
 
The incidence of a higher uptake in non-accredited courses for small and medium enterprises 
is likely to accelerate with changes in mandatory grant allocations which new SETA funding 
regulations potentially entail.  This process of uptake into non-accredited courses is likely 
also to affect large enterprises.  However without an updated national skills survey, the data 
to conclusively demonstrate this trend is absent.  In theory it is likely.  Factually, it still has to 
be shown.  A relatively innocuous trend whereby firms albeit it, small and medium sized 
firms, slowly embark upon a process of substituting their training expenditure, particularly 
that portion which falls outside of immediate oversight of the levy-grant system and which is 
financed by out-of-pocket expenses towards non-accredited training, is more likely.  It 
presents them with greater control and faster turnaround and even if it is aligned only to their 
short term operational needs. 
 
A levy-grant system which gradually and systematically increases the regulatory and 
compliance oversight to training that is financed by retrievals from the skills levy, potentially 
contains a similar disincentive.  It encourages firms (small to large) to shift from accredited 
training that is financed through the skills levy to non-accredited training that falls outside the 
skills levy and which can be financed through out-of-pocket expenses.  Should this take 
place, it reinforces the preservation of a more liberal coordinated training system, one which 
policy-makers have encouraged firms to move away from as the state has attempted to build a 
training system has a more mandated form of training coordination underpinning it.  This is 
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 I first became aware of the notion of working the books by reading this article by Powell (1990). 
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buttressed of course by laws and regulations enacted since 1998 as well as through different 
installments of the NSDS that has been implemented since 2001. 
 
Since training that is conducted through the mechanism of a skills levy at the site of the 
enterprise is an example of training coordination through sectoral institutions (i.e. SETAs), 
training by means of out-of-pocket expenditure is a form of voluntary coordination outside 
the purview of such sectoral institutions.  While it might mimic specific features of SETA 
skills development coordination, this is not necessarily the case.  Ultimately, training through 
out-of-pocket expenditure is mainly coordinated through the dominant calculative mindset 
within the firm.  Among others, this mindset can be on the basis of an engineering paradigm 
(scientific management), an accounting paradigm (cost control) or a paradigm influenced by 
various forms of human relations ideas (human resource management).   
 
In any event, as a response to the economic and wealth potential of human resource 
management in firms, enterprises and organisations (see Bisschoff & Govender (2004); Steyn 
(2004)), education, training and human resource development practitioners have increasingly 
become  established within such organisations particularly within the profit generating sector 
of the formal economy.  In very large enterprises, managers drawn from the human resource 
management, ‘personnel’, ‘training or skills development departments of such businesses 
have risen to occupy senior positions within their specific companies or within formal 
business enterprises.  Such managers have tended to champion the importance of staff or 
workforce training development as a specific feature to profitable enterprises.  Their 
disciplinary knowledge and professional affiliation almost instinctively compels them to 
behave in this way, mindful however of the organisational and economic imperatives of the 














According to Standards 2002/2003 2006/2007 % Change 2002/2003 2006/2007 % Change 2002/2003 2006/2007 % Change 2002/20032006/2007% Change
SAQA/NQF 15109 30890 104.4 19865 58730 195.6 30804 282336 816.6 65778 371956 465.5
Other nationally recogised standards 19331 29731 53.8 14707 23460 59.5 41976 15382 -63.4 76014 68573 -9.8
ISO 9000 6308 6521 3.4 13605 7516 -44.8 20261 27462 35.5 40174 41499 3.3
Other internationally recognised standards 9720 17873 83.9 6818 6750 -1.0 18601 8079 -56.6 35139 32702 -6.9
Total Trained to Standards 50468 85015 68.5 54995 96456 75.4 111642 333259 198.5 217105 514730 137.1
All Employees Trained 130308 229932 76.5 149499 322936 116.0 443484 1129629 154.7 723291 1682497 132.6
% of all employees trained to standards 38.7 37.0 -4.5 36.8 29.9 -18.8 25.2 29.5 17.2 30.0 30.6 1.9
Employees Trained (not to standards) 79840 144917 81.5 94504 226480 139.7 331842 796370 140.0 506186 1167767 130.7
% Employees Trained (not to standards) 61.3 63.0 2.9 63.2 70.1 10.9 74.8 70.5 -5.8 70.0 69.4 -0.8
Source: South Africa: National Skills Survey 2007, ESSD Research Programme, HSRC, Tables 3.11 & 3.12. Report written by Paterson, Visser & du Toit (2008)
Enterprise Size
Small (11-49) Medium (50-149) Large (150+) Total
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Because the HSRC surveys were not able to differentiate levy-grant training expenditure 
from out-of-pocket training expenditure, evidence of the incidence of employee participation 
in firm-level training may in fact have been incorrectly attributed to the NSDS.  Even without 
the NSDS, firms may in fact have undertaken a designated level of training as a proportion of 
payroll.  Unlike what occurred in Australia where such incorrect forms of training attribution 
were exposed through qualitative in-depth case studies, this does not appear to have occurred 
in South Africa.  A recent qualitative study of the training experiences at four firms (Cassim, 
et al. 2016) in the metal and engineering sector in South Africa suggested that there was a 
tendency among small and medium sized firms to favour on-the-job training above accredited 
training.  Training in such small and medium sized firms also tended to be conducted on an 
ad hoc basis as the need arose (Cassim, et al. 2016). 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 has provided a detailed exploration and elaboration of the design and construction 
of the skills development levy in South Africa.  This design process started roughly in 1994 
with studies conducted by NEDLAC and the NTB.  The results of this culminated in a policy 
framework by the Department of Labour known as the Green Paper on Skills Development.  
The Green Paper’s policy conceptions and formulation was almost wholly mirrored in the 
legislation and institutional design which followed it.  Due to constant difficulties around its 
implementation, the initial legislation had to be repeatedly revised to accommodate new 
challenges and conditions. 
 
I cover this period of statutory revision for two full phases of the NSDS starting in 2001.  My 
analysis covered the documentary evidence to the statutes governing the skills levy as well as 
the institutions responsible for ensuring that the policy supporting the coordination of the 
supply of skills at the enterprise level is and was being coherently implemented.  The analysis 
also broaches ideas and proposals to improve this central mechanism to the skills 
development system in South Africa which stretches over more than a decade until 2013 the 
rough cut-off period to this thesis. 
 
The skills levy has been analysed in this manner because it is one of the pivotal mechanisms 
through which the coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa is secured.  
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Essentially, the skills levy traces the ‘circuit’ – if one has the liberty to highlight a word Marx 
used to analyse the value form of the commodity – or the cycle of the flow in payroll levies 
from its inception as a compulsory obligation on firms to its collection by the SARS to its 
distribution to the SETAs and the NSF.  The SETAs are the final arbiter in the process and 
reassign the levies collected from firms as a payroll tax back to the firms that have fulfilled 
specific criteria and indeed undertaken skills development and training.  I have tried as far as 
possible to mirror the actual administrative and bureaucratic process through which firms 
have to proceed to finally retrieve the levy payments that are due to them.  In the process, 
using an inference formulated by Sean Archer (2010 & 2012), I have developed closing 
remarks on the incentives and disincentives that the entire levy process has exerted upon 
firms under the new national skills dispensation in South Africa.  This has been done to get a 
full understanding of the principal formal mechanism that is used to fund the supply of skill 
at the enterprise level.  This funding mechanism is an important feature to the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation and the supply of skills.  Thus, funding for the supply of skills is 
the principal objective of the skills development levy.  This is also the reason why the 
components that make up the skills development levy is analysed in such detail. 
 
Because the precise measurement of expenditure on enterprise training is often quite 
inadequate, this chapter tries to account for this inaccuracy by differentiating between the 
formal expenditure which firms incur when they train employees and the non-visible 
expenses which is hard to measure.  I have defined the latter as the out-of-pocket costs of 
training.  Thus, the final section to Chapter 7 provides insights into the incidence of out-of-
pocket expenses which firms incur when undertaking enterprise training.  This analysis is 
contextualized in terms of the reality which enterprises confront when administering the skills 
development levy in South Africa and its component parts, namely the mandatory grant and 
the discretionary grant.  Evidence from the national skills surveys as well as my own pilot 
survey of a small sample of firms suggests that there is evidence of the incidence of out-of-
pocket expenditure which firms incur.  It represents a dimension of calculative practice at the 
enterprise about which very little is known.  However, even though little is known about it, it 
is extremely important because it suggests trends among firms of a substitution of the training 
which is undertaken.  This substitution is between levy-financed training and non-levy 
financed training.  Non-levy financed training may be more pervasive than is expected.  It is 





Confirmation of the existence of out-pocket-expenditures which firms make to ensure that 
their training needs are met under the current national skills development system, 
notwithstanding their compulsory levy contributions, is also significant from a 
methodological viewpoint.  The literature on skills formation systems in which skills levies 
are prominent mechanisms to the coordination of enterprise skill formation is wholly silent 
on this phenomenon.  It is implicit in the literature but has not been systematically tackled as 
a component and a source to the financing of workforce training within enterprises.  It was 
mainly through drawing upon the work of Alexandre Koyré that postulates of the existence of 
out-of-pocket expenditure within firms could be made. 
 
Confirmation of the prevalence of out-of-pocket expenses became noticeable through an 
interrogation of data contained in national skills surveys conducted by the HSRC.  A 





Chapter 8: Synthesis of Observations and 
Findings to the Coordination of Enterprise Skill 
Formation 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter consolidates the observations and findings of this thesis.  These observations and 
findings are theoretical as well as empirical.  The theoretical observations permeate the thesis 
but they are also explicitly formulated in chapters 3 and 4.  In these two chapters a discussion 
defining skill and a discussion of the sociological understanding of coordination is 
formulated.  The empirical findings are largely elaborated in chapters 5 to 7 of the thesis 
although it is my understanding that the findings are also informed by the theoretical 
premises which underpin the thesis.  Both the theoretical observations and empirical findings 
contribute to the knowledge which the thesis attempts to advance. 
 
However, it is pertinent to first locate the theoretical observations and the contribution that is 
made to the thesis.  From the start, this thesis sets out to develop a sociological and historical 
narrative of professional, market and state initiatives in coordinating enterprise skill 
formation in South Africa.  The initiative was viewed from the perspective of coordinating 
the supply of enterprise skills.  It was necessary therefore to formulate a sociological 
framework in which the often vast and haphazard interventions to coordinate the skill 
provisioning and skill formation process at the enterprise or firm-level could be coherently 
framed.  Although, the research evidence which was collected imposed necessary constraints 
on the manner in which the coordination of enterprise skill formation and the contribution 
which professionals, the market as well as the state was conceived in the thesis, it is 
important to bear in mind the constant effort I have made to narrow the margins between the 
evidence and the arguments which the evidence justifies.  Thus, the margins between 
evidence and argument, typically masks a messy process of theorising. 
 
‘Theorising’ is defined by Swedberg as the process before a theory is presented in its final 
form (Swedberg, 2016: 7).  One’s theoretical postulates often shape the evidence that is 
sought in research endeavours.  Perhaps C. Wright Mills captured this dilemma more crisply 
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when he noted that: ‘Facts discipline reason; but reason is the advance guard in any field of 
learning’ (Mills, 1970: 226).  Translated into a contemporary format as Swedberg (2016) 
avers, this implies that a strong correlation exists between observation and theory, 
particularly in sociology.  More particularly, because he conceives sociology as an empirical 
science, Swedberg actually remarks that ‘observation also belongs to theory’ (2016: 9).  As 
Swedberg (2016) puts it: 
‘In sociology you always start with observation, and you proceed from there.  A 
second reason is that some important parts of observation are based on theoretical 
considerations’ (Swedberg, 2016: 9). 
Essentially, observation is theory-laden.  The theory informs what one sees.  It also denies 
one being able to appreciate evidence about what in all probability is latent and therefore 
exists but cannot be seen or recognised.  Some theories induce a blindness or misrecognition 
of the same phenomena and evidence that a better theory enables one to recognise and 
observe.  In the following section, I discuss theoretical observations which the thesis drew 
upon and extended further. 
 
8.2 Theoretical Observations 
The strong correlation between theory and observation however does not mean that the 
theoretical observations are a crude reflection of the empirical findings to the thesis.  Indeed, 
quite an intricate relationship exists between the core concepts of the thesis and the evidence 
which justifies its use. 
 
Because I have been mindful of the constant tension between the quantitative and qualitative 
content of the subject matter to this research, I have also been mindful of the importance of 
maintaining a sense of integrative coherence in relating concepts to evidence.  It was 
important to deploy the concepts of ‘skill’ and ‘coordination’ in particular without either 
becoming ontological or epistemological straight-jackets (see Abend, 2008 & Goertz & 
Mahoney, 2012).  Abend (2008) goes so far as to plead for ontological and epistemological 
pluralism in sociological theory.  The argument however is not new: Hindess & Hirst (1977) 
made a similar argument three decades before in respect of the theory of modes of production 
in a Marxist interpretation of history.  Hindess & Hirst (1977) were however more 
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unequivocal in their denunciation of what they referred to as ‘epistemological privilege’.  As 
they argued in their second co-authored book published in 1977: 
‘An epistemology is a dogmatism in the sense that it posits a certain level or form of 
discourse as being epistemologically privileged and ultimately immune to further 
evaluation.  To reject epistemology is to destroy the foundations of that dogmatism’ 
(Hindess & Hirst, 1977: 20-21). 
The evidence which has been marshalled in this thesis is neither exclusively qualitative nor 
quantitative.  It is both qualitative and quantitative.  In defining skill (see chapter 3), an 
overlap between the qualitative and quantitative dimension of skill became apparent.  An 
attempt was made to ontologically address the qualitative dimension of skill through: the 
social construction of skill, situating skills through intellectual disciplines and through 
national training discourse with a final discussion of an Anglo-Saxon versus a European 
conception of perceiving skills.  But it was extremely difficult to coherently maintain a 
qualitative conception of skill, especially in a social field where there is a high level of 
contestation in accepting any definition of skill.  As a result, a compromise had to be sought.  
It was elegantly embodied in the work of Francis Green (2011) in the United Kingdom and it 
is a definition which is hard to reject.  I completely endorse Green’s definition: it is a good 
starting point. 
 
However, there is a level of generality in the definition of skill which Green (2011) proposes 
and it actually extenuates problems of measurement.  Measurement problems are of course 
epistemological.  This is especially noticeable when epistemological pronouncements are 
normally invoked in disputes over the reality of objects and the measurement of the social 
conditions which are encountered in locating and examining such objects (also see Cicourel, 
1964).  Consequently, epistemological pronouncement is used as an arbiter between error and 
truth.  Epistemological disputes are confirmed or refuted by observations that are codified 
further through measurement. 
 
Thus, to accommodate the qualitative ontology of skill with the practical epistemology that 
reflects the reward, recognition and deployment of skills which firms and enterprises uphold 
in routine economic life which differentiates but also binds workers and employers, I reverted 
to inserting a quantitative proxy for skill.  While it was substantiated through literature, some 
of which is drawn from human capital theory, this proxy enables one to view the composition 
of skill that can be acquired as an attribute held by individuals participating in the labour 
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market.  These attributes can be measured.  The components to this proxy for ‘skill’ actually 
refers to a more quantitative ontology which bears a closer correlation between the definition 
of skill and the source of skill as an acquired embodied attribute which people are able to 
possess.  Such possession is an innate but acquired quality.  Bridging the divide between the 
definition of skill and the sources which constitute elements through which the embodiment 
of skills in productive economically engaged individuals is enhanced, eases the measurement 
of the skill formation and acquisition process.  To reiterate, the more quantitative but 
qualitatively-sensitive definition of skill which finally underpins the thesis consists of: skill as 
an acquisition through formal education, skill as an acquisition through formal training (both 
on and off the job), skill as the acquisition and accumulation of work experience and skill as 
the capacity for learning by doing.  In the latter, skill is an attribute that is acquired through 
learning by doing. 
 
A similar arduous process was ontologically and epistemologically navigated to arrive at a 
definition of coordination which is applicable in different settings.  The definition was also 
sculptured to perceive the different levels through which the coordination of enterprise skill 
formation in South Africa ensued historically, stretching from the late nineteenth century to 
the current conjuncture. 
 
Unlike the difficulty and fuzziness associated with an ontology of skill, resulting in a virtual 
mental gymnastics to bridge it with the practical epistemological application of skill, the 
ontology of coordination is semantically and conceptually less ambiguous.  Thus, the 
definition of coordination advanced by Francis, Levacic, Mitchell and Thompson (1991) of 
bringing into a relationship otherwise disparate activities or events is quite easy to embrace.  
In its least adorned form, Alexander (1995) uses the title of his book: How Organisations Act 
Together as the fundamental ingredient which characterises coordination. 
 
However, the application of the concept has metamorphosed for practical application.  Over 
time, coordination has become embedded in analysis and designs to understand the rich array 
of institutional arrangements and structures that have been used to organise and build 
economies and societies.  This process contributed to the formation of specific organs and 
structures with the state also facilitating improvements in coordination as a whole.  The thesis 
thus documents the initial tentative application of the concept of coordination, from a 
271 
 
sociological perspective, from at least the early 1920s, in the work of G.D.H. Cole.  These 
insights were quite evidently embodied in Cole’s book, Social Theory (1920). 
 
The insights by Cole were taken up even further by Gunnar Myrdal in his book, Beyond the 
Welfare State (1960).  Myrdal’s book was important because while it illustrated the pivotal 
coordinative role which the state played in social organisation as a whole, he also emphasised 
the coordinative roles which other groups and interests played in societal coordination.  These 
roles contributed to an infrastructure which strengthened society, including markets and the 
social sector.  Myrdal was supportive of greater decentralised self-government whereby 
citizens participated more actively and through which they exercised greater control.  This 
arrangement served as a bulwark against centralised domination and postulates a more 
pluralist dispensation of the coordination potential that permeated the overall society.  Myrdal 
thus postulates the state and society as a more complex set of bodies and institutions which 
react upon one another.  In a sense, Myrdal sketches a degree of centrifugal coordination and 
intervention from the state which is complemented by a reverse flow of centripetal 
coordination from various interests onto the state and society. 
 
A more coherent framework of both micro- and macro- coordination that is directly 
applicable to the skills formation process flows from Myrdal’s conceptualisations.  Thus, 
quite a detailed discussion was undertaken of micro-coordination which occurs at the 
enterprise level.  This was done in order to elevate the concepts of enterprise planning and 
enterprise calculation.  There is a strong current of enterprise planning and economic and 
enterprise calculation which contributes to the formation and supply of labour and workplace 
skills at the enterprise or firm-level of production and reproduction.  Although the concept of 
economic calculation was first prominently articulated in the socialist calculation debates of 
the 1920s (see Hayek, 1948; Boettke, 2001), it is the theorisation of Hindess & Hirst (1977) 
that has given the concept greater prominence and currency.  This work was extended in a 
two volume theoretical publication titled: Marx’s Capital and Capitalism Today (Cutler, 
Hindess, Hirst & Hussain, 1977; 1978). 
 
In a more general manner, Myrdal’s work also anticipates the continuation of research on 
macro-coordination and especially the macro-coordination which has an impact on the 
overall skill formation process embodied within larger geographical boundaries defined by 
nationalism, language, geographical or regional formations.  In particular, the detailed 
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comparative economic analysis which Prais (1981) and his collaborators undertook in the late 
1970s and early 1980s has grown exponentially and has been taken further by comparative 
political theorists.  This literature has spawned a thrust of scholarship which has acquired the 
descriptive mantle typically known as the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach.  Here, 
emphasis is placed on understanding the comparative institutional advantages which different 
forms of capitalism (e.g. liberal versus coordinated) have over the other. 
 
Significant attention in the VOC approach is devoted to understand the importance which 
skill formation plays in providing an institutional advantage in the national productivity and 
prosperity of competing countries under different varieties of capitalism.  Theorists who 
broadly embrace this approach but who write specifically on the issues of skill formation 
have done so from the perspective that it is a collective process.  Thus, while there is no 
specific school of scholarship to designate theorists who adopt this specific approach which is 
generally located in political science/studies, where a neo-institutionalist framework as a 
perspective is more pervasive, they themselves refer to their work as the political economy of 
collective skill formation.  Core research papers showing theorists affiliated to this school of 
scholarship are contained in publications edited respectively by Mayer & Solga (2008) and 
Busemeyer & Trampusch (2012).  However, it is the sophisticated monograph of Thelen 
(2004) with its extensive historical coverage and exquisite detail that compels readers to give 
serious attention and engagement with the phenomenon of the political economy of collective 
skill formation.  Thelen’s text sets a benchmark to the analysis of collective skill formation 
for supporters and critics alike. 
 
An intriguing prospect however in this literature is the sheer resilience of countries finding 
themselves in opposite capitalist varieties being unable to extricate themselves from the 
capitalist variety or path in which they have been inducted.  One reason for this strong level 
of institutional resilience is imputed to reside in the collaborative gains which economic 
power groups (e.g. employers, trade unions etc.) derive from institutional continuity.  The 
thrust of this line of research orientation – typically referred to as neo-institutionalism – are 
explanations which place a high premium on understanding either a continuity or a 
discontinuity in the specific institutional configurations which result in countries that fall 
under either liberal or coordinated types or varieties of capitalism.  Thelen’s (2004) book 
How Institutions Evolve, incorporates the skill formation dimension as it takes place at the 
plant level and its infusion into supporting institutions is exemplary of a neo-institutionalism 
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that embraces the VOC perspective and applies the analysis to the skill formation process.  
Without abdicating my own unattached sociological pluralism, I certainly incorporate lines of 
enquiry which Thelen has suggested and I pose the question whether high levels of out-of-
pocket training expenditure by firms is not in fact evidence of a disjuncture which is starting 
to germinate in the more recent phases of the South African skill formation process. 
 
At a theoretical framework level, it is the work of Ernest Alexander (1995) which has 
provided the clearest and perhaps most comprehensive framing of the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation in the South African skills development system.  Simply put, 
Alexander (1995) sees specific control mechanisms as the precondition for corresponding 
coordination structures. 
 
Alexander (1995) identifies three specific control mechanisms which he refers to specifically 
as: price, authority and trust.  Each is associated respectively with coordination structures 
which are described as: markets, hierarchies and community.  Markets, hierarchies and 
community correspond to the descriptive etymology that I used in the discussion of Brint.  
Brint (1984) distinguishes between the market sector, the state sector and the community 
sector.  Inspired by the work of Granovetter (1985) among others (see also: Fligstein, 1996; 
2001, Richter, 2001), the new economic sociology highlights markets as social structures (see 
Swedberg, 1994).  Alexander (1995) independently extends this conception to coordination 
structures.  Through logical inference one can therefore argue that markets, hierarchies and 
community are coordination structures, each respectively under the control mechanism of 
price, authority and trust. 
 
Since these control mechanisms impose a different coordination logic respectively on 
markets, hierarchy and community, using South African evidence as an illustration, I have 
furthermore infused the nomenclature of a market economy, a state economy and a social 
development economy that each of these control mechanisms have followed.  I have pursued 
this representation through an historical analysis of the evidence.  As a result I have referred 
to these control mechanisms as structural economies.  It gives me the license to demarcate the 
skill formation orientation and attribution that each of these control mechanisms has followed 
over a given period.  Thus, it has allowed me to tease out how these different control 
mechanisms or structural economies have related historically in South Africa.  This process 
has been under way at least since the turn of the twentieth century and with greater 
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prominence when an internal resistance to apartheid in South Africa rose in prominence from 
the early 1970s. 
 
Permeating the coordination structures and the control mechanisms, which ignite the 
momentum and action in coordination and specifically the coordination in the supply of 
enterprise skill formation, which this thesis addresses, is the importance which coordination 
tools or mechanisms play in the process
65
.  The most pervasive driver to the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation is mainly embodied in the resources that can be harnessed by firms 
in the private sector economy, the state (through its mandated authority) and the community 
or non-profit sector which I often refer to as the social development economy. 
 
Firms mobilise resources for skill formation by assigning training costs to operational 
expenditure.  Resources for enterprise skill formation are also mobilised by bargaining lower 
wages for apprentices and trainees.  Collectively, firms in designated sectors and industries in 
South Africa set about putting into place rudimentary sector-based levy mechanisms.  At first 
these were financed by dual employer-employee contributions.  The generally low black 
employee wage structures in South Africa led to a discontinuation of employee contributions 
to such levy income.  Gradually, as was shown in chapter 6, sector-based levy grant 
collection mechanisms were introduced in selected industries and industrial sectors. 
 
The state facilitates the mobilisation of resources for enterprise skill formation through 
transfers for education and training as well as through tax incentive schemes.  As was shown 
in chapter 6, these schemes were often complemented by the gradual development of national 
levy training mechanisms which were perceived to be more effective.  However, the shift 
from sectoral training levy schemes to the formation of a national levy training scheme was 
not automatic or spontaneous.  Indeed, this was only instituted in South Africa in the late 
1990s. 
 
The social development sector is also able to mobilise a wide spectrum of resources which 
flow into initiatives which have an orientation to enterprise skill formation.  The spectrum 
through which such resources are galvanised extend from philanthropic allocations and 
transfers but also incorporate solidaristic and communal forms of allocation.  Examples of 
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 The terms ‘coordination tools’ and ‘coordination mechanisms’ are used interchangeably in Alexander’s 
review of the literature, but to avoid confusion, the term ‘coordination tools’ is certainly more preferable. 
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these encompass reciprocity, provisioning of gifts and assembling resources through 
sacrifice.  Trust as a principle and a practice is an important control mechanism which 
structures the contours of the social development economy.  Typically, interventions to 
enhance the skill formation repertoire of groups in the social development sector have been 
initiated by outsiders.  Contributions from such quarters have been an important resource to 
the skill formation process in South Africa.  The purpose of my commentary here however 
has merely been to give a broad theoretical overview which enterprises, the state and 
professionals have played over a significant historical period to facilitate enterprise skill 
formation and the coordination of its supply in South Africa.  These early efforts have been 
magnified in different ways and have been extended into various forms in the contemporary 
period as well.  This was demonstrated in the empirical chapters to this thesis. 
 
8.3 Empirical Findings 
In this section, a consolidated but synoptic overview is presented of the empirical findings to 
the thesis.  It is important however to reiterate the object which this thesis from the start set 
out to undertake.  This was to understand the process to the formation of enterprise skills in 
South Africa. 
 
The question that was posed to address this objective was to understand what were the 
institutional mechanisms to the coordination of enterprise level training in South Africa and 
how it had changed over the period that the investigation was framed.  Constant reiteration 
was given to the fact that the coordination of enterprise level training in South Africa or as I 
expressed it more formally, the coordination of enterprise skills formation, was sustained 
principally by research evidence which largely dealt with the coordination of the supply of 
enterprise skills formation.  Importantly, a significant dimension of the spotlight to this 
process was on the enterprise as an organ or institution of economic production and 
reproduction.  In this respect, the broader linkages between the enterprise or enterprises as a 
collective set of market institutions that had economic linkages with other types of 
institutions particularly with the state and society in general, was always important.  Because 
the object of enquiry was to comprehend the change that occurred to the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation, the massive time-frame which the thesis covered meant that there 
would be a significant narrative dimension to the study.  This was absolutely necessary to 
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account for the shifts in the episodes and systems in the coordination of enterprise skill 
formation in South Africa. 
 
A more difficult evaluative question underpins the thesis.  Here I of course posed the question 
whether the coordination of enterprise skill formation is likely to result in what was or is 
intended.  I have addressed this question in a more discursive manner.  It is quite difficult to 
demonstrate clear intended actions that have directed and shaped the formation of enterprise 
level skills in South Africa.  The process of coordinating these intentions in the formation of 
enterprise level skills inadvertently bring to the fore the process of coordination. 
 
Coordination melds together multiple actions: intended actions, contingent actions that come 
about when intended actions fail to materialise as well as a wide spectrum of calculative 
actions that germinate from the process.  Contingent actions may be perceived as ‘second-
best’ options taken to achieve the integrity of the intended actions.  Thus, these may embody 
a similar intention but a different outcome.  Calculative actions too may be rooted in a 
diversity of intentions.  Some of these calculative actions may indeed be strategically well 
intentioned and designed to uphold the nobleness of the original intended action.  On the 
contrary, other calculative actions may not be induced by a nobility of purpose but may in 
fact be motivated by inducements of opportunism and advantage which can be gained from 
cunning and reason. 
 
It is for this reason that the opinions derived from informed sources to social research are 
typically post-factum rationalizations which largely ameliorates blatant errors of the subjects 
bearing witness.  Ostensibly, many such subjects may feel to be under scrutiny in research 
investigations.  For instance, the stasis and virtual suspension in apprenticeship enrolments in 
traditional manufacturing trades which occurred after 2000 when the new vaunted skills 
revolution of the post-apartheid government was under construction in South Africa (see 
Duncan, 2013 & chapter 7 of present thesis) would be cast in a more sympathetic light by 
DoL officials responsible for steering apprenticeship enrolments in particular at the 
workplace.  An objective evaluative analysis would therefore require an intricate 
understanding between intended outcomes, contingent outcomes and calculative outcomes: 
noble as well as deviant.  Ultimately this would make an objective evaluative analysis of the 




It is for this reason that the evaluation of the subjective intentionality of the actors involved in 
the process of enterprise skill formation (i.e. enterprises, the market economy, the state and 
the social development sector) has been no more than discursive.  Despite this limitation, a 
substantial body of verifiable and documentary evidence has been marshalled in the empirical 
chapters to this thesis (chapters 5 to 7) to demonstrate the process in the formation of 
enterprise coordination in South Africa, roughly, over the last one hundred years.  
Importantly, the documentary evidence traces the rudimentary institutional construction of a 
national skills development system in South Africa.  It occurred incrementally but 
consistently throughout the period of the twentieth century.  Since the mid-1990s, these 
changes to the institutional configuration of a national skills development system in South 
Africa have been quite significant. 
 
The evidence in chapter 5 shows that a vibrant discussion existed in South Africa about the 
need to improve the coordination of workplace training.  One source drawn upon for insight 
into the discussions was government Commissions of Enquiry.  These Commissions of 
Enquiry constantly emphasised the need to improve the coordination of disparate systems of 
workplace training replacing existing systems with a more uniform and standardised system 
of workplace training.  The Apprenticeship Act set into motion the initial institutional 
structure for better coordination of enterprise skill formation, mainly through provisions it 
made for the establishment of Apprenticeship Committees.  Apprenticeship Committees 
consisted of both local committees with a defined regional responsibility and national 
committees which had national coverage.  These committees were designed to address 
challenges concerning apprenticeship selection, the incidence and quality of training provided 
to apprentices within enterprises, as well as overseeing apprenticeship contracts between 
apprentices as trainees and enterprises and firms as employers and custodians of workplace 
experience and training.  In 1944 provision was made for establishment of a National 
Apprenticeship Board (NAB) which had supervisory and regulatory powers over all 
apprenticeship committees.  The NAB was also assigned with mandatory powers to advise 
the Minister of Labour on all matters related to the Apprenticeship Act. 
 
The institutional formation of apprenticeship committees and later the NAB was an attempt 
by the state to improve the regulatory and coordination oversight on firms and enterprises as 
it affected the acquisition of artisanal and other intermediary skills which enterprises were 
well placed to produce.  This level of focus and scrutiny from the state and its ancillary 
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institutions (e.g. political, legislative, administrative and investigative scrutiny respectively 
through the Ministry of Labour, parliamentary legislation, Apprenticeship Committees and 
the NAB and finally through the scrutiny of Commissions of Inquiry) prised open and 
subjected enterprises to other forms of scrutiny from non-state institutional vehicles.  Armed 
with new disciplinary knowledge practices and techniques a wide spectrum of intellectuals 
mirrored as well as initiated trends occurring elsewhere in the more advanced industrial 
centres internationally and globally in which this new knowledge was applied to improve the 
industrial and organisational management of firms and enterprises.  Thus, the skill formation 
imperatives which confronted firms and enterprises and the labour force engaged within these 
was not immune to the appropriation of such covert but more often overt forms of industrial 
management.  Ultimately, these new knowledge controlled practices had an impact on 
enterprise productivity and enterprise profitability. 
 
Gradually the state was also drawn into the orbit of these new knowledge disciplines, often 
spell-bound by the intellectuals who were at the forefront, many of whom served as advisors 
to the state on specific and critical policy in the realm of human resources development and 
industrial management.  Evidence was marshalled to bolster the pivotal role which Industrial 
Psychology – its subsequent derivatives and appendices occupied – as a central pillar of 
knowledge organisation and application in the history of enterprise and industrial 
management in South Africa.  The two world wars undoubtedly were an important catalyst 
for these developments.  More importantly, the success of the institutions that were erected as 
vehicles to carry the process forward symbolised the promise of big science which the state 
favourably embraced.  National scientific research organisations such as the CSIR with its 
plethora of sub-divisions among which was the NIPR and later the HSRC were institutional 
and organisational outcomes stemming from these state initiatives. 
 
While it is important to acknowledge the overall thrust in the formation of new institutional 
and organisational configurations which the state enthusiastically endorsed, one should also 
appreciate that such an enthusiastic uptake still necessitated prudence and frugality in contrast 
to extravagance and waste.  Thus, the good intentions of managing and coordinating a denser 
and more complex set of organisational arrangements often led to the principles of prudence 
and frugality been forgotten.  As this occurs, institutional responsiveness to new systemic and 
organisational imperatives become more difficult and the original problems which the 




This is the scenario which appears to have developed in South Africa by the early 1970s as 
strains began to be experienced in the racial division of labour within the workplace.  More 
significantly in South Africa, the contemporary social struggles while often mirroring these 
social strains in the division of labour were also fuelled by the quest for political freedom and 
emancipation from the oppressed majority.  The systemic coordination of enterprise skill 
formation in South Africa – its contemporaneous production and the trajectory of its 
reproduction – apart from modernising and reforming the apartheid project – were serious 
challenges confronting the NP regime under the leadership of Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. 
 
Because of its seminal importance in serving as a conceptual rescue mission and navigational 
tool to the reform and modernisation of the apartheid system in South Africa, including the 
important question of the coordination of enterprise skill formation, quite a detailed analysis 
was devoted to analysing the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions of Inquiry.  The findings 
from these Commissions of Inquiry provided systematic documentation of the triumphalist 
but poorly planned and coordinated system of enterprise and workplace training interventions 
which had come into existence in South Africa.  This was the situation when the findings 
from these Commissions began to be released. 
 
Quite a detailed extraction of evidence from the first two reports of the Wiehahn Commission 
in particular was documented and analysed.  In its findings to the South African government 
the Commission recommended systemic improvement to the coordination process of 
enterprise skill formation.  This was addressed on two related fronts which hindsight shows 
to have been strategically and organisationally astute.  First, there was a clear attempt to 
radically streamline policy.  The principle of streamlined policy was meant to improve the 
efficiency of its implementation. 
 
The second front around which it proposed to significantly improve coordination of 
enterprise skill formation was through rapid and radical institutional construction and 
reconfiguration.  The importance of institutional design and construction cannot be 
emphasised enough in comprehending the effectiveness of programme and project 
coordination.  This dimension or front, notwithstanding the radical break in politics and 
policy, which was to ensue with the demise of apartheid from 1990 to 1994, appears to have 
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had much greater continuity with skills development policy instituted during the 1990s and 
beyond. 
 
By putting into place an effective institutional basis for improvements in the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation, quite a detailed and expansive process was embarked to secure a 
sustainable funding and incentive system for sector and national enterprise skill formation 
which could then be institutionalised.  The Wiehahn Commission laid the basis for this and it 
was given serious consideration by the Department of Manpower which had the political 
authority to institute the findings of the Commission.  These considerations were taken up in 
a more systematic manner by the triumvirate of institutions which were drawn upon to 
strengthen the coordination of human resource development in general and the coordination 
of enterprise skills formation in particular.  These triumvirate supporting institutions included 
the: National Manpower Commission, National Training Board and Human Sciences 
Research Council.  In their subsequent explorations and investigations, sector or industry-
wide levy grant mechanisms were identified as desirable.  These were seen as a precursor to 
the construction of a national levy grant system which was seen as the final destination but 
whose implementation at the time (1986-1989) was still not feasible.  However, since these 
proposed improvements into the coordination of enterprise skill formation was still only at an 
initial discussion and planning stage, it was also seen by those in opposition to the apartheid 
regime especially in the mass democratic movement, as part of a process to reform an 
apartheid system, albeit one which was more enlightened or ‘verlig’ in orientation.  But an 
opportune moment presented by history, to even reform the skill formation system then in 
place in South Africa, was almost at an end. 
 
The political changes which started to take place in South Africa after 1990 brought the 
process to a halt.  From this moment, revisions and reconfigurations in the institutional 
landscape to the coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa would henceforth 
be under the hegemony and dictates of a new but democratic political regime.  However, 
almost reminiscent of the notion of liberated zones or dual power which activists in South 
Africa drew from the experience of Frelimo in Mozambique and from Lenin’s theorisation of 
the Russian revolution, the notion that there were alternative skill formation experiences and 
positions from that advocated by the apartheid regime was widespread.  There was 
attractiveness in such a conception and a potency with which it was implemented in South 
Africa, in however small way.  Like the village commune in Stolypin’s Russia, the social 
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development sector was a breeding ground for experiments in alterative educational and skill 
formation practices spanning NGOs, trade unions (e.g. NUMSA), universities (e.g. EPUs and 
Adult Education Departments and Centres) to educational associations and lobbies (e.g. 
NECC).  It was from these disparate groups that a more systematic programme began to be 
formulated on a new educational and training dispensation in South Africa.  Although the 
proposals which NEPI formulated on a national skills levy were quite general, it signified a 
commitment to critique the rather incremental formulations towards a national levy grant 
system which the NTB was still discussing and debating.  While the groundwork for this 
discussion by the NTB was quite thorough and systematic, the historical moment had shifted 
and new forces had entered the fray.  These new forces had a greater urgency to change the 
contours of history in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a case study of the effect of the skills development levy on the 
coordination of enterprise level training in South Africa from the mid to late 1990s until 
roughly 2013.  It shows a high degree of continuity between the commission-of-enquiry 
style-approach which had been infused into the NTB/HSRC investigations into enterprise 
skill formation, to that which followed immediately after a new democratic government was 
installed.  This was embodied especially in the NTB/NEDLAC funding mechanism research 
enquiry whose reports were released in 1997.  The findings from these reports influenced the 
1997 Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy.  The chapter then proceeds to give a 
detailed account of the formulation of a levy grant allocation mechanism in the Green Paper 
as well as the structure and operation of a national levy grant system as prescribed by 
legislation, namely the Skills Development Act and the Skills Development Levies Act.  The 
narrative which I have assembled traces the construction and implementation of a national 
skills levy in South Africa including the amendments which led to some revisions of specific 
features of this legislation.  I have also captured the shifts which are embodied in three phases 
of the NSDS and the impact which this has on the incentives that it gives firms to implement 
enterprise related training skill acquisition and skill formation initiatives.  This discussion 
furthermore examines the likely impact which the revisions and allocations to the skills 
development levy introduced under NSDS lll are likely to have on the outcome of enterprise 
training in South Africa. 
 
More importantly, evidence is presented in chapter 7 which alludes to a level of calculative 
practices which the contemporary South Africa skills development literature has largely 
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overlooked.  Using insights gleaned from Alexandre Koyre, the renowned historian of 
science, whose work was the basis of Thomas Kuhn’s formulation of paradigm shifts in 
scientific revolutions, particularly his argument that Galileo used imaginary thought 
experiments to establish propositions to advance science, I used this notion to argue that 
firms make use of out-of-pocket training expenditure to further their in-house training 
requirements.  The proposition is that firms engaged in out-of-pocket training expenditure 
irrespective of their participation in a sectoral or national levy grant system which mandates 
that their training expenditure is drawn from a funding pool from which all other firms in the 
sector or economy make a contribution.  Unfortunately, because the proposition is informed 
by a different theoretical outlook to that which informs current skills development practice, I 
encountered serious difficulties in proving my case.  I had then to resort to constructing my 
own pilot survey to collect this new data which I was convinced exists but had not yet been 
tapped.  Investigations which ask different questions in surveys are for sociologists, almost 
equivalent to the design of specific measuring instruments for physicists and other scientists 
(see Hirst, 1975: 184-185, n.30 who again emphasises this salient point in Koyre’s study of 
Galileo and other scientists of the seventeenth century). 
 
Due to the small size of my pilot sample (i.e. 43 firms), the evidence that I have assembled is 
not sufficiently categorical but it is extremely suggestive that out-of-pocket expenses is a 
category which intersects and infuses the overall training expenditure in firms.  The 
proposition is given further momentum by evidence collected by the HSRC in its National 
Skill Surveys (NSS) for 2003 and 2007.  Unfortunately the HSRC researchers associated with 
the survey and the interpretation of the evidence were not aware of this. 
 
The proposition has wider implications.  It implies that firms are gradually cultivating 
internal training expenditure and activity which falls outside the parameters of the mandated 
national levy grant system which has been operating in South Africa since 2000.  If this is 
true, further tests are required to test the proposition on a wider scale than I have been able to 
do with my small pilot survey but also to test the proposition in a more systematic way than 
the HSRC NSS.  If the evidence as I submit is correct, it means that the continuity between 
the early phases of enterprise training activity which was in place in South Africa (prior to the 
promulgation of the Apprenticeship Act but also beyond this period extending into the 1950s 
when employers surreptitiously ignored the prevailing legislation by imparting skills on black 
labour without awarding credentials of any sort), which can be characterised as a more severe 
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form of a liberal training dispensation, has in fact not been broken.  This contradicts the 
notion of the vaunted skills revolutions which Membathisi Mdladlana, Minister of Labour 
from 1999 to 2008 often boasted about.  Supposing this is true, then the thesis which Thelen 
(2004) advances of continuity over almost a century stretch in time is upheld.  But further 
evidence is desperately needed to test this proposition. 
 
8.4 The Contribution of the Thesis 
It is my contention that this thesis makes a small but distinct contribution to the 
understanding of the coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa.  It is a 
sociological and historical contribution which at the outset exploits the relative invisibility of 
the subject matter and gives it prominence and visibility.  Any reader will now recognise that 
the arcane subject of the coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa occupies a 
space that can logically be demarcated as an arena for scrutiny and investigation.  However, 
the space is not only confined to synchronic moments of our current existence.  If the 
evidence is sought, a plethora of episodes, events and processes, which exhibit traces and 
footprints of previous attempts to secure the coordination of enterprise skill formation in 
South Africa – both successfully and unsuccessfully – can be seen to have taken place.  A 
wide spectrum of practical and theoretical arguments, ideological postures, institutional 
vehicles and passionate individuals intent on making a difference, coming from diverse 
occupational backgrounds and occupying different locations in the power structure, have 
contributed to this dynamic picture.  The thesis alerts readers to the existence of this 
evidence. 
 
However, knowing that phenomena tied to enterprise skill formation exists today does not 
mean that those in the future who give attention to learning what we knew about these 
phenomena will have anything to say about what we know.  This is simply because our 
knowledge of these phenomena may be a complete jumble and a lot of chattering noise.  The 
thesis makes it possible to understand the historical process in the coordination of enterprise 
skill formation in South Africa.  This is because it undertakes an analysis of an institutional 
space over a significant period stretching over a century, which research has neglected and 
which until now appeared invisible to our contemporary eyes.  In attempting to understand 
the makeup of skill and broaden the understanding of how skill is enhanced through 
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enterprise coordination, this thesis is able to elaborate the unique institutional architecture 
which had to be constructed in the formation of a skills development system. This was 
important to ensure that the coordination of enterprise skill formation could at least show 
discernible results about its expansion. 
 
The thesis gives insight into the coordination of enterprise skill formation which occurred in 
the period of apartheid reform.  In particular, it captures the strategically important role which 
the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry made towards systematising the coordination of 
enterprise skill formation in South Africa, mainly through the introduction of an 
understanding of policy coordination and a corresponding emphasis given towards the 
promotion of its institutional design.  This was the understanding that was held about how to 
expand and promote the formation of skill at the enterprise level.  This was the case for skill 
formation in general, notwithstanding the severe deflection and retardation by the overall 
apartheid policies during the period when the Nationalist Party regime governed the country. 
 
The thesis documents the efforts to improve the coordination of enterprise skill formation by 
the policy advisors and state bureaucrats of the apartheid regime even as the overall regime 
and political system was veering towards the rocks and its ultimate destruction.  I believe that 
the thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry 
which was perhaps a timely intervention into elevating policy and institutional coordination 
in South Africa.  Ultimately, it had a massive bearing on the market economy and the 
trajectory of enterprise skill formation thereafter.   The thesis shows that even when regimes 
change and new political orders are established it does not end the necessity for continuity in 
the coordination of enterprise skill formation. 
 
The thesis gives an intricate and detailed insight into the process of building a new 
coordinated system that was intended to ensure the coordination of enterprise skill formation 
under a democratic post-apartheid political dispensation.  The analysis traces the iterative –, 
both forward and backward – steps that were treaded by policy makers and policy thinkers 
from at least the early 1990s and which extended to the contemporary period.  In the 
contemporary period, the most recent policy proposal from a government sponsored study-
team was made as recently as 2013.  This was when the Higher Education and Training 
Ministerial Task Team into SETA Funding released its report.  This thesis attempted to 
interrogate the facts and traced its pattern from its source in ideas, reports, studies, statistics 
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or whatever pronouncements have entered the policy landscape and terrain of its 
investigation.  The thesis is designed to make a small contribution to the understanding of the 
coordination of enterprise skill formation in South Africa. 
 
8.5 Limitations and Possible Further Research 
I am quite aware that sociologists who work from a more interpretative and subjective 
orientation will be critical of the manner in which I have treated my application of participant 
observation research.  It may be construed as scanty and denuded especially since I have not 
captured the views of the actual and real participants in the process of trying to understand 
the construction, structure and operation of the levy grant system in South Africa.  It appears 
that I have only trusted my own senses and reasoning and did not resort to capturing the 
senses of other key informants.  I unreservedly acknowledge guilt.  However, it is probably 
better to have pursued the research in the manner that I have, than to have undertaken the 
alternative route poorly.  The alternative route to understanding coordination has been 
brilliantly depicted by Donald Chisholm (1989) in his book: Coordination without Hierarchy.  
Chisholm of course was intent on understanding informal structures in multi-organizational 
systems involving the San Francisco Bay public transit system, which contributed to 
coordinated outcomes.  In executing his research project, Chisholm consciously set out to use 
in-depth interviews and observation as a participant attached to the system where he worked, 
in different capacities, but mainly as a researcher.  I did not have the skill or inclination to be 
embedded in this manner for a significant duration in institutions and organisation of the 
South African skills formation system.  I leave this mission to future students of the discipline 
of the sociology of education and training. 
 
Despite my own methodological weakness in comparison to Donald Chisholm, I still believe 
that there are significant themes which this thesis highlights that can be taken further.  One of 
course is the important issue of work and education as it is mediated through the enterprise.  
Such work ought to give more systematic attention to enterprises as coordinating mechanisms 
and delivery infrastructures to programmes which government mandates.  Such mandated 
programmes often embody the implicit assumption that enterprises are institutions without 
any agency.  Nor are they seen as arenas in which specific agency orientations are cultivated 
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(see Hirst, 1981).  Informing our understanding of this crucial dimension is therefore 
thoroughly important and a worthwhile scholarly endeavour. 
 
Linked to the above, is the notion of calculative practices (see Cutler, et.al. 1977 & 1978; 
Miller, 2006 & 2008).  The discourses in South African academic sociology have simply not 
given the phenomenon of calculative practices much attention.  Thus, the understanding of 
enterprises appears to be wholly around profit-maximising behaviour.  It reinforces a narrow 
economistic and accounting conception of enterprises.  Unfortunately this prevents the 
understanding of wider conceptions and dynamics of enterprise behaviour in South Africa 
particularly in so far as it involves: corporate social responsibility, broader dimensions of the 
social wage (e.g. company pension schemes, share-ownership schemes etc.) and democratic 
practices which can possibly sustain such initiatives by giving it institutional longevity. 
 
There is a space one can also use to test the notion of varieties of foreign skill formation 
systems that are associated with foreign multi-national and trans-national firms which operate 
in South Africa.  Are these varieties of company skill formation practices different from the 
national South African variety?  Are some varieties better or worse?  There is merit in 
knowing this.  More important, because of their more critical and conceptual meta-theoretical 
grounding in which they are embedded, it will be ideal if students of sociology can spearhead 
the process 
 
8.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This thesis shows that the process to the coordination in the formation of enterprise skill 
formation occurred in many different guises throughout the industrial history of modern 
South Africa.  This includes both the Segregationist and Apartheid periods as well as the 
democratic period which followed after 1994. 
 
Evidence for the more recent period drawn from National Skills Surveys is however 
marshalled which suggests that while there has been a gigantic increase in the extension of 
the new training dispensation to incorporate large numbers of individuals who would 
formerly have been excluded from the system, there is also a tendency for the liberal training 
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dispensation which the existing literature does not explicitly convey to continue defining the 
character of the skill formation system in South Africa. 
 
This is shown in the uptake and high incidence of enterprise training expenditure which falls 
outside the compliance requirements of the skills levy as it currently exists.  While this 
money is either a product of the profit, operating expenditure or reserves of firms and 
enterprises, I have referred to it as the ‘out-of-pocket’ training expenditure which firms incur. 
More importantly, because the initial evidence appears to suggest that out-of-pocket training 
expenditure is associated with a high incidence of training expenditure which would typically 
characterise firms and enterprises under a liberal training and skill formation dispensation, 
the enterprise survey data from the HSRC which I have correlated with data from a pilot 
survey that I conducted in 2015, is pointing to a trend in the evolution of a training system 
which mimics a liberal market training dispensation.  This is associated with the perpetuation 
of short training courses which respond more directly to the needs of the enterprise. 
 
The fact too that a liberal training dispensation which was nurtured as a modality by 
enterprises and firms even before the abolition of apartheid, suggests that there is a high 
resilience to the elimination of liberal market training systems within firms and enterprises.  
This applies notwithstanding their participation in training systems where mandated 
frameworks or solidarity frameworks are temporarily or intermittently elevated.  Thus, 
enterprises and firms which structurally and inherently are committed to a framework of 
mutual adjustment, where price and market participation has greater influence in shaping the 
action and direction of its training and skill formation obligations, has a stronger propensity 
towards replicating this framework.  A framework of mutual adjustment is in fact a bastion to 
a liberal training dispensation.  This does not necessarily mean an association with a low skill 
training system as it has evolved under racially discriminatory conditions, in South Africa.  A 
liberal dispensation is capable of overcoming such a system but yet will still be inclined 
towards embracing voluntarist and pluralist training practices.  These of course can be 
discarded when appropriate. 
 
It essentially means that the liberal training dispensation which the literature on the South 
African skill formation system is usually averse to discussing is actually more pervasive and 
entrenched.  This is especially the case under an open and relatively democratic training 
system, which currently exists in South Africa.  Here liberal attributes and characteristics of 
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training practice within firms and enterprises do not receive attention and rigorous scrutiny 
from outside.  In contrast, a mandated training framework has the tendency to favour the 
provision of training that takes a particular format (e.g. formal skill training programmes in 
contrast to informal training programmes) and which leads to specific outcomes (e.g. a 
preference for formal qualifications).  Liberal training through frameworks of mutual 
adjustment will favour forms and training outcomes which have more flexibility and cater for 
the immediate production and operational needs of the enterprise. 
 
Firms that uphold liberal training practices by adhering to a framework of mutual adjustment, 
which entrenches a liberal training dispensation, can also exercise significant power to 
modify training systems which contain non-liberal features, which they do not approve.  Such 
non-approved, non-liberal features can in fact be drawn from training systems that contain 
either a framework of solidarity, or a mandated framework.  The current levy-grant system 
and the intermittent proposals which emanate from the Department of Higher Education and 
Training, to adjust and strengthen it, are examples of a mandated framework. 
 
Thus, the ability of firms and enterprises to modify either solidarity or mandated frameworks, 
in favour of liberal or mutual adjustment frameworks, can be done either by withdrawing 
participation in the non-approved training system and concentrating the resources that would 
be used by participating in a system of training that more directly meet their own training 
needs.  The incidence of out-of-pocket training expenditure appears to suggest this pattern. 
 
Moreover, such firms and enterprises can participate surreptitiously to undermine a mandated 
framework which they do not approve.  Firms in fact chose this route when they embarked on 
job fragmentation and job dilution in the 1950s in South Africa.  There may in fact also be 
other ways in which firms can exercise mutually adjusted frameworks and practices which 
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Appendix 1: National Skills Development 
Strategy (l): April 2001 to March 2005 
Objectives Success Indicators 
Objective 1 
Developing a culture of high quality life-long 
learning 
1.1: By March 2005, 70 percent of workers 
have at least a Level One qualification on 
the National Qualifications Framework. 
1.2: By March 2005, a minimum of 15 per 
cent of workers to have embarked on a 
structured learning programme, of whom at 
least 50 per cent have completed their 
programme satisfactorily. 
1.3: By March 2005, an average of 20 
enterprises per sector (to include large, 
medium and small firms), and at least five 
national government departments, to be 
committed to, or have achieved, an agreed 
national standard for enterprise-based, 
people development. 
Objective 2 
Fostering skills development in the formal 
economy for productivity and employment 
growth 
2.1: By March 2005, 75 per cent of 
enterprises with more than 150 workers are 
receiving skills development grants and the 
contributions towards productivity and 
employer and employee benefits are 
measured. 
2.2: By March 2005, at least 40 per cent of 
enterprises employing between 50 and 150 
workers are receiving skills development 
grants, and the contributions towards 
productivity and employer and employee 
benefits are measured. 
2.3: By March 2005, learnerships are 
available to workers in every sector 
(Precise targets will be agreed with each 
Sector Education and Training Authority). 
2.4: By March 2005, all government 
departments assess and report on budgeted 
expenditure for skills development relevant 
to Public Service, Sector and Departmental 
priorities. 
Objective 3 
Stimulating and supporting skills development 
in small businesses 
3.1: By March 2005, at least 20 per cent of 
new and existing registered small 
businesses to be supported in skills 
development initiatives and the impact of 
such support to be measured. 
Objective 4 
Promoting skills development for 
employability and sustainable livelihoods 
4.1: By March 2003, 100 per cent of the 
National Skills Fund apportionment to 
social development is spent on viable 
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through social development initiatives development projects. 
4.2: By March 2005, the impact of the 
National Skills Fund is measured by project 
type and duration, including details of 
placement rates which shall be at least 70 
per cent. 
Objective 5 
Assisting new entrants into employment 
5.1: By March 2005, a minimum of 80,000 
people under the age of 30 have entered 
learnerships 
5.2: By March 2005, a minimum of 50 per 
cent of those who have completed 
learnerships are within six months of 
completion, employed (e.g. have a job or 
are self-employed); in full-time study or 







Appendix 2: National Skills Development 
Strategy (ll): 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2010 








Success Indicator 1.1 
Skills development supports 
national and sectoral growth, 
development and equity priorities. 
Lever 1.1 
 Sector Education and Training 
Authorities (SETAs) use their 
discretionary funds to identify 
critical skills in the sector 
using guidelines prepared by 
the Department of Labour and 
the National Skills Authority 
(NSA). 
 
 Critical skills needed, at entry, 
intermediate and advanced 
levels, are aligned and agreed 
with growth, development and 
equity strategy drivers and 
skills development bodies at 
national level within agreed 
timeframes. 
 
 Success Indicator 1.2 
Information on critical skills is 
widely available to learners. 
Impact of information 
dissemination researched, 
measured and communicated in 
terms of rising entry, completion 
and placement of learners. 
Lever 1.2 
 Department of Labour 
consolidates SETA inputs and 
national/generic priorities and 
prepares a national guide on 
occupational/employment 
trends, periodically updated as 
agreed. 
 
 Relevant stakeholders ensure 
that information is utilised and 
report back to Department of 
Labour. 
 
 The National Skills Fund’s 
(NSF) Critical Skills Support 
Funding Window will fund the 
guide and the training of career 
guidance counsellors in the use 
of this information. 
 
 SETAs will use Discretionary 
Funds to fund the development 
of guides and the training of 
sector specialists or (SDFs) in 
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training for all in 
the workplace 
Success Indicator 2.1 
By March 2010 at least 80% of 
large firms’ and at least 60% of 
medium firms’ employment 
equity targets are supported by 
skills development.  Impact on 
overall profile assessed. 
Lever 2.1 
 All Workplace Skills Plans 
(WSPs) to be submitted no 
later than 30 September for 
2005 and thereafter 30 June 
each year.  Newly registered 
skills levy-payers submit 
WSPs within 6-months from 
establishment. 
 
 WSP to be judged against three 
criteria in 2005: (1) Timeframe 
(submitted in time) and (2) 
WSP meets EE + BBBEE and 
charter compliance criteria. (3) 
Stakeholder signoff. 
 
 From 2006 onwards the WSP 
will be judged by an additional 
criterion, i.e. a report on the 
performance against the 
previoius year’s WSP. 
 
 If the WSP successfully meets 
set criteria then full 50% grant 
paid in quarterly tranches. 
 
 Firms failing to meet the set 
criteria will automatically 
forfeit the WSP grant for the 
given financial year.  Forfeited 
grants will be transferred 
directly into SETA 
discretionary funds. 
 
 Success Indicator 2.2 
By March 2010 skills 
development in at least 40% of 
small levy paying firms supported 
and the impact of the support 
measured. 
Lever 2.2 
 The SETA determines the best 
form of intervention and grant, 
such as WSP grants or the 
provision of free courses.  40% 
of total population of small 
firms in sector to be reached by 
such initiatives is the target.  
SETAs to spend at least 80% 
of the total levy income from 
small firms on the achievement 




 Success Indicator .2.3 
By March 2010 at least 80% of 
government departments spend at 
least 1% of personnel budget on 
training and impact of training on 




 Government budgetary process 
used to ensure that national 
and provincial departments 
spend at least 1% of personnel 
budget on training. 
 Success Indicator 2.4 
By March 2010, at least 500 
enterprises achieve a national 
standard of good practice in skills 
development approved by the 
Minister of Labour. 
Lever 2.4 
 Firms achieving a national 
standard of good practice in 
skills development approved 
by the Minister will 
automatically get 50% of levy 
paid and for period standard is 
maintained.  SETAs will 
secure agreement on 
information required from each 
firm based on regulation. 
 Success Indicator 2.5 
Annually increasing number of 
small BEE firms and BEE co-
operatives supported by skills 
development.  Progress measured 
through an annual survey of BEE 
firms and BEE co-operatives 
within the sector from the second 
year onwards.  Impact of support 
measured. 
Lever 2.5 
 SETA discretionary BEE 
grants. 
 Success Indicator 2.6 
From April 2005 to March 2010 
there is an annually increasing 
number of people who benefit 
from incentivised training for 
employment or re-employment in 
new investments and expansion 
initiatives.  Training equity 
targets achieved.  Of number 
trained, 100% to be South African 
citizens. 
Lever 2.6 
 NSF – Industry Support 
Programme grants.  The 
Department of Labour must 
provide an annual report on 
progress made in respect of 
employment or re-employment 
generated, linked to new 
investment initiatives and 
expansions. 
 Success Indicator 2.7 
By March 2010 at least 700 000 
workers have achieved at least 
ABET level 4. 
Lever 2.7 
SETAs use discretionary funds and 
may with the agreement of their 
Boards include the provision of 
ABET as a criteria for the release 
of WSP grants.  Total sum of all 
SETA targets to be at least 
700 000 workers. 
 Success Indicator 2.8 Success Lever 2.8 
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By March 2010, at least 125 000 
workers assisted to enter and at 
least 50% successfully complete 
programmes, including 
learnerships and apprenticeships, 
leading to basic entry, 
intermediate and high level scarce 
skills.  Impact of assistance 
measured. 
SETA discretionary grants to 
include 18(1) grants for 
learnerships, bursary grants, 
internship grants and study support 
to learners acquiring basic entry, 
intermediate and high level scarce 








Success Indicator 3.1 
By March 2010, at least 450 000 
unemployed people are trained.  
This training should 
incrementally be quality assured 
and by March 2010 no less than 
25% of the people trained 
undergo accredited training.  Of 
those trained at least 70% should 
be placed in employment, self-
employment or social 
development programmes 
including (EPWP), or should be 
engaged in further studies.  
Placement categories each to be 
defined, measured, reported and 
sustainability assessed. 
Lever 3.1 
 NSF Social Development 
Initiatives Funding Window 
including EPWP grants. 
 Success Indicator 3.2 
By March 2010, at least 2000 
non-levy paying enterprises, Non-
governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs), and 
community-based co-operatives 
supported by skills development.  
Impact of support on 
sustainability measured with 
targeted 75% success rate. 
Lever 3.2 
 20% SETA discretionary funds 
and 80% NSF Informal Sector 
Support Funding Window. 
 Success Indicator 3.3 
By March 2010, at least 100 000 
unemployed people have 
participated in ABET level 
programmes of which at least 
70% have achieved ABET level 
4. 
Lever 3.3 
 NSF ABET funding window to 
top up Department of 
Education (DoE) funding of 
Adult Learning Centres and 
funding to other public 
providers, as well as private 






Success Indicator 4.1 
By March 2010 at least 125 000 
unemployed people assisted to 
enter and at least 50% 
Lever 4.1 
 SETA discretionary grants to 
include 18(2) grants for 










skills to enter the 




learnerships and apprenticeships, 
leading to basic entry, 
intermediate and high level scarce 
skills.  Impact of assistance 
measured. 
internship grants and study 
support to learners acquiring 
basic entry, intermediate and 
high level scarce skills 
identified as scarce in their 
sectors.  The NSF Critical 
Skills Support Funding 
Window provides top-up 
funding. 
 Success Indicator 4.2 
100% of learners in critical skills 
programmes covered by sector 
agreements from Further 
Education and Training (FET) 
and Higher Education and 
Training (HET) institutions 
assisted to gain work experience 
locally or abroad, of whom at 
least 70% find placement in 
employment or self-employment. 
Lever 4.2 
 SETA provides Work 
Experience Grants, as per 
agreement, to levy paying and 
non-levy paying employers in 
their sector that will provide 
work experience opportunities 
to students/graduates in sector-
relevant programmes. 
 Success Indicator 4.3 
By March 2010, at least 10 000 
young people trained and 
mentored to form sustainable new 
ventures and at least 70% of new 
ventures in operation 12 months 
after completion of programme. 
Lever 4.3 
 SETA Discretionary New 
Venture Creation grants plus 
NSF Informal Sector Support 






Success Indicator 5.1 
By March each SETA recognises 
and supports at least five 
Institutes of Sectoral or 
Occupational Excellence (ISOE) 
within public or private 
institutions and through Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) where 
appropriate, spread as widely as 
possible geographically for the 
development of people to attain 
critical occupational skills, whose 
excellence is measured in the 
number of learners successfully 
placed in the sector and employer 
satisfaction rating of their 
training. 
Lever 5.1 
 SETA Institute of Sectoral or 
Occupational Excellence 
Grant. This Grant to cover any 
or all of the following – and 
may be used to upgrade a 
facility in order that it can 





- Curriculum and materials 
development 
- Learner support initiatives 
- Upgrading of satellite 
institutions (e.g. emerging 
providers in partnership 
with excellence institution) 
- Other – by mutual 
agreement 
 Success Indicator 5.2 Lever 5.2 
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By March 2010, each province 
has at least two provider 
institutions accredited to manage 
the delivery of the new venture 
creation qualification. 70% of 
new ventures still operating after 
12 months will be used as a 
measure of the institutions’ 
success. 
 SETA discretionary grants plus 
National Skills Fund New 
Venture Creation Delivery 
Grant from the Informal Sector 
Support Funding Window. 
 Success Indicator 5.3 
By March 2010 there are 
measurable improvements in the 
quality of the services delivered 
by skills development institutions 
and those institutions responsible 
for the implementation of the 
National Qualifications 
Framework (NQF) in support of 
the NSDS 
Lever 5.3 
 SETA discretionary grants and 
specific NSF grants from the 
Provisioning Support Funding 
Window approved after advice 
by the NSA 
 Success Indicator 5.4 
By March 2010, there is an NSA 
constitutency based assessment of 
an improvement in stakeholder 
capacity and commitment to the 
National Skills Development 
Strategy 
Lever 5.4 
 SETA discretionary funds and 
NSF Constituency Capacity 
Building and Advocacy 
Funding Window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
